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It is a great pleasure to introduce for the public the results of the 2005–06 China 
International Crime against Business Survey (China ICBS) conducted by the 
team of ANU professors and researchers in Hong Kong.
The general aim of the China ICBS is to enhance our understanding of the 
extent and nature of crimes against business, and their impact on business and 
confidence in China. As the first large-scale survey of crimes against business 
undertaken in Chinese cities, the China ICBS shows that it is possible to obtain 
useful data about crime risks, prevention practices and reactions of business 
enterprises through empirical studies such as fieldwork, surveys, questionnaires, 
and so on. It also makes possible valid comparisons of the prevalence of crimes 
against business in Chinese cities (Hong Kong, Shenzhen, Shanghai and X’ian) 
with others cities similarly surveyed in both emerging economies and developed 
countries.
China’s economic growth since 1978 is no doubt a miracle both at the domestic 
and the global level. At the same time, crime (common crimes and economic 
crimes including crimes against business) is also soaring. It is a fascinating 
terrain for criminologists to verify classical theories, to explore the reason for 
this phenomenon and possibly to find new explanations.
A privilege once reserved for state power or enterprises in command economies, 
doing business is becoming fashionable for everybody in China today, and 
the so-called ‘socialist market economy’ has been established. But China is 
still developing its market economy and problems such as distinctions (or 
discrimination) in status between public and private market actors and conflicts 
between state monopolies and marketisation still exist in China. The policy of 
opening and reforming has triggered profound changes in the economic system 
of China today, while economic changes in turn bring up new situations and 
changes in the social interest structure, class status, culture, mentality, human 
behaviour and governmental functions. This social transformation aggravates the 
phenomenon of institutional shortage. In this context of economic development 
and social change, business enterprises suffer (as victims) from the differences 
in status, in policy and in the competitive environment between the public 
and private sectors, and from bureaucracy and monopolies, but, at the same 
1 Lu Jianping is Professor of Law, PhD, Vice-President of the Chinese Society of Criminology, 
a member of the Board of Directors of the International Society of Criminology, and Vice-Dean of the 
College for Criminal Law Science, Beijing Normal University, China.
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time, they are more inclined towards using bribery and organised crime. Crimes 
against business in China today reflect not only prominent features of a society 
in transformation, but also conflicts of interest between public and private, 
freedom and control, market and government, and civil society and state power.
This book is of great value not only to experts in criminal justice, criminology 
and sociology who are willing to increase their knowledge about China’s 
economic development, social transformation, crime control and rule of law, but 
also to businesspeople who just want to do business in or with China. 
ix
Preface
This book reports the results of the first large-scale survey of crimes against 
business in China. We believe that the survey provides vital benchmark estimates 
of the risks and costs of crime for businesses operating in various economic 
sectors in China. These costs are worth monitoring and the survey can play a 
role in the development of both private and public policy responses, as well as 
crime prevention. As the first comprehensive attempt to measure the risks of not 
only common crimes such as robbery and fraud but also newly emergent crimes 
such as cyber crime, credit card fraud and intellectual property theft, our work 
will, we hope, encourage further investigations based on the same broad victim-
centred methods described here. Our view is that despite the usual difficulties 
of obtaining the cooperation of business leaders and their reluctance to engage 
with researchers on such a sensitive topic, large-scale independent prevalence 
surveys of crimes against business are effective in identifying risks, including 
those involving bribery and organised crime. They also have much to offer in 
assisting businesses in the reduction of both the direct and the indirect harms 
that flow from crime. Such surveys provide public police and private security 
with an understanding of the nature and impact of crime on business—an 
impact that ultimately falls adversely on everyday consumers. 
The data collection for the study we report in this monograph was completed in 
May 2007. Although some years have elapsed, preliminary results were reported 
at the twentieth annual conference of the Australian and New Zealand Society 
of Criminology in Adelaide, 24–27 September 2007, and selected final results at 
the sixteenth Congress of the International Society of Criminology conference in 
Kobe, Japan, 5–9 August 2011. Even allowing for the considerable time needed 
to clean and check raw data, conduct analysis and re-check data and results, we 
have taken longer to finalise the work than intended. In part, this delay arose 
from the usual time pressures upon the research team amplified by changes in 
post and location, illness, as well as the additional complexities of working across 
different locations. Yet this research had its genesis even further back, when in 
2003 a small grant from the University of Hong Kong with further support from 
that university’s Centre for Criminology enabled us to conduct a small pilot 
survey of crime against businesses in Hong Kong and also in Shenzhen. The 
pilot was undertaken in July–August 2003 by the survey team of the Social 
Science Research Centre at the University of Hong Kong and reported by the first 
author at the Societies of Criminology first Key Issues Conference, held in Paris 
on 13–15 May 2004. With the feasibility of the research ensured, the principal 
investigators (Roderic Broadhurst and John Bacon-Shone) in conjunction with 
the Institute of Crime Prevention, Ministry of Justice of the People’s Republic 
of China (then under the direction of Professor Guo J. H.), were able to secure 
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competitive funding from the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (7204/04H) in 2005 to conduct the survey in four key 
cities in China. We are grateful to the Research Council for their support and 
assistance, especially for extending the time to complete the research. 
The survey adapted the relatively untried UN protocol for measuring crimes 
against business provided by Dr Anna Alvazzi del Frate, then at the UN Office 
of Drugs and Crime (UNODC). In 2004, Dr Alvazzi del Frate was in the process of 
completing the analysis of an earlier version of this survey conducted in Eastern 
Europe in 2000 and she gave us invaluable assistance and advice. We draw on 
the results of that and other similar surveys of crimes against business in the 
pages that follow.
Given the scale of the project and the numerous challenges encountered in 
collection and analysis, we owe many debts for the support we have received 
from the funding committees, our respective universities and the work of our 
survey teams based at the Social Sciences Research Centre. We also note the 
support of the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence in Policing and 
Security and its Australian National University (ANU) node for their support, 
without which the final product would have been much less comprehensive. 
Such support enabled Brigitte Bouhours to assist the project at a crucial time, 
and she was instrumental in helping to bring the work to its conclusion. Thierry 
Bouhours became engaged with the project in 2008 and again in the later stages, 
notably in the final analysis and our interpretations of the results.
Among those who have helped this project, in particular, we thank Lee Kingwa 
who was the initial research officer and was responsible for oversight of the 
data collection. Lennon Chang Yaochung, our colleague at the ANU, was also 
a wonderful aid who, in addition to his comments on an early draft of the 
manuscript, provided much-needed assistance with finding as well as translating 
otherwise invisible references and web sites. We gratefully acknowledge the 
help of Zhong Yueying and Aris Chan for the translation from the English to 
the Chinese (both Cantonese and Mandarin) versions of the interview protocol 
and subsequent modifications after the pilot survey. We thank Eduardo Ramirez 
and Nishank Motwani from the ANU who, in the final stages of producing this 
monograph, helped us put together the references and appendices.
At various times we also benefited from the help of colleagues T. Wing Lo, 
Susan Trevaskes and Børge Bakken on specific matters. We also acknowledge 
the generous support and interest of our colleagues at the ANU, especially 
John Braithwaite and Peter Grabosky, who encouraged us to produce a book-
length version of this research. Their encouragement along with the interest and 
support of Craig Reynolds, of the ANU E Press Editorial Board (Asian Studies), 
were important parts of the drive to complete this book. We acknowledge the 
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kind interest of Margaret Thornton, also of the ANU E Press (Law), who gave 
the idea the attention and support needed to bring the work to fruition. Finally, 
we thank the reviewers whose thoughtful comments and suggestions we readily 
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Introduction
Commercial activity entails many risks with the potential to ‘shrink’ profit 
margins. Losses arising from wastage, damage, fraud and theft are an integral 
part of the cost of doing business. Crime is a ubiquitous factor in commercial 
life, a ‘cost’ to avoid, minimise and manage. Losses from theft and fraud can 
sometimes be fatal to business survival, but usually losses are absorbed or 
passed on to clients or consumers. Drawing on the experiences of more than 
5000 businesses, the research reported here seeks to understand the scale and 
impact of crime on business in the People’s Republic of China, exploring both 
conventional or common ‘street’ crimes, such as burglary, robbery and theft, and 
crimes that specifically target business such as fraud, counterfeiting, bribery 
and extortion. We estimate that in the year of the survey, our sample of 5117 
businesses suffered a total annual loss to crime of US$20.35 million, most of which 
was due to fraud by either employees (US$7.45 million) or outsiders (US$7.56 
million). We were able to extrapolate these losses to all Hong Kong companies 
and estimate that annual losses reached approximately US$1.52 billion in 2004; 
however, data about the size and nature of the population of businesses in the 
mainland cities of Shanghai, Shenzhen and Xi’an are insufficient to determine 
the representativeness of our sample. At best, we offer a ‘guesstimate’, based on 
untested assumptions, that suggests that about US$4.9 billion is lost to crime 
annually in these three mainland cities.
A vast literature addresses street crime and the social impact of crime but much 
less has been written about crimes against business. Apart from interest in 
‘white-collar’ and corporate crime and crime perpetrated by business against 
employees, customers or society in general, little is known about business 
as a victim of crime. The relationship between crime in the broader society 
and crime against business is a matter little explored. The available evidence 
suggests that businesses are at much higher risks of theft than households or 
individuals and their losses can have a significant impact on investment and 
growth. Crimes such as robbery, theft, fraud, extortion, bribery and criminal 
damage form a significant cost impost in certain high-risk business activities. 
Significant financial and psychological costs are reported for small business, and 
crime victimisation is not randomly distributed (Gill 1998; Shury et al. 2005; 
Taylor and Mayhew 2002; van Dijk and Terlouw 1996). Crime can also damage 
brand reputation, the value of shares, staff morale and companies’ standing 
with government regulators and police. In addition, a real or even a perceived 
high rate of crime can have unwanted consequences and incur additional costs 
for individual behaviour (risk avoidance), business investment, the price of 
products, tax revenues and tourism.
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Like ordinary citizens, businesses rely in part on the public police to protect 
their property and activities from crime. They might even seek to influence the 
role and deployment of public police, who are key actors in crime prevention 
and crime detection. Unlike street crime or public-order offences, however, to 
which state or public police are normally expected to respond, some crimes 
against business might attract little interest from public police (for example, 
copyright violations, shop theft). Police resource and capacity limitations 
might also result in inadequate support for businesses that are victims of crime. 
Major fraud cases often require specialist expertise and often involve complex 
deception that could easily overwhelm the available law-enforcement expertise. 
The costs of crime and its prevention represent a considerable burden on state 
revenues, and police, like other public services, are subject to rationing. In 
these circumstances, some of the burden of policing will increasingly need to be 
shared with community and business ‘partners’ (see Ayling et al. 2009). 
As a consequence, and given that the risks of crime are seen as a normal feature 
of commercial activity, businesses have adopted countermeasures—often at the 
industry/sector level—to minimise exposure to crime. They typically respond 
to the risks of crime by improving their internal controls over loss mitigation, 
applying external or internal auditing schemes, training staff and providing 
company governance and ethics guidelines, rotating personnel and duties and 
participating in crime-prevention initiatives. Investment in private security 
services and in risk mitigation is widely practised by large businesses, but 
smaller ones tend to rely more on public police and some forms of collective 
protective security practices, such as the hiring of security guards or the 
installation of CCTV for common areas and activities. This tradition of self-
help, however, has limits, and businesses, like other institutions and activities, 
are part of society, and societies can experience wide fluctuations in the rate 
of crime. Indeed the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has experienced, in the 
language of its security officials, several crime ‘waves’ and ‘high tides’ of crime 
since 1949 (Dutton 1997) and recognises that it is currently going through a 
wave of economic crime that is yet to peak (Jiang 2004; Lu 2011). The extent and 
nature of crime will, therefore, have a bearing on how businesses cope with its 
consequences, but social forces beyond the control of business and governments 
will play a significant role in the actual risk to business.
Perspectives on Crime
The character and extent of crime in a particular time and place are often treated 
as proxy measures of a society’s virtue and social cohesion. The frequency and 
severity of criminal events and the effectiveness of the response of the state, via 
its police and courts, are also a reflection of the quality of governance and fidelity 
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to the rule of law. Since Durkheim’s seminal analysis of the impact of rapid 
economic and cultural change on crime in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, shifts in patterns of crime have been seen as emblematic of social and 
cultural strain. Durkheim’s concept of ‘anomie’ or normlessness captures the 
uncertainty and ambiguities of social conduct and the rules of everyday life 
that arise in complex modern societies. Modernity, especially in the economic 
sphere, necessitates tolerance of difference but also creates the circumstances for 
deviance because as social integration and regulation falter, adherence to social 
rules becomes more a matter of choice than compulsion. Crime, then, is a normal 
(functional) outcome of social and economic change when social integration and 
regulation are weakened by a focus on individuality, but crime is also a focus for 
social solidarity around moral and legal rules (Durkheim 1964, 1997). 
Durkheim anticipated the impact of the cult of individualism in modern 
society and the decline of religious or moral solidarity in creating social order 
(Marks 1974; Rock 2002). In a society faced with uncertainty about its social or 
religious values, or in the case of China, with a shift from austere communism 
to a socialist market economy, social control would have to rely more on the 
state and its legal apparatus than on social conventions, gossip and traditional 
forms of social hierarchy. Merton (1968), reflecting on the rapid social and 
economic changes in American society in the 1920s and 1930s and the associated 
widespread corruption, used the concept of anomie (in his adaptation of the 
term, arising from the disconnect or strain between cultural goals of success 
and the institutional means of achieving these goals) to explain the increases in 
crime as the innovative response to inadequate opportunities in a supposedly 
merit-based, equal society. The criminal deviance of the notorious gangster of 
this period, Al Capone, was, in this sense, that of an arch innovator seeking 
out the best means to achieve the American dream of success through wealth 
(cf. Merton 1938). In Chapter 2, we examine in greater depth how theories 
of modernisation and crime fit the context of China’s economic opening and 
modernisation.
The functionalist approach to crime suggested by Durkheim, Merton and others 
provides an account of macro-level conditions conducive to crime but offers little 
guidance on the specific risks for individuals and businesses, except for broad 
policies designed to mitigate disadvantage or strain. From a crime-prevention 
perspective, routine activity theory offers a more prescriptive approach to 
criminal incidents resulting from the convergence of three factors: a motivated 
offender and his/her resources (for example, skills, contacts), attractive targets 
and the absence of capable guardians (Cohen and Felson 1979).1 Routine activity 
1 These authors and others have written extensively about routine activity theory or situational crime 
prevention, and incorporate ideas of crime prevention through environmental design (see further Clarke 1995; 
Clarke and Felson 1993; Felson 1998; Felson and Clarke 1998).
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posits both instrumental and rational decision making as key offender attributes, 
and does not rely on pathologies to explain criminal motivation, although 
individual pathologies might lead to irrational decisions. These ‘situational’ 
crime-prevention approaches do not focus on the offender but on the offence, 
and propose making potential targets of crime less attractive and strengthening 
guardianship as preferred solutions; what matters is the reduction of criminal 
opportunities rather than attempts to change offenders. Many businesses and 
industry bodies have successfully applied this approach to crime prevention, 
and the systematic adoption of such strategies in partnership with police still 
holds great promise in reducing the impact of crime on small and large business 
operations (Clarke 1995).
These perspectives on crime were developed in Western capitalist economies. 
We do not know how well they would apply in socialist nations or transitional 
economies. The abrupt transition to a market economy that followed the 
collapse of the Soviet Union has resulted in widespread lawlessness, the rapid 
expansion of organised crime groups who took over legitimate enterprises, 
and intense corruption. The rule of law was not implemented; instead the 
legal structures and state-control apparatus disintegrated and organised crime 
merged with the political leadership (see, for example, Karstedt 2003; Ledeneva 
and Kurkchiyan 2000; Sergeyev 1998; Shelley 1995a, 1995b). Shelley points out 
that ‘Russia, unlike China, tried to simultaneously create a free market and a 
democratic society. Therefore, citizens have been unable to determine whether 
their present criminalised economy is a result of the difficulties encountered 
in creating capitalism or forming democratic institutions’ (Shelley 1995b:245). 
The International Crime against Business Survey (ICBS) is able to shed light on 
some of the consequences of the Chinese transition from a command to a market 
economy and its opening to Western markets. Throughout the book, we present 
comparisons between the results of the China ICBS and that of a similar survey 
conducted in Eastern Europe in the post-Soviet period (Alvazzi del Frate 2004).
Economic Transformation and Crime
China’s ‘open-door’ policy was instigated under the premiership of Deng 
Xiaoping in the late 1970s as the principal means of modernising China after 
the destructive impact of the ‘Great Leap Forward’ and the Cultural Revolution. 
Deng’s vision was that if China’s socialist modernisation was to succeed it had to 
engage the latent entrepreneurship and productivity of the people with the idea 
that ‘poverty is not socialism—to be rich is glorious’, as he famously put it in 
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his 1992 southern tour.2 Deng’s essential pragmatic approach of ‘seeking truth 
from facts’ (‘it does not matter what colour a cat is as long as it hunts mice’) and 
of assessing what works by trial and error (‘cross the river by feeling for the 
stones with your feet’) formed the basic ingredients for unleashing the economic 
potential of China.3 Discarding class struggle as the key party strategy for 
socialist modernisation to concentrate on the development of China’s productive 
forces was critical but only in the context of firm government leadership.4 Social 
disorder, including crime, was to be kept in check by political unity.
The economic renaissance of China was nevertheless guided by the ‘Four Cardinal 
Principles’ of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—namely: 1) the socialist path; 
2) the dictatorship of the proletariat (the people’s democratic dictatorship); 
3) the leadership of the Communist Party; and 4) Marxist-Leninism and Mao 
Zedong thought.5 The Twelfth National Congress in September 1982 confirmed 
the open-door policy, and Deng affirmed the classical Marxist position that 
China makes its own history, building socialism with Chinese characteristics. 
Thus began one of the great social transformations of modern history. As Golley 
and Song observe, the results were spectacular: 
Within just three decades, China has succeeded in transforming itself 
from a centrally planned closed economy into one of the world’s most 
dynamic and globally integrated market economies. The dynamics 
unleashed by Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, open-door policies and 
institutional changes have unleashed enormous entrepreneurial energy 
and propelled continuous capital accumulation, productivity gains 
and trade and income growth on a scale the world has never seen 
before. During this period, China’s total gross domestic product (GDP), 
industrial output, foreign trade and, importantly, its per capita income 
2 During the 1992 southern tour, the famous phrase ‘to be rich is glorious’ seemed to be a catchcry of the 
press (see Deng Xiaoping 1994; Zhao 1993).
3 The Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee adopted the ‘Resolution on Certain Questions 
in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China’, which condemned the 
Cultural Revolution and re-evaluated Mao’s role, affirming his contributions but acknowledging his mistakes 
in later years. The 70 per cent correct (in respect to the official view of Mao’s legacy) resolution helped unify 
the Communist Party of China and permitted an orderly transition under stable government. (See People’s 
Daily, online English version, undated and reproduced in ‘The life of Deng Xiaoping’, Chinabusinessworld.
com, viewed 5 February 2011, <www.cbw.com/asm/xpdeng/life.html>).
4 Deng’s goals for China were: first, to quadruple the 1980 gross national product (GNP) by the end of 
the century to raise the people’s standard of living; and second, on the basis of that achievement, to again 
quadruple GNP over the following 30–50 years, to reach the level of the moderately developed countries. He 
argued that China would have pointed the way for all the people of the Third World and demonstrated to 
humankind that socialism was superior to capitalism.
5 According to Deng Xiaoping, the approach was about achieving socialist modernisation: ‘to carry it out 
and make China prosperous we must, first, carry out the policies of reform and opening to the outside world, 
and we must, second, adhere to the Four Cardinal Principles, the most important of which are to uphold 
leadership by the Party and to keep to the socialist road, opposing bourgeois liberalisation and a turn to 
capitalism. These two points are interrelated’ (Deng Xiaoping 1987, cited in the Deng hagiography in People’s 
Daily online n.d.).
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increased respectively by factors of 16, 27, 124 and 12. As a result, the 
incidence and severity of poverty have declined dramatically in China. 
(Golley and Song 2010:1)6
With annual growth rates often exceeding 10 per cent per annum over the past 
30 years, China’s economy has been rapidly restructured and modernised with 
significant impact on everyday life, but has remained based on the pragmatism 
advocated by Deng and the strategy of retaining political control to ensure 
economic and social transformation. This approach was vindicated by the 
instability and eventually the failure of Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika 
that relied on a top-down approach in the Soviet Union (Evans 1997). The legacy 
of Deng’s socialist market economy has been spectacular economic growth, 
but it also encountered numerous problems such as unprofitable state-owned 
enterprises, regional imbalances and urban–rural wealth disparity. Economic 
expansion came at a cost to social cohesion, and, like many emerging/developing 
market economies, China has had to confront problems of crime and corruption. 
The liberalisation of labour mobility so critical to rapid economic growth led 
to the accelerated urbanisation of Chinese life: in the 1970s, 20 per cent of the 
population lived in towns and cities compared with 47 per cent in 2009, when 
the ‘floating population’ of urban migrant workers was estimated at 160 million 
(Cai and Wang 2010). Urbanisation was not, however, accompanied by effective 
public infrastructure development and social welfare measures. Large numbers 
of mobile peasant workers in pursuit of work in the cities quickly transformed 
into a mass of disconnected and disaffected workers, radically increasing both 
the pool of potential offenders and the opportunities for crime. 
Urbanisation is one of the major general drivers of crime, combining both 
opportunity for crime through the presence of attractive targets and the 
enhancement of anonymity and anomie (Newman 1999; Shelley 1995b). The 
impact of broad economic change on social cohesion has not escaped the 
attention of Chinese authorities, particularly the potential disorder that could 
result from millions of internal economic migrants who might transform into a 
‘dangerous class’ worthy of special policing and regulation. 
‘Although some areas and segments of society were notably better off than 
before, the re-emergence of significant inequality did little to legitimise the 
Communist Party’s founding ideals, as the Party faced increasing social unrest’ 
(People’s Daily online n.d.). Growing inequality, the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and other communist states, and the pressure for political reform within 
6 Although the massive restructuring of the economy created a new urban poor—the so-called ‘floating 
population’ of rural migrants—‘between 1981 and 2004, the fraction of China’s population consuming less 
than US$1 a day in today’s purchasing power fell from 65 per cent to 10 per cent and about half a billion 
people were lifted out of poverty’ (World Bank 2009:iii, cited in Golly and Song 2010:1). 
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China (as illustrated by the 4 June 1989 Tiananmen Square incident) ushered in 
important regulatory transformations to the political and policing arms of the 
state. The 1987 Thirteenth National Congress endorsed reforms that sought to 
separate the functions of the party and the Government, delegating powers to 
lower levels, reforming government institutions and oversight of party cadres, 
and improving grassroots consultation (for an overview of legal reforms post 
1980, see Zou 2000).
Given the contradictions between the ideal of socialism and the pragmatic 
politics of market socialism, significant cultural and ideological changes were 
needed to support economic prosperity. In short, a capitalist China could not 
modernise society in isolation and political disunity would undermine the 
prosperity engendered by economic reform. Currently, China faces a new 
transitional phase, which could pose even greater challenges as labour costs rise 
and consumption falls in response to a rapid decline in the Chinese population. 
In this context, policing as a key function of an authoritarian state might have 
limited capacity to manage threats and social differences. Golley and Song 
observe: 
[I]ncome inequality and widening regional disparities, along with 
uneven access to health services and social welfare systems, are some 
of the most undesirable outcomes associated with the rapid economic 
growth of the past. Failure to deal with these issues could pose the 
greatest threats to social stability, which in turn could become a serious 
obstacle for growth and development in the decades ahead. (Golley and 
Song 2010:5) 
China’s next transition from an export-driven economy to one that is focused 
on domestic consumption and growth might indeed highlight inequality 
within cities and between the cities and the countryside, and increase crime 
(Shaw 2006). Thus, the problem of social disorder remains a major risk in 
maintaining China’s exceptional economic growth, and could threaten China’s 
millions of businesses. Under the Government’s ‘harmonious society’ slogan, 
high expectations and demands for policing are created—often stimulated by 
an actual and/or a perceived increase in crime (Trevaskes 2010a). The close 
ideological association between crime and the problem of political stability also 
creates additional problems in the legal reform process and the modernisation 
of police (Dutton 2006). The costs of domestic public order have grown rapidly 
in China, even rivalling defence, and the legitimacy of the police will depend 
increasingly on their efforts to curb crimes such as fraud, corruption and 
organised crime (Sun et al. 2010; The Economist 2011b). From our perspective, 
therefore, the legitimacy of China’s police and courts will be crucial given the 
presence of two powerful drivers of crime: inequality and urbanisation. The 
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role public police play in producing order should be of interest to households 
and business since effective policing engenders both stability and legitimacy, 
which are cornerstones of effective crime prevention. 
Social Change, Crime and Policing 
As we remarked earlier, the Chinese Government and its public security 
apparatus have long acknowledged the impact of economic development on the 
emergence of illegitimate opportunities, including opportunities for economic 
crime. In 1989, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) Research Unit Number Five 
produced an influential assessment of crime titled The Basic Character of Crime 
in Contemporary China (see Dutton 1997). This confidential report highlighted 
the seriousness of the crime situation and the loss of the old order and control 
over a once stable population managed by the household registration system, 
work units and neighbourhood committees. It also unwittingly depicted the 
police in ‘crisis management mode’ driven to campaign-style or yanda (strike-
hard) policing (Dutton 1997:160). The report acknowledged that crime stemmed 
from social contradictions, but that these had been deepened by the commodity 
economy and the transition from an old system to a new one with more conflicts 
and ‘loopholes’ in social administration (Dutton 1997:161). It also noted the 
changes in the offenders’ demography, especially the increasing number of 
offenders from among the unemployed (‘idlers’) and the emergence of gangs. The 
imperfect nature of the legal response was recognised as well as the weaknesses 
in the ability to control and guard against crime. The rapid rise in property 
crimes, including crimes against business and state-owned enterprises, and a 
clear expectation that such crimes would continue to rise were explained in 
terms of rapid changes in values.
Many factors account for the large increase in criminal cases involving 
property, but all are closely linked to the present social and economic 
situation in China. In recent years, there has been vigorous development 
of the socialist commodity economy. The commodity economy is a 
powerful lever for improving social development, but it is also a major 
inducement to crime. With the development of a commodity economy, 
money has functioned as a ‘battering ram’, knocking down traditional 
values and concepts. As a result, there have been great changes in 
people’s ideology. The historical tradition of looking down on trade 
has disappeared. In its place has emerged a new craze for trade and 
running businesses. What many people now want is simply to make 
money. At the same time, there has been one wave after another of 
consumerism that has engulfed the country. The huge gap between the 
high consumption lust and existing buying power of the people has 
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resulted in a serious contradiction emerging. Stimulated by the above 
factors, some people who cannot fulfil their personal desires for material 
enjoyment through legal or proper means have taken the other route—
namely, getting money through criminal activity (MPS Research Unit 
Number Five, cited in Dutton 1997:165).
The situation described in the quote above illustrates a typical Mertonian7 
‘innovative adaptation’ and suggests that in the context of China’s rapid 
economic and social changes, functionalist theories of crime as a form of 
adaptation to strain enhanced by institutional anomie are relevant (Bernburg 
2002; Messner and Rosenfield 2009). Institutional or regulatory weakness occurs 
alongside Mertonian anomie when the ‘rules of the game’ are unclear, such as 
in a transitional economy or a colonial order of dubious legitimacy. In these 
circumstances, a permissive environment for crime emerges, exacerbated by the 
limited capabilities of police and other forces of law and order (capable guardians 
in routine activity theory). As a consequence, China’s policing agencies have 
embarked on an extensive process of modernisation and adaptation to the new 
social problems presented by the unremitting economic transformations that 
followed Deng Xiaoping’s open-door policies. In Chapter 2, we outline some 
of the criminal justice reforms implemented by the Chinese Government to 
boost police effectiveness in controlling crime and corruption, and enhance the 
legitimacy of the police with the Chinese people.
The rise of economic crime (broadly defined in China as money laundering, 
deceptive contracts, fraudulent tax evasion, false cheques, fake trademarks, food 
and medicine counterfeiting and infringements of intellectual property rights) 
has also attracted the attention of the Government. In 2004, the Ministry of 
Public Security convened a national conference on economic crime in response 
to concerns about another potential crime wave. At this forum, Premier Wen 
Jiabao, stressed the dangers of such crimes not only to the interest of the people 
but also to economic and financial order, and the Minister of Public Security, 
Zhou Yongkang, warned of the destructive impact of economic crime and its 
connection with corruption (Jiang 2004). Chen Anfu, Director of the Department 
of Economic Crime Investigation of the Ministry of Public Security, reported 
that since 2000 his department had investigated 277 000 cases of economic 
crime, arrested 262 000 suspects and recovered CNY67 billion (US$8.1 billion 
or an estimated US$2 billion annually).8 Chen noted that many of those arrested 
were well educated, had special skills or knowledge and usually operated from 
within their work units. According to the Ministry of Public Security, illegal 
7 As in reference to Robert Merton’s ‘strain theory’ interpretation of Durkheim functional theory in the 
context of American capitalism and the role of unintended consequences (see Merton 1968).
8 Compare these estimated losses with those reported in 1987 by the Public Security Bureau when the cost 
of property crime was estimated at CNY530 million (US$64 million) and that of exceptional fraud cases at 
CNY240 million (US$29.6 million) (Dutton 1997:164, 167).
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pyramid selling had become ‘an economic cult’, involving the jobless, laid-off 
workers and farmers, university students, soldiers and even public servants. 
Chen also predicted that intellectual property (IP) infringement cases would 
increase rapidly in the future and noted that ‘the police should also improve 
capability through team building and resist corruption’ (Jiang 2004).
Reforms of the Chinese Public Security Bureau (PSB), especially the adoption of 
police beat or foot patrols in the major cities such as Shanghai in the early 1990s, 
and more proactive methods of policing were fundamental to the expansion and 
professionalisation of policing (Fu 1990, 2003). They were equally fundamental 
for crime-prevention practices based on the establishment of closer relations 
with local businesses and households. Other changes have included improved 
training, specialisation (in traffic, forensics, and so on), modernisation of 
equipment (for example, vehicles, radios, databases), reorganisation of detective 
or judicial police functions, integrity oversight functions and versions of 
‘community policing’ (Wong 2001, 2011). At the same time, following a 
reorganisation after the Tiananmen Square incident, reforms to the People’s 
Armed Police (PAP) under State Council and Military Commission supervision 
augmented the policing apparatus by providing a garde mobile for the control 
of crime and domestic disorder (Cheung 1996). This was followed by concerted 
efforts from 1998 under Minister of Public Security, Jia Chunwang, in accord 
with Premier Zhu Yongji’s general reforms of the civil service, to modernise 
policing practices. These reforms included the removal of unqualified officers, 
a focus on clearing crime (with less focus on crime reports, which are prone 
to manipulation), a central inspection and supervision system, attempts at the 
reduction of corruption among police (reinforced with an open telephone [110] 
call service), and reorganisation of the Ministry of Public Security (Dai 2001). 
In short, many police reforms have focused on ‘reassurance’ and public-order 
policing, especially in urban areas where great concern existed over the criminal 
potential of the floating population of internal migrants (Bakken 2004; Nielsen 
and Smyth 2009). 
These police reforms seem to have had some impact on the rise of common 
crimes but the effect on crime prevention within the business community 
has been limited. Campaign-style policing (‘strike hard’) and harsh and swift 
punishment, which had been the bedrock of policing strategy until recently 
(Trevaskes 2010a, 2010b), are possibly effective against street crimes and more 
visible forms of deviance in authoritarian contexts but seem inept means of 
uncovering financial fraud. These ‘strike-hard’ mass campaigns bolstered 
by bonuses for police (a process of commodification; cf. Dutton 2006) and a 
compliant judicial process seldom focused on ‘white-collar’ or ‘cadre’ crimes such 
as fraud. Tax evasion and counterfeit products featured in campaigns between 
2000 and 2007 and economic crime in 1982 but there has not been the sustained 
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attention given to ‘non-conventional’ crime that has been given to common or 
street crimes such as robbery (Trevaskes 2010a). The Hong Kong Police have a 
dedicated crime-prevention unit and Shenzhen police have undertaken crime-
prevention campaigns (Zhong 2009a). As we report in Chapter 8, however, only 
a minority of the businesses in our study was interested and had engaged in 
cooperative action with the police, and there is considerable room to further 
develop collective crime-prevention approaches. Chinese police in general have 
yet to engender the co-production of crime control and prevention within the 
community or within economic units in the sense that reassurance policing9 is 
understood as the police response to public demands through a combination of 
‘soft’ and coercive ‘hard’ policing practices (Innes 2005).
Corruption and Organised Crime
Low crime rates, low levels of fear of crime and high levels of public safety 
are theoretically associated with good governance, while high crime levels, 
particularly when they involve criminal organisations, are associated with 
poor standards of governance and corruption (Chin and Godson 2006). The 
scale of corruption has intensified since the mid-1990s and involves many 
more high-level party officials, whose punishment has become the focus for 
the development of a culture of clean government (Li 2010). Although since the 
economic reforms corruption has worsened, it has not become rampant or out 
of control, but nevertheless remains a serious issue for ordinary Chinese and 
a threat to government legitimacy (Li 2010; NBS 2007; Gong 2010; Wedeman 
2004, 2008). Corruption in government and corporate affairs is largely seen as a 
consequence of lack of transparency and weak regulatory practices inherent in 
a state where party and government are intertwined and checks and balances 
fail because the all important political and legal oversight institutions are not 
independent (Gong 2004, 2008; Wedeman 2004, 2006, 2008). There is, however, 
little evidence that such corruption has hindered economic growth. Wedeman’s 
(2004) analysis of corruption in China addresses the apparent contradiction 
between continued economic success and increases in corruption.10 He argues 
that anti-corruption campaigns have impacted on low-level ‘anarchic’ corruption 
9 Reassurance policing is defined as ‘an approach that integrates the delivery of formal social control with 
other local sources, rather than automatically privileging the role of the police; thereby, at least partially 
countering increasing expectations of and dependency on the state’ (Innes and Roberts 2008:242).
10 ‘If corruption increased in gross quantitative terms during the initial phase of reform and intensified 
in the later phases, then simple assumptions about its negative economic consequences clearly need to be 
critically re-examined and the apparent contradiction between rising corruption and rapid growth in China 
resolved’ (Wedeman 2004:920).
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while the negative consequences of organised high-level corruption have lower 
transaction costs, because they are more predictable and less likely to involve 
the risk of exposure; thus: 
[T]he apparent contradiction between ‘worsening’ corruption and 
China’s extraordinarily high rate of growth might be, in part, a function 
of reductions in low-level corruption and the forging of a collusive 
relationship between high-ranking cadres and the emerging business 
community, wherein those with political power have material incentives 
to facilitate profit-making by their ‘business partners.’ (Wedeman 
2004:920)
Tanner and Green (2007) also note the high degree of public security 
decentralisation practised, despite its unitary structure, by the Chinese state, 
which largely stems from fears of a Soviet-style centralised police force of the 
kind that led to abuses in the 1930s Chinese Soviet.11 Thus, ordinary police have 
no jurisdiction over the CCP, which is reluctant to have public security work 
monopolised by professional state agencies—a situation that undermines the 
assertion of the rule of law over the rule of man. Public security ‘is to be handled 
by the mass…The mass line principle…is to transform public security work to 
be the work of the whole people’.12 Given the authoritarian character of the state 
and police, the mass-line approach is essentially top down and, as noted earlier, 
not the kind of co-production of policing that engages communities in priority 
setting or cedes power away from police (per Innes and Roberts 2008). Other 
factors—such as the difficulty of monitoring police work and the limited nature 
of oversight of police by Beijing or provincial heads of the Ministry of Public 
Security—are equally relevant to corrupt party officials’ relative impunity. The 
high degree of autonomy occurs because in the main the PSB is funded by local 
governments, who in turn look to the local CCP legal and political committees to 
govern the PSB and resolve disputes between the courts, police and other law-
enforcement/regulatory agencies (Tanner and Green 2007). The local political 
committees include the head of the PSB, so this structure is unlikely to provide 
sufficient independence to investigate police misconduct or corruption among 
officials, and the courts remain second in status to the police (Clarke 2007). 
So the problem of who guards the guardians (quis custodiet ipsos custodes) can 
be acute at the local county and township levels, but stems from the same 
structure at the centre (Trevaskes 2010a). Widely publicised corruption cases 
such as the one that occurred in Chongqing in 2009 involving entrepreneur 
11 The Chinese Soviet Republic or the Jiangxi Soviet was established in late 1931 by Mao Zedong and 
General Zhu De but was eventually overrun by the Kuomintang in October 1934, precipitating the famous 
Long March of the Chinese communists. The Chinese Soviet was officially dissolved in September 1937 as 
part of the united-front strategy of the communists and nationalists in response to the outbreak of the Sino–
Japanese war.
12 Minister of Public Security, Lui Ruixing, 1994, cited in Wong (2001:1).
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Li Chian, who through intimidation and bribery gained control over transport 
in the city, illustrate the growing sophistication of criminal activity and the 
weakness of local institutional oversight. Li had on his payroll a large number 
of officials, including the Deputy Chief of the PSB. He was sentenced to 20 
years’ imprisonment and fined CNY2.5 billion (US$376 million) (Dai 2010). 
China’s internal and foreign intelligence service, the powerful Ministry of 
State Security, which is responsible to the State Council, is also responsible for 
revenue protection and the prevention of threats to China, and could therefore 
play a decisive role in matters involving corruption especially if foreign interests 
are involved, as in the Rio Tinto bribery case noted below.
Much of what has been written about crime in China has focused on corruption 
and what might be done to overcome its corrosive and persistent influence. In 
addition to its political impact in terms of legitimacy and stability, corruption 
in China has also received sustained attention from economists and business 
analysts. This is not surprising as 6 per cent of the businesses in our survey 
reported incidents of bribery in the past year. The risks were higher in mainland 
cities than in Hong Kong,13 and in large businesses, particularly those engaged 
in manufacturing (see Chapter 5). Businesses which had been the victims of 
corruption revealed that instigators were as often the managers or employees of 
other companies as state officials. Although corruption involving government 
agencies is cause for alarm, corruption among corporations and other private 
business actors is equally damaging (Kaufman et al. 2009). 
Much of Chinese business remains within the sphere of state-owned enterprises, 
and company officers are indeed as likely to be involved in corrupt practices 
as state officials. Illustrating that point is the case of Australian Rio Tinto 
executive Stern Hu, arrested in July 2009 along with three Chinese colleagues 
and sentenced in March 2010 to a total of 10 years’ imprisonment for bribery 
and for stealing business secrets. The case centred on Hu’s role in Rio Tinto’s 
negotiations with Chinese steel producers over the price of iron ore—then 
in high demand. Hu had obtained, by paying lavish bribes to officials in the 
Chinese steel industry, highly detailed and sensitive information about Rio’s 
customers, including storage levels and sales plans, which gave him insider 
knowledge about the kinds of prices that might be sought. He was also in receipt 
of unlawful commissions provided by Chinese steel executives hoping for 
preferable treatment in obtaining the ore (Sainsbury 2010). A number of China’s 
trading partners are regulated by extra-territorial laws criminalising such 
corrupt conduct even if it occurs overseas. Another recent example involved 
13 Throughout this book, for brevity, we use Hong Kong when referring to the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (SAR) of the People’s Republic of China and, to distinguish geographically the PRC 
from its islands, including Hong Kong, we use the term mainland or mainland China.
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the US firm IBM, which was fined for breach of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act for providing gifts and entertainment to Chinese officials in order to secure 
preferential treatment in government contracts (China Economic Review 2011).
The US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 and the Australian Commonwealth 
Criminal Code Amendment (Bribery of Foreign Public Officials) Act 1999 are 
examples of legislative attempts by a growing number of states that wish 
to ensure fair access to overseas contracts, untainted by bribery, and have 
endorsed the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
1997 Anti-Bribery Convention (Hill 2000). As of 2010, 38 countries have 
adopted the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions. Japan and South Korea are, however, the 
only parties from Asia. The Convention observes in its preamble: ‘bribery is a 
widespread phenomenon in international business transactions, including trade 
and investment, which raises serious moral and political concerns, undermines 
good governance and economic development, and distorts international 
competitive conditions.’14 Wilder and Ahrens (2001) note that corruption in 
international business transactions has significant negative effects, including, 
for businesses that engaged in bribery, the risk of being threatened by 
extortionists with public disclosure and contract cancellations. They list many 
harmful consequences such as distorted tendering processes and priorities for 
government contracts (for example, encouraging ‘white elephant’ or redundant 
investment projects); drawing funds away from the public to the private sector 
with a disproportionate impact on the very poor who are more dependent on 
government funds; undermining equity, efficiency and integrity in the public 
service; undercutting aid programs; and adding uncertainty and extra costs for 
businesses. 
As part of a raft of reforms to the Criminal Law of the PRC in 2011, the bribery 
of foreign officials was also criminalised (Article 164 as amended), in recognition 
of the growing role of Chinese business abroad and the inherent risks illustrated 
by cases such as the Rio Tinto example. These reforms (the Eighth Amendment 
passed at the nineteenth meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eleventh 
National People’s Congress on 25 February 2011) focused on enhanced 
punishment and redefined laws in respect of food adulteration, bogus medicines 
and corruption of officials, which had been at the forefront of public scandals 
that had threatened political stability and the legitimacy of police and judicial 
organs (College for Criminal Law Science of Beijing Normal University 2011). 
The extensive revision of Article 294 that redefined organised crime or ‘black 




societies’ more clearly and addressed the role of public officials or ‘umbrellas’ in 
the spread of such crime was belated recognition that more needed to be done 
about the penetration of business by organised crime. 
Another source of potential corruption has been the rapid expansion of Chinese 
stock markets where some government officials have fraudulently disclosed 
confidential market information. Chinese equity markets have, over eight years 
(2002–10), reportedly lost US$30 billion, of which only US$4.5 billion has been 
recovered, despite efforts by the State Council to improve regulatory controls, 
especially over insider-related trading. Since 2008 (up to late 2010—details not 
reported), the securities regulator reported 295 insider cases or 45 per cent of 
all cases pursued. The scale of such losses appears to be modest when compared 
with the pervasive money laundering and estimated US$120 billion reported by 
the Bank of China15 to have been taken out of the country by 16–18 000 corrupt 
officials between 1994 and 2008 (Lewis 2011). The prominent case of Huang 
Gangyu of Gome Electronics who was convicted of insider trading and related 
offences, including links with triads and corruption, is another illustration 
of the collusive connections between private business and corrupt officials 
to the disadvantage of competitors and consumers (Dasgupta 2010). Lo (2010) 
provides an example of market manipulation by the triad Sun Yee On that was 
able to exploit close contact with government officials and dubious state-owned 
enterprises (or shell companies). Such crimes may result in the death sentence, 
which was, for instance, imposed on insider trader Yang Yanming, convicted in 
2005 for defrauding US$9.52 million and executed in 2009 (Fay 2009).
Economic Crime in China
As we show in Chapter 2, the paucity of reliable data on crime and the absence of 
victim surveys have made the study of the impact of crime in China speculative. 
This has not, however, prevented self-help action by many crime victims, who, 
thanks to social media and the Internet, can publicise crime incidents online 
and alert social networks about crime. For example, a 2005 news report from 
the China Daily (2005a, citing a Shanghai Star story) told about a ‘netizen’ who 
had published a ‘thief map’ on the Internet that showed more than 10 places 
‘haunted by thieves’ in Shanghai’s downtown areas and transport hubs. Drawing 
from the Jiefang Daily and the Shanghai Morning Post, the report pointed out 
that between 21 and 31 December, 2456 thefts had occurred in Shanghai, most 
of them in locations noted on the map, and that more than 60 thieves were 
caught in only one day in December 2004. Citing Yu Pinghua, a police officer 
15 See Bank of China 2008, ‘A study of the methods of transferring assets outside China by Chinese corruptors 
and monitoring methods for this problem’, unavailable at the original URL but a translated source available in 
Lewis (2011). The authors thank Peter Reuter for bringing this document to our attention.
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of the Public Transportation Sub-Bureau of the Shanghai PSB, the report noted 
that the PSB had caught 762 thieves on public transportation in a 15-day action, 
recovering more than CNY120 000 (US$14 510) and 272 mobile phones (China 
Daily 2005a).
While the extent of crimes against business in China might not be well understood, 
such crimes do receive considerable media attention. For example, in July 2007, 
the China Daily reported an increase in waterside theft from Shanghai’s ports, 
which the Shanghai Hongkou District Prosecutors’ Office attributed to the 
widespread use of fake business licences that made possible the theft of cargo. 
About the same time, 52 people were charged with trading in fake government 
documents, mostly business and driving licences. The fakes often originated from 
Hunan and Henan Provinces (Cao and Zheng 2007). Large-scale banking fraud is 
also commonplace, and the Bank of China, along with other domestic banks, has 
often been required, after a series of high-profile scandals, to review procedures 
and strengthen controls to prevent fraud (as noted above). For example, the 
Beijing Huayuanda Real Estate Development Company allegedly colluded with 
staff at the Bank of China’s Beijing branch to obtain CNY645 million (US$77.7 
million) in fraudulent mortgage loans for its Senhao Apartments, while an official 
of one of its sub-branches in Heilongjiang Province disappeared with CNY290 
million (US$34.9 million) (China Daily 2005b). Public Security Bureau sources 
quoted by China Business Daily estimated direct losses through Internet fraud 
arising from nearly 30 000 cases of Internet crime reported in 2005 by everyday 
domestic users at more than CNY100 million. Attacks on commercial activities 
and financial systems were, however, estimated to have cost about CNY1 billion. 
Most of the 72 836 incidents of malware identified in 2005 targeted commercial 
web sites or business activities. 
The recurring problems of counterfeit medicine and tainted food have also been 
widely reported. The contaminated milk scandal of 2008 resulted in at least 
six deaths and thousands of hospitalised children (Associated Press 2010) and 
led angry parents to demand better government controls and policing. Further 
cases of contaminated milk (involving the addition of melamine and more 
recently nitrates) continued to surface in 2010 and 2011 (Stone 2011) despite 
the conviction and execution of a dairy farmer and a milk salesman over the 
melamine contamination and other crackdowns on breaches of product safety 
regulations. Some of these cases have led to mass protests and a decline in 
confidence in key government agencies, and naturally in the case of contaminated 
milk to a substantial loss of business for the Chinese dairy industry. Although 
there are many examples of counterfeit medicines, one from 2005 will suffice. 
It involved three counterfeited medicines of well-known household brands: the 
cold medicine Contac NT, the painkiller Fenbid and the antibiotic Cefalexin, on 
sale in suburban pharmacies in Beijing (China Daily 2005c). All three products 
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were taken off the shelves when the Beijing Municipal Drug Administration 
found out that the medicines looked like the authentic ones but did not contain 
the active ingredients. Trademark violations are common in China. In 2004, 
the administrative authorities for industry and commerce registered 40 171 
trademark16 infringement and counterfeiting cases, of which 5401 were related 
to foreign trademarks. Only 96 of these cases were transferred to the police and 
courts.17
An element in the pervasive nature of white-collar crime and a relevant aspect 
of crimes against business has been the widespread use of fake credentials. It 
is also a serious problem in academia where plagiarism and data fraud are of 
significant concern—prompting The Lancet (2010), a leading medical journal, 
to call for improvements in China’s scientific integrity, especially given Premier 
Hu Jintao’s goal of making China a research superpower. The sheer boldness 
of some cases is staggering. Zhang Wuben, an untrained traditional Chinese 
medicine practitioner, amassed wealth by faking credentials from Beijing 
Medical University to sell treatments based on mung beans, and the former head 
of Microsoft China, Tang Jun, boosted his status with a fake doctorate from the 
California Institute of Technology (Jacobs 2010).
Measuring Crimes Against Business
The general aims and objectives of the research reported in this book are to 
enhance our understanding of the extent and nature of crimes against business 
and their impact on business costs and confidence in China. The China United 
Nations Crime against Business Survey (UNICBS) is the first large-scale survey of 
crimes against business undertaken in Chinese cities. The results of the survey 
show that it is possible to obtain useful data about crime risks, prevention 
practices and the degree of corruption/crime tolerance of business enterprises. 
Given the relatively limited crime data from official and other sources, the survey 
allows for the monitoring of crime risks, including corruption, in a country well 
advanced in its rapid transition from a command to a market-based economy. 
It also makes possible valid comparisons of the prevalence of crimes against 
business in Chinese cities with other cities similarly surveyed in both emerging 
economies and developed countries. Because the UNICBS (hereinafter the ICBS) 
uses a protocol that is similar to the United Nations International Crime Victims 
16 In 1983, China’s annual trademark applications were less than 20 000, among which only 1687 were 
foreign applications. By 2004, the number of applications had reached 588 000, some 60 000 of which were 
foreign trademarks. By the end of June 2005, China’s accumulated number of registered trademarks had 
reached 2.37 million, among which 422 000 were foreign trademarks (see China Internet Information Centre 
News 2005).
17 See ibid.
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Survey (UNICVS), comparisons between business and individual victimisation 
within and between jurisdictions are also feasible. This book, therefore, also 
contributes to comparative studies of crime and its causes.
The ICBS extends studies of criminal victimisation against individuals and 
households by including business activity or corporate victims. The ICBS focuses 
on crimes against business—that is, when a commercial entity is the victim of 
crime. Crime against business might be perpetrated by individuals (for example, 
employees, customers), other businesses (for example, competitors, suppliers), 
officials (for example, in the case of bribery) or criminal groups (for example, 
extortion). The ICBS, therefore, excludes crimes committed by businesses or 
corporations against customers (for example, faulty products), employees (for 
example, work safety violations), the environment (for example, pollution), the 
public at large (for example, accidents caused by negligence such as the Bhopal 
disaster in 1984) and other businesses (for example, price collusion). In the 
ICBS, businesses are the unit of victimisation analysis, not the individuals who 
operate and work in these businesses, although it is clear that crimes against 
business can have severe effects on individuals when, for example, losses to 
fraud or other crimes force a business to close or to lay-off workers, or when 
staff members are injured or killed. 
Household and personal crime victim surveys have been carried out regularly 
in Hong Kong since the late 1970s, but have rarely been used in the mainland. 
In Hong Kong, the Government Census and Statistics Department has so far 
conducted seven sweeps of the Crime Victimisation Survey (CVS), in 1979, 1982, 
1987, 1990, 1995, 1999 and 2006. For the first time, in 2006, the University of 
Hong Kong conducted the UNICVS (Broadhurst et al. 2010). While the CVS and 
UNICVS have measured only crime against individuals, Hong Kong businesses 
have since 2001 participated in the PriceWaterhouseCoopers’ biennial Global 
Economic Crime Survey, which estimates the extent of global economic crime 
against business. In contrast, the first rigorous study of crime victimisation in 
modern mainland China took place in 1994 with the Beijing survey, conducted 
as part of the UNICVS (Zhu et al. 1995).18 Ten years later, in 2004, the Tianjin 
survey built upon and extended the earlier ICVS (Zhuo et al. 2008). In 2005, 
the Taiwan National Police Agency undertook the Taiwan Areas Criminal 
Victimisation Survey, which also focused on personal and household crime 
(Sheu et al. 2005).19 No substantive attempt to measure the prevalence of crimes 
against mainland businesses had been made prior to the UNICBS reported in this 
book. The survey protocol assumes that businesses will be the targets of both 
18 A repeat survey was conducted in Beijing in 1996; unfortunately, the data and findings of that survey 
have never been released.
19 A unique feature of the Taiwan survey was that, in addition to the randomised survey, it also interviewed 
2025 victims of crime who had reported a burglary, robbery, vehicle theft or fraud to the police in 2004. An 
earlier study of a smaller sample of Taipei respondents was reported by Mon (2003).
Introduction
19
common crime20 and crimes that manipulate business practices, and accounting 
and payment procedures. Thus, business crime surveys include so-called 
‘white-collar’ crimes such as fraud—often neglected or poorly captured by 
household surveys—and also help plan the cost and distribution of government 
and private-sector crime-prevention initiatives (Doerner and Lab 1998; Eigen 
2002; Kaufman et al. 2000; van Dijk 1999). 
A basic requirement of a prevention-oriented approach to crimes against 
business is the availability of extensive and reliable data and, as noted, this is 
generally not the case for China or indeed for many countries in the developed 
and developing world. The value of crime victim surveys lies in measuring the 
‘hidden’ or ‘dark’ figure of unreported crime.21 Van Dijk, a leading researcher 
on crime victimisation, argues that crime victim surveys constitute ‘a better 
indicator of the level of crime than the numbers of crimes reported to, and 
recorded by, the police’ (2000:97). The reporting behaviour of victims directly 
affects the size of the hidden crime figure and, in turn, the official crime rate. 
Thus, victim surveys can contribute to policy assessment by overcoming the 
limitations of official crime statistics (Carach and Makkai 2002; van Kesteren 
et al. 2000). Official police data are usually inadequate in identifying incidents 
involving repeated victimisation; yet, we know that ‘some people and places are 
targeted more frequently than others, such that a small proportion of victims 
experience a large proportion of all crimes’ (Taylor and Mayhew 2002:4). The 
limitations of official data might lead to inefficient expenditure on crime control 
and prevention and misinformation about the risks of crime amongst the 
general public, adversely affecting criminal justice policies. For example, a 1999 
Australian survey showed that police statistics based on recorded crime misled 
policy about the prevalence of burglary and robbery compared with other types 
of crime in the business community (Taylor 2002). In the case of business, it 
might lead entrepreneurs to rely on inaccurate estimates about the risks and 
cost of crime when they consider investing in a particular country or industry. 
The UNICVS has highlighted that residential locality and town size, self-
exposure to criminal opportunities, target attractiveness and the strength of 
guardianship are significant factors in the risk of individual victimisation (van 
Kesteren et al. 2000) and it is likely that they also play a role in crimes against 
business. The ICVS also showed that more than 40 per cent of crime victims were 
victimised more than once in the course of a year and one-third were victims 
of multiple incidents (Wittebrood and Nieuwbeerta 2000). British experience 
20 Street or common crime refers to offences such as burglary, car theft, threats, common assault, robbery, 
sexual assault, criminal damage and other personal theft that directly affect individuals and households.
21 For example, the 2009 US National Crime Victimization Survey estimated that only 49 per cent of the 
4.3 million violent crimes were reported to the police (Truman and Rand 2010) and the Hong Kong UNICVS 
showed that nearly 70 per cent of personal and household victims did not report their victimisation to the 
police (Broadhurst et al. 2010). 
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indicates that businesses have higher risks of crime victimisation than both 
individuals and households, and businesses located in city/town centres tend to 
be more at risk than those in smaller towns (Hopkins 2002). Chapter 6 explores 
these risk factors and attempts to identify businesses at greater risk of criminal 
victimisation, including those vulnerable to corruption. 
The 1999 sweep of the UNICBS in Central Eastern Europe challenged conventional 
views about the reasons businesses do not report their victimisation to the 
police. Few victims cited negative publicity or company policies as reasons; 
however, the rates of refusal to answer a question and ‘don’t know’ responses 
were elevated for some offences—notably, employee fraud (Alvazzi del Frate 
2004). Even in developed countries businesses are often unwilling to report 
crime, in part because of perceived high transaction costs, especially if the losses 
are not deemed large enough to warrant the involvement of police and there 
is a risk of reputation damage. A 2002 KPMG survey of 351 large Australian 
businesses found that 55 per cent had experienced a fraud (average loss AU$1.4 
million), but only 64 per cent of the victimised businesses alerted the police or 
regulatory agencies (KPMG Forensic 2003).22 Through questions that explore the 
willingness of business to report crime and their reasons for calling the police or 
not, we seek to identify factors that inhibit or encourage the reporting of crime 
to police and test previous findings that businesses might be more prone to 
certain crimes than households but less willing to report crime than households. 
Although it is often assumed that reporting crime is both a public duty and 
an effective response to crime, Chapter 7 discusses how in some contexts or in 
regard to certain crimes it might be an unwelcome and onerous duty. 
Our study in part falls within the field of ‘victimology’, defined by van Dijk 
(1997:3) as ‘the scientific study of the extent, nature and causes of criminal 
victimisation, its consequences for the persons involved and the reactions 
thereto by society, in particular, the police and the criminal justice system as 
well as voluntary workers and professional helpers’. It also, however, has cross-
disciplinary relevance to economics, management, finance and law (Shahid 
1991). It provides a tool for improved risk assessment of investment strategies 
and enables detailed comparisons of crime as a business risk relative to market 
development. The negative and distorting role of crime, corruption and 
insecurity on business performance is a priority focus of national, provincial 
and municipal crime-prevention and enforcement strategies. The ICBS permits 
the estimation of business risks and identification of vulnerable sectors to 
assist investment, trade and management decisions; facilitates the policing of 
22 Smith and Urbas (2002) in another Australian survey of fraud against business found that that 5–10 




the business community not only by the public police but also by regulators 
and professional bodies; and helps prevent crime and corruption in one of the 
fastest-growing economies of the world. 
Our research addresses some broader questions, particularly the extent to which 
the ‘rule of law’ creates an advantageous context for business. The survey 
estimates the prevalence and severity of crimes against business in Chinese 
cities of varying levels of economic and legal development, and differential 
risks of common street crime. Our underlying assumption is that the prevalence 
and severity of crimes against business will co-vary with regional levels of 
legal and economic development. We hypothesise that the presence of strong 
legal institutions will reduce the likelihood of crime and increase confidence in 
policing and government. The four cities included in the survey (Hong Kong, 
Shanghai, Shenzhen and Xi’an) were chosen because to some degree they might 
be representative of the relative differences in economic and legal development 
found between Chinese cities. For example, in comparison with Hong Kong, 
which is a free-trade port long wedded to capitalist market economics, an inland 
city such as Xi’an has been less open to market reforms and its industrial and 
commercial sectors remain dominated by state-owned enterprises.23 Shanghai, 
on the other hand, has been restored to its traditional role as the commercial 
centre of China and has overtaken Hong Kong as the major port for Chinese 
trade. Shanghai might not have yet fully developed its legal institutions or a 
thoroughly independent system of rule of law usually considered essential for a 
modern market economy, but it has been the most progressive city in reforming 
commercial law (Mako 2006). Shenzhen exemplifies the ‘open-door’ policy 
advocated so successfully by Deng Xiaoping. In 1979, the ‘overnight city’—as 
Shenzhen is now known—was the first of many ‘special economic zones’ (SEZs) 
allowed to experiment with ‘market socialism’, and it has been a revealing 
laboratory for the governance of the reform process and other problems caused 
by rapid change. While official data on the prevalence of crime, especially against 
business, in Chinese cities are scarce, there is sufficient information to conclude 
that Hong Kong has a relatively low level of ‘street crime’ at least compared with 
Shenzhen (see Chapter 2), and a more developed capitalist economy and legal 
institutions than other Chinese cities. Hong Kong also ranks much higher on 
World Bank governance indicators such as rule of law, voice and accountability, 
political stability and violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, 
and corruption control (Kaufman et al. 2009; see Appendix A). We acknowledge, 
however, that limited resources also influenced the selection of the four cities 
(the next chapter provides further background details about the cities included 
in the survey). 
23 The absence of a direct question as to whether the business was state or privately owned was a significant 
omission in respect to mainland cities. The aim was to reduce the survey burden and raise the response rate. 
Moreover, such a question was not part of the original ICBS protocol.
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Our research also sought to: 1) extend the scope of crimes measured by the 
UN business crime survey by including new or emergent crimes such as cyber 
crime, credit-card fraud and intellectual property (IP) crimes; 2) estimate the 
risk of organised crime to legitimate business through bribery, corruption and 
‘protection/extortion’ in anticompetitive business practices and other distortions 
in market development; 3) assess the effectiveness of countermeasures and the 
potential of crime-prevention initiatives; and 4) estimate the direct and indirect 
costs of crime and crime prevention. 
We aim to provide a benchmark for subsequent surveys and encourage 
longitudinal research on changes in business crime risks, which could be 
undertaken via periodic surveillance of crimes against business in selected 
Chinese cities. Unlike the UNICVS, the ICBS has not been extensively applied 
nor have the repeated sweeps—which could make assessments of change 
possible—been conducted. Further ICBSs are planned in Eastern European 
countries under the auspices of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
and follow on from large-scale surveys of the prevalence of corruption in the 
western Balkans.24 A low-cost reliable instrument can routinely monitor crime 
against business by type of business activity and scale of enterprise (that is, 
small, medium and large business operations in various sectors: manufacturing, 
transport, communications, retailing, service and construction). Such monitoring 
could prove essential in emerging and transitional economies where police and 
other official sources of data are incomplete and often unavailable. At present, 
a number of business consultants (for example, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 
KPMG and Kroll) undertake surveys of fraud and other business-related crimes, 
sometimes drawing on their client base for participants. They often suffer, 
however, from limitations of scope and many small business operations are not 
included. These industry-sponsored surveys have included Chinese businesses 
(see Chapter 2) but, as noted, scope and samples have been relatively small in 
spite of their global and regional focus.25 Private industry-sponsored surveys 
of business crime risks are useful tools (albeit often used as marketing material) 
that attempt to collect information that is absent from official data sources, but 
they might lack the crucial independence that is essential for credible influence 
on policy. While victim surveys are not immune to sampling error and under-
reporting (in the UNICVS, for example, assaults between intimates), they have 
had a substantial impact on policy development, notably in improving services 
to victims. Surveys of crimes against business have generally suffered from low 
response rates and reluctance to disclose information about income, profits and 
losses. We have also encountered these problems, which we discuss in Chapter 
9 along with other limitations of the China ICBS.
24 Personal communication with Enrico Bisogna, Statistics and Survey Section, UNODC, 19 August 2011.
25 In some cases, the survey methodology is not detailed and response rates, interview methods and the 
exact number of respondents are not disclosed (for example, see Economist Intelligence Unit 2010).
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Structure of the Book
This book has nine chapters that report in detail the findings from the large-
scale survey of the prevalence of crimes against business in four Chinese 
cities. Chapter 1 briefly reviews research that examined the victimisation of 
business and outlines the development of the ICBS. Chapter 2 provides further 
background on the overall crime situation in China and the response of crime-
control institutions in the context of China’s transformation from a socialist to 
a market socialist economy. This chapter also summarises the general pattern 
of crime in China since the 1970s. Chapter 3 outlines the methodology of the 
survey, the structure of the questionnaire and the lessons learnt from the initial 
pilot survey conducted in Hong Kong in 2003. This chapter concludes with a 
description of the characteristics of the sample, an assessment of the response 
rate and the limitations of the survey protocol and its implementation. Prevalence 
and incidence rates of victimisation by common crimes against business are 
presented in Chapter 4, where we compare our results with other survey findings 
on crimes against business and the Hong Kong UNICVS. This is followed by an 
analysis of the correlates of victimisation by common crimes. We also highlight 
variation in the rates of victimisation on four criteria—by city, business sector, 
business size and location—and estimate the cost of these crimes. Chapter 5 
examines victimisation by ‘non-conventional’ crimes such as fraud (by insiders 
and outsiders), Internet fraud, bribery, extortion, intellectual property (IP) 
infringements, and computer-related crime. We disaggregate the prevalence of 
non-conventional crimes along the same criteria selected for common crimes, 
estimate the cost of fraud, and compare our results with the findings of other 
business victimisation surveys of non-conventional crimes. In Chapter 6, we 
present our statistical analysis of the predictors of business victimisation and 
show how sector and size of business are associated with certain crime risks. In 
Chapter 7, we analyse businesses’ responses to their crime victimisation, their 
reasons for reporting or not to police, and their level of satisfaction with the 
ways in which police responded to their complaint. This chapter also examines 
all respondents’ attitudes about the effectiveness of the police in their area, and 
their engagement in collective crime prevention. Chapter 8 analyses attitudes to 
crime and corruption, particularly as an obstacle to doing business, but in the 
context of attitudes to other factors that might also inhibit business growth. We 
investigate respondents’ perceptions of crime trends and compare Hong Kong 
and mainland cities’ attitudes to various obstacles to business. Finally, Chapter 
9 outlines our conclusions and recommendations for future research in light of 





Development and Findings of Business 
Victimisation Surveys
The United Nations International Crime against 
Business Survey 
Since its inception in 1989, the United Nations International Crime Victims 
Survey (UNICVS) has provided comparative information on the victimisation 
of individuals, but there is limited comparable information at the international 
level on crime and corruption affecting business, particularly in terms of 
direct experiences as opposed to perceptions. A new focus on business crime 
arose from a growing concern about the impact of crime, especially organised 
crime and corruption in developing economies, and the rising costs of crime 
prevention for government and the private sector (Doerner and Lab 1998; Eigen 
2002; Kaufman et al. 2000; van Dijk 1999). The first national victimisation 
survey—conducted among a sample of businesses in the Netherlands in 1990—
confirmed that businesses were the victims of a range of crimes, from common 
crimes to extortion and fraud (van Dijk and Terlouw 1996). Crime increases 
operating and insurance costs and causes significant damage to business in 
terms of reduced profit, increases in prices paid by consumers and loss of jobs 
and income. Persistent and serious crime can also result in the loss of trust 
in business and confidence in the economy, and at worst lead to financial 
instability. Exposure to crime affects business investment strategies and can 
slow economic development. As potentially attractive targets, many businesses 
have evolved strategies that seek to minimise the risk of crime from external and 
internal offenders. The relative success of such prevention efforts, however, and 
the costs involved are less well understood. Prevalence studies such as the ICBS 
provide contextualised baseline information about the scale and nature of such 
risk-minimisation strategies. The development of a strong crime-free business 
community needs reliable knowledge about the nature of crime risks that vary 
with the situational and socioeconomic environment in which businesses 
operate. 
During the 1992 Rome Conference on the International Crime Survey, the 
possibility of extending studies of crime victimisation from individuals and 
households to businesses using an international survey mirroring the ICVS was 
raised. The first International Commercial Crime Survey (ICCS) was conducted in 
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1993 in Australia and in 1994 in eight European countries:1 the Czech Republic, 
France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom. Surveys based on the ICCS questionnaire were also conducted in 
Finland (1994–95; see Aromaa and Lehti 1994), Estonia (1997) and South 
Africa (1998; see Naudé et al. 1999). The ICCS explored experiences of crime, 
perceptions of safety and pollution, security precautions and their cost, and 
attitudes towards police. Common crime and crime by staff surfaced as the main 
problems for businesses, but only a small proportion of respondents mentioned 
incidents of corruption. 
Using a comparable methodology, surveys focusing on issues of security 
(particularly that of foreign investors) were conducted between 1995 and 1999 in 
St Petersburg, Latvia and Lithuania. There, corruption and extortion emerged as 
major problems. To explore these problems further, the UN Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) and the UN Interregional Criminal Justice Research Institute 
(UNICRI) revised the questionnaire to include new questions that measured the 
extent of corruption, extortion and fraud, and assessed whether these were seen 
as obstacles to doing business.2 In 2000, the survey was renamed the International 
Crime against Business Survey (ICBS) and carried out in the capital cities of 
nine Central Eastern European countries.3 Alvazzi del Frate (2004) argues that 
the ICBS instrument offers great potential to study business victimisation. Her 
study showed that despite some reluctance by businesses to discuss and disclose 
events that might damage their public image, there was great interest among 
businesses which participated in the survey. Limited funding constrained the 
scope of the Central Eastern Europe ICBS—for example, data collection was 
restricted to capital cities and sample sizes were small. Most of the resources 
available for the ICBS were spent on fieldwork rather than on analyses and the 
publication of a comprehensive report, and few researchers and policymakers 
are aware of the survey and its results (Alvazzi del Frate 2004).
In 2005, following a cooperative agreement between the UN Industrial 
Development Organisation (UNIDO) and UNODC, work began on developing the 
ICBS further to produce the standardised International Crime and Corruption 
Business Survey (CCBS). The questionnaire addresses bribery, corruption, fraud, 
extortion and several other forms of crime against business and industry. Pilot 
studies were carried out in Bulgaria and Canada in 2005–06, with small samples 
of businesses, and the revised CCBS was conducted in Cape Verde (2006; see 
Alvazzi del Frate 2007) and Nigeria (2007; see Nigerian NBS 2009, 2010).
1 For details on the development and methodology of the ICCS, see van Dijk and Terlouw (1996), and Walker 
(1995a, 1995b) for Australia. 
2 Questions on perceptions of institutional obstacles to doing business, including crime, and corruption and 
bribery practices, were taken from the World Bank’s Private Sector Survey (Alvazzi del Frate 2004).
3 These were: Albania (Tirana), Belarus (Minsk), Bulgaria (Sofia), Croatia (Zagreb), Hungary (Budapest), 
Lithuania (Vilnius), Romania (Bucharest), Russia (Moscow) and Ukraine (Kiev).
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Other Business Crime Victimisation Surveys
At the same time as the ICBS was being developed, a number of other surveys 
and studies focusing on the victimisation of businesses took place (see AIC 
2004 for a review). The majority was conducted in the developed world by 
academic institutions, criminal justice organisations and private companies. In 
the United Kingdom, there were small local surveys on crimes against business 
(Hopkins 2002). The scope and wording of the questionnaires varied, but the 
most comprehensive ones, such as the Australian Crimes Against Small Business 
Survey (Perrone 2000) and the British Commercial Victimisation Survey (Shury 
et al. 2005), tended to include similar questions to the ICBS. Others focused on a 
single type of crime—for example, fraud (Ernst and Young 2010), economic crime 
(Global Economic Crime Survey: PWC 2007a, 2009), or a single economic sector, 
most often retail (for example, US National Retail Security Survey: Hollinger 
2010; British National Survey of Retail Crime: Centre for Retail Research 2000; 
Global Retail Theft Barometer: Bamfield 2010).4 All the studies found that 
criminal victimisation was a significant problem for business, with serious 
consequences in terms of costs and loss of profitability. They also indicated 
that generally businesses were victimised at a higher rate than individuals or 
households. Few of these surveys looked at bribery and corruption; those that 
did reported a low prevalence, which is perhaps not surprising since most were 
conducted in Western Europe and other industrialised countries where high 
standards of governance and the rule of law tend to prevail. It was an assumption 
of this study that, because of the long-established English common-law system 
in Hong Kong, a similarly low level of bribery and corruption would also be 
found in Hong Kong when compared with mainland cities. (See Appendix B for 
a list of business victimisation surveys identified by our research.)
Findings of Business Crime Victimisation Surveys
Table 1.1 presents the findings from three business victimisation surveys with 
a similar design to the China UNICBS and a comparable sample size. Two were 
conducted in developing countries—the Central Eastern Europe ICBS, in 2000 
(Alvazzi del Frate 2004), and the Nigeria CCBS, in 2007 (Nigerian NBS 2009, 
2010)—and one in Western Europe (in 1994) and Australia (in 1993), which, 
4 The ICBS and many of these other studies also included a section on workplace violence. Workplace 
violence is not examined in the China UNICBS. The prevalence of and problems associated with violence at 
work are fully discussed by Chappell and Di Martino (1999), who reported the results of a 1996 EU survey 
about violence at work. With a sample of 15 800 respondents, the research showed that 4 per cent of workers 
had been subjected to physical violence in the previous two years; 2 per cent to sexual harassment; and 8 per 
cent to intimidation and bullying. The survey showed, for example, that young women engaged in precarious 
work were at high risk of workplace violence.
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for brevity, we call the Western Europe ICBS (van Dijk and Terlouw 1996).5 
The lowest prevalence of victimisation by common crime during the 12-month 
reference period was recorded in Eastern Europe (27 per cent) and the highest 
in Western Europe (at least 60 per cent for theft by customers, employees 
and outsiders).6 While the overall prevalence of victimisation in the Nigeria 
CCBS was lower than in the Eastern Europe ICBS (48 per cent and 27 per cent 
respectively), rates of victimisation by specific crimes were consistently higher 
than those of both sweeps of the ICBS. This indicates that businesses in Nigeria 
were particularly prone to multiple victimisations by different types of crime, 
during the same or different incidents. The three surveys found that larger firms 
(that is, those with a larger workforce) were more likely to be victimised than 
smaller ones. 
The prevalence of corruption was much lower in Western Europe (3 per cent; 
this figure included incidents of extortion as well as bribery) than in Central 
Eastern Europe (19 per cent) and Nigeria (34 per cent).7 In both Nigeria and 
Eastern Europe, businesses were often asked to pay bribes to obtain services 
from officials as a way of ‘greasing the wheels’. Nigerian businesses were most 
likely to pay a bribe when dealing with the police or with customs. About 
8–9 per cent of businesses in Eastern Europe and Nigeria reported incidents of 
extortion or intimidation. 
The proportion of criminal incidents that was reported to the police varied 
greatly depending on the type of crime and the seriousness of the incident. 
In the three surveys, theft of a vehicle and burglary had high reporting rates, 
which were linked to insurance requirements. The main reasons invoked by 
respondents for not reporting to the police were that the incident was too minor 
or that it was an internal matter. Overall, theft by employees had the lowest 
reporting rates and businesses were more likely to deal with such incidents 
through disciplinary rather than judicial measures.
5 Although the Western Europe survey was conducted just more than 10 years prior to the China ICBS, we 
expect that in countries with a stable political and economic system, crime rates have changed relatively little 
over this time. The survey was also conducted in the Czech Republic and Hungary, but we do not include 
these countries.
6 When comparing the results of these surveys, variations in rates of victimisation might also be partly 
due to the composition of the samples (for example, business sectors and size), the mix of crimes that was 
included, the way in which questions were asked and the survey methodology. For example, the proportion 
of retail businesses in the Western Europe ICBS was more than 68 per cent, but only 25 per cent in the Eastern 
Europe ICBS.
7 The measurement of corruption differed between the ICBS and the CCBS. In the ICBS, respondents were 
asked whether someone had tried to obtain bribes from the company. In the CCBS, respondents who had 
contact with public officials/agencies were asked whether the company did pay a bribe.
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Table 1.1 Selected Findings from Three Business Crime Victimisation 
Surveys 
ICBS Western Europe ICBS Eastern Europe CCBS Nigeria
Year of victimisation 1993 1999 2006
Mode of survey Telephone
Telephone/
face-to-face Face-to-face
Sample size (N) 7558a 4322 2203
Victimised at least once per annum by:
Any common crime (%) - 27 48
Burglary (%) 29 9 30
Vandalism (%) 10 4 10
Theft of vehicle (%) 6 4 7
Theft from vehicle (%) 13 7 11
Theft by employees (%) }60 4 22
b
Theft by customers (%) 5 -
Theft by outsiders (%) 13 17b
Robbery (%) 3 3 12
Assault and threats (%) 9 1 14
Corruption and bribery (%) }3 19 9
c
Extortion/intimidation (%) 9 8
Reported to policed (%) >90 (burglary) 
to 33 (crimes by 
employees)
19 (employee theft) 
to 67 (burglary)
46 (outsider 
theft) to 85 
(robbery)
Sources: International Crime against Business Survey (ICBS), Central Eastern Europe (Alvazzi del Frate 
2004); International Crime against Business Survey (ICBS), Western Europe (van Dijk and Terlouw 1996); 
Crime and Corruption Business Survey (CCBS) (Nigerian NBS 2010). 
Notes: a This figure includes businesses in the Czech Republic and Hungary; except for Australia 
(N = 1000), sample size by country was not provided; b includes theft as well as fraud; c this is the 
percentage of businesses that did pay a bribe to an official; it does not include requests for bribes that were 
not paid; d for all common crimes except theft of a vehicle.
It is worth mentioning the PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) Global Economic 
Crime Survey, conducted in 2007 in 40 countries from all regions of the world 
(PWC 2007a), although it focuses only on economic crime.8 The economic 
crimes that were surveyed covered similar acts to the ICBS but were categorised 
differently. They included
8 The PWC survey has been conducted every two years since 2001 and has included an increasing number of 
countries. The latest survey was carried out in 2009 but we use the results of the 2007 sweep, as it is the closest 
in time to the China ICBS. The companies surveyed are selected randomly and for each country the sample 
size is determined according to the country’s GDP. The 2007 sample included 47 per cent of respondents from 
Western Europe, 16 per cent from the Asia-Pacific, 15 per cent from Central and Eastern Europe, 11 per cent 
from North America, 6 per cent from South and Central America, and 5 per cent from Africa.
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•	 asset misappropriation: the theft of company assets such as monetary assets, 
cash, supplies and equipment by company directors, others in fiduciary 
positions and employees
•	 accounting fraud: the falsification or misrepresentation of the company 
accounts in such a way that they do not truly reflect the value of the company 
or its activities
•	 corruption and extortion: the unlawful use of an official position to gain an 
advantage and the use of intimidation or blackmail
•	 money laundering: acts intended to legitimise the proceeds of crime by 
disguising their origin
•	 IP infringement: illegal copying, counterfeiting and illegal distribution of 
fake goods in breach of patent or copyright.
Of the global sample of 5428 companies, 43 per cent of companies reported 
suffering at least one type of economic crime in the two years prior to the survey. 
The prevalence of economic crime was lowest in Western Europe (38 per cent) 
and the Asia-Pacific (39 per cent) and highest in North America and Africa (52 
per cent). The most prevalent type of victimisation was asset misappropriation 
(mentioned by 30 per cent of respondents), followed by IP infringement (15 per 
cent) and corruption and extortion (13 per cent). 
Consistent with other business surveys, the PWC survey found that larger 
companies were at greater risk of economic victimisation. Globally, 62 per cent 
of companies with more than 5000 employees reported one or more instances of 
victimisation, but only 32 per cent of companies with fewer than 200 employees 
did so. Rates of victimisation also varied by sector of activity. The insurance 
and the retail sectors reported the highest prevalence of economic crime (57 per 
cent) and the pharmaceuticals sector the lowest (27 per cent). Economic crime 
in the financial services sector was slightly above average (46 per cent) while it 
was close to average in the manufacturing sector (42 per cent).
The total direct monetary loss reported by respondents over two years was in 
excess of US$4.2 billion. PWC estimated that nearly one-third of that amount 
was lost through asset misappropriation; 15 per cent was due to IP infringement, 
13 per cent to bribery and extortion and 12 per cent to accounting fraud. 
Adding to these direct losses were ‘crime-management costs’ such as the cost of 
litigation, reallocation of management time and potential fines from regulators. 
Companies also faced less tangible kinds of loss such as damage to the company 
brand, a drop in share price, decline in morale and impaired relations with other 
businesses and regulators.
Before we outline the design and methods of the ICBS, we briefly describe 
the four cities that were surveyed, which provides a background to better 
understand the ICBS results in each city.
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The Four Cities: Hong Kong, Shanghai, 
Shenzhen and Xi’an
These four Chinese cities were chosen because of their different administrative 
status and geographic location. Initially, we considered running the survey in 
Beijing where the UNICVS had been conducted in 1994. We also considered 
Tianjin where in 2004 a similar omnibus crime victim survey had been conducted 
by local and overseas researchers (see Chapter 2). Beijing and Tianjin are, 
however, located close to each other on the east coast of China and we decided 
not to include them to maximise administrative and geographical variation.9 
Table 1.2 presents selected characteristics of the four cities.
Hong Kong
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HK SAR) of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) comprises a peninsula and more than 200 islands 
located in the South China Sea at the mouth of the Pearl River, covering an area 
of 1104 sq km.10 Hong Kong borders the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone of 
the PRC’s Guangdong Province. A British colony since 1842, Hong Kong was 
handed back to China on 1 July 1997 under the ‘one country, two systems’ 
principle agreed in the joint Sino–British declaration of 1984. The ‘one country, 
two systems’ allows Hong Kong to continue to follow English common law and 
maintain its autonomy in all domains except foreign affairs and defence. Article 
5 of the Hong Kong Basic Law states: ‘The socialist system and policies shall not 
be practised in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and the previous 
capitalist system and way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years.’ Hong 
Kong SAR has a two-tier system of government, headed by the Chief Executive. 
The Legislative Council comprises 60 members elected every four years, of whom 
30 are elected directly by geographic district and 30 are elected by so-called 
functional constituencies (that is, comprising various sectors such as labour, 
industry and professional associations), and 18 District Councils (also elected) 
that manage local affairs. The Legislative Council reviews government policy, 
approves budgets and endorses the appointment or dismissal of the appellate 
judges and the Chief Judge. The two official languages of Hong Kong under the 
Basic Law are English and Chinese, although the language policy is ‘biliterate 
and trilingual’, meaning that Cantonese is acknowledged as the de facto official 
spoken variety of Chinese in Hong Kong, while the use of Mandarin is also 
accepted.
9 Funding constraints also limited the range of cities, but apparent sensitivity at the time to social and other 
surveys conducted in Beijing was also a factor. 
10 This section draws mainly from Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong (2007b, 2007c).
Business and the Risk of Crime in China 
32
In 2004, the population was estimated at 6 882 600 people, with few non-
permanent residents (0.3 per cent) (Table 1.2). Following the trend in most 
industrialised countries, here, the rate of population growth has been slowing—
from an annual rate of about 3 per cent in the mid-1970s to just more than 1 
per cent in 2000–05. Because of a decline in the fertility rate, the proportion of 
youths under fifteen years is decreasing, while the proportion of the population 
aged sixty-five and over is growing. The population median age has been rising, 
from thirty-four years in 1996 to thirty-six years in 2001 and 38.6 years in 2004. 
People of Chinese descent constitute 95 per cent of the Hong Kong population; 
Filipinos (1.6 per cent) and Indonesians (1.3 per cent) form the largest ethnic 
groups and this is mainly due to the large numbers of migrant workers (mostly 
domestic helpers) from the Philippines and Indonesia.
Hong Kong is one of the world’s leading financial centres. It continues to have a 
capitalist economy based on free trade, low taxation and minimum government 
intervention. In 2006, it was the twelfth-largest trading entity in the world, 
with the second-largest stock exchange in Asia in terms of market capitalisation 
after Tokyo. About half of Hong Kong’s total trade value is with mainland 
China. Four key industries contribute to Hong Kong’s economic success and 
employ nearly half the workforce: trading (wholesale, retail and import/export) 
is the largest (29 per cent of GDP), followed by financial services (13 per cent), 
various professional services (11 per cent) and finally tourism (3 per cent). In 
2004, Hong Kong’s gross domestic product (GDP) was US$192 billion—one of 
the highest among Asian as well as Western countries (Figure 1.1, top). The GDP 
was overwhelmingly driven by the tertiary sector, which accounted for 88 per 
cent of GDP. More than 60 per cent of the population was in the labour force. At 
6.8 per cent, the rate of unemployment was slightly higher than in neighbouring 
countries (Singapore, 3 per cent; Taiwan, 4 per cent; Japan, 4.5 per cent), and 
closer to rates in the United States and Australia (5 per cent). Although Hong 
Kong’s GDP has more than doubled since 1988, Hong Kong also has the greatest 
level of income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient.11 Hong Kong’s 
Gini coefficient (53.3) is relatively close to Singapore’s (48.1), but much higher 
than Seoul (31.3), Taiwan (33.9) and Tokyo (38.1) (Figure 1.1, bottom).
11 The Gini coefficient is a measure of equality that varies from 0 to 100. Zero represents perfect equality 
(everyone has the same income) and 100, perfect inequality (one person has all the income). Numbers closest 
to zero indicate countries with smaller income disparities.
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Table 1.2 Selected Characteristics of Hong Kong (2004) and Three 
Mainland Cities (2005)
Hong Kong Shanghai Shenzhen Xi’an
Total population (million) 6 .88 17 .78 8 .28 8 .06
Percentage of non-permanent 
population 0 .3 33 75 9
Percentage of population aged:
      Under 15 years 15 8 11 21
      15–64 years 73 80 88 73
      65 years and over 12 12 1 .3 6
Average annual population 
growth, 1985–2005 (%)a 1 .9 2 .5 10 .6 2 .8
Average annual disposable 
income for household (US$) - 2293 3394 2171
Average annual income for 
employees (US$) 16 082 3299 3345 2180
Unemployment rate (%) 6 .8 4 .4 2 .6 4 .3
GDP per capita (US$) 24 400 6331 7171 1951
Sector of economy, percentage 
of GDP:b
      Primary (agriculture & mining) 0 .1 1 .0 0 .5 5 .0
      Secondary (manufacturing) 12 .0 48 .6 61 .5 42 .0
      Tertiary (services) 87 .9 50 .4 38 .0 53 .0
Sources: Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong (2005); Government of Shenzhen (2006); Government 
of Xi’an (2006); Shanghai Municipal Statistics Bureau (2006).
Notes: a Estimated from United Nations Secretariat (2006); b CIA (2005).
Shanghai
Shanghai is located on the coast of eastern China, at the heart of the Yangtze River 
Delta, but extends beyond urban areas into the surrounding rural hinterland, 
covering about 7000 sq km. Strategically located as a centre for international 
trade, but also as a key point of entry into the China market, particularly the 
eastern regions, Shanghai is the largest city in China, and one of the largest 
in the world. It is one of four municipalities, along with Beijing, Tianjin and 
Chongqing, under direct administration of the Central Government, with 
administrative status equal to that of a Province. As a result, national policies 
have much influence on the city, but the Mayor of Shanghai also has political 
support to run the city, and several National Government officials, such as 
former President Jiang Zemin, have risen in Shanghai. 
The Shanghai municipality comprises 17 districts and one county. While the 
central district including the Old City remains Shanghai’s political, economic 
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and cultural centre, urbanisation has shifted focus from the central area to the 
outskirts, with the creation—on the basis of industries—of new urban towns 
with planned layouts and favourable conditions for economic development. 
From a population of about 5.3 million in 1950, Shanghai’s resident population 
reached 17.78 million in 2005—that is, just more than 1 per cent of China’s 
population (of 1.33 billion). One-third of this population comprised non-
permanent residents. The proportion of the permanent population aged under 
fifteen was only 8 per cent—suggesting an ageing population trend. Of the 
total workforce, 42 per cent was employed in state-owned or collective-owned 
enterprises, 26 per cent in privately run businesses, 10 per cent in foreign 
investment companies and the rest in various other forms of business. Shanghai’s 
GDP totalled US$112 billion with a per capita annual disposable income for 
urban households of US$2293 in 2005 (an increase of 11.8 per cent from 2004). 
Annual wages for staff and workers averaged US$3299, with an unemployment 
rate of 4.4 per cent in urban areas (Shanghai Municipal Statistics Bureau 2006). 
Not everyone, however, has benefited from the city’s phenomenal growth. 
Guang (2002) remarks that the distribution of socioeconomic and infrastructural 
resources is uneven and shanty areas coexist with the best-quality residences. 
Large-scale migration from the countryside to the city has resulted in problems 
of social disorganisation such as traffic congestion, inadequate transport and 
water supply, homelessness, and lack of training opportunities for unemployed 
and low-skilled workers. According to the United Nations, Shanghai’s Gini 
coefficient for 2004–05 was 32.12
Already a major trading port in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
Shanghai grew rapidly following the Treaty of Nanking, in 1842, which 
settled the First Opium War (1839–42) fought against the British to prevent 
the importation of opium. The treaty opened Shanghai (and Canton, Ningbo, 
Xiamen and Fuzhou as well as ceding Hong Kong Island) to international trade 
and granted foreigners the right to live and trade in Shanghai. The foreign 
concessions (the ‘unequal treaties’) and settlements were administered under 
the laws of the French, English, Americans and later the Japanese in the colonial 
period before World War II (Jones 1939:34). Foreign banks, factories and trading 
houses were established, along with international shipping routes to Europe, 
the United States, Japan, Hong Kong, South-East Asia, India and Australia. From 
the end of the nineteenth century until the mid-1940s, Shanghai accounted for 
about half of China’s foreign trade and became the main banking, financial, 
industrial and shipping centre in China (Yan 1984:101). Shanghai during this 
period also became known for its crime problems and the role of organised 
crime groups such as the Green Gang in the city’s government and illicit markets 
(Wakeman 1995).
12 Other sources, however, suggest that the Gini index for Pudong, Shanghai’s new economic zone, is much 
higher and rose from 37 in 1994 to 45 in 2001 (Chen 2009). The Gini index is typically based on the resident 
population, which excludes many migrant workers. Therefore, for Shanghai and other mainland cities, these 
indices could be biased.
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Figure 1.1 GDP and Gini Coefficient for Selected Cities
Sources: Hawksworth et al. (2007:24–6); for Taiwan, CIA (2005). 
Note: GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP) is based on the international dollar, a hypothetical unit of 
currency with the same purchasing power as the US dollar within the United States. It is a useful measure 
to compare various countries’ standard of living in space and over time; the GDP for Taipei was not 
available so we use that of Taiwan. 
Sources: UN-HABITAT (2008); for Taipei, ADB (2007).
Note: The Gini Coefficient was calculated for various years ranging from 2001 to 2006; for Hong Kong, the 
year is 2001; for mainland cities, it is 2004–05. 
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In 1949, the Communist People’s Liberation Army took control of Shanghai. Most 
foreign companies moved their offices and headquarters out of Shanghai and 
many relocated to Hong Kong. During the next two decades, Shanghai became an 
industrial centre and one of the main contributors to the Central Government’s 
tax revenue. For this reason, despite high economic growth, Shanghai’s 
infrastructure and capital development was slow until the municipality was 
permitted to initiate economic reforms in 1991. Starting with the creation of 
the Pudong New Economic Zone in the early 1990s and an influx of foreign 
and domestic investments, Shanghai experienced a period of fast economic 
development, with an annual growth rate between 9 and 15 per cent. Major 
industrial restructuring led to a decrease in low value-added manufacturing 
but spectacular growth in the tertiary sector—finance, insurance, trade, retail 
and wholesale, transportation, communications, real estate and information 
technology—the total GDP of which exceeds that of both the agricultural and 
the industrial sectors. In 2005, the tertiary sector contributed 50.4 per cent 
to Shanghai’s total GDP; the secondary sector, 48.6 per cent; and the primary 
sector, just 1 per cent. Shanghai has, in addition to the tertiary sector, a 
diverse economy comprising a range of manufacturing industries (electronics, 
communication, information, automotive, and iron and steel), a sophisticated 
petroleum and chemical industry, biomedicine, and tourism.
Shanghai is considered China’s first commercial and financial centre for both 
domestic and international trade. The independent Shanghai Stock Exchange, 
opened in 1990, is the largest in mainland China in terms of the number of 
listed companies and total market value, and the world’s fastest-growing stock 
exchange. Shanghai hosts branches of most international banks, insurance 
and securities companies, and 325 of the world’s top-500 companies have 
investments in Shanghai (Guang 2002). With several districts designated as 
special economic zones (SEZs), the non-state sector has grown to now generate 
42 per cent of Shanghai’s GDP. Shanghai occupies only 0.1 per cent of the land 
area of the country, yet supplies more than 12 per cent of the municipal revenue 
and handles more than one-quarter of total trade passing through China’s 
ports. In 2005, container traffic through Shanghai’s port overtook that of Hong 
Kong, making Shanghai the second-busiest port in the world behind Singapore 
(American Association of Port Authorities 2005). Hong Kong provided the 
largest source of overseas investment in Shanghai, mostly in infrastructure, real 
estate, food catering and retail trade. Supported by rising income levels and a 
large inflow of tourists, Shanghai is the largest consumer market among all the 
mainland cities, and is considered a trendsetter for fashion and lifestyle. Major 
foreign retailers, department stores and franchised chain stores are present in 





Shenzhen is located on the Pearl River Delta at the southern tip of the Chinese 
mainland, about 100 km south-east of Guangzhou, the capital city of Guangdong 
Province, and adjoining Hong Kong SAR on its southern border.13 The city 
covers roughly 2000 sq km with access to 230 km of coastline. Shenzhen has the 
status of sub-provincial city—that is, it is governed by Guangdong Province but 
it administers its economy and law independently. Shenzhen has jurisdiction 
over six districts and two zones. For most of its history, Shenzhen had been 
a fishing village with fertile agrarian land and a relatively small population, 
estimated at 30 000 in 1979. Shenzhen’s landscape and status changed radically 
when it was chosen to be China’s first SEZ in May 1980. Under Deng Xiaoping’s 
policies of economic reform and liberalisation known as ‘socialism with Chinese 
characteristics’, Shenzhen was opened to foreign investment, restrictions on 
business development were reduced or lifted, and several free-trade processing 
zones, where imports and exports were exempt from the usual duties, were 
established. The city was promoted to prefecture level with the right to 
draft local laws and set local regulations and was granted special economic 
management status and flexible governmental measures conducive to business 
and economic growth. Since then, Shenzhen has been one of the fastest-growing 
cities in the world and has become a major centre for foreign investment and 
trade, importing more goods than any other city in China. In 2006, among 
120 mainland Chinese cities, Shenzhen was ranked second-best in terms of 
investment climate for foreign firms by the World Bank, ahead of Shanghai 
(ranked 17) and Xi’an (ranked 70), and third-best in terms of the Government’s 
effectiveness towards foreign firms, ahead of Shanghai (ranked 26) and Xi’an 
(ranked 57) (Mako 2006). 
Since 1980, Shenzhen has experienced a population explosion, with average 
annual population growth of more than 10 per cent fully justifying its reputation 
as the ‘overnight city’ (Table 1.2). The population increase was particularly high 
during the 1990s when it reached nearly 20 per cent annually (UN Secretariat 
2008). Ninety per cent of the population growth has been fuelled by the large-scale 
influx of migrant workers from China’s interior (Chen 1987). In 2005, Shenzhen’s 
resident population reached 8.28 million; however, less than one-quarter was 
registered under the hukou (household registration system), the majority being 
‘floating’ workers registered elsewhere but mainly from rural areas of China. The 
household registration system, inter alia, entitles those registered in urban areas 
to low-cost government services and benefits (health, education and housing), 
but without such registration many migrant workers must pay fees even for 
access to local services such as a bus pass. Millions of poor rural workers have 
13 Unless otherwise indicated, information in this section is from Shenzhen Government Online: <english.
sz.gov.cn/>
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been drawn to rapidly developing cities such as Shenzhen. Efforts to reform the 
hukou system and to reduce the negative consequences of no registration have 
yet to reduce the disadvantages experienced by many migrant workers (Chan 
and Buckingham 2008).14 Many of China’s social problems, including crime in 
urban areas, have been attributed to the impact of the large floating population 
of unregistered peasant workers drawn to low-skilled jobs in the cities (Roberts 
2002; Zhong 2009a).
Because of the large migrant population, both Cantonese, the language spoken in 
Guangdong (and eastern Guanxi Province), and Mandarin are used in Shenzhen. 
Shenzhen’s population is young, with an average age of about thirty years. More 
than 88 per cent of the population is aged between fifteen and fifty-nine years, 
including 20 per cent aged twenty–twenty-four years, with only 1.3 per cent 
aged sixty-five and over. At the end of 2004, Shenzhen’s GDP was US$42 billion 
and the per capita annual disposable income of urban households was US$3394. 
Shenzhen’s employees’ annual wages averaged US$3345 and unemployment in 
urban areas was 2.6 per cent—lower than in the other cities.
Shenzhen’s economy is oriented mostly towards exports. In 2005, its import 
and export volume represented one-seventh of the country’s total import/
export volume and ranked first in the Mainland. The major share of exports 
from Shenzhen goes to Hong Kong (44 per cent, with most of it re-exported), 
then to the United States (22 per cent) and Europe (11 per cent), with a growing 
market developing with India and Russia. Shenzhen has three free-trade zones 
reserved for foreign businesses, where no taxes or duties are levied on imported 
and exported goods. These special zones are attractive to foreign investors, who 
can cheaply produce goods that are exported back to the West. More than 150 
000 companies have premises in Shenzhen: 60 per cent are privately owned, 26 
per cent are state or collective owned and 14 per cent are funded using foreign 
investments. Thirty per cent of workers are employed in the private economy 
sector, which contributes to half of Shenzhen’s total revenues. The majority (70 
per cent) of foreign investment in Shenzhen comes from Hong Kong; the rest 
comes from a variety of countries including investments by more than 100 of 
the largest multinationals. 
Hong Kong firms have long outsourced manufacturing and other business 
activities to Shenzhen where labour and other costs are much lower. In more 
recent times, labour and service costs have risen and many manufacturing 
enterprises have relocated to cheaper locations in the interior. It is commonplace 
for Hong Kong business to operate in both Shenzhen and Hong Kong, and 
14 Chan and Buckingham (2008:583) note: ‘the hukou system is a cornerstone of China’s infamous rural–
urban “apartheid”, creating a system of “cities with invisible walls”. It is a major source of injustice and 
inequality, perhaps the most crucial foundation of China’s social and spatial stratification, and arguably 
contributes to the country’s most prevalent human rights violations.’ 
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increasingly for companies from Shenzhen and other mainland cities to operate 
or establish branches in Hong Kong. These dual operations are reflected in the 
format of the questions asked in the survey.
Shenzhen’s economy is driven by the secondary sector (manufacturing, 61.5 per 
cent of GDP) supported by the tertiary sector (38 per cent of GDP). Industrial 
development is based on low-input/low-consumption and high-input/high-
efficiency industries. High-tech production is prominent in Shenzhen and 
accounts for half of the city’s gross industrial output value. Key industries 
include information technology and computers, software, communication 
equipment, light machinery, microelectronics, video and audio products, 
electro-mechanical goods, chemicals and plastics, and modern energy-producing 
technology. The development and production of pharmaceuticals, medical 
equipment, biotechnology and new materials are increasing. Shenzhen is also 
a manufacturing and trade centre for textiles and clothing, as well as jewellery, 
clocks and watches. In 1990, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange opened and helped 
Shenzhen develop as a centre for finance, commerce and trade. Real estate, the 
legal and accounting sectors, insurance and tourism are key tertiary industries 
that contribute to Shenzhen’s economy, and 38 foreign banks have branches in 
Shenzhen.
As the fastest-growing city in China for the past 30 years, Shenzhen is 
characterised by rapid industrialisation, urbanisation, migration and 
population growth, with its associated problems. Qi and Liu (2008) remark that 
land scarcity might restrict Shenzhen’s future sustainable development and that 
urban sprawl has led to increases in petrol consumption and vehicle-related 
pollution. The economic liberalisation of the early 1980s has changed the status 
of land from collectively owned public property to an economic asset and a 
source of profits (Hang 2008). In a fast-developing city such as Shenzhen, the 
high demand for land and housing has led to skyrocketing land prices and, 
because of the extraordinary number of migrant workers, there has been a 
great need for rental housing that could not be filled by government housing. 
In contrast with many Western and newly developing countries, however, in 
Shenzhen, slums and shanty towns have not spread and the housing needs of 
low-paid migrant workers have been provided by urban ‘villages’. Originally, 
urban villages were rural settlements that have been incorporated into the built-
up areas by the growing city. Cheap housing has been developed by farmers 
on their land and rented out. In this way, urban villages provide an income 
to the traditional village population who manages these villages, and supplies 
affordable accommodation, near the city centre and industrial areas, to migrant 
workers. Shenzhen urban villages share some characteristics of shanty towns, 
such as overcrowding, lack of infrastructure, and social and environmental 
Business and the Risk of Crime in China 
40
problems, but basic services such as water, electricity and sewerage systems 
are provided and the housing is of relatively better quality than that of slums 
(Wang et al. 2009a, 2009b).
According to the Shenzhen Government’s description of life in Shenzhen, 
‘the population structure polarises into two opposing extremes: intellectuals 
with a high level of education, and migrant workers with poor education’. 
The Shenzhen Government makes it relatively easy for people to obtain hukou 
(residence permits) if they are highly educated, but this does not apply to the 
low-end migrant factory workers. While average wages tend to be higher in 
Shenzhen than in the rest of mainland China, inequality is also high. With 
a Gini coefficient of 49 in 2004–05, Shenzhen approximates the high level of 
inequality in the United States (Figure 1.1).
Xi’an
Xi’an is the only surveyed city located in central China, on the Guanzhong 
Plain, between the Huang He (Yellow River) and the Yangtze River. It is the 
capital of Shaanxi Province and has the status of a sub-provincial city, with 
jurisdiction over nine districts and four counties. It is governed by Shaanxi 
Province but, like Shenzhen, it independently administers its economy and 
law. As one of the Four Great Ancient Capitals of China, Xi’an has a long and 
rich history dating back 7000 years. Because of its strategic location on the 
Silk Road, it has been the capital of some of the most important dynasties in 
Chinese history. Xi’an is best known as the site of Emperor Qin’s mausoleum 
and its Army of the Terracotta Warriors (247–208 BC). Xi’an’s (or Chang’an as 
it was known at the time) political influence declined in the second century 
AD, when the empire’s capital was moved to Luoyang, Henan Province, but it 
remained an economic centre at the starting point of the Silk Road. Under the 
Tang Dynasty (618–907), Xi’an was re-established as the capital and became 
one of the largest international cities of the time. After the fall of the Tang 
Dynasty, Xi’an’s prestige declined although it still played an important role as a 
regional capital and a trade centre on the Silk Road. In December 1936, the Xi’an 
Incident,15 which led the Nationalists and Communists to cooperate and fight 
the increased threat posed by the Japanese invasion, was a significant event in 
Chinese recent history (see Crossland 1987; Tuchman 1971).
The city of Xi’an is located about 1000 km south-west of Beijing. It covers nearly 
10 000 sq km and is surrounded by fertile arable lands and several rivers and 
streams. In 2005, the resident population was 8.06 million, including 9 per cent 
15 The Xi’an Incident involved the capture of the Nationalist leader, General Chiang Kai-shek, by Marshal 
Zhang during the civil war and led to the formation, among otherwise bitter political opponents, of a united 
front just prior to the outbreak of the second Sino–Chinese war (see Garver 1991; Tuchman 1971).
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who were non-permanent residents. Nearly three-quarters of the population 
(73 per cent) was aged between fifteen and sixty-four, and 6 per cent was sixty-
five and over. Since the 1980s, Xi’an has experienced an economic revival and 
has re-emerged as an important cultural, industrial and educational centre 
for the central region, with facilities for research and development, national 
security and China’s space-exploration program.16 In 2005, the GDP of Xi’an 
totalled US$15 billion, with a per capita annual disposable income for urban 
households of US$2171. Xi’an’s employees’ annual wages averaged US$2180 
and unemployment in urban areas was 4.3 per cent. The city’s GDP nearly 
doubled between 2000 and 2005, and in 2005 Xi’an’s GDP accounted for one-
quarter of the Province’s total GDP. Tertiary industries (service and tourism) 
contributed 53 per cent to GDP, followed by the secondary sector (industry and 
construction, 42 per cent), and the primary sector (agriculture and mining, 5 
per cent). The land that surrounds Xi’an is fertile with easy access to irrigation 
and consequently large yields of farm produce are obtained. The area is also 
rich in mineral resources and is close to the sources of relatively cheap energy 
of the north of Shaanxi Province (coal, oil, and natural gas), which ensures an 
adequate supply of energy for industries and residents.
With three state-level development zones (economic and technological 
development, hi-tech industries, and export processing), Xi’an is the largest 
industrial centre in China’s mid and north-west and receives large amounts of 
direct foreign investment. The level of import/export activity achieved by the 
industrial sector makes up more than 60 per cent of the city’s total trading value. 
Equipment manufacturing is a key industry including aviation equipment, 
railway equipment, motor vehicles and heavy and light machinery. The city is a 
pioneer in the software industry including a significant export trade in software 
applications. The hi-tech sector is at the heart of Xi’an’s economic development 
and includes electronics and microelectronics, mechanical and electrical 
integration, bioengineering, pharmaceuticals, new materials, and energy-saving 
devices. Several national and multinational telecommunication companies also 
have factories and research centres in Xi’an.
Xi’an is, in addition to manufacturing, a major scientific and technological 
research centre in China with about 500 research institutions, laboratories, 
and engineering and industry research and testing centres. With many higher 
education institutions, it is also a leading centre for engineering training. 
Significant scientific achievements such as the first Chinese engine for carrier 
rockets and the first satellite-borne computer were designed and developed in 
Xi’an. The city is home to several state-owned military industries and is a leader 
in the development of science and technology for national defence, as well as a 
major centre for missile production. With its rich cultural history, Xi’an is one 
16 Information in this section was drawn from Xi’an Statistical Yearbook 2006 (Government of Xi’an 2006).
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of the nation’s key tourist destinations, and tourism (primarily internal) forms 
the basis of the service industry, along with service outsourcing from overseas. 
A financial and commercial sector is now also emerging as an important element 
of Xi’an’s growth. 
Xi’an presents many advantages that encourage companies and professionals to 
relocate there. Because the city is a leader in aeronautics, aerospace software and 
other high-value industries, the proportion of technical personnel in Xi’an is 
the highest in China, providing substantial numbers of skilled technicians and 
workers. In addition, labour and human resources costs are much lower than on 
the eastern coast and this has benefited the city in more recent times as such 
costs (and associated inflation) have led to increasing labour costs in established 
coastal cities. For example, in 2005, 19 of the world’s top-500 companies, such as 
Mitsubishi, Coca-Cola, Boeing and Toshiba, had established branches in Xi’an. 
State and public ownership of businesses is still dominant, but foreign capital 
enterprises and private companies are also rapidly developing a presence. 
The Gini coefficient of Xi’an is 37—that is, the second-lowest after Shanghai, 
suggesting lower inequality in Xi’an than in Shenzhen or Hong Kong. 
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2. Crime and its Control in China
Both Hong Kong and the mainland have experienced profound social, political 
and economic changes in the past 30 years, which have influenced crime rates and 
the responses to crime. Research on crime and victimisation is well developed in 
Western industrialised countries, but less so in developing countries and new 
economies. In Hong Kong, official crime and justice statistics as well as data from 
victimisation surveys are readily available. Information from the mainland is 
becoming more accessible, particularly in the English language; however, crime 
statistics are limited, by and large, to aggregate national data. Although the 
extent and nature of crime in communist China are still subject to speculation, 
there is a tendency towards a more open discussion of crime problems, and 
a growing body of empirical (albeit small-scale) and criminological studies 
is appearing in the relevant scholarly and police journals. Generally, experts 
agree that crime rates were traditionally very low, but rose dramatically in the 
1980s (Bakken 2005; Messner et al. 2007a). In this chapter, we review data 
and trends for crimes against both persons and businesses to contextualise the 
results of the ICBS. We argue that the general climate for criminal activity will 
be relevant to the risks of crimes against business. We also provide an overview 
of policing and crime-control mechanisms, first looking at Hong Kong and then 
at the mainland, including what is known about crime problems in Shanghai, 
Shenzhen and Xi’an. We compare crime and victimisation rates in Hong Kong 
and the mainland with a number of selected countries in Asia and the rest of 
the world, drawing from both official data and victimisation surveys. Finally, 
we discuss how well these data fit with theories of modernisation and crime. 
Crime and Policing in Hong Kong
Crime Trends and Common Crime
Despite its economic success and ‘safe city’ status, Hong Kong has experienced 
several crime waves and major crises in the past half-century. Industrialisation 
after World War II produced social problems—notably, a class of urban poor, 
aggravated by the continuous influx of migrants. Long-held anti-colonial feelings 
and social discontent led to riots in 1966 and 1967, to which the Government 
responded by implementing social reforms regulating working conditions and 
funding public housing to accommodate the influx of migrants from mainland 
China. Yet, crime continued to increase and official figures of police-recorded 
crime feature a rapid rise during the early 1970s, which was maintained from 
1974 (1294 per 100 000) until 1995 (1493 per 100 000). From the mid-1990s, 
crime rates started to decrease. For example, the rate of homicide stood at 0.79 
per 100 000 population in 1961, which rose to 2.79 in 1972 and 2.4 in 1990. By 
2005, it had fallen to 0.49—a lower level than in 1961. The pattern for other 
crimes followed that of homicide (see Broadhurst et al. 2007 for details). 
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The Asian financial crisis of 1998 triggered a recession in the Hong Kong 
property market and the 2003 SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) 
epidemic further depressed the already weakened Hong Kong economy. These 
events intensified social instability and might have been reflected in an increase 
in the overall crime rate in 1999 and 2003, but the effect was temporary because 
crime rates returned to the previous lower level in the late 2000s. The drop in 
crime since the mid-1990s matches a reduction in the population group with 
the highest risk of offending—that is, those aged fifteen–twenty-nine years 
(Broadhurst et al. 2008).
Table 2.1 Hong Kong: Police-recorded crime, 1999 and 2004, and Crime 
Victimisation Survey, 2005 (rate per 100 000)
Police-recorded crimea Hong Kong CVSb
1999 2004 2005
All crime 1162 1199 5250c
All violent crime 238 205 1070
Homicide 0 .9 0 .7 -
Wounding and serious assault 112 105 290
Robbery 55 33 250
Criminal intimidation 17 17 250
Burglary 139 103 1520
Deception/fraud 52 59 280
All theft 441 551 -
Shop theft - 135 -
Triad-related crime 44 37 525d
Sources: Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong (2007a); Hong Kong Police Force (2009a). 
Notes: a Rates are per 100 000 population and are calculated based on population data from the Census 
and Statistics Department; except for homicide, rates have been rounded to the nearest whole number; 
b except for ‘all crime’, rates are per 100 000 population aged twelve and over; to enable comparisons, we 
have converted the rates per 1000 reported by the CVS to rates per 100 000; c overall rate estimated by 
adding up total N household crime + N personal crime/total population; rate is underestimated because the 
CVS sample consists of people aged twelve and over; d in the CVS, 10.2 per cent of crime victims believed 
the incident might have involved triads, but this is not directly comparable with police definitions of 
triad-related crime.
Table 2.1 presents official crime statistics for 1999 and 2004 (the reference year 
for the ICBS), and rates of victimisation reported in the Hong Kong Government’s 
own victimisation survey for 2005. Not surprisingly, victimisation rates are 
much higher than those in official records because not all crimes are reported or 
come to the attention of the police. In addition, the Hong Kong UNICVS showed 
that rates of reporting to police tended to be relatively low, particularly for 
less serious offences (Broadhurst et al. 2010). For example, the official rate of 
burglary represents less than 10 per cent of the estimates from the UNICVS, but 
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for wounding and serious assault, the official record accounts for 35 per cent of 
the UNICVS estimate. In both 1999 and 2004, homicide rates were less than 1 
per 100 000 population—about the same level as in the early 1960s. At 1199 per 
100 000, the 2004 overall rate of crime was similar to that of 1999 (1162). 
Crimes against Business, Non-Conventional and 
Organised Crime
It is difficult to know the extent of crimes against business because official crime 
statistics typically do not report the characteristics of victims. For example, 
police record the number of frauds reported to them, but the monetary amount 
of the fraud and details about perpetrators and victims are rarely available. Since 
fraud can be perpetrated by businesses against consumers or other businesses, 
or by suppliers, consumers and other persons against businesses, official 
statistics are inadequate to study the fraud victimisation of businesses. Studies 
and surveys that specifically target business (like those reviewed in Section 1.2) 
are more useful; we found only two studies that had been conducted in Hong 
Kong and one in the mainland. 
In 2009, seven large retail corporations located in Hong Kong took part for the 
first time in the Worldwide Shrinkage Survey or Global Retail Theft Barometer, 
which examines the cost to retailers of ‘shrinkage’—that is, loss of stock due to 
theft by customers, employees and suppliers, and loss due to errors.1 Across the 
41 countries surveyed, shrinkage was estimated to represent 1.43 per cent of 
global retail sales in 2008–09. In Hong Kong over the 12 months of the survey 
period, shrinkage cost US$294 million to the retail industry and represented 
0.9 per cent of total retail sales. One-quarter of the loss was due to pricing and 
accounting errors; three-quarters to theft and fraud: 52 per cent was attributed 
to theft by customers and shoplifting, 19 per cent to theft by employees, and 9 
per cent to fraud by suppliers. Consistent with Hong Kong’s generally low rates 
of all types of crime, Hong Kong ranked second-lowest among the 41 countries 
included in the survey, just ahead of Taiwan. India reported the largest shrinkage 
(3.2 per cent of retail sales); Singapore, China and Japan (1.2 per cent, 1.1 per 
cent and 1 per cent respectively) ranked lower than Western countries such as 
the United States (1.6 per cent) and the United Kingdom (1.4 per cent) (Bamfield 
2009).
Hong Kong companies have participated in three sweeps of 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers’ (PWC) Global Economic Crime Survey, which every 
1 The survey has been conducted globally since 2001 by the British Centre for Retail Research. The 2009 
sweep surveyed 1069 large retail companies across 41 countries. The data period was one year: 1 July 2008 to 
30 June 2009. In 2009 and for the first time, the survey included companies in four Chinese cities: Hong Kong, 
Beijing, Guangdong and Shanghai.
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two years since 2001 has examined the prevalence of and perceptions about 
economic crime against businesses in 40 countries from all regions of the world.2 
In 2007, PWC contacted the representatives of 100 Hong Kong companies and 
asked them about their experiences of asset misappropriation, accounting 
fraud, corruption and bribery (including extortion), money laundering, and 
intellectual property (IP) infringement (PWC 2007b).3 As Table 2.2 shows, of 
the 100 companies surveyed, just more than one-quarter (26 per cent) reported 
that they had been victims of economic crime in the past two years, which 
was much lower than the global average of 43 per cent. Yet, this figure was 
4 percentage points higher than in the 2005 survey. Nearly half (N = 46) the 
companies surveyed also conducted business activities in mainland China and 
those were asked about their experiences of victimisation and perceptions of 
economic crime in the mainland. For them, the rate of victimisation was slightly 
higher, at 29 per cent, and the type of victimisation was different. Bribery and 
corruption were reported more frequently in the mainland (14 per cent—close 
to the global average) than in Hong Kong (9 per cent), and the prevalence of IP 
infringement (21 per cent) was much higher than in Hong Kong (7 per cent) and 
globally (15 per cent).
Asked about the likelihood that, in the next two years, their company would 
become a victim of economic crime, only 4 per cent of Hong Kong respondents 
thought this was likely or very likely to occur within Hong Kong, but 11 per 
cent believed it could happen in mainland China. Respondents from the rest 
of the world generally perceived that corruption was a major obstacle to doing 
business in the mainland.
In contrast with the mainland, Hong Kong is perceived as one of the least-
corrupt countries in the world, but this was not always the case. During the 
colonial period and particularly in the 1950s and 1960s, when Hong Kong 
experienced rapid economic and population growth, corruption was extensive 
and endemic in all government agencies, including the police force. In 1973, 
revelations that Chief Police Superintendent, Peter Godber, had accumulated 
great wealth through receiving bribes and had managed to flee Hong Kong led 
to a public outcry. In 1974, the Independent Commission Against Corruption 
(ICAC) was established (Lethbridge 1985). The ICAC is independent of the police 
and proactively fights corruption through law enforcement, prevention and 
education, and is often represented as a model anti-corruption agency.
2 The companies surveyed are selected randomly and for each country the sample size is determined 
according to the country’s GDP. The 2007 sample included 47 per cent of respondents from Western Europe, 
17 per cent from North and South America, 16 per cent from the Asia-Pacific, 15 per cent from Central and 
Eastern Europe, and 5 per cent from Africa.
3 Although the survey has been conducted every two years and Hong Kong participated in the 2003 and 
2005 sweeps, disaggregated (by city) results were not available, so we draw only from the fourth sweep, 
conducted in 2007 and covering crimes that occurred in the previous two years.
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Table 2.2 Economic Crime Victimisation of Hong Kong Businesses and 
Global Averages, PWC Global Economic Crime Survey, 2005–06 (per cent)
Type of economic crimea
All Hong Kong 
businesses
N = 100
Hong Kong businesses with 




Total economic crime 26 29 43
Asset misappropriation 19 14 30
Accounting fraud 8 10 12
Corruption and bribery 9 14 13
Money laundering 4 2 4
IP infringement 7 21 15
Sources: PWC (2007a, 2007b). 
Notes: a The Global Economic Crime Survey was conducted in 2007 and refers to victimisation in the 
previous two years; b sub-sample of Hong Kong respondents who had business activities in China and 
were asked to report victimisation that occurred in their mainland business; c total number of business 
respondents interviewed in 40 countries and victimised anywhere. 
The ICAC 2006 Annual Survey reported that 2.8 per cent of about 1500 citizens 
contacted had been the victims of corruption by government or business 
representatives (ICAC 2006).4 The survey also indicated low tolerance of 
corruption, with 66 per cent of respondents saying that it was totally unacceptable. 
Nearly one-quarter of respondents, however, believed that corruption might 
increase in the future because of the growing volume of commercial exchange 
with mainland China, where corruption is more prevalent. Similar concerns 
were raised following the 1997 hand-over of Hong Kong to China. For example, 
Chan (2001) questioned whether increasing social and economic integration 
with the mainland would provide further opportunities for corruption and 
negatively affect the business culture in Hong Kong. Official data from the ICAC 
do not support this hypothesis. Immediately following ICAC’s inception, the 
rate of reported corruption cases was at its highest (71 per 100 000 population), 
but quickly fell to 35 per 100 000 in the early 1980s (Figure 2.1, top graph). It 
peaked in 2000, following the hand-over and the Asian financial downturn, 
but dropped back to 55 per 100 000 in 2004 and kept falling, to 48 per 100 
000 in 2010. Looking at Figure 2.1, we must keep in mind that the numbers 
of corruption cases reported to ICAC reflect the public’s willingness to report 
and ICAC’s proactive policies as much, if not more, as actual levels of corrupt 
practices. ICAC is rated highly by the Hong Kong population, with 99 per cent 
of respondents stating in 2004 that ICAC deserved their support (ICAC 2006).
During ICAC’s early years, the bulk of cases related to corruption in government 
departments (83.5 per cent in 1975). Over time, the relative proportion of 
4 No respondent to the 2006 UNICVS in Hong Kong reported any incident of corruption by officials 
(Broadhurst et al. 2010).
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cases relating to the government sector decreased, and, in 1988, the balance 
shifted, with the majority of cases originating in the private sector (Figure 2.1, 
bottom graph). The proportion of reports relating to public bodies (for example, 
hospitals) has remained small—from 3.7 per cent in 1975 to 6.5 per cent in 
2010. These trends, again, reflect ICAC’s policies more than the actual extent of 
corruption and bribery. The initial focus of ICAC was to control the extensive 
corruption in the public and government sectors; once this was achieved, ICAC 
officers turned to corruption in the private sector and uncovered many cases. 
The rise in the number of cases originating in the private sector does not mean 
that corruption was not present before, but rather was less subject to control 
(Lo 1993, 2003). 
Figure 2.1 Cases of Corruption Reported to Hong Kong ICAC, 1975–2010: 
Rate per year (top) and types of case (bottom) 
Sources: Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption (<www.icac.org.hk>). Rates (top graph) 
calculated using population data from <www.databank.worldbank.org>
Another threat to business comes from organised crime, particularly the 
infamous Hong Kong triads or ‘black’ societies. Typical triad-related activities 
include blackmail, extortion, price fixing and protection rackets involving 
local shops, small businesses, restaurants, construction sites, wholesale and 
retail markets, and places of public entertainment. Smuggling, counterfeiting, 
money laundering and credit-card fraud constitute other important sources of 
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illicit profit that harm legitimate businesses. In the early 2000s, triads started to 
counterfeit CDs and DVDs, as technology made it easier to mass-produce them. 
In 2003, an officer from the Hong Kong Organised Crime and Triad Bureau 
successfully infiltrated the Woh Sing Woh triad, whose members were involved 
in the manufacturing and distribution of pirated video compact discs (VCDs). 
Gang members were selling the VCDs through about 20 street stalls and were 
able to earn up to HK$50 000 a day in profit. About 40 people were arrested (The 
Standard 2003). On occasion, triads have teamed up with legitimate businesses 
to monopolise newly developing markets, such as home decoration companies, 
waste disposal, non-franchised public transport routes and elements of the film 
industry (Broadhurst and Lee 2009; Chu 2005). 
Despite periodic alarm over their influence, triad involvement in recorded crime 
has remained static at between 3 and 4 per cent of all recorded crime in Hong 
Kong over the past 20 years (Broadhurst and Lee 2009). In 2004, official statistics 
estimated the rate of triad-related offences was 37 per 100 000—down from 
44 per 100 000 in 1999. During the pre-ICAC period, the climate of rampant 
corruption, particularly within the police, provided fertile ground for triad-
related activities, but the suppression of corruption and bribery among police 
and other government agencies, along with police reforms, has somewhat limited 
the growth of the triads. In the past decade, however, Hong Kong triad members 
have increased their activities in China, particularly in Guangdong Province and 
Shenzhen, where elements of the emerging market economy were unprotected 
by law, creating opportunities for protection and corruption (Broadhurst and 
Lee 2009).
Policing and Crime Control in Hong Kong
Hong Kong’s low crime rate might reflect the relative effectiveness of law 
enforcement with a comparatively high incarceration rate, large police force and 
significant public resources allocated to crime control and security. Hong Kong 
has its own police force, independent of that of the mainland, and has retained 
its criminal justice system based on English common law since reunification. 
In 2004, 10.5 per cent of Hong Kong’s total budget was allocated to security 
(<www.budget.gov.hk/2004/>), with the police force totalling 32 254 sworn 
officers including auxiliaries, or a rate of 469 per 100 000 population (Hong 
Kong Police Force 2009b). This is larger than other Asian and most Western 
jurisdictions. In addition, Hong Kong supports a relatively large private policing 
and security sector.5 The death penalty was abolished in 1991,6 but Hong Kong 
5 In 1999, there were 722 registered security and guarding companies in Hong Kong, employing 
approximately 160 000 registered personnel (Personal communication, Security and Guarding Services 
Industry Authority HK SAR). In comparison, according to Nalla and Hoffman (1996), there were about 200 
security companies in Singapore, which employed between 15 000 and 20 000 private police—a ratio of about 
two private police to every public police officer, while Hong Kong’s ratio is closer to five.
6 No execution had taken place since 1966.
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has a moderately high rate of incarceration per 100 000 persons. According 
to Hong Kong Correctional Services Department’s figures, the average daily 
prison population in 2004 was 13 138, or a rate of 193 per 100 000 population; 
however, the rate is inflated by the significant number (up to one-third) of 
mainland Chinese who are incarcerated for immigration offences that include 
short mandatory imprisonment.7
Hong Kong’s use of imprisonment seems to be supported by the population. The 
2006 UNICVS asked respondents what sentence they thought a twenty-one-
year-old recidivist burglar should receive for stealing a colour television. Nearly 
60 per cent of Hong Kong respondents opted for a prison sentence, followed by 
28 per cent who favoured community service. The proportion of respondents 
who chose imprisonment was much higher than the international average of 38 
per cent (Broadhurst et al. 2010).8
Conscious efforts have been made to increase the legitimacy of the Hong Kong 
Police, and the successful transition from a once suppressive colonial quasi-
military police force into the current professional and modern police service 
with its client-oriented consensus policing style has contributed to increasing 
reporting rates and effective crime prevention. Corruption—once endemic—
has been successfully controlled and the Hong Kong Police have generally 
received the support of the citizens. The 2006 UNICVS found that 96 per cent 
of respondents thought that police in their area had done a ‘fairly good job’ 
or a ‘very good job’ at controlling crime and 94 per cent either fully agreed or 
tended to agree with the statement that police do everything they can to help. 
Of victims of crime who reported the incident to the police, 67 per cent were 
satisfied with the police response (Broadhurst et al. 2010). 
Hong Kong residents are aware that their city is safe. In the UNICVS, few 
respondents (5.6 per cent) indicated that they felt ‘a bit’ or ‘very unsafe’ in 
Hong Kong streets after dark. Of all the cities surveyed, Hong Kong recorded 
the lowest level of concern about street crime, followed by the Scandinavian 
countries. Similar results were found for crime against households: nearly three-
quarters of respondents (71.8 per cent) felt that it was unlikely that their home 
would be burgled in the coming year; only 1 per cent thought a burglary was 
‘very likely’, and 27.2 per cent perceived it was ‘likely’. People aged fifty-five 
and over were less concerned about their household being victimised than 
younger people aged twenty-five to thirty-four years. Compared with the other 
industrialised cities that participated in the UNICVS, Hong Kong residents were 
7 This figure includes inmates in prisons, detention centres, rehabilitation centres, training centres and 
drug-addiction treatment centres (Hong Kong Correctional Services Department: <www.csd.gov.hk/english/
ins/ins_stat/files/chartdata2009_htm>). 
8 The proportion of respondents who opted for a prison sentence was generally higher in common-law 
countries (for example, England and Wales, 51 per cent) than in civil-law countries (van Dijk et al. 2007).
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far less likely to have alarms or special security doors installed in their house; 
however, nearly half the respondents said they were taking part in formal and 
informal systems of neighbourhood watch (Broadhurst et al. 2010:Ch. 7). 
State action, however, only partly accounts for the low levels of crime and fear 
of crime experienced in Hong Kong. Broadhurst et al. (2008) argue that this is the 
result of a complex mixture of cultural traditions, proactive crime prevention and 
the increasingly professionalised police service. Family oriented Confucianist 
values, a large police force that focuses on a client-services approach, strict 
firearms laws, high levels of formal and informal surveillance, effective control 
of cross-border crime, an ageing population, ethnic homogeneity, proactive 
efforts to suppress organised crime and corruption, and severe punishment for 
the convicted all serve to reduce opportunities for crime. 
Crime and Policing in Mainland China
Crime Trends and Common Crime 
Until 1986, when, for the first time, China submitted its national crime statistics 
to Interpol, crime statistics were classified as state secrets (Zhong 2009a). In 
1987, the first issue of the China Law Yearbook reported national crime statistics. 
Along with a variety of other indices, official crime statistics are reported yearly 
by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (<www.stats.gov.cn/english/
statisticaldata/yearlydata/>), but are not disaggregated by province or city. 
Depending on their seriousness and the harm caused, offences are classified as 
criminal (more serious) or public security (less serious) cases. In this section, we 
focus only on criminal cases. Unlike federal countries such as the United States 
and Australia, which administer criminal law at each state’s level, mainland 
China has a national criminal law and criminal procedural law. Local police 
departments are supposed to follow a standardised procedure to record crimes, 
and statistics are compiled at the provincial and national levels. 
Drawing from official and other sources, Zhong (2009a) cites an overall rate of 
recorded criminal cases of 59 per 100 000 population in 1951, falling to 44 per 
100 000 in 1960 and 30 per 100 000 in 1965, before creeping back up to 56 per 
100 000 in 1978. In 1981, which was described as ‘the year of the crime wave’ 
(Bakken 2005:64), the overall crime rate reached 89 per 100 000. The next seven 
years saw a general decline, with rates per 100 000 of 52 in 1985 and 75 in 
1988. In 1989, the rate of recorded crimes more than doubled to 182 per 100 
000, and with some fluctuations kept going up to reach 363 per 100 000 in 
2004, the year preceding the ICBS. The clearance rate for criminal cases in China 
is surprisingly high compared with Western standards: from 77.5 per cent of 
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recorded crimes solved in 1951, to about 90 per cent in the late 1950s.9 From 
then to the year 2000, clearance rates oscillated between 55 and 80 per cent, but 
fell to 40–45 per cent from 2000 to 2004 (Zhong 2009a:100). While the volume 
of crime has increased in China in the recent period of rapid modernisation, the 
increase has not been uniform across all crime types. Liu (2005) used annual 
time-series data on major crimes in China from 1978 to 1999 to analyse the 
level of change by type of crime. He found that economically motivated crimes, 
such as larceny, fraud and robbery, increased at a faster rate than others. Grand 
larceny—defined as theft to a value of CNY3000 (US$370) and more—increased 
the most (9042 per cent over 21 years), then robbery (2722 per cent), followed 
by fraud (692 per cent). In contrast, homicide and rape increased at the slower 
rates of 253 per cent and 131 per cent respectively.
In 2005, the overall crime rate across mainland China was relatively low at 356 
per 100 000 population (see Table 2.5). This figure, however, includes only the 
most serious cases—that is, those categorised as criminal rather than public 
security offences. Thefts represented the bulk of all recorded crimes (242 per 
100 000), and the official rate of homicide stood at 1.6 per 100 000.
As in the rest of the world, in China, official crime statistics do not provide 
an accurate picture because only a small proportion of all crimes comes to the 
attention of the police: victims’ reporting behaviour varies over time; crime 
definitions change;10 and recording standards might not be consistent (see He and 
Marshall 1997). In China, seemingly more so than in industrial countries, crime 
has been chronically under-recorded by police (Yu and Zhang 1999). Bakken 
(2005) argues that under-recording and fluctuations in rates of police recording 
of crime in the 1980s and mid-1990s were, in part, due to the differential 
emphasis over time on ‘case-cracking’ bonuses: during periods when bonuses 
were indexed to clearance rates, police officers tended not to record hard-to-
solve cases, such as rape cases, so they could show high clearance rates. When 
less importance was given to clearance rates, crime rates started to increase as 
police recorded a broader range of cases, but, at the same time, clearance rates 
declined. In the late 1990s, it became evident that bonuses did not boost police 
effectiveness, and the practice was reduced or stopped. 
Yu and Zhang (1999) discussed the findings of the large-scale National Study 
of the Crime Problem in Modern China, conducted across mainland China in 
9 Zhong (2009a) notes that during the three years 1958–60, crime rates were low and clearance rates 
extremely high. She suggests that these were the early years of the Great Leap Forward, and generally inflated 
figures were published on all types of topics.
10 For example, in China, offences are classified as criminal offences or public security offences depending 
on their seriousness. Until 1992, the monetary threshold that differentiated theft as a public security offence 
from theft as a criminal offence in urban areas was CNY80, but, in 1992, it was raised to CNY500. In the few 
years post 1992, overall crime rates fell significantly, but this was because a large proportion of thefts was no 
longer being recorded as criminal offences but as public security offences (Zhong 2009a). 
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the late 1980s, which examined police crime-recording patterns. They found 
that under-recording of crime occurred at the local, provincial and national 
levels. The authors suggest that between 1985 and 1988, only about one-third 
of all crime incidents reported to the police were counted in the official crime 
statistics. Homicide had the highest recording rate (88 per cent) and theft, the 
lowest. Taking into account the under-recording and other factors related to 
offence classification, the overall crime rate in China in 1990 was estimated to be 
800 per 100 000 population, rather than the official published rate of 200 per 100 
000 (Yu and Zhang 1999:256). Yu and Zhang suggest that under-recording was 
probably not as high in the pre-reform period, but economic reforms and social 
change in the 1980s have led to an increase in crime and in the police workload, 
without a comparable increase in material and human resources. Based on the 
findings of the National Study, the Chinese Government has made changes to 
police procedures and recording rates have increased, suggesting that official 
rates in the past decades are becoming more accurate.11
Although two completed victimisation surveys have been conducted in Beijing, 
in 1994, and in Tianjin, in 2004, it is difficult to compare their results with official 
statistics because different offences are included and victim surveys count all 
types of victimisation regardless of their seriousness or official classification. 
The 1994 UNICVS Beijing sample of 2000 people over the age of sixteen was 
interviewed face-to-face, and 12.6 per cent reported at least one victimisation 
in the past 12 months of any of the standard UNICVS household and personal 
crimes; the majority of victims had experienced the theft of a bicycle (10.9 per 
cent) (Zhu et al. 1995).12 Ten years later, in Tianjin, one of the largest cities 
in mainland China, Messner et al. (2007b) found that in the past year (2003) 
11.5 per cent of respondents had been victims of personal theft, 2 per cent of 
robbery and another 2 per cent of assault. This study considered only incidents 
that occurred in public places.13
11 Although homicide seems to be the most accurately recorded crime, there are large differences between 
the officially publicised rate and the ‘internal’ rate, circulated among officials. Internal figures for homicide 
for the period 2000–03, obtained by Bakken (Personal communication, 17 November 2010), produce rates per 
100 000 of 3 in 2000, 3.7 in 2001, 4.1 in 2002, and 3.8 in 2003. In contrast, official rates of homicide were: 2.2 
in 2000 and 2001, 2.1 in 2002, and 1.9 in 2003. 
12 A repeat of the Beijing UNICVS was conducted in 1996 by the UNODC and the Institute of Crime 
Prevention (Ministry of Justice, PRC), but the results were not published.
13 The Tianjin study primarily examined the relationship between lifestyle/routine activities and 
victimisation, and did not use the standard UNICVS questionnaire, although crimes were similar (personal 
theft, robbery, and assault and threats) but limited to those that occurred in a public place. The sample 
consisted of about 2500 respondents aged eighteen years and over, who were asked about victimisation within 
the past five years (1999–2003) and the past year (2003). The unusual administration of the questionnaire 
might have influenced the willingness of respondents to report crime victimisation (see Messner et al. 2007b 
for details).
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Crimes against Business, Non-Conventional and 
Organised Crime
The Global Retail Theft Barometer is the only survey we found that had been 
conducted in mainland China and focused on crimes against business—in this 
case, retail. Forty-six large retailers were interviewed in Beijing, Guangdong 
and Shanghai about their losses due to theft. The survey estimated that losses 
totalled US$1.089 billion or 1.1 per cent of total retail sales. In China, 18 per 
cent of shrinkage was due to various pricing and accounting practices, while 
the remaining 82 per cent was attributed to theft by customers (48 per cent) and 
employees (24 per cent) and fraud by suppliers (6 per cent). Errors and fraud by 
suppliers accounted for a smaller proportion of loss in China than in Hong Kong 
(18 per cent versus 25 per cent and 6 per cent versus 9 per cent respectively); 
theft by employees was slightly more frequent in China (24 per cent compared 
with 19 per cent in Hong Kong) (Bamfield 2009).
Another survey, the PWC Global Economic Crime Survey (PWC 2007a), gives 
us some indication of the risk of victimisation from the perspective of foreign 
investors. Globally, 21 per cent of companies reported that they had been 
victims of corruption/bribery by a perpetrator located overseas, and 17 per 
cent of these perpetrators were from China. The highest risk, however, was 
for IP infringement—that is, the illegal reproduction of products protected by 
copyright, trademarks or patents: 41 per cent of companies surveyed suffered 
from IP infringements; of these, 44 per cent of perpetrators originated in China. 
Across the 40 countries and 5400 companies that participated in the survey, 
about 500 respondents had business interests in mainland China. More than 
one-quarter of them (26 per cent) worried about corruption and bribery, and 
23 per cent about IP infringement occurring in China. While their perception 
of the risk of IP infringement in mainland China was notably higher than for 
other regions (Europe, 16 per cent, and North America, 19 per cent), they also 
perceived the risk of corruption and bribery was substantially higher in China 
compared with Europe (18 per cent) and North America (12 per cent). 
China has never been free of corruption, but its frequency and costs are 
increasing. According to a study by the Chinese Academy of Sciences and 
Qinghua University (cited in Yu 2008), no cases before 1992 reached CNY100 
000 (US$13 000). Post 1992, 73 per cent of cases exceeded this amount, 32 per 
cent involved more than CNY1 million (US$130 000) and 11 per cent were in 
excess of CNY10 million (US$1.3 million). Organisational bribery—that is, 
bribery financed by companies to get market advantages—is also on the rise. 
Targets of bribery are no longer limited to state officials but include employees 
and executives of rival companies and specialised government branches. In the 
mainland, corruption in the public sector is already a major source of domestic 
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discontent. Yu (2008) linked a number of popular protests nationwide to 
evictions and land acquisitions by corrupt local government officials in collusion 
with property developers. Since there were few responsive official channels for 
people’s grievances, with petitions least effective, public protests were often the 
only recourse. 
Apart from the police, three government agencies deal with cases of corruption: 
the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (the Chinese Communist 
Party’s disciplinary apparatus), the Ministry of Supervision, which oversees 
the behaviour of government agencies, and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate 
(including the General Bureau of Anti-Corruption), a branch of the judiciary. 
Neither the judiciary nor any other anti-corruption mechanism is, however, 
independent of the Communist Party. Corruption statistics are available only on 
an irregular basis, making the study of trends impossible. Wedeman (2006) and 
Yu (2008) remark that many reports of corruption are not acted upon and only a 
relatively small proportion of all reported cases are prosecuted; most are ignored 
or dealt with administratively. Yet, the Chinese Government has shown concern 
at the extent of corrupt practices both in the public and in the private sectors, 
and every three to four years, campaign-style actions are launched to fight 
corruption. While these might reduce petty corruption, they do little to stamp 
out grand corruption. Cases that are prosecuted are often harshly punished, 
sometimes through the death penalty, although public figures tend to receive 
more lenient sentences (Fan and Cha 2008). 
Policing and Crime Control
Social control in China is achieved through a mixture of formal and informal 
mechanisms. Klein and Gatz (1989:169) remark that ‘social control is formally 
invested in less formal structures…formal agencies make informal groups the 
locus of social control’. The policing system consists of a network of social-
control institutions, which apart from the public security organs per se includes 
the neighbourhood committees, the work units, the household registration 
system and, more recently, an emerging private security industry. Among other 
responsibilities, the neighbourhood committees and the work units operate 
closely with the Public Security Bureau (PSB or People’s Police) to manage social 
order at the grassroots level. The household registration system (hukou) is under 
the jurisdiction of the local police and aims at maintaining social stability by 
controlling people’s movement and place of residence.14 In China, crime is a 
morally charged behaviour, which brings shame not only to the perpetrators 
but also to their family and the social organisations to which they belong. 
14 The purpose of the hukou system goes beyond population control. The hukou system forms the basis 
of the allocation of state services and benefits. There are two types of hukou: for rural and urban dwellers. 
Citizens with agricultural hukou are not entitled to state benefits, apart from the right to farm, while those with 
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Therefore, private, social and state entities are expected to mobilise to control 
crime, in a process in which ‘the formal mixes with the informal and the private 
blurs with the public’ (Zhong 2009a:110). The traditional policing functions of 
law enforcement, order maintenance and public service are mostly performed 
by the People’s Police under the Ministry of Public Security and the People’s 
Armed Police (PAP), a paramilitary force deployed to ensure domestic safety and 
public order that is controlled by the Central Military Commission and the State 
Council. Both have equivalent powers such as the power to arrest and question 
suspicious persons, and to search and seize property. The difference between 
the two police forces is difficult to describe. Sun and Wu (2009) suggest that the 
People’s Police tend to handle public security or criminal cases while the PAP 
focuses on cases that potentially threaten the stability of the state, such as large-
scale disorder (and riots), organised crime and terrorism, but this might further 
evolve with the new People’s Armed Police Act promulgated in 2009. 
Unlike in Hong Kong, in the mainland, low crime rates cannot be directly 
correlated with the strength of the police force as China has a rather low police–
public ratio. In 1997, data provided to the United Nations by Chinese authorities 
indicated that the rate of police officers per 100 000 population was 96, but it 
appears this figure relates only to the People’s Police. From numbers provided 
by Zhong and Grabosky (2009), we estimate that in the period 2003–07, and 
including both People’s Police and PAP, the ratio was 181 per 100 000 persons.15 
This figure is comparable with that of Japan, but lower than Western countries 
and 2.5 times lower than Hong Kong. An important evolution of the policing 
system in China, however, is the emergence of private security in the 1980s 
and its spectacular growth since then. Two major factors, relating to China’s 
economic transformation, account for the introduction of the private security 
industry. First, the police lacked the resources to deal with rapidly climbing 
rates of crime in the 1980s. Second, foreign investors were reluctant to accept 
the Chinese police’s direct involvement in their company’s internal security, and 
preferred using private security services. Modelled on Hong Kong’s guarding 
and security agencies, the first mainland security services company started 
operating in 1985 in the Shenzhen SEZ, and within a few years all major cities 
had permitted their use. By December 2005, it was estimated that there were 
four million security guards nationwide (Zhong 2009b). Unlike the regulation 
of such services in the West, private security companies in China are under the 
non-agricultural hukou receive various privileges and benefits. It is difficult to transfer from an agricultural to 
a non-agricultural hukou, which makes it difficult for rural workers to migrate to cities in search of work. For 
more detail on these institutions of social control in China, see Zhong (2009a). 
15 Zhong and Grabosky (2009:439) report that the number of public security police personnel in 2003 
was 1.7 million, and the number of People’s Armed Police personnel in 2007 was 660 000. Based on a total 
population of 1.3 billion, these figures result in a rate of 181 per 100 000.
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direct control of the police, and it appears they carry out up to one-third of all 
police work including catching suspects (Dutton 2005; Zhong and Grabosky 
2009). 
China’s incarceration rate—118 per 100 000 population in 2003—is roughly in 
line with international averages (Walmsey 2005). On the other hand, China, in 
addition to imprisonment, applies the death penalty on a large scale, although 
the exact number of executions is unknown. Trevaskes (2010b; see also 
Johnson and Zimring 2009) estimates that each year more people are executed 
in China than in the rest of the world combined. In 2005, nearly 70 crimes 
attracted the death penalty, including economic crime and corruption, but it 
seems there is little consistency in its application and few checks and balances. 
The recent introduction of the mandatory review of death sentences by the 
People’s Supreme Court appears to have had a check on the use of the death 
penalty.16 It is estimated that about 8000 people are executed each year with 
probably a greater number during ‘strike-hard’ campaigns (Fan and Cha 2008; 
Wang 2007). In China, as in Hong Kong, the population seems to support 
harsh punishment. The 1994 Beijing ICVS found that 84 per cent of Chinese 
respondents chose imprisonment as a suitable sentence for the twenty-one-year-
old recidivist burglar, which was the highest rate among the 58 nations surveyed 
(Bakken 2004).
Faced with rising crime rates in the post-reform period, the Chinese Government 
launched several national ‘strike-hard’ campaigns, in 1983–86, 1996–97 
and 2001–02. Tanner (2005:171) describes this campaign-style policing as 
‘concentrated, fixed-term, special targeting of particular categories of crime for 
arrest and severe punishment’. Through mass rallies and public parading of 
offenders, the Government endeavoured to convince large numbers of citizens 
to get involved in the campaigns, but Tanner argues that such mass involvement 
is on the decline. Moreover, these ‘strike-hard’ campaigns have been criticised 
because of their excessive punishment, particularly the extensive use of 
the death penalty, and the lack of any long-term effectiveness or deterrence 
value. As mobilising the masses to fight crime became increasingly difficult, 
the police forces needed to reform to keep pace with the rapidly changing 
social and economic environments. In an effort towards modernisation and 
professionalisation, the Chinese police became less concerned with political 
matters and more focused on order maintenance, crime control and law 
enforcement. Wong (2002) describes the many changes that took place throughout 
16 Although reforms in respect to the death penalty are in process and the number of offences that attract 
the death penalty has declined (to about 50), the absence of reliable data makes it difficult to assess the impact 
of these important changes. It is likely that if the number of death sentences decreases, replaced with a 
greater use of the suspended death penalty, the rate of incarceration will increase (Personal communication, 
27 October 2010, Professor Lu Jianping, Beijing Normal University, and Professor Liang Genlin, Peking 
University).
Business and the Risk of Crime in China 
58
the public security organisations from the late 1980s: changes in values, culture 
and management philosophy; the reorganisation and standardisation of the 
police forces’ structure and practices; the introduction of personal rewards; 
increased professionalisation through the development of police academies; and 
perhaps most importantly, the adoption in 1995 of the Law on People’s Police 
of the PRC, which institutionalised and regulated the structure, operations 
and powers of the People’s Police. New proactive rather than reactive policing 
practices were implemented. For example, starting in Shanghai in 1993 and soon 
spreading to all cities, conventional beat policing (foot patrols) was introduced 
as a mechanism to help police react to problems quickly, prevent crime and 
improve citizen–police relations. Another innovation was the establishment in 
1996 of a national telephone emergency hotline to report crime, seek help and 
register complaints. (For a detailed review of police reforms in China, see Dutton 
2005; Wong 2002, 2004, 2011.) Wong (2004) suggests that police reforms have 
also been prompted by the Chinese police’s perceived lack of legitimacy and 
the deteriorating relationship between the police and the public. For example, 
in 2003, police had been accused of engaging in illegal behaviour, receiving 
bribes, abusing their power and brutalising suspects.17 In the next section, we 
explore in more depth the attitudes of the Chinese population to crime and a 
variety of social issues and their perception of the police and other institutions. 
Public Attitudes to Crime and Public Security
The extent that crime generates fear and concern and the level of public 
confidence in police are routine questions in household victimisation surveys 
and are of interest to businesses, especially those sensitive to changes in 
discretionary consumer behaviour. Public opinion can be influential in focusing 
government attention on neglected issues; however, surveys of attitudes to crime 
in China are scarce. Although perceptions about crime might not always reflect 
actual risks of crime, they often give an indication of unease over change. Both 
the pace of social change and the perceived effectiveness of police (among other 
agencies) in maintaining law and order are most likely to impact on perceptions 
of crime. Confidence in police, as one of the most visible symbols of the state, 
will thus act as a litmus test of the legitimacy of governance, and the extent of 
crime (and corruption) becomes a proxy measure of government performance. 
In an authoritarian state, this conflation of cause and effect creates ambiguity 
over what crime signifies, and statistics about crime are highly sensitive facts. 
Therefore, not surprisingly, we have limited data on the fear of crime in China 
but we can draw on two earlier studies produced by the Ministry of Public 
17 Wong (2004), for example, reports the case of Sun Zhigang, who was beaten to death in Guangzhou in 
2003, and of Li Siyi, a three-year old girl who died of starvation after the police arrested her mother but did 
not allow her to organise for the care of her daughter.
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Security (MPS) and the UNICVS in the late 1980s and early 1990s respectively 
and two later studies conducted in 2003 by the Chinese National Bureau of 
Statistics and a commercial marketer. 
The Sense of Public Security survey reported the responses of a national survey 
by the MPS of 12 652 respondents over the age of eighteen (84.3 per cent 
response rate to 15 000 distributed questionnaires) undertaken in December 
1988 (Chang 1990). This survey asked five basic questions.
1. What is your evaluation of the contemporary situation of public security?
2. What is your personal perception of the current state of social order?
3. Are you afraid to go out alone at night?
4. Are you afraid of a stranger visiting you when you are home alone?
5. Does a woman need a companion in order to go to work safely on a night 
shift? 
The author provided little detail, merely stating: ‘on all these five questions, 
respondents split approximately 50-50’ (Chang 1990:125). Almost half (49.1 per 
cent) the respondents feared going out alone at night—noted by the author as 
unexpected and much higher than reported by Beijing residents five years later. 
The 1994 Beijing UNICVS reported that only 19.5 per cent felt unsafe walking 
alone after dark (Zhu et al. 1995:Table 7, p. 210).
‘Crime in violation of the laws’ was identified as the biggest problem in the 
area of social order by 35.4 per cent of the respondents, and 19.3 per cent cited 
‘confused social order’. In response to a question about ‘crime cases that might 
be a threat to you’, most feared property crime, followed by violent crime and 
‘hooligan’ assault. Only 18.9 per cent of the respondents reported they would 
seek the help of police officers if their personal safety or that of their property 
were in danger. Chang concluded that the sense of security is lower than it was 
previously and he noted that among social issues (for example, social mobility, 
education, social order), which respondents were asked to rank, 44 per cent 
ranked ‘salary and prices’ and 28 per cent ranked ‘public order’ first. Among 
respondents, 17.7 per cent stated that they or members of their family had been 
illegally assaulted, and the author concluded that the sense of security thus 
arose from indirect experiences, concluding that ‘too much attention to crime 
in the media will not be acceptable because it might create a climate of terror’ 
(Chang 1990:127). This argument and its ancillary about the harm of publishing 
crime statistics have been frequently put to the first author by PSB officers and 
might partly account for the secrecy around crime and local criminal statistics.18
18 Although police approaches to attitude and victimisation surveys might be changing. 
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Gauging the salience of the crime problem compared with other problems is 
relevant to our understanding of the impact of crime. We ask business about 
how crime is perceived and the extent that crime and security and corruption 
are seen as obstacles to business activity compared with other issues such as 
consultation, tax and regulatory demands on business. As we report in Chapter 
8, both these issues are indeed ranked by many businesses as problems and 
obstacles, but in this respect are business concerns any different from those 
of the public in general? Two relatively recent surveys are discussed here as 
a guide to the salience of crime: the Chinese Mainland Marketing Research 
Company (N = 10 716) face-to-face survey of attitudes to migrants, perceptions 
of current public security, corruption, government effectiveness/efficiency and 
community involvement in 32 cities in China in September 2003 (Nielsen and 
Smyth 2005) and an official annual national survey that began in 2003 on the 
public sense of security.
The Nielsen and Smyth (2005, 2009)19 analysis of this survey was concerned 
to show the relationship between perceptions of public safety and the rapid 
changes in Chinese urban life, especially the influx of ‘unruly’ migrants from the 
countryside. They reported that 37.1 per cent of the sample was satisfied with 
the current level of public security, 27.8 per cent was not and the remaining 
substantial proportion (35.1 per cent) indicated neutrality. Their path analysis 
of these data suggested that the respondents’ perceptions of security could be 
accounted for by routine activity theory. From this perspective, the influx of 
internal migrants to the cities was the equivalent of an increase in the numbers 
of motivated offenders while confidence in police and informal (guardians) was 
in decline. Respondents who felt that officials neglected their duties and were 
inefficient and corrupt were also more likely to perceive their risks of victimisation 
as higher. In other words, there was little confidence in formal guardians such as 
the police, and informal guardianship (community involvement) played a minor 
role in satisfaction with public security. They observed that urban residents (in 
particular older and more wealthy respondents) who felt uncomfortable with 
the floating migrant populations were also more likely to be less satisfied with 
public security. 
The National Public Sense of Security Survey (NBS 2007) aims to gauge the 
feelings of the masses about public security and their evaluation of local social 
security and public order, the presence of guard posts and security patrols, 
intensity of crackdowns (‘strike hard’) on illegal and criminal activity, and what 
concerns the masses. The survey has been conducted since 2003, however, at the 
time of writing, the latest survey reported was for 2007. The survey reports are 
briefly described and provide no analysis of demographic variations or details 
19 This survey is based on interviews in urban shopping malls and yielded 8152 useable responses from 
respondents aged fourteen to eighty-eight (see Nielsen and Smyth 2005).
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of definitions of all the questions. The item on the public’s sense of overall safety 
in the 2007 sweep reported continued improvement in perceptions of public 
safety, with the majority of respondents (93.3 per cent) reporting feeling ‘very 
safe’ (20.8 per cent), ‘safe’ (42.8 per cent) or ‘basically safe’ (29.7 per cent), while 
the remainder felt ‘less safe’ (5.2 per cent) or ‘unsafe’ (1.5 per cent). As noted 
above, the Beijing UNICVS reported that in 1994 nearly one in five stated they 
felt a ‘bit’ or ‘very unsafe’ and a small minority (5.6 per cent) of Hong Kong 
respondents in 2006 reported being ‘a bit’ or ‘very unsafe’. In neither survey 
was there an option for being ‘basically safe’, whatever that might imply, and its 
inclusion frustrates any comparisons.
The National Public Sense of Security Survey has in each sweep asked 
respondents to nominate the issue of most concern to them. The initial list of 
nine topics was expanded in 2006 to 13 topics. Thus, prior to 2006, medical 
care, food hygiene, product safety and ‘others’ were not among topics to choose 
from; however, of interest to us is that ‘corruption’ has been one of the topics 
from the onset. The topics relating to medical care, food hygiene and product 
safety were added to the list at a time when such issues were gaining attention 
in media and government circles. As Table 2.3 shows, corruption has been 
ranked third (15.9 per cent of the sample), fifth (12.6–14.3 per cent) and sixth 
(7.6–9.1 per cent) among all the topics, showing a consistent level of salience 
among Chinese. Until the addition of ‘medical care’ to the list of topics, ‘social 
issues’—perhaps better captured by the idea of social values—was the most 
frequently nominated issue of concern. ‘Social issues’ also captures the notion 
of social behaviour, manners, adherence to rules and the like and so is a measure 
of concern over social change. The report provides no further breakdown of 
the responses (for example, by age, sex or place) and therefore provides only 
a limited perspective of the salience of one type of crime (that is, corruption). 
Since multiple responses were not allowed to this question, the relative salience 
of different issues of concern among respondents is unknown. Table 2.3 shows 
the persistent concern over corruption and social issues or values among 
Chinese. Since definitions of these topics are not provided, it is worth noting 
that perceptions of corruption are likely to be based on the more general idea 
of official misconduct rather than only the very serious offence of acceptance of 
bribes, so take into account relatively less serious conduct such as dereliction of 
duty, drunkenness and bullying by officials (Wedeman 2008). 
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Table 2.3 The Salience of Social Concerns in China, 2003–07 (percentage 
ranking each topic first)
Ranking 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
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Sources: NBS (2003, 2004, 2005c, 2006b, 2007).
Note: Percentages rounded to nearest decimal point.
Turning to the perceptions of the Chinese population about their policing 
institutions, 83 per cent of respondents in the 1994 Beijing UNICVS thought 
that the police were doing a good job at controlling crime. But, the majority 
(57.5 per cent) of the crime victims who had reported the incident to the police 
were dissatisfied with the police response, mainly because the police failed to 
recover their property or find and apprehend the offender (Zvekic and Alvazzi 
del Frate 1995). Survey data collected in 2003 in eight Chinese cities (including 
Shanghai and Xi’an) indicated that nearly three-quarters of respondents trusted 
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the police (17 per cent said they trusted police a lot and 55 per cent, to a degree).20 
Support was not uniform, as younger Chinese reported lower levels of trust in 
police than older ones, and respondents who perceived they had some political 
power and influence were more likely to trust police than those without such 
perceived power (Wu and Sun 2009). 
The Communiqué on the National Public Sense of Security Survey shows the 
results of the 2007 attitude survey of respondents’ satisfaction with law-
enforcement agencies (NBS 2007). The survey as described by the National 
Bureau of Statistics is an annual (since 2003) nationwide, multi-stage, stratified, 
proportional probability sample of 101 029 randomly selected households from 
which one member over the age of sixteen completes the questionnaire.21 Even 
allowing for the awkward translation provided in the official English version, 
the format of the questions is unconventional, as Table 2.4 illustrates: the 
majority of respondents reported being ‘satisfied’ or ‘basically satisfied’ with the 
performance of public security agencies. The surveys presented above indicate a 
high level of support for the police force, but we must keep in mind that citizens 
might be reluctant to express negative opinions of these institutions and the 
attitudes expressed are unrelated to actual experiences of crime victimisation.
Table 2.4 Attitudes of the Masses to Public Security Agencies in 2007 (per 
cent)
Agency Satisfied Basically satisfied Not satisfied
Public Security Bureau 46 .5 45 .2 8 .3
People’s Court 48 .1 46 .8 5 .1
People’s Prosecutorate 51 .6 44 .2 4 .2
Judicial administrative agencies 49 .0 46 .3 4 .7
Social security governance office 50 .6 44 .2 5 .2
Source: NBS: <www.stats.gov.cn:82/tjsj/qtsj/shtjnj/2007/t20081208_402524098.htm> (in Chinese). 
Note: This question appears only in the 2007 survey and no trends are available.
20 Results are presented in Wu and Sun (2009). The survey was conducted through face-to-face interviews 
by the Chinese Academy of Social Science Research Centre in Beijing, Chongqing, Dalian, Guangzhou, Nanjing, 
Qingdao, Shanghai and Xi’an. The sample was selected randomly, but included only 800 respondents, and 
we might wonder about the representativeness of such a small sample relative to the size of the Chinese 
population. In addition, the respondents’ city was not recorded; therefore, any examination of potential city 
effects is impossible.
21 The National Bureau of Statistics, however, does not provide further details on the means of administration, 
although we understand that it is by way of self-administered questionnaire delivered and retrieved by the 
bureau or its delegates. 
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Crime and Policing in Shanghai, Shenzhen and Xi’an
Unfortunately, only the Shanghai Statistical Yearbook (Shanghai Municipal 
Statistics Bureau 2006) provides detailed crime statistics; official data for the 
two other cities are sparse (Table 2.5). We gathered further information on 
crime and policing in the three mainland cities from a review of Chinese and 
English-language media reports (Appendix C). We present a brief chronological 
discussion of the crime problems and trends in each city.
Table 2.5 Mainland China: Police-recorded crime (including attempts) 
overall and by city, 2005 (rate per 100 000 population)
Mainland Shanghai Shenzhen Xi’an
All crimea 356 719 949 292
Homicide (completed) 1 .6 1 .4 4 .5b -
Aggravated assault 12 12 - -
Robbery 26 14 465c -
Fraud 16 56 - -
All theftd 242 542 - -
Grand larcenye 86 - - -
Sources: Government of Xi’an (2006); NBS (2006a); Shanghai Municipal Statistics Bureau (2006); Zhong 
(2009a).
Notes: a Except for homicide, rates per 100 000 have been rounded to the closest whole number; b rate 
for 1995, cited in Tan and Xue (1997); c rate for 2003, estimated from Chow (2004); d includes all thefts of 
value of more than CNY500 (US$60); e grand larceny consists of theft with a value of more than CNY3000 
(US$400).
Shanghai 
The media suggested a rise in reported crime in the mid-1990s; however, a major 
problem appeared to be an increasing number of economic crimes, particularly 
stock exchange fraud. The number of securities-related fraud jumped from two 
in 1991 to 240 in 1993. Stockbrokers blamed the lack of regulations for the 
growing rate of economic crime because, although the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
started operating in 1990, by 1995 there were still no national regulations as 
well as a lack of personnel to enforce local regulations. Corruption was also a 
concern, and, in 1994, the police set up task forces to deal with economic crime, 
particularly in government departments. For homicide, we estimate that, in 
1995, the rate was about 0.7 per 100 000 population—that is, about half that of 
2005. In 1998, citizens complained that Shanghai was no longer a low-crime city 
and that robbery, theft and burglary were on the rise. Yet, the police estimated 
that 30 000 to 40 000 criminal offences were reported in 1997—that is, a crime 
rate of about 350 per 100 000. The perceived increase in crime was attributed to a 
growing income gap, unemployment and the influx of migrant workers living in 
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poor conditions. The courts reported that in 1998 the number of criminal trials 
had decreased compared with 1997, but cases of economic crime had increased 
by 12 per cent. In 1999, another task force was established to deal with economic 
crime. In June 1999, the Shanghai Police Municipal Investigative Team Against 
Economic Crime successfully prosecuted its first case of fraud-related crime. 
Weng Changzhong was arrested on charges of defrauding CNY290 million from 
17 Shanghai banks over a four-year period. By claiming his registered company 
owned multiple assets, Weng was able to obtain loans, but disappeared each 
time repayments were due.
In 1996, Shanghai took part in the national strike-hard anti-crime campaign and 
deployed 20 000 public security and police officers along with civilian security 
personnel to patrol the streets. In 2000, patrolling was extended to cover night-
time and focus on 24-hour convenience stores and financial institutions. In 
the early 2000s, the media mentioned fluctuations in the rate of crime with an 
increase in 2003. The police still blamed migrant workers for a large proportion 
of the crimes committed in Shanghai, but reported that the proportion of crimes 
committed by migrants had decreased from 80 per cent in 1998 to 45 per cent in 
2002. The police chief complained of a lack of police and planned to increase the 
size of the force from 260 officers per 100 000 population in 2004 to 300 in 2009. 
Compared with the average for China (181 per 100 000), Shanghai seems to have 
a rather large police force, which is complemented by a sizeable private security 
industry. Dutton (2005:215) estimated that in 1998 there were 27 000 private 
security officers in Shanghai—that is, nearly half the number of police officers. 
In 2005 the overall official crime rate in Shanghai was about twice the national 
rate. The homicide rate was on par with the national average, rates of assault 
and robbery were relatively lower, but rates of fraud and theft were much 
higher. This is consistent with the media reports that emphasised the rise in 
economic crime in the past 15 years. Economic crime might partly account for 
the doubling in the overall crime rate between 1997 and 2005, although it seems 
that street crime had also risen.
Shenzhen 
The increase in crime started earlier in Shenzhen and has been more dramatic 
than in Shanghai. Shenzhen’s crime trends illustrate the way in which social 
disorder often accompanies rapid modernisation and economic growth. Economic 
development in the Shenzhen SEZ attracted millions of rural migrants from all 
over China, many of whom were unemployed. The city was unable to quickly 
establish a reliable system of dispute settlement or create the circumstances for 
effective public order. It is estimated that the rate of serious crime increased by 
67 per cent from 1993 to 1994. Tan and Xue (1997) reported a very rapid rise in 
homicide, from 1.38 per 100 000 in 1990 to 4.49 in 1995. Following complaints 
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by business people and visitors about the absence of police officers in the SEZ, in 
1993, Shenzhen Municipality introduced police patrols (Wong 2002:307). As in 
Shanghai, here, the economic boom led to an increase in fraud and corruption, 
although some perpetrators were punished harshly. In July 1994, Liu Jianyi 
was executed by firing squad for defrauding his employer, Shenzhen Eastern 
Development Company, of more than US$20 000. Liu used his connections 
to secure contracts for the sale of pharmaceuticals. After he was paid for the 
products he kept the money, but when deliveries were not made, the fraud 
was discovered. When asked how he felt about Liu’s execution, the director of 
Shenzhen Eastern Development said, ‘Happy! Yes, very happy.’
The security problem was also aggravated by an inflow of triad-related gangs 
(Wang et al. 2003). By 1992, every district of Shenzhen had fallen to triad 
activities (mostly from Hong Kong but also Taiwan and Macau) and, in 2000, 
more than one million ‘black society’ members were estimated to be active in 
China (Broadhurst and Lee 2009). Incidents of extortion by triad-related groups 
became more frequent and continue to occur. For example, in January 2006, 
two bombs exploded at a supermarket owned by French retail giant Carrefour 
following cash demands made through an anonymous phone call. One customer 
was injured. Three other stores reported similar phone calls and were evacuated. 
Police arrested three people following the explosion.
With crime still rising, the police cooperated with customs in 2001 to crack 
down on smuggling, and with financial, taxation and industrial administrations 
in 2002 in an effort to reduce commercial and economic crime. A year later, 
police launched a ‘storm operation’ targeting serious crimes such as homicide, 
robbery and kidnapping. The aim was not only to improve social order, but 
also to protect the safety of Hong Kong people doing business and shopping 
in Shenzhen, because about that time as many as 30 Hong Kong people per 
month were kidnapped by Shenzhen criminals. In 2003, however, the PRC 
abolished the border permits controlling access to Shenzhen and abandoned the 
custody and repatriation system long used to expel beggars and indigents. The 
inadequacy of the local procurator’s office, the shortage of police and corruption 
among them made Shenzhen more vulnerable to crime: overall crime surged, 
with more than 100 000 offences recorded in 2003 (or a rate of about 1300 per 
100 000 population). In a single year murder and assault increased by one-
third and kidnapping by 75 per cent. The Shenzhen police and courts were 
overwhelmed (Broadhurst and Lee 2009). Some business owners started to deal 
with the crime problem themselves. In October 2003, a middle-aged woman 
was caught stealing four fish and containers of yoghurt in a supermarket. The 
head of security forced the woman to stand outside the shop holding a sign 
reading ‘I am shameless. I’m a thief’. Although the store manager had no right 
to punish shoplifters using public humiliation, most local retailers agreed with 
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the punishment. A small shopkeeper said, ‘I don’t see anything wrong with the 
woman wearing the sign. She deserves it.’ Retailers agreed that police did not 
treat shoplifters seriously enough. 
High-level corruption and gang-related attacks did little to boost citizens’ 
confidence. In 2003, Shenzhen’s former Deputy Mayor was sentenced to 20 
years’ jail for abusing his authority for personal gain, and accepting bribes from 
businesspeople. The same year, local gangsters tried to bomb a police car in 
a war of intimidation. Some police were involved in providing protection to 
triads who operated vice premises. Crime in Shenzhen became so serious that a 
senior police official was forced to apologise over the city’s crime problem, and 
called in the Army to assist with foot patrols. Additional officers were employed, 
bringing the total police force to an estimated 16 000 officers, or a rate of 188 
per 100 000 population, in 2005. While this is on par with the national average 
(181 in 2007), it is lower than Shanghai (260 in 2004), and much lower than 
Hong Kong (496 in 2004). Crime rates peaked in 2003–04 and thereafter declined 
in line with a surge in the apprehension and detention of offenders (Zhong 
2009a:Ch. 7). 
Xi’an 
We found little information on crime and policing in Xi’an from official sources 
or newspapers. In 2005, the overall rate of officially recorded crime was 292 
per 100 000, which was lower than the national average as well as crime rates 
in Shanghai and Shenzhen. The Xi’an Yearbook reported that the 2005 rate was 
down 17 per cent on 2004, and that the clearance rate had increased by 10 per 
cent. Theft by employees, however, was mentioned as a growing problem in 
Xi’an, with more than 900 cases discovered between 2003 and 2008. A large 
proportion of these cases had been targeting state-owned companies. In one 
case, theft by employees, combined with bribery and corruption, led to the loss 
of nearly US$1 million. A Xi’an prosecutor indicated that the Xi’an Government 
was taking the loss of government-owned assets very seriously. For example, in 
August 2010, the Xi’an Intermediate People’s Court convicted Zheng Shaodong, 
a former assistant to the Minister of Public Security, of abusing his position to 
benefit others in return for more than US$12 million in bribes between 2001 and 
2007. Zheng was sentenced to death, but the sentence was suspended because 
he confessed his crimes and returned most of the illegally obtained money.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that homicide numbers had increased, which 
prompted the Xi’an Public Security Bureau to implement a new anti-homicide 
policy in 2001, in which the Director and Deputy Director of the PSB were 
directly responsible for dealing with all homicide cases. This strategy aimed for 
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‘two decreases and one increase’: a decrease in the number of homicide cases 
and the number of offenders, and an increase in the clearance rate of homicide 
cases. 
In 2004, the Xi’an Government took some innovative action to control crime. 
Because of a shortage of police personnel, the Government started outsourcing 
some public security work to contractors in some villages. Contractors are 
responsible for preventing fire, robbery and vandalism. They do not have 
similar powers to police, such as arresting people or investigating crime, but 
when they discover problems they report to and seek help from police. In mid-
2004, 16 villages were using contractors. 
In 2005, the Chinese Central Government declared Xi’an ‘the best city for public 
security governance’. In 2006, informal interviews with 20 Xi’an citizens, 
including teachers and government officers, revealed that 80 per cent of the 
interviewees believed that Xi’an was a safe place to live; however, they also said 
that burglary and thefts were the biggest problems. 
It is difficult to compare rates of crime in Hong Kong and the mainland because 
of differences in crime classification, particularly for less serious offences. The 
rate of homicide, however—one of the most serious crimes—was lowest in Hong 
Kong and highest in Shenzhen in 2004–05. Hong Kong and Shanghai recorded 
similar rates of theft and fraud, which were higher than the overall Chinese 
average. Both cities are important financial and commercial centres, and this 
might explain their higher rates of fraud and economic crime. The next section 
compares a range of crime and criminal justice indicators in China, Hong Kong 
and some Asian and Western countries, using standardised data.
Comparing China and the World
So far we have examined crime and policing in Hong Kong and the mainland, 
drawing mainly from national figures, but it is also important to consider how the 
situation in China compares with other industrialised countries and developing 
economies. Many obstacles, such as different definitions and counting rules, 
make it difficult to compare national statistics from various countries. In this 
section, we use data on crime, police strength and levels of incarceration 
gathered mostly by the United Nations and somewhat standardised to enable 
international comparability.22
22 We have tried to use the available data closest in time to the years of the China ICBS. Figures in this 
section might vary slightly from those already reported because of revision, standardisation and different 
collection methods; however, these figures are consistent between countries.
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Homicide data are often used for comparative purposes because homicide is 
much less subject to the vagaries of reporting, recording and definitional 
changes than less serious crimes, which are also less likely to be reported. Figure 
2.2 presents rates of police-recorded homicide and robbery, drawing on various 
sweeps of the UN Surveys of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice 
Systems (CTS),23 for Hong Kong, mainland China and selected countries in Asia, 
Europe and America. 
Looking at homicide, we see that Hong Kong has one of the lowest rates among 
Asian countries and in the world. At 0.6 per 100 000 population, it is comparable 
with Japan (0.5) and lower than Singapore (0.9), Australia (1.6), England and 
Wales (1.6) and mainland China (2.1). The rate of homicide in the mainland is 
higher than in the industrialised countries included in the comparison except 
the United States (4.6),24 but much lower than Eastern European countries 
(particularly Russia, with a rate of 19.8 per 100 000) and developing countries 
in Asia (for example, Thailand, 8.5, and the Philippines, 7.6). For robbery, we 
see an opposite pattern to homicide, with higher rates of robbery in Western 
countries. These might be the result of higher reporting rates by victims 
compared with developing countries and the availability of more attractive 
targets25 (see, for example, van Dijk et al. 2007). Hong Kong’s rate of robbery 
is about one-third that of England and Wales and the United States, half that 
of Macau, but about twice that of mainland China. The rate of robbery for the 
mainland is among the lowest in the chart, but higher than Singapore (11.5 per 
100 000) and Japan (4.1 per 100 000). 
23 The survey is conducted annually by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime via a questionnaire sent to each 
member state. The questionnaire consists of a series of questions asking for data on the main components 
of the criminal justice system. Member states provide as much or as little data as is practicable for them, 
therefore, data are not consistently provided. For less serious crimes, the official rates are more of an image of 
the effectiveness of police than a record of crime because reporting rates might be low and the police ability 
to record crimes might be limited, particularly in developing countries.
24 If we consider the ‘internal’ rate of homicide reported in Footnote 11 (this chapter), we see that the 
unofficial rate of homicide in China might be comparable with that of the United States.
25 In developing countries, robberies might also be more often lethal—hence counted as homicides—than 
in developed countries.
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Figure 2.2 Homicide and Robbery Recorded by Police: Hong Kong, 
mainland China and selected countries (rate per 100 000 population)
Source: UNODC (2004).
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Victimisation surveys are one way to avoid some of the pitfalls attached to 
official crime data. Unfortunately, as noted earlier, mainland China participated 
in only one of the sweeps of the UNICVS—in 1994—and it is likely that, in more 
than 10 years, the level of victimisation has changed. Hong Kong did not take 
part in the 1992–94 UNICVS, but the Hong Kong Government ran its own Crime 
Victim Survey (CVS) in 1994 (Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong 
1999), using broadly comparable questions to the UNICVS (see Broadhurst et al. 
2010 for a detailed comparison of the UNICVS and Hong Kong CVS).26 Beijing 
recorded a higher overall five-year victimisation rate than three other Asian 
cities (52.2 per cent compared with 43.8 per cent for Jakarta, 43.7 per cent 
for Mumbai and 40.1 per cent for Manila), but was lower than most European 
nations (ranging from 52.6 per cent for Albania and Macedonia to 77 per cent 
for Bulgaria and the Netherlands) (van Dijk 2000). Beijing’s higher rate was, 
however, due only to higher rates of bicycle theft, because for all other crimes, 
Beijing had a similar or lower likelihood of victimisation than these three Asian 
cities (Figure 2.3). Beijing and Manila recorded rates of bicycle theft more 
than five times those of Mumbai and Jakarta (10.9 per cent and 9.5 per cent). 
Apart from this unusually high figure, Beijing’s rates of burglary (1.5 per cent), 
robbery (0.5 per cent) and assault and threats (1.5 per cent) were in line with 
or lower than rates in Mumbai (1.3 per cent, 0.6 per cent and 1.6 per cent 
respectively for each type of crime), Jakarta (3 per cent, 1.4 per cent and 1.6 per 
cent), and Manila (2.9 per cent, 2.7 per cent and 1.6 per cent). With 2.2 per cent 
of burglary, Hong Kong rated higher than Beijing and Mumbai, but lower than 
Manila and Jakarta. Hong Kong’s rates were the lowest for robbery (0.4 per cent) 
and assault (0.2 per cent). 
Turning to the strength of the police forces, the seventh CTS shows that in 2000 
Hong Kong had one of the largest police forces per capita, with 496 police per 
100 000 persons (Figure 2.4). Only a few countries, such as Italy (560), Portugal 
(485) and Ukraine (470), were comparable with Hong Kong,27 and most Asian 
jurisdictions had proportionally smaller police forces. Hong Kong’s large police 
force also exceeded that of most industrialised nations such as the United States 
(244), Australia (219) and England and Wales (210). In contrast, mainland China 
had a rather low police–public ratio, as noted above. The 1997 data provided 
to the United Nations by Chinese authorities indicated a rate of police officers 
per 100 000 population of 96, but it appears to count only the People’s Police. 
The rate doubles to 181 per 100 000 persons when we consider the estimate 
from Zhong and Grabosky (2009) that includes both People’s Police and People’s 
Armed Police, and is comparable with that of Japan—lower than Western 
countries and 2.5 times lower than Hong Kong. 
26 The CVS does not provide an overall rate of victimisation because different units of measurement are used 
for personal crime (individuals) and household crime (households).
27 Data for the Russian Federation were provided only for 1994, and the rate was a very high 1222 police 
per 100 000.
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Figure 2.3 One-Year Victimisation Rates by Selected Crimes in Five Asian 
Cities, 1994 (per cent)
Sources: Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong (1999:118); data are not available for bicycle theft. 
Other cities: Zvekic and Alvazzi del Frate (1995:19).
Note: a Bicycle theft rates are based on owners, not the whole population.
Figure 2.4 Rates of Police Officers in Hong Kong, Mainland China and 
Selected Countries (per 100 000 population)
Sources: UNODC (2004); China (2003–07) estimated from Zhong and Grabosky (2009).
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Figure 2.5 presents incarceration rates in a number of countries between 2003 
and 2005. At 189 per 100 000, Hong Kong’s rate was on par with Macau (197), 
higher than England and Wales (141), Australia (117) and Japan (58), but lower 
than Thailand (264) and Singapore (392). The rate in the mainland (118) was 
lower than in Hong Kong,28 as well as Macau, Singapore and Thailand. Both the 
mainland and Hong Kong, however, had notably lower rates than the United 
States (726—the highest in the world) (Walmsey 2005, 2006). 
Figure 2.5 Rates of Incarceration in Hong Kong, Mainland China and 
Selected Countries (per 100 000 population)
Sources: Walmsey (2005, 2006).
Note: The countries marked with asterisks are those where the use of capital punishment is still legal.
To conclude this comparative section, we examine Transparency International’s 
corruption index, which does not directly measure the prevalence of corrupt 
practices, but provides a reliable indication of the extent of corruption using 
the experiences and perceptions of a range of experts. The most frequently 
used global indices of corruption are the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and 
the Bribe Payers Index (BPI).29 CPI scores relate to perceptions of the degree of 
28 Seymour (2005) argues that official rates are under-reported and estimates the rate of imprisonment in 
2003 to be 160 per 100 000, which puts mainland China closer to Hong Kong.
29 The CPI has been published since 1995 and the BPI since 1999. The 2005 CPI was constructed using 16 
sources originating from 10 independent institutions, and ranked 159 countries. For the full list of countries’ 
index and information on how it is constructed, see: <www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_
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corruption in the public and political sectors as seen by businesspeople and 
country analysts. The BPI examines the ‘supply side’ of corruption by ranking 
leading exporting countries in terms of the likelihood that their companies will 
pay bribes to public officials in key emerging markets. Both CPI and BPI scores 
range between 0 (highly corrupt) and 10 (totally ‘clean’). Figure 2.6 presents 
the 2005 CPI and 2006 BPI for selected countries. The countries perceived as 
the least corrupt (that is, highest-ranking) were: Iceland (9.7), Finland (9.6), 
New Zealand (9.6) and Denmark (9.5), followed by Singapore (9.4). Hong Kong 
(8.3) was ranked fifteenth, but mainland China received a much lower score—of 
3.2—ranking it seventy-eighth out of 159 countries. While China’s score was 
lower than Singapore’s and Hong Kong’s, it was similar to or higher than other 
Asian nations, such as India (2.9), the Philippines (2.5) and Indonesia (2.2). 
China also ranked ahead of Ukraine (2.6) and the Russian Federation (2.4). 
In terms of the propensity of companies to offer bribes overseas, the country 
perceived as the least likely to do so was Switzerland (7.8). Japan ranked 
eleventh with a score of 7.1, followed by Singapore (6.8). Hong Kong ranked 
eighteenth with a score of 6, ahead of Taiwan (twenty-sixth, score of 5.4). While 
Hong Kong was assessed as a country where officials were relatively unlikely 
to accept bribes, this did not, however, translate into transparent business 
practices. Mainland China ranked second-last (4.9), just below Russia (5.2) and 
ahead of India (4.6). On both indices, mainland China scored low, suggesting 
that practices of both accepting and offering bribes are widespread. Official 
records of bribery and corruption cases are sparse. More than other types of 
crime, corruption is difficult to measure because of its clandestine and diffuse 
nature, and petty corruption is more likely to be exposed than grand corruption 
involving elites. 
indices/cpi/2005> The BPI was published in 2002 and 2006. We use the 2006 ranking, which is closest to 
the years when the ICBS was conducted. The 2006 BPI drew from a sample of 11 000 businesspeople in 
125 countries, and ranked 30 leading exporting countries. For details, see: <www.transparency.org/policy_
research/surveys_indices/bpi/bpi_2006>
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Figure 2.6 Corruption Perception Index, 2005, and Bribe Payers Index, 
2006, Hong Kong, Mainland China and Selected Countries
Source: Transparency International. 
Note: CPI scores relate to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by businesspeople and country 
analysts; BPI scores rank leading exporting countries in terms of the likelihood that their companies will 
pay bribes to public officials in emerging markets; both indices range between 10 (totally clean) and 0 
(highly corrupt).
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Modernisation and Crime
The figures we have reviewed above are consistent with the broader literature 
on crime in China, and confirm that, regardless of the measures we use, 
crime rates in mainland China and Hong Kong are relatively low compared 
with many industrial and developing countries, particularly post-communist 
and transitional societies (Messner et al. 2007a). Hong Kong has long had a 
reputation as both a thriving and a safe city. In contrast, for 30 years following 
the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China’s economy 
stagnated, despite efforts to increase industrial and agricultural production 
through economic planning led by the Central Government. After Mao’s death in 
1976, rapid economic reforms and modernisation processes were implemented. 
The path to a ‘socialist market economy’ was rewarding, with a consistent 
annual growth in GDP of 9–10 per cent since 1990 and an almost sevenfold 
increase in average incomes between 1985 and 2006 (Yu 2008). Increasing 
economic prosperity, however, was accompanied by a rise in crime—described 
in a Chinese metaphor as ‘flies and mosquitoes coming through the window of 
reform’ (Zhong 2009a:99).
Liu (2004, 2005, 2006) argues that the Chinese transition from planned 
command economy to a market economy required a fundamental ideological and 
institutional turnaround. In the pre-reform period, egalitarianism was a tenet 
of Chinese communism and government policy and ideology discouraged the 
pursuit of individual economic interests. Under the new post-reform economic 
orientation, however, the values of the market—such as entrepreneurial 
motivation, individual economic ambition and personal success—started to 
be seen as essential to achieve economic growth. Numerous opportunities for 
private businesses have emerged and, according to Liu (2006:128), ‘getting 
rich by any means has become a national spirit’. Liu suggests that traditional 
modernisation theory—which attributes the rise in crime in developing 
countries to the breakdown of traditional society, social disorganisation, anomie 
and weakened social control—only partly applies in the Chinese context. He 
links the predominant increase in economically motivated crime compared with 
other forms of crime to the intense economic focus fostered by the Government 
and the market institutions.
While economic motivation can account for the significant rise in property crimes 
and the less spectacular rise in violent crime, it does not explain why, despite 
profound social and economic transformations, Chinese society maintained 
comparatively low rates of crime. Messner et al. (2007a) suggest that the 
combination of a set of ‘master forces’ and ‘pathway forces’ can help explain this 
apparent contradiction. Master forces are those that accompany modernisation 
and have been linked to rises in crime, such as urbanisation, growing inequality, 
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large-scale migration of labour and weakened social controls. These master 
forces exist in modern China as in other rapidly industrialising and modernising 
nations, and have expanded opportunities for crime. On the other hand, and 
unlike in Eastern European post-communist societies, in China, the transition to 
a market economy has been managed by a strong central government, which has 
retained control over organisational structures and successfully maintained an 
effective framework for both formal and informal social controls (the pathway 
forces). For example, the migration of workers towards cities such as Shenzhen 
has not resulted in the spread of shanty towns or the large-scale disorganisation 
often seen in cities in developing countries, although it has been accompanied 
by a notable increase in both violent and property crimes. In summary, while 
the process of industrialisation and economic development in China, as in 
other new economies, has been accompanied by rising crime rates, a strong 
central government has succeeded in mitigating the negative consequences of 
modernisation in a society where collective informal social-control mechanisms 
remain important.
The crime situation in mainland China, however, is paradoxical. On the one 
hand, the active role of a strong state has mitigated the criminogenic processes 
associated with modernisation; on the other hand, the tight control by the state 
over the economy has created ample opportunities for crime by government and 
business elites. Wedeman (2005) and others (for example, Brody and Luo 2009; 
Messner et al. 2007a; Pei 2007; Yu 2008) argue that the rise of corruption is due 
to structural opportunities brought about by the interface of both a command 
and market economy and the implementation of selective market mechanisms 
within a government-planned economy, where the Chinese Government has 
retained significant control over the economy and the business world. The 
coexistence of state and privately owned businesses creates opportunities for 
local officials to use their power for monetary advantages. The perception of the 
risks of getting caught is low, putting little restraint on behaviour. Strong state 
control seems to have inhibited the development of strong independent legal 
institutions, able to settle disputes fairly and control elite crime.30 Following 
the Wuhan Court scandal, the Chinese Government initiated reforms to try to 
stamp out corruption in the justice system and other parts of government.31 
Corruption remains an issue of widespread concern, however, especially the role 
of officials (in the vernacular known as ‘umbrellas’) in protecting the emerging 
phenomena of ‘black societies’ or organised crime groups (see Qiu 2008; Tan and 
30 Legal institutions are not exempt from corruption. The biggest judicial corruption scandal in recent 
years occurred in the Wuhan Court (Hubei Province) and involved nearly 100 judges and court officials. 
The case, tried in 2004, revealed an ingrained network of corrupt officials at all levels of the Wuhan court 
system and exposed an organised system of bribe extraction that included taking bribes from both plaintiffs 
and defendants, manufacturing court cases, abusing the power of judges to suspend business operations or 
confiscate property, and receiving bribes for delivering beneficial judgments (Human Rights in China 2005). 
31 For detail of anti-corruption mechanisms and reforms in China, see Guo (2006).
Business and the Risk of Crime in China 
78
Yang 2009). Corruption undermines the goal of market reforms by substituting 
market forces with corrupt distribution of opportunities, and increases income 
disparities. Henderson (2007) argues that civil society needs to play a leading 
role because an impartial and independent judicial system, including anti-
corruption agencies, is crucial to maintain stability and encourage investment. 
Pei (2007) warns that endemic corruption might ultimately threaten China’s 
economic growth in a way similar to Indonesia and Japan, where widespread 
corruption has led, in part, to political upheaval and economic stagnation. 
The UNICBS, like the omnibus crime victim surveys that address household 
and personal crime victimisation, provides an independent measure of the 
crime risks faced by Chinese businesses. In the context of China, where crime 
statistics—despite recent concessions to the need for evidence-based sources—
have long been regarded as state secrets, alternative measures of the prevalence 
and nature of crime are an essential means of estimating the impact of crime. 
Such surveys help assess the likely scale and scope of risks of crime and are 
most valuable when repeated. In the next chapter, we outline the methods and 
limitations of the UNICBS snapshot of crimes against business in China.
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3. ICBS Instrument, Methodology 
and Sample
Development of the China ICBS Questionnaire
The China ICBS questionnaire was adapted from the 2000 UN Interregional Crime 
Research Institute (UNICRI) version of the ICBS that was used in Central Eastern 
Europe. In order to examine new areas of crime but keep the questionnaire 
to a reasonable length, questions about violence at work were removed, and 
the section dealing with protection money was combined with the section 
on intimidation/extortion. New sections were included on computer-related 
crime and infringement of intellectual property (IP). Overall, the questionnaire 
included 120 pre-coded questions, available in English, Cantonese and Mandarin. 
The Chinese versions were translated from the original English version with the 
assistance and advice of the Crime Prevention Institute of the PRC’s Ministry of 
Justice. 
The UNICBS questionnaire first asked respondents about their company 
characteristics—for example, business sector, main activities, number of 
employees and annual turnover. The next section measured the respondents’ 
perceptions of institutional obstacles to doing good business, such as the ease 
of dealing with various types of business regulations, crime, and bribery and 
corruption.1 The main section then inquired about the prevalence, during the 
past 12 months, of nine common crimes against businesses (burglary, vandalism, 
theft of and from vehicles, theft by employees, theft by customers, theft by 
outsiders, robbery, assault, and IP infringement); crimes that are more likely 
to specifically target businesses (fraud by employees and outsiders, bribery, 
and intimidation, extortion or request for protection money); and finally, 
computer-related crimes, such as hacking and Internet fraud. When bribery 
and/or intimidation/extortion were mentioned, respondents were asked about 
the perpetrator and some details of the incident. 
For each type of crime, respondents who reported victimisation incidents 
were asked whether the company reported the incident to the police. In-depth 
questions about responses to victimisation were included for the most serious 
of the 10 common crimes and the business-related crimes. If the incident was 
1 Fourteen questions were adapted from the World Bank’s Private Sector Survey (Brunetti et al. 1997) and 
included in the UNICBS in 2000. The questions about obstacles to doing business were asked early in the 
survey in order to avoid respondents’ answers being tainted by their recollection of victimisation; however, 
we will discuss perceived obstacles to doing business after the prevalence of victimisation.
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reported to the police, respondents were asked why the company decided to 
report the crime, whether it was satisfied with the police response, and, if not, 
the reason(s) for dissatisfaction. If the incident was not reported, respondents 
were asked the reason(s) why.
The instrument concluded with general questions about crime prevention and 
the company’s involvement in crime-prevention practices, and the respondent’s 
opinion of the police and its effectiveness in addressing crimes against business. 
Most questions were close-ended and allowed a single answer. Standard answers 
were presented for open-ended questions, such as those asking about reason(s) 
for reporting or not reporting victimisation, and multiple answers were usually 
allowed. Responses additional to the interviewer’s prompts were recorded 
on a separate sheet. Interviewers often reminded the respondents to exclude 
incidents mentioned previously.
Two pilot studies were conducted to test the length, logic, likely response rate, 
Chinese wording and format of the questionnaire: the Cantonese version of the 
ICBS China questionnaire was piloted in Hong Kong in 2003 (N = 612) and 
Shenzhen (N = 112) and the Mandarin version in Shanghai in 2005 (N = 30). 
Data from the pilot studies were not counted as part of the final survey, but were 
useful to develop the questionnaire, test the Chinese translations and improve 
the instructions given to interviewers.
Hong Kong Pilot Survey, 2003
The work on the pilot survey was funded by a seed grant from Hong Kong 
University (2002–03) in conjunction with the UNICRI and the UN Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to extend both the methodology (telephone interview 
strategies versus face-to-face methods) and scope (new crimes) of the UNICBS.
Development of the Questionnaire and Implementation
The standard UNICBS questionnaire was translated in Cantonese. Because of 
the additional questions on IP infringement and computer-related crime, and to 
reduce respondents’ burden, the following sections of the original questionnaire 
were reduced or excluded.
•	 Obstacles to doing business: items relating to foreign exchange regulations, 
price control, investment policies, starting up a business, and political 
instability were removed from the list of potential obstacles, reducing the 
number of questions from 14 to eight.
3 . ICBS Instrument, Methodology and Sample
81
•	 Insurance: the number of questions relating to insurance was reduced to a 
single question: ‘do you have insurance?’
•	 Violence at work: the whole section (10 questions) was omitted from the 
Hong Kong pilot.
•	 Losses due to crime: one question on the amount of monetary loss was 
included, but probing questions to estimate amounts lost through crime and 
asked of respondents who did not know the specific amount were omitted.
•	 Bribery: prevalence questions were retained, but most of the questions on 
the perception of the frequency and modus operandi were omitted.
•	 Corruption and protection money: the section on corruption was combined 
with the section on bribery, and the section on protection money was 
combined with that on extortion.
New questions included
•	 one about IP infringement, which was added to the list of common crime; 
IP infringement was defined as ‘illegal reproduction of products and 
counterfeiting, when patents/trademarks/copyrights/designs owned by 
your company have been used by others without your permission’
•	 one in the section on fraud by employees regarding corporate payment or 
credit-card fraud committed by an employee.
At the end of the victimisation component of the survey instrument, a section 
on computer-related crime comprising 17 questions was included. Questions on 
cyber crime were adapted from the Hong Kong UNICVS (Broadhurst et al. 2010). 
Three questions assessed the extent and the ways in which businesses used 
computers and the type of protection (for example, antivirus or firewall software) 
installed on their computers. Questions about computer-related victimisation 
included: Internet fraud; attacks through malicious software such as viruses, 
malware and spyware; threats of harm online or through email; unrequested 
lewd communication; and software copyright violation. Respondents who 
mentioned incidents of computer-related victimisation were asked whether 
they reported to the police or other organisations, and how satisfied they were 
with the response.
The pilot survey was based on a sample of telephone numbers randomly selected 
from the Yellow Pages (business phone) directory and used a computer-aided 
telephone interview (CATI) system. It was implemented in Hong Kong in July 
2003 and referred to victimisation that occurred from 1 January to 31 December 
2002. The response rate was 28 per cent, producing a sample of 612 businesses. 
Appendix D presents the results of the Hong Kong ICBS Pilot Survey.
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What Was Learned from the Hong Kong Pilot?
Various sampling procedures were tested for the pilot survey and the approach, 
based on random dialling from the Yellow Pages business directory, yielded a 
satisfactory distribution of business activity when compared with Hong Kong 
Census and Statistics Department estimates of business sectors and industry/
commercial business registries (see Census and Statistics Department, Hong 
Kong 2006). Based on a victimisation rate of 17 per cent (the highest rate in 
the pilot for fraud by outsiders), we calculated that a sample of about 1500 
businesses would produce at least 250 companies that had experienced some 
type of victimisation in each city. This figure was adequate to perform reliable 
basic statistical analyses. 
Following the Hong Kong pilot, the survey instrument was further reduced 
to encourage a higher response rate and minimise respondent burden. Some 
general questions about the business were removed (for example, when did you 
start your business, any foreign investment, are you involved in import/export). 
Overall, the pilot survey indicated that the Chinese version of the UNICBS was 
culturally appropriate and conducting the survey using CATI was feasible.
Some findings from the pilot were unexpected. There was a higher level of 
concern about corruption and crime than about conventional ‘impediments’ 
to business such as tax regimes, import/export controls, and labour, safety 
and environmental regulations. This was somewhat inconsistent with Hong 
Kong’s well-regarded and efficient anti-corruption and enforcement capabilities 
and overall reputation for clean government (as noted in the data reported by 
Transparency International in the previous chapter). We also found surprising 
that a similar proportion was concerned by a lack of consultation with business, 
and that smaller but not negligible groups of respondents complained about 
changes in law and tax regulations. Tax and regulatory controls in Hong Kong 
are relatively simple and easy to deal with compared with other jurisdictions. 
These findings could suggest higher levels of unreported crime against 
business, particularly corruption; however, since many Hong Kong companies 
have business interests in the mainland, we suspected that respondents might 
have conflated their perception of doing business in Hong Kong with their 
experiences or perception of the mainland, where widespread corruption and 
complex regulatory practices have been noted. 
In order to test this hypothesis, we decided to include an additional item about 
the location of the company’s premises (only in Hong Kong, only in mainland 
China, or both in Hong Kong and in the mainland), and to ask Hong Kong 
respondents two sets of questions about their perception of potential obstacles 
to doing good business: one set about doing business within Hong Kong, and 
one set about doing business in the mainland. With these additional questions, 
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we could test whether respondents with business activities in both Hong Kong 
and the mainland had similar views on the business environment in both 
jurisdictions, and whether respondents with business activities only in Hong 
Kong had different perceptions. As a consequence of this distinction, a larger 
sample for Hong Kong than for other cities was thought necessary. As it turns 
out, a significant number of businesses in mainland China also had businesses 
in Hong Kong and the survey failed to fully capture the likely effect of this on 
their crime experience.
To ensure reliability and statistical power, we aimed for a larger sample of about 
1800 business respondents in Hong Kong and between 1000 and 1200 respondents 
in the other cities. Assuming a similar response rate of 28 per cent across the 
four cities in the final survey, we set up the research team with a sufficient 
number of interviewers with the aim of contacting about 20 000 businesses 
overall. Appendix E outlines the content of the final survey instrument, and 
Appendix F provides a copy of the instrument used in the China ICBS.2
Survey Mode and Sample Selection
The ICBS China was conducted in two phases: in Hong Kong, between November 
2005 and mid-January 2006, referring to victimisation that occurred in 2004; 
in Shanghai, Shenzhen and Xi’an, in mid-2006, referring to victimisation that 
occurred in 2005. All interviews were conducted using computer-assisted 
telephone interviewing (CATI)—that is, interviewers read the instructions and 
the questions from a computer screen; answers were entered directly into the 
computer system and used to select the next question. This process effectively 
reduces the potential for routing errors by interviewers. All interviews were 
conducted from the Hong Kong University Social Sciences Research Centre, as 
the cost of calling long distance from Hong Kong to the mainland cities was 
comparable with that of employing mainland research agencies and ensured 
closer quality control. Calling from Hong Kong also avoided the process of 
obtaining official approval from each city for the questionnaire in the mainland. 
All interviewers spoke fluent Cantonese, Mandarin and English, and received 
appropriate training in applying the survey protocol, including two days of 
intensive practice and preparation. Quality checks were carried out at each stage 
of the process to ensure satisfactory standards of performance. A validation 
assessment was conducted on the day following the survey, through a telephone 
call-back to randomly selected respondents. 
2 The standard ICBS questionnaire is available online at <www.crime.hku.hk/victims.htm>
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Sampling
Slightly different sample frames were used in Hong Kong and in mainland China. 
In Hong Kong, businesses were selected randomly from the business section of 
the White Pages telephone directory published by PCCW, Hong Kong’s leading 
telecommunication provider. The advantage of PCCW’s White Pages is that 
virtually all businesses, except perhaps some home businesses, are listed in the 
directory. They are listed by name, however, not by business sector. Therefore, 
the validity of information provided by respondents could be checked only 
through call-backs to the business.
In mainland China, we used the Yellow Pages directory published by China 
Telecom as the sampling frame. The directory includes all phone numbers 
registered for business purposes with China Telecom, the largest state-owned 
landline service in 21 provinces including Shanghai Municipality, Guangdong 
Province (Shenzhen) and Shaanxi Province (Xi’an). Using China Telecom 
Yellow Pages guaranteed an extensive coverage of businesses. Companies are 
categorised by business sector, thus ensuring the accuracy of information on 
each company surveyed. The representativeness of the Yellow Pages directory, 
however, is unknown, and inquiries made to China Telecom over the directory’s 
percentage coverage of businesses did not yield any results. It is likely that 
businesses in rural areas and small businesses, such as convenience stores, are 
under-represented in the UNICBS China. 
In all cities, business numbers were randomly drawn from the directories and 
five attempts were made to call these numbers. Upon successful contact, the 
person who answered the phone was asked to refer the call to the manager of the 
company or other persons who understood the operation of the company well 
if they themselves did not. These respondents were invited to participate in the 
survey; if they refused, they were not replaced, and the next business on the 
list was called. The process continued until the desired number of completed 
interviews was reached. 
Response Rate
The research team made approximately 18 300 phone calls to businesses. In 
total, 5117 business respondents completed the survey: 1817 businesses 
in Hong Kong; 1110 in Shanghai; 1112 in Shenzhen; and 1078 in Xi’an. The 
completion rate across the four cities was 28 per cent. An additional 12 per 
cent of respondents started the survey, but did not complete it, reflecting the 
demanding nature of the questionnaire. Response rates varied substantially 
between cities. It was particularly low in Hong Kong (18 per cent) compared 
with the average for the three mainland China cities (41 per cent). Shenzhen 
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had the highest response rate (54 per cent), followed by Xi’an (39 per cent) and 
Shanghai (34 per cent). Response rates might also reflect, to some degree, the 
salience of concerns about crime, and this can play a role in the willingness of 
respondents to participate in a survey. Response rates to business surveys are 
generally lower than for household surveys (KPMG Forensic 2004; Taylor 2002) 
particularly when seeking interviews with management, who often perceive 
that surveys are time consuming.3 This was found to be a recurring problem in 
Hong Kong, where company managers and others who had enough company 
knowledge to complete the survey were often too busy to do so upon initial 
contact. Based on this experience, the method of contact was modified in 2006 
in the mainland cities. Rather than requesting to complete the interview at the 
time of initial contact, appointments were made to arrange a convenient time to 
conduct the interview. This method boosted the success rate in mainland cities. 
Interviewers also found that some businesses in the mainland were convinced 
to participate because the University of Hong Kong—cited as the UNICBS China 
host in the questionnaire introduction—is a well-known university and has a 
high reputation in China.
Limitations of the UNICBS 
The general limitations that exist within telephone surveys also apply to the 
UNICBS China. These include: possibilities of sampling error, under-reporting, 
telescoping, erroneous responses, systematic mistakes and improper coding and 
processing of data—although in respect to the last two problems CATI helps 
mitigate coding errors. Crime surveys are prone to a number of response errors. 
First, participants might not recall trivial incidents that occurred during the 
survey period. They might recall only incidents that were serious but occurred 
outside the survey period. Some respondents might fail to realise that an incident 
is relevant, or they might be unwilling to report certain incidents. Therefore, 
the UNICBS measures only crimes that respondents were prepared to reveal to 
interviewers.
Despite the assistance of CATI, interviewers might commit errors during data 
collection, such as misinterpreting answers or mistakenly entering the wrong 
code. Together, these factors might affect the reliability of the data obtained. 
3 For example, the response rate via telephone interview for the Hong Kong UNICVS in 2006 was 49 per 
cent, but the KPMG Forensic (2004) survey of crime against business conducted by mail in 2004 yielded 
a success rate of only 22 per cent. Generally, response rates of about 25 per cent are considered good in 
commercial surveys. The Central Eastern Europe ICBS had a surprisingly high average response rate of 65 
per cent (ranging between 30 per cent in Moscow and 99 per cent in Tirana). In many of the cities (but not 
Moscow) the survey was, however, conducted face-to-face, and this method usually yields higher response 
rates than telephone surveys.
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Every effort, however, was made during the administration, data coding and 
analysis stages to minimise these problems. A small number of cases were 
excluded due to data inconsistencies or partial completion of the questionnaire.
No weighting was applied to the data regarding business sectors and business 
size because we lacked accurate information about the overall distribution of 
business by sector and the numbers employed in businesses, particularly for 
the mainland. As noted below, however, for Hong Kong, information about 
the population of businesses was available and this enabled us to compare our 
sample with official census data. The proportion of businesses in each sector of 
economic activity in the sample differs from official statistics of contribution 
to GDP by sector of activity, which suggests the China ICBS sample might not 
be representative of the population of businesses at least in terms of sector of 
activity. 
In Chapter 9, we will discuss the limitations of the survey in more depth and 
suggest ways of improving its instrument and methodology. In the next section, 
we describe the sample of businesses in the China ICBS; then, we proceed 
to describe victimisation by common crime in Chapter 4, followed by fraud, 
bribery and extortion victimisation in Chapter 5.
Characteristics of the China UNICBS Sample
This section describes the characteristics of the sample of businesses that were 
surveyed in the 2005–06 UNICBS in terms of business activities, size of workforce 
and locations of premises in each city. These characteristics are described only 
for those premises that were surveyed. Depending on the size of the companies 
and whether or not they had branches in other locations, the figures reported 
might or might not reflect the whole of each surveyed business’s activities and 
features. The sample consisted of a total of 5117 businesses selected at random 
in Hong Kong (35.5 per cent), Shanghai (21.7 per cent), Shenzhen (21.7 per cent) 
and Xi’an (21.7 per cent). 
Business Sector
Across the four cities, the four leading sectors of business activity were 
manufacturing (33.7 per cent), wholesale and distribution (25.2 per cent), non-
food retail (24.3 per cent) and professional services (21.5 per cent) (Table 3.1). 
Food retailing, unspecified trading and financial services each represented less 
than 10 per cent of the sample. A relatively large proportion of businesses (17.5 
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per cent) were also engaged in other types of business activity. Some respondents 
described their company as a ‘headquarters’ (16.4 per cent) or ‘branch/chain 
shop’ (10.6 per cent), but did not provide further information on their activity.













Manufacturing 23 .5 44 .2 43 .4 30 .1 33 .7
Wholesale/distribution 18 .1 26 .8 23 .9 36 .7 25 .2
Retail—non-food 20 .9 22 .3 22 .7 33 .8 24 .3
Professional services 20 .9 23 .3 19 .8 22 .5 21 .5
Retail—food 10 .5 4 .5 3 .1 7 .2 6 .9
Trade (unspecified) 4 .8 1 .5 1 .3 0 .6 2 .4
Financial services 2 .5 1 .6 1 .2 1 .1 1 .7
Other sectors 24 .9 12 .3 14 .7 13 .5 17 .5
Head office 6 .5 23 .3 24 .9 17 .2 16 .4
Branch/chain shop 3 .4 17 .2 12 .9 13 .4 10 .6
Note: a Multiple answers were allowed, so percentages add up to more than 100 per cent. 
Respondents were asked to nominate all their company’s activities at the 
premises surveyed, which could crossover two or more sectors. Just over half 
(55 per cent) the respondents indicated that their business was involved in only 
one sector of activity, 33 per cent in two sectors, and 12 per cent in three or more 
sectors. There were differences between cities: a larger proportion of Hong Kong 
businesses (67.2 per cent) cited a single sector compared with 48.6 per cent of 
mainland businesses, and 29.8 per cent of Hong Kong businesses but 34 per cent 
of mainland businesses mentioned two sectors of activity. This suggests that 
mainland businesses had more diversified lines of business and explains why 
there was a higher proportion of mainland businesses represented in each sector 
of activity. To be able to conduct statistical analyses on the factors linked to the 
likelihood and type of victimisation, we needed to recode each business’s sector 
of activity into a single variable made up of mutually exclusive categories. The 
following decisions were applied.
•	 First, the sectors were combined into five categories: manufacturing, retail 
(including food and non-food retail), wholesale/distribution and unspecified 
trade, financial and professional services, and other sectors; the last category 
includes those who described their activity as headquarters and branch/
chain (coded as administration and management).
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•	 Businesses with a single sector of activity and those with two sectors of 
activities that had been combined were coded according to the above 
categories.
•	 When two or more sectors had been mentioned and one of them was 
‘headquarters/branch’, this answer was eliminated and the case was 
coded according to the actual sector. A similar process was applied when 
respondents had mentioned ‘other sector’ along with other responses.
For about 20 per cent of businesses, no single sector of activity could be 
identified from the responses given. We were able to refine our coding scheme by 
using the answers given to two other survey questions: location of premises (for 
example industrial estate, shopping precinct, serviced building), and does your 
premises belong to a chain of shops? The answer to these questions permitted 
us to assess the most likely sector of activity when several were mentioned. For 
example, if respondents said they were involved in retail and wholesale, and 
their premises was located in a shopping precinct, we coded the main sector 
of activity as ‘retail’; if respondents mentioned manufacturing and retail, and 
their premises was located in an industrial estate, their business was coded as 
‘manufacturing’. Table 3.2 presents the main sector of activity of the surveyed 
businesses in each city and overall, and Figure 3.1 (top) compares businesses in 
Hong Kong and the mainland.












Manufacturing 23 .5 44 .2 43 .4 30 .1 33 .7
Retail 27 .4 13 .1 14 .2 25 .2 21 .0
Financial & 
professional services 22 .8 20 .8 16 .9 20 .4 20 .6
Wholesale/distribution/
trade 18 .6 14 .6 11 .4 20 .9 16 .7
Administration/
management and 
other sectors 7 .7 7 .3 14 .0a 3 .3 8 .1
Note: a A relatively large proportion of Shenzhen’s businesses described their activities as headquarters or 
branches, without specifying a sector of activity. 
There were significant differences in business activities between Hong Kong 
and the mainland and some differences between the three mainland cities. 
Significantly more companies were engaged in manufacturing in the mainland 
than in Hong Kong (34.9 per cent and 23.5 per cent respectively), while 
businesses in Hong Kong were more likely to be involved in retail (27.4 per cent 
compared with 17.4 per cent in the mainland). Similar proportions of businesses 
were engaged in the other sectors of activity in Hong Kong and the mainland. 
3 . ICBS Instrument, Methodology and Sample
89
The distribution of businesses by sector of activity was comparable in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen: manufacturing was the largest sector (43–44 per 
cent of businesses), followed by financial and professional services (17–21 per 
cent), and retail and wholesale/distribution (11–15 per cent). Reflecting variant 
development and government policies, Xi’an had a different pattern of business 
activity, with only 30 per cent of businesses involved in manufacturing but 25 
per cent in retail. A similar proportion of businesses (20 per cent) were active in 
the wholesale/distribution and financial and professional services sectors. About 
one-quarter of companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen were headquarters, with 
a lesser proportion in Xi’an (16.4 per cent) and only 6.5 per cent in Hong Kong.
Figure 3.1 Main Business Sector and Size of Workforce, Hong Kong and 
Mainland China
A record of the total number of registered companies in Hong Kong and 
their sector of economic activity is available from the Census and Statistics 
Department (2006) and we are able to assess the representativeness of the 
Hong Kong sample of businesses. Such data are not available, however, for 
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the mainland.4 Our Hong Kong sample of 1817 businesses represented 0.61 
per cent of the population of registered companies (in 2005). Of these 296 249 
companies, 61 per cent were engaged in the wholesale and retail sector, 22 per 
cent in financial and professional services, 5 per cent in manufacturing and 12 
per cent in other various sectors of activity. Therefore, we see from Table 3.2 
that the manufacturing sector (23.5 per cent) is over-represented in the Hong 
Kong ICBS sample (by a factor of about four), while the combined wholesale 
and retail sectors (46 per cent of the sample) are under-represented. The share 
of businesses in the financial and professional services sector and various 
other sectors is on par with the population.
For mainland businesses, we can perform only a gross approximation of the 
sample representativeness using contribution to GDP (see the economic 
characteristics of the four cities presented above). Economic sectors’ contribution 
to GDP is not an adequate way to estimate representativeness because it does 
not take into account the size of the companies—for example, a small number 
of very large factories will contribute more to GDP than a great number of 
small workshops. Given the limited amount of information we could gather on 
businesses activities in the mainland, we present below this crude estimation 
of the representativeness of the mainland sample. The Shanghai sample seems 
representative of the economic activities of the city, since the secondary sector 
contributed 48 per cent of GDP in 2005, and, in our sample, 44.2 per cent of 
businesses are manufacturers; however, manufacturing seems under-represented 
in the Shenzhen and Xi’an samples: while the secondary sector contributed 61 
per cent to Shenzhen’s GDP and 44 per cent to Xi’an’s GDP, 43.4 per cent of 
the Shenzhen sample and 30.1 per cent of the Xi’an sample were involved in 
manufacturing.
Annual Turnover and Workforce
The majority of data on the companies’ annual turnover are missing, with 
only 30.5 per cent of valid answers. Interviewers frequently noticed a certain 
reluctance from respondents to reveal financial data and were instructed not to 
probe or press for an answer given the apparent sensitivity, particularly among 
mainland respondents. There were more valid answers in Hong Kong (42 per 
cent) than Shanghai (28 per cent), Shenzhen (20 per cent) or Xi’an (24 per cent). 
Based on the figures available, there were no major differences in mean annual 
turnover between Hong Kong and the mainland, or between the four cities. 
4 We did find a record of the total number of mainland companies earning more than CNY5 million and 
similar data for Shanghai (NBS 2007; Shanghai Municipal Statistics Bureau 2006, 2010). Unfortunately, as 
described in the next section, the majority of data on our businesses’ turnover was missing, which made it 
impossible to compare our sample of mainland businesses with the population.
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With so much missing information, however, this variable is not useful, and we 
use the number of employees at the premises surveyed (full-time, part-time and 
casual) as a proxy to estimate the size of the businesses.
More than 40 per cent of all businesses were small, with 10 or less employees; 
more than one-quarter (27.9 per cent) had 11 to 49 employees, and about 18 
per cent had between 50 and 250 employees. Nearly two-thirds of Hong Kong 
businesses were very small (one to five employees) and nearly 80 per cent had 
10 or less employees—in contrast with the mainland where only 21.9 per cent 
of the businesses surveyed employed 10 or less people (Figure 3.1, bottom). In 
the three mainland cities, the majority of the businesses surveyed were medium 
to medium-large (50 to 250 employees), although companies in Xi’an tended to 
be smaller than those in Shanghai and Shenzhen (Table 3.3). 
Table 3.3 Size of Workforce, 2005–06 China UNICBS Sample (per cent)












Very small: 1–5 61 .2 5 .0 5 .2 14 .7 27 .1
Small: 6–10 17 .6 11 .9 10 .0 14 .9 14 .1
Medium: 11–49 14 .1 37 .1 33 .5 36 .1 27 .9
Medium-large: 50–250 4 .7 27 .7 29 .5 18 .2 17 .9
Large: 251–750 0 .3 7 .2 9 .9 4 .9 4 .9
Very large: 751+ 0 .7 4 .3 5 .5 3 .9 3 .2
Don’t know/refusals 1 .4 6 .8 6 .4 7 .3 4 .9
The size of businesses varied by sector of activity (Table 3.4). Three sectors—
manufacturing, administration/management, and financial and professional 
services—tended to have larger workforces (more than half of these businesses 
had workforces totalling between 11 and 250 workers). The majority of retail 
businesses were small: 63.3 per cent employed 10 or less people, and only 4.1 
per cent had more than 250 employees. The size of the workforce is consistent 
with the repartition of businesses by city and sector; a larger proportion of 
manufacturing businesses were located in the mainland and they tended to have 
a larger workforce, but a majority of retail businesses were located in Hong 
Kong and they tended to have a smaller workforce. With fewer manufacturing 
companies than Shanghai and Shenzhen, Xi’an had a larger proportion of small 
businesses although still far less than Hong Kong. 
Location of Businesses
Respondents were asked two questions about the location of their premises. 
First, whether their premises was located in a town or city centre, in a built-up 
area outside a city centre, in the countryside or somewhere else. The second 
question was more precise and included seven response options: an industrial 
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estate or business park, an indoor shopping precinct, an outdoor shopping 
precinct, a main shopping street, an out-of-town commercial area, a serviced 
building for small businesses or another location. This question is important 
to assess whether some business locations are more prone to victimisation than 
others and provides information on the types of crime-prevention initiatives 
more likely to be effective in certain locations.5 On the last question, respondents 
could pick several answers. The variable was simplified by combining several 
categories. When businesses mentioned several locations that could not be 
combined, a single location was selected based on the type of business, its size 
and whether it was located in the city centre or out of town. For example, if a 
business’s main sector of activity consisted of financial or professional services, 
and the respondent said the premises was located in a main shopping street 
and a serviced building, we coded the location as serviced building, because 
we assumed the serviced building was located in a shopping street. The four 
main locations were: industrial or business area, which included industrial 
estates, business parks and out-of-town commercial areas; shopping area, which 
included indoor and outdoor shopping precincts and main shopping streets; 
serviced building for small businesses; and other locations.








































































































1–10 28 .2 63 .3 53 .1 42 .7 34 .6 43 .3
11–49 28 .1 23 .6 32 .7 32 .2 36 .1 29 .4
50–250 29 .6 9 .1 11 .4 17 .3 19 .4 18 .8
251+ 14 .1 4 .1 2 .8 7 .8 9 .9 8 .5
Note: a Excluding ‘don’t know’ and refusals. 
Not surprisingly, the location of business premises was related to the type and 
size of the business. Businesses involved in manufacturing were more likely to be 
located in industrial or business areas, retail businesses were most often located 
in shopping areas, and financial and professional services, as well as smaller 
wholesale and trading businesses, in serviced buildings. Across the four cities, 
more than one-third of businesses (35.6 per cent) were located in industrial or 
business areas (Table 3.5). In Shenzhen, half the businesses were located in such 
areas; in Shanghai, 43.3 per cent; and this relates to the predominance of the 
5 For example, the notion of ‘crime prevention through environmental design’ was first formulated by 
criminologist Ray Jeffery (1971) and developed by others (for example, Newman 1972). 
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manufacturing sector and larger businesses in these two cities. More premises in 
Hong Kong and Xi’an were in shopping areas because of the larger proportion of 
food and non-food retailers in these two cities.













business area 23 .9 43 .3 50 .0 32 .6 35 .6
Shopping area 34 .2 19 .8 21 .9 33 .0 28 .2
Serviced building 26 .7 20 .5 22 .1 15 .4 22 .0
Other locations 15 .1 9 .7 12 .7 19 .0 14 .2
Although the questionnaire referred only to victimisation at the premises 
surveyed, respondents were asked whether their company had other premises, 
and where these premises were located. We were particularly interested in the 
opinion of Hong Kong respondents who also ran businesses in the mainland. A 
significantly larger proportion of mainland companies had multiple premises 
compared with Hong Kong (40.9 per cent and 28.8 per cent respectively), and 
this is consistent with their generally larger size. The majority of the businesses 
surveyed (84.9 per cent) were located in a single jurisdiction (56.5 per cent in 
mainland China and 28.5 per cent in Hong Kong), although they could have 
several premises within this jurisdiction. A slightly higher proportion of Hong 
Kong businesses also had premises in mainland China (19.9 per cent) compared 
to mainland businesses with other premises in Hong Kong (12.5 per cent). Table 
3.6 shows that businesses with premises in both Hong Kong and the mainland 
were generally larger. For example, just more than 10 per cent of Hong Kong 
businesses with premises in the mainland had between 50 and 250 employees, 
compared with only 3.4 per cent of single-premises companies. Among the three 
mainland cities, Shenzhen companies were the most likely to have premises in 
Hong Kong as well (21.7 per cent, compared with 11.7 per cent for Shanghai and 
5.2 per cent for Xi’an). This is not surprising since Hong Kong and Shenzhen are 
adjacent to each other and have strong commercial and financial links.




















1–10 79 .9 83 .6 65 .4 22 .0 23 .3 12 .8
11–49 14 .3 12 .6 20 .9 38 .1 39 .1 31 .4
50–250 4 .7 3 .4 10 .1 27 .1 26 .8 28 .8
251+ 1 .1 0 .4 3 .6 12 .8 10 .8 27 .0
Note: a Defined as N full and part-time employees and based on N = 4867 businesses, excluding ‘don’t 
know’ and refusals; missing values on location of premises were coded as Hong Kong only or mainland only.
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Interviewees 
We hoped to be able to interview people in managerial positions as often as 
possible, because they should have the most knowledge about the business, 
in terms of both company background and potential victimisation. Across the 
four cities, 47.6 per cent of respondents occupied managerial positions: 22.8 
per cent were the owners, managing directors or chief executives; 17.1 per cent 
were the managers of the premises surveyed; and 12.6 per cent occupied various 
executive positions such as financial director, production manager or company 
secretary (including 4 per cent of respondents who were responsible for the 
company’s security). Other interviewees (52.4 per cent) included clerks, sales 
assistants and other non-executives.
Although the proportions varied between the mainland cities, overall, we 
interviewed significantly more executives in Hong Kong than in the mainland 
(65.5 per cent and 45.2 per cent respectively). In Xi’an, 50.5 per cent of the 
respondents were executives; in Shanghai, 47.7 per cent; and in Shenzhen, 37.7 
per cent. The interviewee’s position was related to the size of the company: more 
managers completed the survey in small to medium businesses than in larger 
companies, where predominantly employees were interviewed. This explains 
why more managers were interviewed in Hong Kong, since the majority of the 
businesses surveyed were small or medium-sized. One drawback is that while 
executives and managers have more knowledge about the business and its 
victimisation, they are also very busy people and, therefore, are more likely to 
refuse being interviewed or are unable to complete the survey. It is probable 
that the low response rate in Hong Kong is partly due to this problem. On 
the other hand, non-executive employees, as expected, knew less about the 
business. For example, while many respondents refused to reveal the annual 
turnover of the company, between 34 and 47 per cent of managers provided an 
answer compared with less than 20 per cent of employees. We found a consistent 
pattern where non-executive respondents were more likely than managers to 
answer ‘don’t know’ on many of the survey questions: less than 2 per cent of 
managers could not answer questions about victimisation compared with 4–5 
per cent of non-managerial staff; on the crime-prevention questions, up to 15 
per cent of non-executive respondents responded that they did not know. This 
has of course implications for the accuracy of the information we received, as 
employees might also have answered questions for which they did not have 
complete or accurate knowledge. It also suggests that future surveys of this 
nature need to reconsider how best they might boost the involvement of senior 
staff and managers. We now turn to the prevalence and type of victimisation 
against business, which we describe in the next two chapters.
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4. Common Crimes against Business
We refer to ‘common’ crime when talking about conventional crime or ‘street’ 
crime, such as burglary, robbery or theft, which is perpetrated against both 
individuals and businesses. The next chapter examines crime that is more 
likely to specifically target businesses or commercial enterprises, such as fraud, 
bribery and corruption, and computer-related crime. Here, we focus on nine 
common crimes: burglary, vandalism, vehicle theft, theft from a vehicle, theft 
by customers, theft by employees, theft by outsiders, robbery, assault, and an 
‘unspecified offences’ category. First, we report rates of victimisation by city. 
Then, we consider whether victimisation varies by business sector and by 
business size, and examine interactions between these characteristics. Finally, 
we compare the rates found in the China ICBS with those of other victimisation 
surveys. Unless otherwise specified, percentages are based on the total numbers 
of respondents (that is, the ‘N’ value), including ‘don’t know’ and refusals, 
which is the standard way of reporting crime victimisation in UN surveys (see 
van Dijk et al. 2007).
Rates of Victimisation by City
Table 4.1 presents rates of victimisation overall and by city for each of the 
common crimes. This is a simple measure of the prevalence of victimisation—
that is, the percentage of businesses which reported having been the victim 
of at least one incident during the survey period (2004 for Hong Kong and 
2005 for the mainland cities). Overall, in the 12-month reference period of 
the China UNICBS, 6.7 per cent of businesses across the four cities reported at 
least one incident of victimisation by common crime. Hong Kong businesses 
reported the highest rate (8.3 per cent), followed by those in Shenzhen (7.4 per 
cent), Shanghai (5 per cent) and Xi’an (4.9 per cent). Rates in Hong Kong and 
Shenzhen were comparable, but significantly higher than those in Shanghai and 
Xi’an. The crimes most likely to affect the businesses across the four cities were 
burglary (3.7 per cent) and theft by outsiders (3.1 per cent). The prevalence 
of other types of crime was less than 2 per cent, ranging from 0.6 per cent for 
vehicle theft to 1.8 per cent for vandalism and theft by employees.
Considering only the combined rate for all crime types is misleading. In Figure 
4.1, we group the mainland cities and compare the prevalence of common crime 
with Hong Kong. As the figure shows, the higher overall rate of victimisation 
in Hong Kong compared with the mainland cities was driven by the high 
prevalence of theft by customers (3.1 per cent and 1 per cent respectively, p 
< 0.001). Hong Kong’s rates of theft by outsiders, robbery and vehicle theft 
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were, however, significantly lower than those of the mainland cities combined, 
and for the other offences, they were comparable. Shenzhen, on the other 
hand, recorded consistently higher rates of victimisation across a number of 
crimes: vandalism (2.6 per cent versus 1.6 per cent for the three other cities 
combined), vehicle theft (1.1 per cent versus 0.5 per cent), theft by employees 
(3 per cent versus 1.5 per cent), theft by outsiders (4.3 per cent versus 2.8 per 
cent), robbery (2.4 per cent versus 0.4 per cent—nearly three times that of Xi’an 
and 10 times that of Hong Kong), and assault (1.2 per cent versus 0.5 per cent) 
(Table 4.1). Among the three mainland cities, Shenzhen had the highest rates of 
victimisation for all crime types, except theft by customers. Shanghai and Xi’an 
showed a comparable rate of overall victimisation (5 per cent and 4.9 per cent 
respectively).
Table 4.1 Victimisation by Common Crime: One-year prevalence rates by 
city and overall (per cent)












All common crimes 8.3*** 5.0 7.4** 4.9 6.7
Burglary 3 .1 3 .5 4 .6 3 .7 3 .7
Theft by outsiders 2 .4† 2 .6 4 .3** 3 .6 3 .1
Vandalism 1 .4 1 .4 2 .6* 2 .1 1 .8
Theft by employees 1 .7 1 .5 3 .0* 1 .1 1 .8
Theft by customers 3 .1*** 1 .1 0 .6†† 1 .3 1 .7
Robbery 0 .3†† 0 .2†† 2 .4*** 0 .9 0 .9
Theft from vehicle 0 .6 1 .0 1 .0 0 .9 0 .8
Vehicle theft 0 .3† 0 .5 1 .1* 0 .8 0 .6
Assault 0 .7 0 .1 1 .2* 0 .6 0 .6
Other offences 1 .5** 0 .5 0 .9 0 .6 1 .0
* p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001, rate is significantly higher
† p < 0.05  †† p < 0.01, rate is significantly lower
Note: a Rates refer to the 12-month period from 1 January to 31 December 2004 for Hong Kong, and 1 
January to 31 December 2005 for Shanghai, Shenzhen and Xi’an.
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Figure 4.1 One-Year Prevalence of Common Crime, Hong Kong (2004) and 
Mainland (2005)
Victimisation by Business Sector and Business 
Size
While we see a greater prevalence of crimes against business in Shenzhen, 
differences between cities are only one representation of victimisation patterns. 
Victimisation can also vary according to sectors of activity, location and business 
size. It is likely that some types of crime occur more frequently in some business 
sectors—for example, we can expect theft by customers (shoplifting) to be more 
prevalent in the retail sector than in other sectors of activity. Victimisation risks 
might also be related to the size of the business. Because of the large amount of 
missing data on annual turnover, we do not examine this factor in relation to 
victimisation risks.
Victimisation by Business Sector
For all common crimes combined, businesses involved in retail were significantly 
more likely to be victimised than those in other sectors of activity (Table 4.2). 
Just more than 9 per cent of retailers reported some victimisation, compared 
with 4.2–6.8 per cent (average 6 per cent) in other sectors. As expected, retailers 
were particularly prone to theft by customers (5.2 per cent), but also by 
outsiders (4 per cent). Manufacturing businesses, on the other hand, had the 
lowest prevalence of theft by customers (0.8 per cent), but were significantly 
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more at risk of theft by employees (2.3 per cent) than other sectors. Wholesalers 
and traders were least likely to be victimised by any type of common crime (4.2 
per cent overall).1
Table 4.2 One-Year Prevalence of Common Crime by Main Sector of 
Activity across Four Cities (per cent)
















All common crimes 6.4 9.1** 4.2†† 6.8 5.6
Burglary 4 .2 4 .2 2 .0†† 4 .2 1 .9
Theft by outsiders 3 .2 4 .0* 1 .6† 3 .7 1 .7
Vandalism 1 .9 2 .1 1 .3 2 .1 1 .2
Theft by employees 2 .3* 2 .1 0 .6†† 1 .8 1 .7
Theft by customers 0 .8 5 .2*** 0 .4 1 .3 0 .7
Robbery 1 .0 0 .4 0 .6 0 .9 1 .7
Theft from vehicle 0 .9 0 .7 0 .4 1 .1 1 .0
Vehicle theft 0 .6 0 .5 0 .2 0 .9 1 .0
Assault 0 .8 0 .6 0 .5 0 .7 0 .5
Other offences 1 .0 1 .0 0 .8 1 .0 1 .2
* p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001, rate is significantly higher
† p < 0.05  †† p < 0.01, rate is significantly lower 
The manufacturing sector had the highest rate of theft by employees. In both 
Shanghai and Shenzhen, more than 40 per cent of businesses were engaged in 
manufacturing (Table 3.2), yet Shenzhen recorded a significantly higher rate of 
such thefts than Shanghai. Shenzhen also had a higher share of large and very 
large companies than Shanghai, which can account for the difference in rate of 
theft by employees. The relationship between the risk of victimisation and the 
size of the business also explains some of the variation in rates of victimisation 
between the cities: Hong Kong tended to have smaller businesses than the 
mainland and less victimisation, except in the case of shoplifting, for which 
very small businesses were more at risk.
Victimisation by Business Size
In these analyses, we again use the number of employees as a proxy for estimating 
business size. From Table 4.3, we see that, except for theft by customers, the 
likelihood of victimisation generally increases with the size of the business. 
1 The subgroup of traders in unspecified goods (N = 122) had a particularly low victimisation rate of 1.6 
per cent. 
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For all common crimes combined, large businesses (those with more than 
250 employees) were victimised at nearly twice the rate of small and medium 
businesses (fewer than 50 employees). Medium-large and large businesses (50 
or more employees) were statistically significantly more likely to be the victims 
of burglary, vandalism, theft by employees, theft by outsiders, robbery and 
assault than smaller businesses. For other types of crime, differences are not 
statistically significant, but victimisation rates are higher for larger businesses, 
apart from theft by customers. While small businesses—that is, those with 10 or 
less employees—seemed to be protected from many common crimes, they were 
most prone to theft by customers (2.7 per cent, p < 0.01). These businesses are 
likely to be small retail shops, which might have lacked resources to implement 
surveillance systems. The rate of theft by employees in small businesses was 
significantly lower than in larger ones, perhaps because they were often owned 
and run by family members.
Table 4.3 One-Year Prevalence of Common Crime by Size of Workforce 













All common crimes 6.6 5.8 8.0 10.4** 6.9
Burglary 2 .9† 3 .5 5 .1** 5 .8* 3 .8
Theft by outsiders 2 .6 3 .1 4 .1* 5 .3*** 3 .2
Vandalism 1 .4† 1 .6 3 .1** 2 .7 2 .7
Theft by employees 0 .9† 1 .6 3 .4*** 4 .4*** 1 .9
Theft by customers 2 .7*** 1 .1 0 .9 2 .2 1 .8
Robbery 0 .4† 0 .8 1 .9*** 1 .7* 0 .9
Theft from vehicle 0 .5† 0 .8 1 .2 1 .7* 0 .8
Vehicle theft 0 .3† 0 .8 0 .9 1 .0 0 .6
Assault 0 .5 0 .6 0 .8 1 .7** 0 .7
Other offences 1 .1 0 .5 1 .1 2 .2 1 .0
* p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p< 0.001, rate is significantly higher
† p < 0.05, rate is significantly lower 
Note: a Number of employees (part and full-time, excluding ‘don’t know’/refusal)—small, 1–10; medium, 
11–49; medium-large, 50–250; large, more than 250. 
Interaction Between City, Business Sector and 
Business Size
Analyses conducted so far suggest that for most types of crime, rates of business 
victimisation were higher in Shenzhen than in other cities, but theft by customers 
was more prevalent in Hong Kong. Two sectors of business activities were more 
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prone to victimisation, but this depended on the type of victimisation: the 
retail sector was at heightened risk of theft by customers and outsiders, and 
companies in the manufacturing sector were more likely to be victims of theft 
by employees. Apart from theft by customers, which was most prevalent against 
small businesses, risks of victimisation generally increased with the size of the 
business. We now examine whether correlations between business sector and 
size are present across the four cities. Details of victimisation rates by city and 
sector, and by city and business size, are presented in Appendix G, Tables G.1 
and G.2. 
Table G.1 confirms that retailers were significantly more likely to be victims of 
theft by customers and outsiders than other businesses, but only in Hong Kong 
and Shanghai. Since the Hong Kong sample consisted of about one-quarter of 
retailers, it is not surprising to find a high rate of shoplifting there. Shanghai 
retailers also had a higher risk of victimisation by shoplifting, but only about 
one-third that of Hong Kong (3.4 per cent compared with 9.2 per cent), probably 
because retail businesses accounted for only 13 per cent of the Shanghai sample. 
In Shenzhen, businesses that provide financial and professional services were 
particularly at risk of vandalism (5.3 per cent, p < 0.05) and theft by outsiders 
(7.4 per cent, p < 0.05). Across the four cities, the wholesale/trade sector tended 
to report lower rates of victimisation, but this was not significant.
While we find few sector effects, Appendix Table G.2 shows a strong and 
consistent effect of business size, with on the whole greater levels of victimisation 
against medium-large/large businesses. Hong Kong and Shanghai recorded 
similar levels of theft by customers in small businesses (3.1 per cent and 3.2 per 
cent respectively). In Shanghai, shoplifting was significantly more prevalent 
in small businesses (one–10 employees) than in larger ones, but in Hong Kong, 
the relationship was not significant because the highest rate of shoplifting 
occurred in the largest businesses (10.5 per cent for companies with more than 
250 employees). This suggests that compared with Shenzhen and Xi’an, retailers 
in Hong Kong were generally prone to experiencing shoplifting, with the few 
larger companies most at risk. In part this might also reflect the nature of retail 
trading in Hong Kong where larger retail outlets dominate shopping zones (for 
example, Kowloon and Causeway Bay) and are designed to attract overseas 
visitors as well as local shoppers. As a consequence, these retailers can attract 
gangs of thieves, often from the mainland or further abroad.
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Victimisation by Location of Premises 
Respondents only reported victimisation that occurred on the premises surveyed, 
but were asked whether the company had other premises and their location 
(that is, Hong Kong or mainland). Looking at all common crimes combined, 
Hong Kong businesses with other premises in the mainland were significantly 
more likely to be victimised than their counterparts without premises in the 
mainland, and mainland businesses with premises in Hong Kong also had a 
higher rate of victimisation than mainland businesses with no premises in Hong 
Kong, but the difference was not statistically significant (Table 4.4). For nearly 
all types of common crime, businesses with premises in both the mainland 
and Hong Kong tended to have a higher risk of victimisation, with statistically 
significant differences in rates of victimisation for theft by employees. Theft by 
customers again was the exception and Hong Kong businesses with premises 
only in Hong Kong showed a rate double that of Hong Kong businesses with 
additional premises in the mainland.
Table 4.4 One-Year Victimisation Rates for Businesses with Premises in 
Hong Kong or Mainland Only, or Hong Kong and Mainland (per cent)
Hong Kong (2004) Mainland (2005)
Type of victimisation











All common crimes 7.8 10.0** 5.4 8.0
Burglary 3 .0 3 .9 3 .8 4 .6
Theft by outsiders 2 .2 3 .0 3 .4 4 .1
Vandalism 1 .4 1 .4 2 .0 2 .7
Theft by employees 1 .1 4 .2*** 1 .7 3 .4***
Theft by customers 3 .4*** 1 .7 1 .1 0 .5
Robbery 0 .1 0 .8* 1 .1 1 .7
Theft from vehicle 0 .5 0 .8 1 .0 0 .7
Vehicle theft 0 .2 0 .6 0 .8 0 .7
Assault 0 .6 1 .1 0 .5 1 .5
Other offences 1 .5 1 .7 0 .5 1 .7**
* p < 0.05   ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001
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The differential risk of victimisation between the two groups of businesses, 
however, is related to the size of businesses rather than the location of their 
premises. We ran the same analyses based only on the number of premises 
but not considering the location of the other premises. For burglary, theft by 
employees, theft by outsiders and other unspecified crimes, large differences in 
victimisation emerged and companies with multiple premises had a significantly 
higher risk of victimisation than those with single premises. This pattern 
occurred because businesses with multiple premises, regardless of where they 
were located, were generally larger, and, as reported above, larger business size 
was associated with higher risk of victimisation. But again, the exception was 
theft by customers, with no differences in victimisation rates between single 
and multiple-premises companies.
In Hong Kong, the prevalence of theft by customers was lower for businesses 
with multiple premises than those with single premises, which appears 
to contradict the general pattern of victimisation just described. Theft by 
customers was, however, the only type of crime that was most prevalent in 
smaller retail businesses, and in Hong Kong, the majority of retailers (80 per 
cent) operated small businesses. Therefore, it is not surprising that single-
premises companies—most likely retail shops—experienced more theft by 
customers than larger, non-retail, multiple-premises companies.
Considering now the specific location of the premises surveyed, Table 4.5 reveals 
a pattern consistent with other analyses: businesses located in shopping areas 
were significantly more likely to be victimised than those in other locations, 
but this was due only to high rates of theft by customers and by outsiders. This 
is not surprising since retail shops were those most often located in shopping 
areas and they were particularly prone to theft by customers and outsiders. A 
more interesting finding is that companies operating from serviced buildings 
reported a significantly lower rate of theft by employees than others. Companies 
located in serviced buildings tended to be smaller than in other locations, which 
goes some way in accounting for their lower victimisation rates. It is likely, 
however, that the level of security typically available in serviced buildings also 
helped reduce the likelihood of criminal victimisation.
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Table 4.5 One-Year Prevalence of Common Crime by Location of Premises 














All common crime 5.8 9.1*** 5.4 5.8
Burglary 3 .7 4 .0 3 .1 3 .8
Vandalism 1 .8 1 .7 1 .6 2 .6
Vehicle–related crimeb 1 .3 1 .2 0 .7 1 .2
Theft by employees 2 .1 2 .2 0 .8† 1 .9
Theft by customers 0 .7 4 .2*** 0 .6 1 .1
Theft by outsiders 2 .9 4 .2* 2 .3 2 .6
Violent crimec 1 .4 1 .1 0 .8 1 .2
Other offences 0 .6 1 .3 1 .2 1 .0
* p < 0.05  *** p < 0.001, rate is significantly higher
† p < 0.05, rate is significantly lower
Notes: a Includes industrial estates, business parks and commercial areas; b includes theft of vehicle and 
theft from vehicle; c includes robbery and assault.
Monetary Loss Due to Common Crime 
Respondents who mentioned one or several instances of victimisation were 
asked to estimate the amount of monetary loss that resulted from the most 
serious incident. Of the 328 businesses that were victimised and provided 
details about the most serious incident of common crime, 10.6 per cent reported 
no monetary loss; however, nearly one-quarter of respondents (22.6 per cent) 
did not know whether the incident incurred losses for the business or refused to 
answer this question. On Figure 4.2, we see that there are no major differences 
in the amount lost between the cities. All businesses reported some monetary 
losses in Xi’an, but nearly one-third (31.5 per cent) suffered relatively small 
losses (less than US$250) from the crime. One in five victimised businesses in 
Shanghai had losses in excess of US$5000—a slightly higher proportion than in 
the other cities.
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Figure 4.2 Monetary Loss in Most Serious Incident of Victimisation by 
Common Crime
Across the four cities and excluding businesses that reported no monetary 
losses, the average loss due to the most serious criminal incident was US$5680; 
the median, however, was much lower at US$640 (Table 4.6). We use median 
losses for comparative purposes, as the median is less sensitive to extreme values 
than the mean. The median loss was lowest in Hong Kong (US$576) and highest 
in Shanghai (US$1230).
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Table 4.6 Monetary Loss Due to Common Crime: Mean, median and 












Mean, most serious 
incident, US$ 7,002 5,329 4,867 3,528 5,680
Median, most serious 
incident, US$ 576 1,230 861 769 640
Total loss, most serious 
incident, US$1000 856 268 345 183 1,652
Total loss, all incidents, 
US$1000b 1,528 812 919 479 3,738
Notes: a Based on respondents who reported a loss—that is, excluding N = 74 who did not know or 
refused to answer, and N = 27 who reported no monetary loss; b this estimate includes losses due to 
multiple victimisations—that is, by different offence types, but not losses due to repeat victimisation (that 
is, several incidents of the same offence type).
Based on the losses that respondents reported for the most serious incident of 
common crime, we estimated that together the businesses we surveyed had 
lost a total of US$1.65 million from the most serious incident of common crime 
(Table 4.6). If we combine the monetary losses from all the incidents of common 
crime—that is, counting losses due to victimisation by different offences for 
businesses that had been victimised more than once—our estimate more than 
doubles, to US$3738. (Note that this figure is underestimated as it does not 
include losses due to repeat victimisation by the same offence.) The largest 
amount was lost in Hong Kong (US$1.5 million), followed by Shenzhen (less 
than US$1 million).
Not surprisingly, the cost of the criminal incident varied depending on the type 
of crime (Table 4.7). In terms of median losses from the most serious incident 
(middle column), we see that unspecified offences were the most costly (median 
US$1845), followed by assault and theft by employees (US$1538). Theft by 
outsiders and theft by customers incurred the lowest median amounts of loss—
US$246 and $256 respectively. Theft by customers was most likely to happen in 
small retail shops where customers would be able to steal only small, relatively 
inexpensive items. If, however, we consider the total amounts lost to each type 
of common crime (right-hand column), theft by employees incurred by far the 
largest loss, of more than US$1.3 million—double the total cost of theft of a 
vehicle (US$680 000). Monetary losses due to customer theft totalled a relatively 
modest amount (US$33 000) because, as indicated by the mean and median, 
each incident incurred only small losses.
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Table 4.7 Monetary Loss Due to Common Crime: Mean, median and 
estimated total loss by type of crime
Most serious incident onlya All incidents






Theft by employees 18 554 1538 1371
Vehicle theft 17 700 1230 680
Burglary 3354 1230 559
Theft by outsiders 2096 246 357
Theft from vehicle 8680 861 290
Other offences 6400 1845 272
Robbery 2764 923 115
Vandalism 455 369 40
Theft by customers 400 256 33
Assault 1538 1538 21
All offences 5680 640 3738
Notes: a Based on respondents who reported a loss—that is, excluding N = 74 who did not know or refused 
to answer, and N = 27 who reported no monetary loss; b estimates do not include losses due to repeat 
victimisation—that is, businesses victimised in several incidents by the same offence type.
Across the four cities, 38.4 per cent of the surveyed businesses were insured 
against damages and loss caused by crime. Perhaps reflecting their knowledge 
of the higher crime risk in their city, Shenzhen businesses were more likely 
to take out insurance than those in other cities: 45.6 per cent were insured 
compared with 38.8 per cent in Shanghai, 36 per cent in Hong Kong and 34.6 
per cent in Xi’an (the difference was statistically significant). These figures are 
consistent with worldwide rates reported by PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC 
2007b), which found that globally an average of 39 per cent of companies had 
taken out insurance to cover economic crime losses (the figure for Hong Kong 
was 38 per cent). The likelihood of being insured increased with the size of 
the business: less than one-third of businesses with five or fewer employees 
were insured, but 47 per cent of those with 50–250 employees and half those 
with more than 250 employees (p < 0.001). Small food retailers were the least 
likely to have insurance. Of the 328 businesses that were victimised by common 
crimes, just less than half were insured in Shenzhen (43.4 per cent), with smaller 
proportions in the other cities: 37.9 per cent in Hong Kong, 36.5 per cent in 
Xi’an and 29.1 per cent in Shanghai.
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Comparison with Other Victimisation Surveys 
Several surveys of crime against business using a comparable instrument to the 
ICBS have been conducted in Europe and Africa, which gives us an opportunity 
to compare the level of victimisation reported in China with that of other 
countries. We focus on three surveys: the Western Europe ICBS conducted in 
1993–94 in six Western European countries and Australia (van Dijk and Terlouw 
1996); the Central Eastern Europe ICBS conducted in 1999 in nine countries 
(Alvazzi del Frate 2004); and the Crime and Corruption Business Survey (CCBS) 
conducted in 2006 in Nigeria (Nigerian NBS 2009, 2010). In 2006, the University 
of Hong Kong also conducted the UNICVS for the first time in Hong Kong 
(Broadhurst et al. 2010). The UNICVS was concerned with the victimisation of 
individuals but allows us to compare the prevalence of victimisation against 
business with that of victimisation against individuals for conventional crimes. 
We use the results from Hong Kong and international averages from the fifth 
sweep of the UNICVS 2004–05 (van Dijk et al. 2007) to compare individual risks 
of crime with those of businesses.
Although no overall figure of the prevalence of common crime was reported 
in the Western Europe ICBS, the rate for a single crime—theft by customers, 
outsiders and employees—reported in the Western Europe ICBS (60 per cent) 
was nearly nine times higher than the overall rate of common crime in the 
China ICBS (6.7 per cent). Rates of victimisation by type of crime were higher 
in Western Europe than in China, ranging between 3.6 times higher for robbery 
(3.3 per cent and 0.6 per cent respectively) to 16 times higher for theft from a 
vehicle (13 per cent and 0.8 per cent respectively) (Figure 4.3). Large differences 
were present for theft by customers, outsiders and employees (combined) and 
burglary. The Western Europe survey found that 60 per cent of companies had 
been the victims of theft by any person compared with about 5 per cent in 
China; and that nearly 29 per cent had been burgled compared with 4 per cent 
in China. The Western Europe ICBS sample comprised nearly 70 per cent of 
retail businesses, which would inflate the rate of theft by customers. Violent 
crime was also more prevalent in Western Europe: 8.5 per cent of respondents 
mentioned an assault and 3.3 per cent a robbery, whereas less than 1 per cent of 
Chinese respondents had been victimised by either of these crimes.
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Figure 4.3 One-Year Prevalence of Common Crime, China ICBS (2004–
05) and Western Europe ICBS (1993–94) 
The Western Europe ICBS examined factors linked to victimisation only in 
relation to retail and found little differences in victimisation between businesses 
trading in various goods. Businesses with a larger floor surface were more at risk 
of theft by customers than those with a smaller floor surface. Western European 
companies were often victimised repeatedly by the same offence, particularly 
theft. In addition, businesses were much more likely than households to be the 
victims of burglary and theft of a vehicle.
Rates of overall victimisation by common crime were also much lower in China 
than in Eastern Europe. The Eastern Europe ICBS found that on average 27 
per cent of businesses were the victims of at least one of nine conventional 
crimes2—that is, four times the rate reported in Chinese cities (6.2 per cent; 
Figure 4.4). There were, however, variations by city: the lowest rate of 7 per 
cent—which is close to that of the China ICBS at 6.1 per cent—was observed 
in Zagreb; the highest, 42 per cent, was in Vilnius and Budapest. Looking at 
individual types of crime, every city in the Eastern Europe ICBS consistently 
recorded higher rates than the Chinese cities, ranging from more than twice the 
rate of assault to eight times the rate of theft from a vehicle. Across the cities 
surveyed in the Eastern Europe ICBS, larger businesses also reported higher 
rates of victimisation for all types of crime than smaller businesses.
2 The nine crimes include: burglary, vandalism, theft of a vehicle, theft from vehicle, theft by customers, 
theft by employees, theft by outsiders, robbery and assault. The category ‘other unspecified offences’ is not 
included in the count.
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Figure 4.4 One-Year Prevalence of Common Crime, China ICBS (2004–
05) and Central Eastern Europe ICBS (1999) 
It is more difficult to compare the overall rate of victimisation in the China ICBS 
with the Nigerian CCBS because questions on theft by employees and theft by 
outsiders also included fraud. For the types of crime that are comparable, the 
Nigerian CCBS found rates of victimisation ranging from 1.5 times higher than 
the ICBS for theft of vehicles (7 per cent in the Nigerian CCBS versus 4 per cent 
in the China ICBS) to 14 times higher for assault and threats (14 per cent in the 
CCBS versus 1 per cent in the ICBS).
Some types of common crimes are directly comparable with the Hong Kong 
UNICVS (Table 4.8). In Hong Kong, businesses were at much greater risk of 
burglary than households (3.1 per cent and 0.6 per cent respectively), but less 
likely to be the victims of assault (0.7 per cent versus 1.3 per cent). While no car 
theft was reported in the Hong Kong UNICVS in 2005, 0.2 per cent of business 
respondents mentioned the theft of a vehicle. Car ownership rates are low in 
Hong Kong, but companies would be more likely to use vehicles for business 
than individuals, which can explain the higher rate of vehicle theft in the ICBS. 
The Eastern Europe ICBS found that burglary and theft of a vehicle were more 
likely to target business premises than households. Rates of theft from a vehicle 
and robbery were comparable in the Hong Kong UNICVS and the ICBS.
For the five crimes considered here—burglary, theft of, and from a vehicle, 
robbery, and assault—average ICBS rates for mainland cities were higher than 
those reported in the 2005 Hong Kong UNICVS. The prevalence of business 
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victimisation in mainland cities, however, was lower than the international 
average for household and personal victimisation, apart from burglary, which 
was similar.
Table 4.8 One-Year Prevalence of Selected Common Crimes, Hong Kong 
UNICVS and China ICBS (per cent)
UNICVS ICBS












Burglary 3 .2 0 .6 3 .1 3 .9
Theft of vehicle 1 .3 0 .0 0 .2 0 .8
Theft from vehicle 4 .4 0 .5 0 .6 1 .0
Robbery 2 .4 0 .4 0 .3 1 .2
Assault 4 .0 1 .3 0 .7 0 .6
Sources: International UNICVS (van Dijk et al. 2007:Appendix 9, Table 2); Hong Kong UNICVS (Broadhurst 
et al. 2010). 
Note: a Surveys were conducted in 33 capital cities from developed and developing countries in 2004–05. 
This chapter examined the prevalence of common crimes against business 
in Hong Kong and China. At least one common crime was reported by 343 
businesses (6.7 per cent) in our sample and most of them were victims of more 
than one crime. Apart from theft by customers, which was more prevalent in 
Hong Kong than in the other cities, Shenzhen recorded higher rates of common 
crime, particularly robbery, vandalism and theft by outsiders and employees. 
Hong Kong and mainland companies with cross-border operations were at 
higher risk of victimisation, but this was in part mediated by the size of the 
business, since larger businesses were more likely to be victimised and they 
were also those more likely to operate across borders.
Comparisons with the Western Europe and Eastern Europe ICBSs indicated 
that rates of common crime against business in China (both Hong Kong and the 
mainland) were lower than in a number of other industrialised and transitional 
countries; the overall rate of common crime was four times lower than the rate 
found in the Eastern Europe ICBS, and nine times lower than that found in the 
Western Europe ICBS. Comparison with the UNICVS, however, indicates that, as 
in most other countries, in China, businesses were more at risk of burglary than 
households. In the next chapter, we focus on less-conventional crimes including 
bribery and extortion, and again compare results in China with those from other 
surveys.
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5. Fraud, Bribery, Extortion and Other 
Crimes against Business
We use the term ‘non-conventional’ to denote crimes that are more likely to 
be directed primarily at businesses because of their size, resources and the 
types of activity they perform. The ICBS examined fraud by employees and 
outsiders, Internet fraud, bribery, extortion and intimidation, infringements of 
intellectual property (IP) (counterfeiting) and computer-related victimisation. 
A single question was asked in relation to bribery and corruption: ‘did anyone 
try to bribe you, other managers, your employees, or obtain bribes from the 
company in relation to its activities?’ That is, the question referred to bribes 
received by employees presumably at the expense of the business as well as 
times when members of the company were asked to pay bribes to an outsider 
to receive services. Responses to the follow-up questions on bribery suggest 
that respondents reported incidents only when bribes were requested from 
the company. Extortion refers to incidents of intimidation and requests for 
protection money, and included: ‘for example, extorting money from your 
company, threatening and intimidating managers and/or employees, threatening 
product contamination, etc.’ Infringement of IP was defined as the use by others 
without your permission of patents, trademarks, copyrights, designs owned by 
your company, and included software copyright violation.1 Computer-related 
victimisation consists of a broad range of incidents such as attacks by a virus 
or malicious software, unsolicited emails and communication, and email threats. 
Because some of these are extremely common—for example, virus attacks or 
unsolicited emails—we focus mainly on Internet-related fraud when purchasing 
items or banking.
Rates of Victimisation by City
Fraud was the most frequently reported type of non-conventional crime 
victimisation (13.4 per cent)2 (Table 5.1). Eight per cent of businesses had been 
defrauded by outsiders, such as clients, suppliers or other businesses. Just over 
4 per cent (4.6 per cent) of businesses were victims of fraud while purchasing 
goods or doing banking online, and 3.7 per cent were defrauded by employees. 
1 The survey asked two separate questions: one on IP infringement and one on software copyright violation. 
These two items cover acts such as the counterfeiting of goods and products including software as well as the 
distribution of illegal copies, and belong to a similar domain; therefore, we combine the results of the two 
questions under the heading ‘IP and software copyright violation’.
2 This could reflect the fact that three questions were asked about fraud, but only one question about the 
other types of crime.
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Incidents of bribery were mentioned by about 6 per cent of respondents, and the 
same proportion reported incidents of IP and software copyright infringement. 
Extortion and intimidation occurred less frequently (2.3 per cent).
Different victimisation patterns were apparent in Hong Kong and the mainland 
(Figure 5.1). While overall levels of fraud were similar, Hong Kong companies 
were more prone to fraud by outsiders than their mainland counterparts (9.9 
per cent versus 6.9 per cent, p < 0.001), and mainland businesses appeared 
more at risk of Internet fraud (5.3 per cent) than Hong Kong businesses (2.3 
per cent, p < 0.001). Fraud by employees was the least frequent type of fraud, 
with similar prevalence reported in Hong Kong and the mainland (3.6–3.8 per 
cent). Looking at bribery and extortion, we see a reverse pattern between Hong 
Kong and the mainland. The rate of bribery was about three times higher in the 
mainland (8 per cent) than in Hong Kong (2.7 per cent, p < 0.001). On the other 
hand, extortion and intimidation were much more prevalent in Hong Kong (3.1 
per cent) than in the mainland (1.8 per cent, p < 0.01). 
Table 5.1 One-Year Prevalence of Victimisation by Non-Conventional Crime 
by City (per cent)












All fraudb 13 .5 10 .5†† 15 .4* 14 .1 13 .4
Fraud by outsiders 9 .9*** 4 .9††† 8 .2 7 .7 8 .0
Bribery 2 .7 6 .5 8 .5*** 9 .0*** 6 .1
IP and software 
copyright violation 3 .5 5 .9 9 .1*** 7 .6* 6 .1
Internet-related fraudc 2 .3††† 4 .3 6 .3** 6 .4** 4 .6
Fraud by employees 3 .8 3 .1 4 .2 3 .4 3 .7
Extortion/intimidation 3 .1** 0 .9†† 3 .1** 1 .3 2 .3
* p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001, rate is significantly higher
†† p < 0.01  ††† p < 0.001, rate is significantly lower
Notes: a Rates refer to the 12-month period from 1 January to 31 December 2004 for Hong Kong, and 1 
January to 31 December 2005 for Shanghai, Shenzhen and Xi’an; b includes fraud by employees, outsiders 
and Internet-related fraud; c includes fraud while purchasing or banking online; percentages are based on 
N = 3818 respondents who used the Internet for business purposes: Hong Kong, N = 1102, Shanghai, N = 
954, Shenzhen, N = 959, Xi’an, N = 803. 
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Figure 5.1 Prevalence of Non-Conventional Crime, Hong Kong (2004) and 
Mainland (2005)
For all non-conventional crimes, Shanghai businesses reported lower 
victimisation rates than those in Shenzhen or Xi’an. Shanghai’s overall rate of 
fraud was the lowest of the four cities (10.5 per cent versus 13.5–15.4 per cent, 
p < 0.01), as was the rate of fraud by outsiders (4.9 per cent versus 7.7–9.9 per 
cent, p < 0.001). Internet-related fraud was more frequent in Shanghai than in 
Hong Kong, but not as prevalent as in Shenzhen or Xi’an. Unlike the other cities, 
Shenzhen had high levels of both bribery and extortion/intimidation (8.5 per 
cent and 3.1 per cent respectively). Shenzhen businesses experienced incidents 
of extortion/intimidation at a rate similar to Hong Kong businesses, but about 
three times that of Shanghai (0.9 per cent) and Xi’an (1.3 per cent). For all other 
types of crime, Shenzhen and Xi’an recorded comparable rates of victimisation.
Fraud against Business
Three types of fraud were examined in the ICBS: fraud by employees, fraud 
by outsiders and Internet-related fraud. First, we look at the likelihood of 
victimisation by business sector, then depending on the size of the business 
and the location. Finally, we discuss the monetary losses that were associated 
with the fraud.
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Rates of Fraud by Business Sector 
The wholesaling and trading sector reported a significantly higher overall level 
of fraud than other sectors, but this was due only to the higher prevalence of 
fraud by outsiders (10.2 per cent) in this sector (Table 5.2). Retailers also reported 
a higher rate of fraud by outsiders (9.3 per cent) than the manufacturing and the 
financial and professional services sectors. The retail sector reported a slightly 
lower rate of Internet-related fraud (3.7 per cent) than other sectors (4.3–5.4 per 
cent). 
Table 5.2 Fraud by Business Sector across Four Cities, 2004–05 (per cent) 

















































































All frauda 13 .9 13 .4 16 .0* 11 .5 11 .1 13 .4
Fraud by outsiders 7 .6 9 .3* 10 .2** 6 .4 5 .3 8 .0
Internet-related fraudb 5 .4 3 .7 4 .6 4 .3 4 .3 4 .6
Fraud by employees 3 .8 3 .6 3 .6 3 .6 3 .4 3 .7
* p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01
Notes: a Includes fraud by employees, by outsiders and Internet-related; b includes fraud while purchasing 
or banking online; percentages are based on N = 3818 respondents who used the Internet for business 
purposes. 
Appendix H (Table H.1) presents the overall rates of fraud by city and business 
sector. We saw above that across all four cities fraud was more prevalent in the 
wholesale and trading sector than in other sectors. This was particularly strong 
in Xi’an and, to a lesser extent, in Shenzhen, but not in Hong Kong, where levels 
of fraud were similar across the manufacturing, retail and wholesale sectors, or 
in Shanghai, where fraud was less prevalent in the wholesale sector. In Xi’an, 
nearly 21 per cent of respondents in the wholesale and trading sector said their 
company had been the victim of fraud (compared with 8.2–16 per cent in the 
other sectors, p < 0.01), and this was related to a very high prevalence of fraud 
by outsiders in the wholesaling sector (13.8 per cent compared with 2.8–7.4 per 
cent in the other sectors, p < 0.001). In Shenzhen, the difference between sectors 
was not statistically significant, although the prevalence of fraud was higher in 
the wholesaling and trading sector (19.7 per cent versus 12–15.5 per cent). 
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Rates of Fraud by Business Size
The overall level of fraud was comparable across businesses regardless of size 
(13.2–14.3 per cent), but the size of the company was relevant for specific types 
of fraud (Table 5.3). Small businesses of 10 or less employees were significantly 
more prone to fraud by outsiders than larger companies (9.6 per cent compared 
with 7.6 per cent for medium and 6.8 per cent for medium-large firms); however, 
the largest businesses, with more than 250 employees, seemed to be somewhat 
protected from fraud by outsiders (4.4 per cent were victimised). While fraud 
by outsiders was prevalent against small businesses, fraud by employees was far 
less frequent against small businesses of 10 or less employees than larger ones 
(2.7 per cent versus 4.1–5.1 per cent). This is consistent with the lower rate of 
theft by employees recorded in small businesses and again could be associated 
with the likelihood that these small businesses are often run by family members. 
The largest businesses were also most at risk of Internet-related fraud (7.7 per 
cent versus 3.1 per cent for small companies). One explanation is that large 
companies often have networks of interconnected computers, which increases 
the risk of cyber victimisation. 
Table 5.3 Fraud by Business Size across Four Cities, 2004–05 (per cent)












All fraudb 13 .2 14 .3 13 .2 14 .3 13 .6
Fraud by outsiders 9 .6*** 7 .6 6 .8 4 .4†† 8 .1
Internet-related fraudc 3 .1 5 .3 4 .7 7 .7** 4 .6
Fraud by employees 2 .7†† 4 .7 4 .1 5 .1 3 .8
** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001, rate is significantly higher
†† p < 0.01, rate is significantly lower
Notes: a Number of employees (part and full-time): small, 1–10, medium, 11–49, medium-large, 50–250, 
large, 251 or more; b includes fraud by employees, outsiders and Internet-related; c includes fraud while 
purchasing and banking online; percentages are based on N = 3635 respondents who used the Internet 
for business purposes. 
Although the overall prevalence of fraud in Hong Kong (13.5 per cent) was 
comparable with that of the mainland cities (13.4 per cent), including for fraud 
by employees (3.8 per cent versus 3.6 per cent), there was a large difference 
in rates of fraud depending on the size of the company. In Hong Kong, rates 
of fraud ranged between 10.6 and 14 per cent in businesses with up to 250 
employees; however, in large businesses (more than 250 employees), the rate 
of fraud jumped to 31.6 per cent (Appendix H, Table H.2). This figure is 
significantly higher than for both smaller companies within Hong Kong and 
companies of similar size in the mainland and is due to the much higher rate 
Business and the Risk of Crime in China 
116
of fraud by employees in large Hong Kong businesses (21.1 per cent compared 
with an average of 3.6 per cent for businesses with fewer than 250 employees). 
Businesses with more than 250 employees in the mainland also recorded much 
lower rates of fraud by employees than those in Hong Kong (5.5 per cent in 
Shanghai, 4.7 per cent in Shenzhen, and 2.1 per cent in Xi’an).
Rates of Fraud by Location of Premises 
Table 5.4 presents rates of fraud victimisation depending on the number and 
location of business premises. For businesses located in Hong Kong, whether 
they had premises in the mainland or not made little difference to their likelihood 
of fraud victimisation; however, mainland businesses with additional premises 
in Hong Kong had significantly higher rates of all types of fraud combined 
(18.2 per cent), as well as Internet-related fraud (8.3 per cent) and fraud by 
employees (6.3 per cent), than their mainland counterparts. Interestingly, Hong 
Kong businesses without premises in the mainland had a higher rate of fraud by 
outsiders (10.1 per cent) than those with premises in the mainland (8.9 per cent) 
but this was not statistically significant. This is related to the fact that smaller 
businesses were more at risk of fraud by outsiders, unlike other kinds of fraud; 
there were more small businesses in Hong Kong, and smaller businesses were 
also less likely to have additional premises.
Again, the differential risk of victimisation is not due to the location of the 
premises per se, but to the size of the business. Regardless of the location of 
additional premises, businesses that operated from multiple premises tended 
to be larger and were at greater risk of fraud victimisation: multiple-premises 
companies, regardless of location, were significantly more likely to be victimised 
by fraud (16.4 per cent) than single-premises businesses (11.7 per cent, p < 
0.001). For fraud by employees, differences in rates of victimisation are also 
explained by the size of the business: the larger the business, particularly in 
manufacturing and retail, the greater the risk of employee fraud. General and 
specific locations of premises had little impact; this is an offence committed 
‘from inside’. 
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Table 5.4 Fraud by Location of Business Premises, 2004–05 (per cent)
Location of surveyed premises
Hong Kong (2004) Mainland (2005)
Type ofvictimisation












All frauda 13 .5 13 .6 12 .7 18 .2*
Fraud by outsiders 10 .1 8 .9 6 .7 8 .3
Internet-related fraudb 2 .3 2 .3 5 .2 8 .3***
Fraud by employees 3 .7 4 .2 3 .2 6 .3*
* p < 0.05  *** p < 0.001  
Notes: a Includes fraud by employees, outsiders and Internet-related; b includes fraud while purchasing 
or banking online; percentages are based on N = 3818 respondents who used the Internet for business 
purposes. 
Incidence and Monetary Loss Due to Fraud 
The overwhelming majority of businesses that were victims of fraud by 
employees reported less than five incidents by different perpetrators in the past 
year (Table 5.5). Although the number of incidents of fraud by outsiders was 
slightly larger than fraud by employees, across the four cities about 90 per cent 
of respondents said they were victims of fewer than five incidents during 2005.
Overall, our sample lost an estimated US$15.07 million to fraud. The mean 
monetary loss due to all incidents of fraud by employees varied greatly between 
the cities, but the median loss was comparable (about US$1100–1300). In all 
cities except Shenzhen, about 30 per cent of victimised businesses suffered a 
loss of more than US$5000, with a smaller proportion in Shenzhen (20 per cent). 
Overall, incidents of fraud by employees cost our respondents more than US$7.5 
million, and nearly 80 per cent of that amount was lost in Hong Kong.
The monetary loss resulting from outsider fraud was highest in Shanghai, where 
half the businesses victimised reported a loss of more than US$5000. The median 
loss in Shenzhen was US$3690, but in Hong Kong and Xi’an, it was comparable 
with the loss caused by employee fraud (US$1280 and $1230 respectively). The 
total loss due to fraud by outsiders (US$7.5 million) was comparable with that 
lost through employee fraud, but losses were more equally spread across the 
four cities. The largest total loss occurred in Shanghai (US$2.5 million) and the 
smallest in Xi’an (US$1.2 million).
Lesser amounts of money were lost due to Internet-related fraud than to other 
types of fraud, and the majority of victimised businesses (77.8 per cent) did not 
actually lose any money. For those who did, losses were relatively minor, with 
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the median loss ranging from US$37 in Xi’an to US$123 in Shanghai. Compared 
with the two other types of fraud, Internet-related fraud incurred relatively 
smaller losses, particularly in Hong Kong, where we estimated businesses lost a 
total of less than US$400. Most of the money stolen through Internet fraud was 
in Shenzhen, where companies lost nearly US$45 000.
Table 5.5 Fraud: Number of incidents and monetary loss
Hong Kong Shanghai Shenzhen Xi’an Total
FRAUD BY EMPLOYEES N = 69 N = 34 N = 47 N = 37 N = 187
N incidents
Less than 5 (%) 97 .0 100 .0 95 .0 98 .0 97 .0
Monetary lossa, b
Mean in US$ 85 673 10 733 20 872 8192 42 828
Median in US$ 1280 1230 1107 1230 1230
Percentage loss more than 
US$5000 31 .0 29 .6 20 .0 29 .2 27 .9
Estimated total loss 
US$1000c 5912 365 981 303 7561
FRAUD BY OUTSIDERS N = 179 N = 54 N = 91 N = 83 N = 407
N incidents
Less than 5 (%) 89 .0 89 .6 96 .3 88 .5 90 .5
Monetary lossa, d
Mean in US$ 11 520 46 293 18 559 14 518 17 917
Median in US$ 1280 5535 3690 1230 1280
Percentage loss more than 
US$5000 28 .2 50 .0 42 .3 26 .9 33 .3
Estimated total loss, 
US$1000c 2062 2500 1689 1205 7456
INTERNET FRAUD N = 25 N = 41 N = 60 N = 51 N = 177
Monetary lossa
No monetary loss (%) 80 .0 68 .3 83 .0 78 .4 77 .8
Of those with a loss (N = 39)
Mean in US$ 77 254 4407 273 1301
Median in US$ 64 123 89 37 64
Percentage loss more than 
US$5000 0 .0 0 .0 20 .0 0 .0 5 .0
Estimated total loss, 
US$1000c 0 .4 3 45 3 51
Estimated total loss for all 
types of fraud, US$1000c 7974 2868 2715 1511 15 068
Notes: a Loss amounts are for all incidents that occurred during the reference year; b mean and median 
are based on N = 136 respondents—that is, excluding N = 51 who did not know or refused to answer; 
c estimates are for the whole sample and were calculated by substituting the mean loss by offence for ‘don’t 
know’ and refusals; d mean and median are based on N = 327 respondents—that is, excluding N = 80 who 
did not know or refused to answer.
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Bribery and Extortion
Characteristics of Bribery and Corruption Incidents 
Across the four cities, 6.1 per cent of respondents reported one or more incidents 
of bribery. Bribery was most prevalent in the manufacturing sector (7.8 per cent, 
p < 0.001) and the ‘other unspecified sectors’category, but rarest in the retail 
sector (3.5 per cent) (Table 5.6). Incidents of bribery were increasingly prevalent 
as businesses became larger—for example, 3.6 per cent of small businesses (that 
is, with 10 or fewer employees) reported incidents of bribery compared with 
10.9 per cent of those with more than 250 employees. 
The rate of bribery for Hong Kong businesses with additional premises in the 
mainland was more than twice the rate of those without such premises (4.7 
per cent and 2.2 per cent respectively, p < 0.01). A similar pattern emerged for 
mainland businesses: those with additional premises in Hong Kong experienced 
a significantly higher rate of bribery (11.4 per cent) than those without premises 
in Hong Kong (7.5 per cent) (Table 5.6). While rates of bribery were higher in 
the mainland than in Hong Kong, it was not their location but their size that 
made these businesses more vulnerable to bribery. Larger businesses were more 
prone to being asked for bribes, and businesses with multiple premises were 
generally larger than single-premises companies. The data also suggest that 
business activities involving engagement outside the home jurisdiction increase 
the risk of bribery and larger businesses might also offer more attractive targets 
than smaller businesses.
In Hong Kong and Xi’an, there were significant differences in the rates of 
bribery between the manufacturing sector and the other sectors. In Hong Kong, 
5.2 per cent of manufacturers reported incidents of bribery compared with an 
average of 1.9 per cent in the other sectors combined; in Xi’an, 12.6 per cent of 
manufacturers had been victims of bribery, compared with an average of 7.4 per 
cent in other sectors. In Shanghai and Shenzhen, the prevalence of bribery was 
comparable across the sectors (Appendix H, Table H.1).
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Table 5.6 Prevalence of Bribery and Extortion by: a) Business sector,  
b) Business size, and c) Number of premises, across four cities 2004–05 
(per cent) 

















Bribery/corruption 7 .8*** 3 .5 5 .0 6 .3 7 .3
Extortion/











Bribery/corruption 3 .6 7 .6** 7 .9** 10 .9***
Extortion/
intimidation 2 .2 2 .0 2 .3 4 .1**
C) Business premises
Surveyed premises in  
Hong Kong














Bribery/corruption 2 .2 4 .7** 7 .5 11 .4**
Extortion/
intimidation 3 .3 2 .8 1 .7 2 .9
** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001
Note: a Number of employees (part and full-time): small, 1–10, medium, 11–49, medium-large, 50–250, 
large, 251 or more; based on N = 4867 businesses—that is, excluding respondents who did not know the 
size of the workforce or refused to answer. 
In Hong Kong, Shanghai and Shenzhen, the perpetrators of bribery were 
significantly more likely to be managers or employees from other companies 
than any other person (Table 5.7). Managers or employees of other firms were 
involved in 79.2 per cent of bribery cases in Hong Kong, 77.5 per cent of cases 
in Shanghai, and 62.6 per cent in Shenzhen. Bribery by officials (Legislative 
Council members, government, tax or court officials, and police or custom 
officers) was rare in Hong Kong (4.2 per cent)3 compared with the mainland. 
In Xi’an, however, more than half the incidents of bribery were due to various 
types of officials, and 44.8 per cent to managers and employees from other 
companies. In all cities, members of the Legislative Council or National People’s 
3 We note, however, the higher rate in Hong Kong of respondents who did not know who the perpetrator 
was or refused to answer (16.6 per cent compared with rates of less than 10 per cent in the mainland).
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Congress were the least frequent requestors of bribes, followed by police or 
custom officers, then by government, taxation or court officials. The incidence 
of bribery (how many times it happened in 2005) was the highest among those 
businesses victimised in Shenzhen (on average, just more than four times [mean 
4.2 times]).













Less than 5 94 .2 90 .0 89 .3 100 .0 93 .0
5 or more 5 .8 10 .0 10 .7 0 .0 7 .0
Mean N incidentsa 2 .9 3 .2 4 .2 3 .4 3 .5
Perpetrator
Managers/employees 
from other companies 79 .2 77 .5 62 .6 44 .8 63 .1
Government officialsb 2 .1 14 .1 15 .4 30 .2 17 .6
Police or customs 
officers 2 .1 2 .8 9 .9 14 .6 8 .5
Legislative Council 
member (HK)/deputy to 
NPC (mainland)c 0 .0 0 .0 2 .2 3 .1 1 .6
Don’t know/refusal 16 .6 5 .6 9 .9 7 .3 9 .2
Notes: a In 2004 for Hong Kong and 2005 for the mainland cities; b includes government, taxation and court 
officials; c NPC = National People’s Congress.
Characteristics of Extortion and Intimidation Incidents 
Extortion and intimidation were less prevalent than bribery, with 2.3 per cent 
of respondents mentioning one or more incidents. The retail sector recorded the 
highest level of victimisation (3.2 per cent, p < 0.01; Table 5.6). Extortion and 
intimidation were also relatively more frequent in the finance and professional 
services (2.8 per cent), and other unspecified sectors (2.9 per cent), but this was 
not significant. The number and location of premises other than those surveyed 
did not significantly impact the likelihood of extortion and intimidation, but 
the size of the business did, with large businesses more likely to be the victims.
Extortion and intimidation were significantly more frequent in Hong Kong and 
Shenzhen, where 3.1 per cent of businesses were victimised compared with 1.3 
per cent in Xi’an and 0.9 per cent in Shanghai (Table 5.1). In Shenzhen, there 
were no statistically significant differences in rates of extortion/intimidation 
depending on the sector of economic activity, but in Hong Kong retailers had a 
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higher rate of victimisation (4.8 per cent) than respondents in other sectors (2.5 
per cent average). In both Hong Kong and Shenzhen, larger companies (250+ 
employees) were significantly more likely to become the victims of extortion and 
intimidation than smaller ones (10.5 per cent versus 3.1 per cent respectively 
in Hong Kong and 5.8 per cent versus 2.7 per cent in Shenzhen) (Appendix H, 
Table H.2). 
In Shanghai and Shenzhen, about 10 per cent of victimised businesses 
experienced more than five incidents (Table 5.8). The mean number of incidents 
was lowest in Xi’an (2) and highest in Shenzhen (2.9). In all cities except 
Shenzhen, extorting money from the company was the most prevalent type of 
attack, ranging from 60 per cent in Shanghai to 66.7 per cent in Hong Kong, 
but only 31.4 per cent in Shenzhen. In contrast, in Shenzhen, threatening and 
intimidating managers or employees were the most frequent kinds of attack 
(62.9 per cent of incidents, compared with 30–36 per cent in the other cities). 
The higher rate of assault that was reported by Shenzhen businesses might 
be linked to such incidents. Across all cities, threats of product contamination 
were rare; nevertheless, respondents mentioned seven cases.
The modus operandi for incidents of extortion was more likely to involve 
walking into the premises and/or phone calls than face-to-face contact in other 
locations or written communication. In Hong Kong, walking into the premises 
was mentioned far more often than phone calls, but in Shenzhen and Xi’an 
phone calls were the method used the most frequently. This might be related—
at least when we compare Shenzhen and Hong Kong—to the higher prevalence 
of intimidation in Shenzhen and of extortion of money in Hong Kong. Weapons 
(knives mainly) were used in only 5 per cent of these cases, and more often 
in Shenzhen and Xi’an than in Hong Kong (never reported by Shanghai 
respondents).
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Less than 5 94 .2 90 .0 89 .3 100 .0 93 .0
5 or more 5 .8 10 .0 10 .7 0 .0 7 .0
Mean N incidentsa 2 .6 2 .6 2 .9 2 .0 2 .6
What happened?b
Extorting money 66 .7 60 .0 31 .4** 64 .3 55 .2
Threatening people 35 .1 30 .0 62 .9* 35 .7 43 .1
Threatening 
contamination 5 .2 10 .0 5 .7 14 .3 6 .9
Modus operandib
Walk-in to premises 64 .9 50 .0 34 .3 21 .4 49 .1
Telephone calls 28 .1 40 .0 45 .7 50 .0 37 .1
Face-to-face in another 
location 12 .3 0 .0 20 .0 28 .6 15 .5
Written communication 7 .0 20 .0 2 .9 7 .1 6 .5
Perpetratorb
Local organised crime 
group 49 .1 30 .0 40 .0 28 .6 42 .2
Rival business 3 .5 20 .0 2 .9 28 .6 7 .8
International organised 
crime group 1 .8 0 .0 2 .9 0 .0 1 .7
Others 47 .4 60 .0 60 .0 57 .1 53 .4
* p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01
Notes: a In 2004 for Hong Kong and 2005 for the mainland cities; b multiple answers were possible, total 
might add up to more than 100 per cent. 
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Local organised crime groups were blamed for the incidents by just under half of 
Hong Kong respondents, 40 per cent of respondents in Shenzhen and about 30 
per cent in Shanghai and Xi’an. Rival businesses were blamed in 28.6 per cent of 
cases in Xi’an and 20 per cent in Shanghai. International organised crime groups 
were rarely or not at all mentioned across the four cities. We speculate that 
the higher prevalence of extortion in Hong Kong and intimidation in Shenzhen 
is linked to the involvement of triad or ‘black’ societies. The relatively high 
proportion of respondents in the two cities who blamed local organised crime 
confirms this hypothesis, and the direct ‘walk-in’ approach is a method common 
to triad-related gangs. The large proportion of respondents who mentioned 
‘others’ (respondents were often uncertain about how to identify the source of 
threats) as perpetrators makes it difficult to analyse the responses in any greater 
detail.
Other Crimes against Business
Intellectual Property and Software Copyright Violation 
Overall across the four cities 6.1 per cent of respondents reported IP and 
copyright violations (Table 5.1). Such violations were significantly more frequent 
in the mainland (7.5 per cent) than in Hong Kong (3.5 per cent). Shenzhen, with 
9.1 per cent, and Xi’an, with 7.6 per cent, recorded particularly high rates. The 
retail sector had the lowest rate of IP and copyright violations (3.3 per cent) 
and the finance and professional services sector had the highest (8 per cent, 
p < 0.01). The strongest indicator of the likelihood of victimisation through 
IP and copyright violation was the size of the business, with risks increasing 
along with the size of the business. Only 3.9 per cent of small companies (up 
to 10 employees) mentioned IP violations, but 7.6 per cent of medium (11–49 
employees), 8 per cent of medium-large (50–250 employees) and 9.4 per cent of 
large (251 or more employees) companies did. It is likely that the high rate of 
such violations in the finance and professional services sector is due in part to 
the number of designers and software creators in this category.
Monetary losses due to IP and copyright violations were not negligible, at 
least in Hong Kong. Overall, we estimated that our respondents lost US$1.53 
million; however, most of that monetary loss occurred in Hong Kong (US$1.4 
million), with much smaller amounts lost in Shenzhen (US$121 000), Xi’an 
(US$3500) and Shanghai (US$1900). The average amount of loss in each incident 
of IP and copyright violation varied greatly between the cities. In Hong Kong, 
each incident of IP theft cost the company about US$22 000 and in Shenzhen, 
US$1200. In Shanghai and Xi’an, average losses were relatively minor (US$29 
and $42 respectively). 
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Computer-Related Victimisation 
Apart from fraud through the Internet, respondents were asked about a 
variety of other Internet-related victimisation, including attacks on computers 
through malicious software, and unwanted communication. Of the 3818 
business respondents who used the Internet in their business, only 6.4 per cent 
did not have some form of protective software (for example, firewall or anti-
virus program) or did not know. Across the four cities, nearly two-thirds of 
respondents (63.4 per cent) reported some type of attack on their computer 
through malicious software such as viruses, malware or spyware, or hacking, but 
this was more frequent in the mainland (69.3 per cent) than in Hong Kong (48.8 
per cent). In addition, 37.7 per cent had received lewd or obscene unwanted 
communication via emails or while online, with comparable proportions in 
Hong Kong and the mainland. Fewer, however, reported receiving threats of 
harm or physical attacks via email (2.6 per cent overall). The questions on cyber 
victimisation had many limitations when applied to the business context and 
we discuss these further in our general conclusion. Suffice to note that in 2005–
06 Web 2.0 applications, especially social networking and related software and 
robust versions of web-interface applications (for example, Internet Explorer 
7.0), were relatively novel.
Comparison with Other Business Victimisation 
Surveys
Few surveys are available that can be directly compared with the China 
ICBS. Apart from the Western Europe and Central Eastern Europe ICBSs, 
which used the same instrument as the China ICBS, other surveys of business 
victimisation have focused on different types of crime and/or have used different 
questionnaires. While this is a frequent problem in comparative criminology, it 
is not insurmountable and, in this section, we attempt to draw comparisons 
for at least some types of victimisation against business that have been studied 
in the developed and developing worlds. First, we look at the Western and 
Central Eastern Europe ICBSs, the surveys closest to the China ICBS; then we 
turn to the Nigerian CCBS, which surveyed the same types of crime as the ICBS 
but recorded incidents of victimisation in different ways. Finally, we draw from 
PriceWaterhouseCooper’s Global Economic Crime Survey to assess whether 
mainland China, as an emerging market, differs from other emerging markets in 
terms of crime and corruption.
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Western and Central Eastern Europe ICBSs
Again, looking only at Australia and six countries in Western Europe, we find 
that the rate of fraud by employees in our Chinese cities (3.7 per cent) was 
higher than the average in Western countries (2.1 per cent); there were variations 
between countries, which ranged from a low of 1.3 per cent in France and 
Switzerland to 3.1 per cent in Germany. Fraud by outsiders, however, seemed 
much less frequent in China (8 per cent) than in Europe, where, on average, 
23.1 per cent of companies reported at least one incident of victimisation. The 
Netherlands recorded the lowest rate, of 12.6 per cent, and France the highest, 
with 42.3 per cent (van Dijk and Terlouw 1996). 
The Western Europe ICBS had a single measure—called corruption—which 
combined bribery and extortion. Using the same measure in the China ICBS, 
we see from Figure 5.2 that corruption, as defined in the Western Europe ICBS, 
was more frequent in mainland cities (8.4 per cent) than in Western Europe (2.6 
per cent and ranging between 1.5 per cent in Italy and 4.8 per cent in France). 
The way in which data were presented precludes a more detailed comparison; 
however, we suspect that the prevalence of bribery in Western Europe was 
comparable with that of Hong Kong (2.7 per cent) but that extortion was more 
frequent in Hong Kong than in Western Europe.
Figure 5.2 One-Year Prevalence of Fraud and Corruption: China ICBS 
(2004–05) and Western Europe ICBS (1993–94) 
On average, rates of fraud by outsiders, fraud by employees and bribery were 
three times higher in the 1999 Central Eastern Europe ICBS than in the China 
ICBS, and the rate of extortion was four times higher. Zagreb reported the lowest 
prevalence of fraud by employees (4 per cent)—similar to that of China (3.7 per 
cent). Of all the Eastern European cities, Tirana had the lowest prevalence of 
fraud by outsiders (16 per cent), which was nevertheless double that of China (8 
per cent). Considering only the mainland, we see that all rates on Figure 5.3 were 
lower in the mainland than in Eastern Europe. Across the Eastern European cities 
that were surveyed, fraud victimisation was highest in the wholesale sector—a 
finding consistent with the China ICBS. It is difficult to compare the prevalence 
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of bribery in Eastern European cities with that of China because the Eastern 
Europe ICBS included two questions (one dealing with personal experience of 
being offered a bribe, and one dealing with requests or demands for bribes 
from the company) while the China ICBS included only one general question. 
Nine per cent of Eastern European respondents mentioned having been offered 
bribes, ranging from 5 per cent in Sofia and Vilnius to 17 per cent in Minsk. 
Larger proportions of respondents said that someone had tried to obtain bribes 
from the company (19 per cent on average, ranging from 4 per cent in Tirana to 
46 per cent in Minsk). Hong Kong businesses reported lower rates of bribery in 
the ICBS (2.7 per cent) than any Eastern European city, and the average level of 
bribery reported in the mainland was half that reported in the Eastern Europe 
ICBS. The rate of extortion was higher in Hong Kong than in the mainland, but 
it was only one-third of the average across Eastern European cities.
Figure 5.3 One-Year Prevalence of Fraud, Bribery and Extortion: China 
ICBS (2004–05) and Central Eastern Europe ICBS (1999) 
Nigerian Crime and Corruption Business Survey
Crimes were counted in slightly different ways in the Nigerian Crime and 
Corruption Business Survey (CCBS) and the China ICBS. It is, however, still 
possible to conduct meaningful comparisons between the two surveys by 
recalculating victimisation rates in the ICBS in a way that matches more closely 
that of the Nigerian CCBS. To compare rates of theft and fraud in the two 
surveys, we combined the ICBS theft and fraud by employees, and theft and 
fraud by outsiders.4 Nigerian businesses reported both types of crime more 
frequently than Chinese businesses (Figure 5.4). The prevalence of theft and 
fraud by employees was particularly high in Nigeria—about four times that of 
China (21.6 per cent versus 5 per cent). 
4 We include in the combined rate all businesses that have been the victims of at least one incident of 
theft or fraud. When businesses have been victims of both theft and fraud, we count this as one incident of 
victimisation.
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For bribery and corruption, the Nigerian CCBS examined only requests for bribes 
by public officials and government employees, while the China ICBS included 
those by managers or employees of other businesses. The CCBS recorded as 
bribery the number of times a bribe was actually paid by a business in order 
to get a service, not, like in the ICBS, the number of times that a bribe was 
requested but not necessarily paid. Therefore, in the comparison between the 
two surveys, it is likely that the level of corruption in Nigeria is underestimated 
compared with China. The prevalence of bribery in Shenzhen and Xi’an (8.5 
per cent and 9 per cent respectively) as counted in the ICBS was similar to that 
recorded in the Nigerian CCBS (9.4 per cent), but lower in Shanghai (6.5 per 
cent) and of course Hong Kong (2.7 per cent). We saw, however, in Table 5.7 
that across the four Chinese cities about 63 per cent of incidents of bribery 
involved members of other businesses rather than officials. Counting, therefore, 
only requests for bribes made by government officials, including legislators, 
police and customs officers, we find that the level of bribery reduces to 2.2 per 
cent overall: 0.6 per cent in Hong Kong and 3.1 per cent in the mainland—1.4 
per cent in Shanghai, 3.1 per cent in Shenzhen, and 4.9 per cent in Xi’an; that 
is, an average in the mainland less than half that of Nigeria. 
Figure 5.4 One-Year Prevalence of Theft/Fraud, Bribery and Extortion: 
China ICBS (2004–05) and Nigeria CCBS (2006) 
Unlike in China, in Nigeria, payments of bribes were more likely to be made 
by small (fewer than 50 employees) rather than large businesses, and the main 
reason a bribe was paid was to receive better treatment. Many businesses 
said they had to pay bribes more than once, to different public officials—for 
example, 63 per cent of bribes were paid to police officers, the most frequently 
cited public officials to receive bribes; 26 per cent were paid to customs officers, 
and 15 per cent to various elected officials. In China, the pattern of corruption 
was different: of the 113 incidents of bribe requests by public officials, nearly 
half were made by various government officials (47.8 per cent), 29.2 per cent 
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by elected officers (most of them in the mainland), and 23 per cent by police or 
customs officers. In the Nigerian survey, a large proportion of the bribes were 
paid in relation to traffic offences and to speed up or alter the results of police 
investigations, which accounts for the large proportion of bribes paid to police 
officers. The ICBS did not ask the purpose of bribes, but the results suggest 
different purposes: procurement of services to the Government and possibly 
political advantage.
In Nigeria, 7.8 per cent of respondents mentioned that their company had been 
the victim of extortion or intimidation—a rate more than double that of the 
ICBS in Hong Kong (3.1 per cent) or Shenzhen (3.1 per cent), the cities with the 
highest rates. The modus operandi was similar in both countries, but weapons—
mainly guns rather than knives—were used more often in Nigeria than in China 
(in 20 per cent and 5 per cent of incidents respectively).5
PriceWaterhouseCoopers’ Global Economic Crime 
Survey
Three economic crimes included in the PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) survey 
can be compared with the ICBS, although definitions do not cover exactly the 
same criminal acts: asset misappropriation, corruption and bribery (including 
extortion), and IP infringement. As we have seen before, PWC’s study defined 
asset misappropriation as ‘the theft of company assets (including monetary 
assets/cash or supplies and equipment) by company directors, others in 
fiduciary positions or an employee for their own benefit’, which also included 
embezzlement and deception by employees. The definition clearly includes theft 
and fraud/deception by employees. Although the definition did not explicitly 
include outsiders to the company, we understood that ‘others in fiduciary 
positions’ related to persons within or outside the company such as accountants 
and bankers, and, by extension, others who had a contractual relation with the 
company, such as suppliers, and who could exploit that relationship to their 
benefit. Therefore we combined the ICBS rates of theft by employees, fraud by 
employees and fraud by outsiders to create a variable comparable with PWC’s 
asset misappropriation. With regards to bribery and corruption, PWC defines 
bribery as ‘typically, the unlawful use of an official position to gain an advantage 
in contravention of duty. This can involve the promise of an economic benefit 
or other favour, the use of intimidation or blackmail. It can also refer to the 
5 Weapons were also used often in incidents of common crime in Nigeria, ranging from 56 per cent during 
theft from a vehicle to 87 per cent during robbery. The ICBS did not ask about the use of weapons in the 
commission of common crimes.
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acceptance of such inducements.’ The PWC survey included racketeering and 
extortion in its definition of corruption and bribery. In the comparison below, 
we have combined the ICBS rates of bribery and extortion.
PriceWaterhouseCoopers in its 2007 report of the Global Economic Crime Survey 
highlights the increasing concern about crime, and particularly corruption, in 
emerging markets such as Brazil, India, Russia and mainland China. While the 
PWC survey did not interview business respondents in mainland China, we have 
the opportunity to examine rates of crime against business in these emerging 
markets as well as mainland China. Figure 5.5 presents rates of victimisation for 
three types of crime as reported in the Global Economic Crime Survey and the 
ICBS in the mainland.
Figure 5.5 One-Year Prevalence of Theft/Fraud, Bribery and Extortion 
and IP Infringement: Mainland China ICBS (2004–05) and PWC Global 
Economic Crime Survey (2007–09) 
Sources: PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2007a, 2009, 2010a, 2010b).
Overall, rates of crime against business in mainland China were close to the 
average across all 40 countries and lower than those in other emerging markets. 
The prevalence of asset misappropriation was similar in Brazil, India and Russia, 
ranging from 36 to 46 per cent. Globally, it stood at 15 per cent—slightly higher 
than in mainland China (11 per cent). Bribery and extortion were most common 
in India, where 42 per cent of businesses said they had been victimised. In 
Russia, about one-third of respondents mentioned incidents of bribery/extortion 
against their company, but only 8 per cent in Brazil, which was close to the 
average global rate of 7 per cent. In China, one in 10 companies reported one 
or several incidents of bribery or extortion, which was higher than the global 
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average but again lower than in Russia and India. Theft of IP is increasingly 
becoming a global concern and while rates of IP infringement were much higher 
in mainland China than in Hong Kong as well as the rate recorded in India by 
PWC (4 per cent), they were on par with the global PWC average (8 per cent) and 
just below Brazil (12 per cent). In contrast, more than one-quarter of Russian 
companies said they had been victims of IP infringement. While the perception 
was that IP infringement and corruption were high in the international business 
community (PWC 2007a), the prevalence of actual victimisation in China was 
not as high as in other emerging markets. We must remember, however, that 
the ICBS surveyed the experiences of companies located in China. Companies 
located elsewhere in the world that trade with China might have different 
experiences when dealing with Chinese businesses, and this was predominantly 
the focus of the PWC survey (2007a).
Other Crimes against Business Surveys
We only found one business victimisation survey that examined cyber 
victimisation: the Crime Against Business Survey conducted by the British 
Chambers of Commerce (2004). Of the 2788 businesses that took part in the 
survey, just over half (52 per cent) had been subject to virus infection and 
nearly three-quarters (73 per cent) said that they had received unwanted spam 
emails. Hacking in the business’s computer system, which is potentially more 
damaging to business, was much less frequent and mentioned by only 6 per cent 
of respondents. The high rate of attacks by malicious software and unwanted 
email communication recorded in the ICBS is not specific to China but seems to 
be a global phenomenon for both businesses and individuals.
This chapter focused on business victimisation by non-conventional crime 
and found that various types of fraud were the most frequently mentioned 
and involved 13.4 per cent of businesses across the four cities. Shenzhen was 
significantly more at risk (15.4 per cent) of fraud than other cities, and Shanghai 
was the least likely to suffer although it was still reported by 10.5 per cent of 
its businesses. The size of companies played a less important role in varying the 
risks of fraud victimisation, but nevertheless larger businesses were more at risk 
of fraud by outsiders and Internet-related fraud. IP and copyright infringements 
were significantly more of a problem in Shenzhen (9.1 per cent) and Xi’an (7.6 
per cent) than in Shanghai (6.5 per cent) and Hong Kong (2.7 per cent). 
About 6 per cent of businesses reported at least one incident involving bribery, 
with Shenzhen and Xi’an reporting significantly higher risks (8.5 per cent and 
9 per cent respectively) and Hong Kong the lowest (2.7 per cent). In Xi’an, 
officials and members of other firms were as likely to be involved in bribery, 
but in Hong Kong, employees of other companies were involved in four out 
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of five reports. Incidents of extortion were more frequent in Hong Kong and 
Shenzhen (3.1 per cent) than in the other cities, which can be attributed to the 
long-established activities of triad-related groups (Hong Kong or Taiwan based) 
who capitalised protection on the opening up of the special economic zone in 
Shenzhen. Comparisons with the available data from the Western and Eastern 
Europea ICBSs and Nigerian CCBS showed that, as with common crime, risks 
were much lower in China for all of the non-conventional crimes. In addition, 
the emerging economies of Brazil, India and Russia had a higher prevalence of 
non-conventional crimes than mainland China. This chapter and the previous 
one have begun to examine which factors, such as economic sector and business 
size, are associated with the likelihood of becoming a victim of crime. In order 
to design and implement effective crime-prevention measures, it is important 
to understand the correlates of victimisation and how these work together. The 
next chapter attempts to answer this question.
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6. Predictors of Business 
Victimisation
The descriptive analyses performed so far suggest that business size was a major 
predictor of victimisation, but that, for some crime types, business sector and 
city also had some effect. Because the proportions of businesses of different sizes 
involved in various sectors of activity differ across the four cities, it is necessary 
to control for sector and size effects in order to present a valid picture of city 
effects, if any exist. In this chapter, we try to disentangle the relative impact of 
four factors—business size, sector of activity, location of premises, and city—
on business victimisation by conducting a series of logistic regressions. We 
describe first how we constructed a business size scale that takes into account 
the number of employees, but also other indicators. Then, we examine the most 
likely predictors for each type of victimisation. Finally, we summarise what the 
ICBS revealed about risks of victimisation against business in China.
Business Size Scale
Three of the ICBS measures were used to construct a business size scale: 1) 
size of workforce, 2) number of sectors of activity in which each business was 
operating, and 3) single versus multiple premises. Each item forming the scale 
was coded and scores were added up to form a business size scale that could 
range from three (very small) to 13 (very large). Since the three indicators used 
to construct the scale have been described in Chapter 3, we summarise only the 
coding scheme below and present details in Table 6.1.
•	 Size of workforce: the number of full and part-time employees was available 
for 95.2 per cent of the sample (N = 4867 businesses). Six categories were 
created—from very small to very large business.
•	 Number of sectors of business activity: 10 sectors of activity were recorded 
in the dataset—manufacturing, non-food retail, food retail, wholesale, 
distribution, financial services, professional services, sub-branch, head 
office, and other unspecified sectors. At least one main sector of activity was 
available for all businesses. In addition, some indicated that the company 
operated across several sectors (up to four) and these were recorded. 
•	 Number of premises: data were available for 98.7 per cent of the sample. 
Three categories were created.
The three measures were positively and significantly correlated (Table 6.2). 
Missing values on the variables of size of workforce and number of premises 
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were replaced with the means calculated by city and sector. We tried to include 
some measure of turnover in the business size scale, but with more than two-
thirds of data missing, it was not possible to create a meaningful measure. The 
computed business size scale ranged from three to 13 (mean = 5.7, median = 6). 
Confirming previous results, the average size of businesses in Hong Kong was 
significantly smaller on the scale (4.35) than business size in Shanghai (6.65), 
Shenzhen (6.73) or Xi’an (6.11).
Table 6.1 Three Business Size Measures
Size of 
workforce
Code N employees Size of business %
1 1 to 5 Very small 27 .0
2 6 to 10 Small 14 .8
3 11 to 49 Medium 29 .8
4 50 to 250 Medium-large 20 .3
5 251 to 750 Large 4 .9
6 751 and more Very large 3 .2
Sectors of 
activity
Code N sectors of activity Size of business %
1 1 Small 55 .3
2 2 Medium 32 .5
3 3 Medium-large 8 .6
4 4 or more Large 3 .6
Number of 
premises
Code N premises Size of business %
1 One premise at the surveyed location Small 63 .8
2 Other premises in HK or the mainland Medium 28 .9
3 Other premises in both HK and mainland Large 7 .3
Table 6.2 Correlations Between Three Business Size Measures
(N = 5117) N sectors N premises
N employees 0 .177*** 0 .293***
N sectors 0 .157***
*** p < 0.001 
Business Size and Victimisation
Using the business size scale, we ran a series of t-tests to examine whether there 
were significant differences between the average size of businesses that had 
been victimised and those that had not (Table 6.3). Although differences are 
not large, the overall pattern confirms previous analyses that for most common 
and non-conventional types of crime the risk of victimisation increases with the 
size of the business. For example, the average score on the business size scale 
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for companies that had been victims of any common crime was 6.03, compared 
with 5.71 for non-victimised companies (p < 0.001). The largest differences were 
found for theft by employees (score of 6.95 for victimised versus score of 5.71 
for non-victimised companies, p < 0.001) and Internet-related fraud (score of 
6.9 for victimised versus score of 5.69 for non-victimised companies, p < 0.001). 
Table 6.3 Business Size and Victimisation Prevalence: t-tests on business 







Yes 328 6 .03
0 .31 2 .80**
No 4789 5 .71
Burglary
Yes 186 6 .34
0 .63 4 .31***
No 4931 5 .71
Vandalism
Yes 94 6 .35
0 .63 3 .06**
No 5023 5 .72
Vehicle-related 
crime
Yes 57 6 .51
0 .79 3 .02**
No 5060 5 .72
Theft by employees
Yes 93 6 .95
1 .24 6 .07***
No 5024 5 .71
Theft by customers
Yes 89 5 .23
-0 .52 2 .46*
No 5028 5 .74
Theft by outsiders
Yes 159 6 .39
0 .68 4 .30***
No 4958 5 .71
Violent crime
Yes 59 6 .58
0 .86 3 .34**
No 5058 5 .72
Other common 
crimes 
Yes 50 6 .13
0 .40 1 .44
No 5067 5 .73
All fraud
Yes 687 6 .01
0 .32 3 .97***
No 4430 5 .69
Fraud by 
employees
Yes 187 6 .34
0 .63 4 .31***
No 4930 5 .71
Fraud by outsiders
Yes 407 5 .57
-0 .18 1 .80
No 4710 5 .75
Internet-related 
fraud
Yes 177 6 .90
1 .20 8 .07***
No 4940 5 .69
Bribery
Yes 312 6 .57
0 .89 7 .85***
No 4805 5 .68
Extortion
Yes 116 5 .88
0 .15 0 .81
No 5001 5 .73
IP and copyright 
violation
Yes 312 6 .62
0 .94 8 .26***
No 4805 5 .68
* p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001 
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Theft by customers, however, was a notable exception to the general model. 
For this type of crime, the pattern is reversed and smaller businesses were more 
likely to be victims (score of 5.23 for victimised versus score of 5.74 for non-
victimised companies, p < 0.05). Small and non-significant differences in average 
business size were found for fraud by outsiders and extortion, suggesting that 
small and large businesses were equally likely to be targeted. 
Predictors of Business Victimisation
The previous analysis confirmed that, for many of the crimes surveyed, business 
size was a major predictor of victimisation; however, we saw previously that 
business sector, city and, to some extent, the location of the business premises 
also had some effects. To estimate the relative impact of these four factors in each 
type of crime, we conducted binary logistic regressions—a statistical technique 
appropriate for dichotomous dependent variables, such as the incidence of 
victimisation. Variables were introduced by block-wise entry in the following 
order: 1) business size, using the scale as a continuous variable; 2) main sector 
of business activity; 3) location of premises; and 4) city. To assess the impact 
of each of the four factors, we examine the Nagelkerke R-squared at each step 
(or block) of the regression analysis.1 Table 6.4 presents the amount of variance 
explained by each predictor for each type of victimisation. 
Although the overall model is significant for the majority of the types of 
crime considered (apart from vandalism and vehicle-related crime), the four 
predictors together do not explain a great amount of variance. The highest 
amount is 14.9 per cent for theft by customers and the lowest is 2.1 per cent for 
fraud by outsiders. In the majority of the regression analyses, size and sector 
account for more variance than city or location of premises, although there are 
some exceptions. We review below the summary diagnostics for each type of 
victimisation.
Predictors of Victimisation by Type of Crime
Burglary 
About half of the variance explained (1.3 per cent) is accounted for by the size 
of the business, and another third by a small sector effect, with wholesaling and 
trading businesses less likely to be burgled than those in other sectors.
1 Nagelkerke R2 is a pseudo-R2, which attempts to quantify the proportion of explained variance in the 
logistic regression model in a way similar to the R2 in linear regression, although the variation in a logistic 
regression model must be defined differently.
6 . Predictors of Business Victimisation
137
Vandalism 
There is a small effect of business size (1 per cent of the variance explained). It 
is likely the effect is not strong because, as we have seen before, businesses of 
medium to large size were the ones most at risk of vandalism, not the very large 
ones.
Theft of and from Vehicle 
Nearly half of the total 2.7 per cent variance explained is due to the effect of 
business size, with other factors contributing negligible amounts. It is probable 
that larger businesses owned a larger fleet of vehicles than smaller ones, and 
therefore were more at risk of theft of and from vehicles.
Theft by Employees 
Compared with other types of crime, here, a higher amount of variance is 
explained by the four factors combined (7.9 per cent). Half of that variance 
(3.9 per cent) is due to the size of the business, with larger businesses at greater 
risk of theft by employees. Another 1.8 per cent and 1.1 per cent are explained 
by the city and the location of the premises, respectively. Businesses in Hong 
Kong and Shenzhen were at more risk compared with those in Shanghai and 
Xi’an; however, companies located in serviced buildings that provided for small 
business tended to be relatively better protected from theft by employees.
Theft by Customers 
Nearly 15 per cent of variance (the highest proportion among all crime types) is 
explained by the four factors. In contrast with most of the other crimes, for theft 
by customers, the size of the business did not have a significant effect (0.8 per 
cent of variance explained, n.s.), and this is because both the smallest and the 
largest businesses were more likely to be targeted. Not surprisingly, more than 
half the variance (9 per cent) is explained by the sector of activity, with retail 
shops significantly more likely to become victims of theft by customers. The 
location of the premises adds another 2.9 per cent of variance explained, and, 
consistent with the previous finding, businesses located in indoor and outdoor 
shopping areas were more prone to theft by customers. Finally, there was a small 
city effect (2.2 per cent of variance explained), with Hong Kong businesses more 
at risk of theft by customers.
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Theft by Outsiders 
Business size and sector each explain 1.4 and 1.3 per cent of variance respectively; 
larger businesses were significantly more at risk of theft by outsiders, but 
wholesalers and traders were least likely to be targeted. There are no significant 
location or city effects, each accounting for less than 1 per cent of variance.
Robbery and Assault 
For these two violent crimes, the city effect is the strongest, with 4 per cent of 
variance explained. The city effect accounts for more than half the total variance 
explained (6.6 per cent). Violent crime, particularly robbery, was significantly 
more prevalent in Shenzhen, but rare in Shanghai. It was also more likely to 
target larger businesses (1.7 per cent of variance is explained by business size).
Fraud by Employees 
Less than 3 per cent of variance is explained by the four factors combined, and 
nearly half (1.3 per cent) by the effect of business size. Like many of the other 
types of crime, the risk of fraud by employees increased with the size of the 
business. It is likely that larger businesses offer more opportunities for fraud 
and reduced chances of detection among a large workforce. It is to be expected 
that the location of the premises does not explain much variance, because this is 
an offence committed ‘from the inside’, regardless of location.
Fraud by Outsiders 
Most of the variance explained (only 2.1 per cent overall) is accounted for 
by two factors: city and sector. Fraud by outsiders was significantly lower in 
Shanghai. While wholesalers and traders were relatively protected from theft 
by outsiders, they were, however, particularly prone to fraud by outsiders, 
although sector explains only 0.7 per cent of variance. It is not surprising that 
traders were prone to being defrauded, since their activity is based on a large 
number of transactions.
Internet-Related Fraud 
Again, business size (risks increasing with business size) is the main predictor of 
Internet fraud and accounts for 4.4 per cent of variance explained. In addition, 
there are some city effects, with a higher prevalence in Shenzhen and Xi’an, but 
a significantly lower prevalence in Hong Kong.
6 . Predictors of Business Victimisation
139
Bribery 
More than half the variance is accounted for by business size (3 per cent of 5.8 
per cent total variance explained) and another 1.8 per cent by the city, with 
bribery particularly prevalent in Xi’an. Retailers were the least likely to be asked 
for a bribe, although the effect is small (0.7 per cent of variance explained).
Extortion and Intimidation 
Overall, 5.8 per cent of variance is explained by the four factors, but city (3.2 
per cent) and sector (2 per cent) are the main predictors. Businesses in Hong 
Kong and Shenzhen were most at risk of extortion. Again, wholesalers and 
traders seemed somewhat protected. Size had a negligible (0.1 per cent) effect.
IP and Software Copyright Infringement 
The size of the business is the strongest predictor of victimisation, accounting 
for 3.3 per cent of variance explained, with the larger companies more at risk. 
There is also a sector effect (1.4 per cent of variance explained) and a city effect 
(0.9 per cent of variance). Retailers had a significantly lower risk of victimisation 
than other sectors, particularly manufacturing and financial and professional 
services. Unlike manufacturers and designers, who own patents and trademarks, 
retailers rarely own IP rights over the products they sell. The prevalence of IP 
and copyright violation was lowest in Hong Kong and Shanghai. Hong Kong 
generally has stronger laws and enforcement mechanisms against this type of 
crime than the mainland.
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Summary of Predictors of Victimisation
One of the main findings of the China ICBS is that the size of a business is 
the strongest predictor of victimisation for most types of common and non-
conventional crimes, apart from theft by customers, which was more prevalent 
in small retail businesses. Two sectors of activity were associated with the risk 
of victimisation: the retail sector was particularly prone to theft by customers, 
and the wholesaling sector was somewhat protected from crime apart from 
fraud by outsiders, which was more prevalent in that sector. Finally, some city 
effects were present: overall, victimisation was higher in Shenzhen, particularly 
for violent crime, but not for theft by customers. The latter was most frequent 
in Hong Kong, probably because of the high proportion of retailers in this city. 
The general pattern between business size and victimisation suggests that targets 
that provided more opportunity for gain were more likely to be victimised. This 
pattern fits well with the principles of opportunity/situational theories: a suitable 
attractive target and the absence of capable guardians are parts of the alchemy 
of victimisation. Situational theories might have better explanatory power 
when approached from a victimisation rather than an offending perspective. 
This is because the situational crime-prevention approach merely postulates 
the presence of a motivated offender and does not attempt to determine the 
offender’s specific motivation or what causes motivation to commit crime (Clarke 
1997). An examination of some of the sector/victimisation prevalence patterns 
(Table 6.4) further supports an opportunity-theory interpretation of the data. 
For instance, customer theft was more prevalent against retailers than any 
other type of business; and it was also more prevalent against small businesses, 
which were less likely to have implemented anti-shoplifting measures. Theft 
by customers was rare in the manufacturing sector where customers were more 
likely to be other manufacturers, wholesalers or retailers. On the other hand, 
manufacturers were more likely to be the victims of burglary. They stock large 
amounts of goods and materials, and their premises were generally located in 
industrial zones away from the ‘public eye’ of more populated residential areas, 
which made them more attractive targets for burglars. 
The wholesaling and trading sector was particularly at risk of fraud by 
outsiders, but not theft by outsiders. This pattern is also consistent with a 
situational theory of victimisation: wholesale and trading companies, although 
they were not particularly large businesses, were likely to perform a large 
number of business transactions, some of them complex, but rarely involving 
cash payments. They offer an attractive target for fraud by a third party. The 
businesses’ sector of activity, however, only partly explains victimisation, as 
Shanghai had a similar proportion of wholesale businesses to the other mainland 
cities, yet its rate of fraud was lower. Situational factors can also account for the 
low rate of fraud by employees in very small businesses (up to five employees). 
Business and the Risk of Crime in China 
142
Businesses run by family members probably constituted a large proportion of 
such small businesses. Also a small business with fewer employees allows for 
a degree of intimacy that could offer some protection against fraud by insiders 
because working in close contact in such businesses would make it difficult to 
defraud the business without being noticed. 
An interesting pattern of victimisation emerges when looking at bribery/
corruption and extortion/intimidation. Broadly, the mainland cities reported a 
higher prevalence of bribery than Hong Kong, but businesses in Hong Kong and 
Shenzhen were more prone to extortion. Shenzhen presented high rates of both 
bribery and extortion. Bribery tended to target larger businesses predominantly 
in the manufacturing sector, and these were more likely to be located in mainland 
China, particularly Shenzhen. Bribery was also common in Xi’an, but unlike in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen, where people from other businesses were the ones 
soliciting bribes, the majority of perpetrators in Xi’an were government and 
public officials. This is likely linked to the characteristics of Xi’an: an inland, 
relatively isolated city, dominated by state-owned enterprises and where the 
traditional values of the Communist Party have retained more influence than 
in Shanghai or Shenzhen. The lower level of bribery/corruption in Hong Kong, 
on the other hand, is the result of the Government’s anti-corruption efforts, 
particularly the proactive Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), 
which has focused on both government and corporate acts of corruption. This 
result is consistent with the results from the 2005 Hong Kong UNICVS, in which 
respondents reported no incidents of corruption.
The size of the business was not significantly correlated to the prevalence of 
extortion/intimidation, but the sector was, with retailers and, to some extent, 
financial services more at risk. A sector effect is not sufficient to explain that 
pattern, as Shanghai had a comparable proportion of retail businesses to Hong 
Kong, yet, extortion was infrequent in Shanghai. The two cities of Shenzhen 
and Hong Kong are located close to each other. The border between Hong Kong 
SAR and the PRC is fairly porous, and we know the Hong Kong triads have 
expanded their activities in southern China. Therefore, we speculate that the 
higher prevalence of extortion/intimidation among Hong Kong and Shenzhen 
businesses is linked to the involvement of organised crime and triad societies. 
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7. Reporting Crime Victimisation and 
Satisfaction with Police Response
The willingness of crime victims (whether a business or an individual) to report 
crime to police or other law-enforcement agencies, such as an anti-corruption 
body, is in part a reflection of their confidence in these agencies. Omnibus crime 
victim surveys, such as the UNICVS, which measure the prevalence of crimes 
against households and individuals, find large variations in the willingness of 
victims to report a crime. Reporting ‘rates’ have been found to vary according 
to the nature and severity of the offence as well as the age and gender of the 
victim, and, in relevant offences, the degree of intimacy with the offender(s). 
The role of insurers in requiring victims to report crime before processing claims 
for typical offences such as vehicle theft and household burglary helps generate 
higher levels of reporting to police. Vehicle theft is a useful marker of the role 
that mandatory vehicle insurance (as in Hong Kong and China) plays and it is 
usually the case that more than 90 per cent of victims report having contacted 
police in the case of vehicle theft. Fundamental differences in the willingness to 
report to police are also related to the degree to which the victim feels that the 
matter is private and the extent that harm or injury has occurred. Businesses are 
often just as reluctant to report offences, especially fraud, as individuals, as this 
might have an impact on the reputation of the business, and they often prefer to 
deal with insider theft or fraud privately (Shover and Hochstetler 2006; Shury 
et al. 2005). 
This chapter first examines the level of official reporting to police (and other 
agencies) for all types of business victimisation and how reporting rates vary 
across offence types and businesses. Then, we analyse the reason(s) why some 
businesses chose to report the crime incidents and others opted not to. Focusing 
on businesses who did report to the police, we examine how these respondents 
felt about the ways in which police dealt with the complaint; were they satisfied 
with the police response, and, if not, why. Since the analysis is based only on 
victims of crime (and in the case of reasons further reduced to only the most 
serious incident), the number of cases is often too small for a very detailed 
analysis in some categories. The results from these analyses are compared with 
similar victimisation surveys from other parts of the world. Finally, the last 
section looks at what respondents thought of the overall police performance in 
relation to business and crime prevention.
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Reporting Crime Victimisation to Police
Victims of all types of common crime were asked about the most recent incident 
‘did you or anyone else from the company report the incident to the police?’. 
Victims of fraud, bribery and extortion, and computer-related crime were 
asked whether all, most or just some of the incidents were reported to the 
police. For bribery/corruption, reporting agencies included specialised anti-
corruption agencies, and for computer-related crime, they included Internet 
service providers and system managers. First, we examine rates of reporting for 
all crimes and compare reporting rates in Hong Kong and the mainland, then 
analyse the reason(s) businesses gave for reporting or not reporting the incident. 
Rates of Reporting for Crimes against Business
Common crimes committed by outsiders such as burglary, vandalism, theft of 
or from vehicles, theft by outsiders, robbery and assault were well reported, 
ranging, across the cities, between 71.7 per cent for theft by outsiders and 96.4 
per cent for vehicle theft (Table 7.1).1 In the four cities, victimised businesses 
appeared more reluctant to report theft by customers and employees (38.2 per 
cent and 52.7 per cent respectively) than other crimes, particularly in Hong 
Kong. Reporting rates were generally higher in mainland cities than in Hong 
Kong. Apart from car theft, which was virtually universally reported, and 
assault (75 per cent and 80 per cent of cases reported in Hong Kong and the 
mainland respectively), Hong Kong’s rates of reporting were significantly lower 
(between 10 per cent and 30 per cent) than those from the mainland. Overall, 
reporting rates were comparable in the three mainland cities. There were two 
exceptions: vandalism was reported at a lower rate in Shanghai (68.8 per cent) 
than in Shenzhen (89.7 per cent) or Xi’an (82.6 per cent), and theft by employees 
was more often reported in Shenzhen (63.6 per cent) than in Shanghai (47.1 per 
cent) or Xi’an (33.3 per cent). 
Across the four cities, non-conventional crimes were less often reported to police 
than conventional ones, ranging between 6.4 per cent for bribery and 32.1 per 
cent for fraud by employees. The level of reporting of internet-related fraud (23.2 
per cent) was lower than that of other types of fraud (averaging 30 per cent). 
The reporting rate for bribery was particularly low irrespective of location, but 
1 The high level of reporting to police of vehicle theft is reassuring (as to reliability) since it conforms to 
expectations given mandatory reporting associated with compulsory third-party insurance. Such insurance 
has been compulsory in mainland China since May 2004 and has greatly increased the rate of comprehensive 
insurance, especially for commercial vehicles; see Article 17 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
Road Traffic Safety (Order of the President No. 8), adopted at the Fifth Meeting of the Standing Committee of 
the Tenth National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on 28 October 2003, <english.gov.cn/
laws/2005-09/07/content_29966.htm> 
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it was the only crime with a slightly higher reporting rate in Hong Kong (8.1 per 
cent) than in the mainland (6.1 per cent). For other non-conventional crimes, 
Hong Kong’s reporting rates were lower than the mainland’s. For the most part, 
rates of reporting were comparable between the three mainland cities, but there 
were two exceptions. Half the incidents of extortion were reported in Shanghai 
compared with only about one-third in Shenzhen and Xi’an. In Shenzhen, 9.1 
per cent of intellectual property (IP) infringements were reported compared 
with half in Shanghai and one-quarter in Xi’an.
Table 7.1 Reporting to Police, All Types of Crime, Hong Kong and Mainland 
(per cent)
Type of crime victimisation Hong Kong Mainland Total
Common crime
Theft of vehicle (N = 31) 100 .0 96 .2 96 .4
Theft from vehicle (N = 42) 60 .0 90 .6* 82 .9
Burglary (N = 187) 70 .2 83 .1 79 .1
Vandalism (N = 94) 65 .4 83 .8* 78 .5
Assault (N = 32) 75 .0 80 .0 78 .1
Robbery (N = 44) 60 .0 79 .5 77 .3
Theft by outsiders (N = 159) 51 .2 79 .3*** 71 .7
Theft by employees (N = 93) 41 .9 58 .1 52 .7
Theft by customers (N = 89) 26 .8 57 .6** 38 .2
Other offences (N = 50) 57 .1 90 .9* 72 .0
Non-conventional crime
Fraud by employees (N = 187) 23 .1 37 .2* 32 .1
Extortion (N = 122) 22 .9 37 .3 30 .2
Fraud by outsiders (N = 407) 21 .8 36 .0** 29 .7
IP and copyright violation (N = 312) 6 .3 18 .5* 16 .0
Internet-related fraud (N = 177)a 12 .0 25 .0 23 .2
Bribery (N = 315)b 8 .1 6 .1 6 .4
* p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001
Notes: a Refers only to incidents that were reported to law-enforcement agencies; b refers to incidents that 
were reported to the police and/or anti-corruption agencies. 
The lower level of reporting criminal incidents in Hong Kong compared with 
the mainland is consistent with the results of the Hong Kong UNICVS, which 
found that for most crimes, and particularly the less serious offences, reporting 
rates in Hong Kong were lower than the international average (Broadhurst et 
al. 2010). As noted, vehicle and some other forms of theft had higher reporting 
rates than other offences, as insurance services typically require that a crime be 
reported to the police before processing a claim. No differences, however, were 
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found in rates of reporting between businesses with and without insurance. 
Third-party vehicle insurance is compulsory and Article 98 of the Law of the 
People’s Republic of China on Road Traffic Safety provides for severe penalties 
for a failure to insure;2 however, the extent of insurance coverage for theft and 
other crimes against business is unknown.
Reporting to Police by Characteristics of 
Businesses
We were interested to examine whether there were any differences between 
businesses that reported incidents of victimisation against them and those 
that did not. We have seen above that businesses located in the mainland 
were significantly more likely to report some types of offence to the police 
than Hong Kong businesses. Other factors of interest were size of businesses, 
sector of activity, single or multiple premises, amount of monetary loss due to 
victimisation, and whether businesses were insured. We found that the only 
factor consistently differentiating businesses that reported to the police and 
those that did not was the size of the company. 
Using the business size scale described in Chapter 6, we ran a series of t-tests to 
analyse whether there were significant differences between the average size of 
victimised businesses that did report their victimisation to the police and those 
that did not (Table 7.2). Although differences are not large, the overall pattern is 
that larger businesses were significantly more likely to contact police than smaller 
ones. For example, the average score on the business size scale of companies that 
had reported the most serious incident of victimisation by common crime was 
6.4, compared with 5.1 for companies that did not report (p < 0.001). The largest 
differences were found for theft by outsiders (score of 6.83 for reporting versus 
score of 5.29 for non-reporting companies, p < 0.001), vandalism (score of 6.66 
for reporting versus score of 5.2 for non-reporting companies, p < 0.001), theft 
by customers (score of 6.12 for reporting versus score of 4.67 for non-reporting 
companies, p < 0.01), fraud by employees (score of 7.23 for reporting versus 
score of 5.92 for non-reporting companies, p < 0.01) and theft by employees 
(score of 7.56 for reporting versus score of 6.27 for non-reporting companies, p 
< 0.01). For some types of crime—mostly non-conventional ones—differences 
in the size of the reporting and non-reporting businesses were not statistically 
significant. The lack of statistical power is likely related to the small proportions 
of these offences that were reported in the survey.
2 In June 2010, additional requirements for commercial vehicles were imposed by the PRC Ministry of 
Commerce: ‘Circular of China Insurance Regulatory Commission Concerning Regulating the Administration 
on Premium Rates in the Insurance Clauses of Commercial Motor Vehicles’, <english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/
policyrelease/announcement/200712/20071205275856.html>
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Table 7.2 Business Size and Reporting to Police: t-tests on business size 








Most serious common crimeb
Yes 234 6 .40
1 .30 5 .15***
No 94 5 .10
Burglary
Yes 148 6 .56
1 .00 2 .74**
No 38 5 .56
Vandalism
Yes 74 6 .66
1 .46 2 .96**
No 20 5 .20
Theft from vehicle
Yes 35 6 .69
0 .26 0 .02
No 7 6 .43
Theft by employees
Yes 49 7 .56
1 .29 3 .08**
No 44 6 .27
Theft by customers
Yes 34 6 .12
1 .45 3 .18**
No 55 4 .67
Theft by outsiders
Yes 114 6 .83
1 .54 4 .40***
No 45 5 .29
Violent crimec
Yes 47 6 .73
0 .73 1 .74
No 12 6 .00
Fraud by employees
Yes 60 7 .23
1 .31 4 .33***
No 127 5 .92
Fraud by outsiders
Yes 121 6 .29
1 .03 4 .99***
No 286 5 .26
Internet-related fraudd
Yes 41 6 .96
0 .08 0 .24
No 136 6 .88
Briberye
Yes 20 6 .80
0 .24 0 .54
No 292 6 .56
Extortion
Yes 35 6 .22
0 .49 1 .212
No 81 5 .73
IP and copyright violation
Yes 50 6 .78
0 .19 0 .74
No 262 6 .59
* p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001
Notes: a Theft of vehicle is not included because virtually all victims reported to the police; b includes 
burglary, vandalism, theft of and from vehicle, theft by employees, customers and outsiders, robbery, 
assault, and other unspecified crimes; c includes assault and robbery; d refers only to incidents that were 
reported to law-enforcement agencies; e refers to incidents that were reported to the police and/or anti-
corruption agencies. 
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There was no correlation between sector of activity and the likelihood of 
reporting victimisation to the police.3 For a number of crimes, we found that 
Hong Kong businesses with additional premises in the mainland reported their 
victimisation at a higher rate than businesses with single premises in Hong Kong, 
but this was related to the size of the businesses, as companies with multiple 
premises were larger than those with single premises. Monetary losses due to 
crime were generally higher for businesses that reported, but that relationship 
was not statistically significant. For example, the average monetary loss due 
to the most serious common crime against reporting businesses amounted to 
US$6801 compared with US$2943 for non-reporting businesses. 
Although there was no direct correlation between the likelihood of reporting 
the crime to the police and whether or not businesses had insurance, we found 
that larger businesses—that is, those with the highest reporting rates—were 
more likely to have insurance.4 This suggests that requirements by insurance 
companies to report criminal victimisation in order to process claims are related 
to the likelihood of reporting, but that other factors are also at play. Large 
businesses might have a policy of systematically reporting criminal victimisation. 
They might also be in a better position to do so than smaller companies because 
of specialised security personnel who have the time, expertise and resources to 
deal with criminal incidents.
Reasons for Reporting Crime to the Police
Respondents who indicated that their business had been victimised by one 
or several common crimes were asked to select the incident they regarded as 
the most serious. If that most serious incident was reported, they were asked 
the reasons the company reported this crime; if the incident was not reported, 
they were asked the reasons it was not. For each question, a list of reasons was 
provided, from which respondents could select several. They could also specify 
their own reasons. A similar set of questions was asked for each type of fraud, 
bribery, extortion and computer-related victimisation. The reasons for reporting 
or not reporting the crime to police were thus restricted to the crime incident 
identified by the respondent as the most serious. Many of the businesses were 
victims of more than one crime but we do not explore the reporting behaviour 
of all the crime incidents mentioned in the survey.
3 The only significant relationships between sector and reporting were that businesses in manufacturing 
were more likely to report vandalism than businesses in other sectors, and retailers were significantly less 
likely to report theft by outsiders than businesses in other sectors of activity.
4 Insured businesses had a mean score of 6.10 and uninsured businesses a mean score of 5.5 on the business 
size scale (p < 0.001).
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Reasons for Reporting Common Crime
Of the 328 businesses that mentioned at least one incident of victimisation by 
common crime, one-third regarded burglary as the most serious incident, and 
about 11–12 per cent selected theft by customers, employees or outsiders (Table 
7.3). For the other crimes, responses varied between 1.2 per cent for assault 
and 6.1 per cent for robbery, with about 12 per cent selecting other unspecified 
crimes. Overall, 71.3 per cent of the most serious incidents had been reported 
to the police: all assaults and vehicle thefts, about 80 per cent of burglaries and 
robberies, half the thefts from vehicles, and lesser proportions for the other 
crimes. Questions about reasons for or against reporting were asked only about 
these ‘most serious’ crimes.
Table 7.3 Most Serious Common Crime and Reporting to Police





Burglary 115 35 .1 80 .9
Theft by customers 41 12 .5 36 .6
Theft by employees 39 11 .9 46 .2
Theft by outsiders 37 11 .3 70 .3
Robbery 20 6 .1 80 .0
Vehicle theft 15 4 .6 100 .0
Vandalism 10 3 .0 70 .0
Theft from vehicle 6 1 .8 50 .0
Assault 4 1 .2 100 .0
Other crimes 41 12 .5 90 .2
Total 328 100 .0 71 .3
Reasons given by respondents for reporting crime are presented in Table 7.4. 
Overall, over one-third of those who reported to the police did so because they 
believed that crimes are serious events that should be reported, and an equal 
proportion did so to recover property. About one in five respondents wanted the 
offender to be caught and punished, and 17.1 per cent hoped it would prevent 
crime from happening again. Less than 5 per cent of respondents mentioned 
getting compensation or insurance purposes as reasons for reporting the crime 
to police.
There were differences in the reasons invoked by businesses in the four cities. 
The duty to report crime was more often invoked in Shenzhen (43.5 reporting) 
and Hong Kong (40.9 reporting) than Shanghai (26.1 reporting) and Xi’an (21.1 
reporting). In contrast, Shanghai and Xi’an respondents were significantly more 
likely to mention recovering property (50 reporting) than those in Shenzhen 
(32.3 reporting) and Hong Kong (23.9 reporting). More than half the businesses 
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in Xi’an were motivated by incapacitation and punishment (55.3 reporting), 
and this is significantly higher than for those in Shenzhen (22.6 reporting), 
Shanghai (15.2 reporting) and particularly Hong Kong (8 reporting). Finally, 
more than one-quarter of Shenzhen respondents invoked preventative reasons 
(to stop it happening again) compared with 17.4 per cent in Shanghai, 12.5 
per cent in Hong Kong and 10.5 per cent in Xi’an. Once again, the fact that 
Shenzhen businesses felt more duty-bound to report crime and more motivated 
to stop it from reoccurring than businesses from other cities might reflect their 
greater risk of victimisation. 
Table 7.4 Reasons for Reporting Most Serious Common Crime to Police by 












Crimes should be 
reported/
serious events 40 .9 26 .1 43 .5 21 .1* 35 .5
To recover property 23 .9 50 .0** 32 .3 50 .0** 35 .5
Wanted offender to be 
caught/punished 8 .0 15 .2 22 .6 55 .3*** 20 .9
To stop it happening 
again 12 .5 17 .4 27 .4 10 .5 17 .1
To get compensation 
from the offender 1 .1 6 .5 9 .7 2 .6 4 .7
For insurance purposes 5 .7* 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 2 .1
Other reasons 25 .3 15 .2 11 .3 7 .9 16 .7
* p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001
Note: a Multiple answers were possible; total might add up to more than 100 per cent. 
There are also some relationships between the types of crime and the motivations 
for reporting them. Vehicle theft, robbery, burglary and theft by employees 
were more likely to be reported to recover property, but theft by outsiders or 
customers, assault and vandalism because they were seen as serious events that 
should be reported. As mentioned above, few businesses said they reported the 
crime because they had to for insurance purposes.
Reasons for Reporting Fraud, Bribery, Extortion and 
Other Crimes
For less-conventional crimes, reporting rates were relatively low and it is not 
possible to perform meaningful statistical analyses with such a small number of 
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cases. Therefore, Table 7.5 presents the reasons for reporting to police given by 
respondents for five types of crime, and we highlight in the text any large and/
or significant differences between cities.
Fraud by Employees 
Across the four cities, the reasons most frequently cited for reporting fraud by 
employees were the duty to report crime (36.7 per cent) and to recover the stolen 
property (31.7 per cent). About one in five victims (21.7 per cent) mentioned 
crime prevention (to stop it happening again), and one in 10 hoped to have the 
offender caught and punished. The motivation to recover property was highest 
in Shanghai (53.3 per cent) compared with other cities (approaching statistical 
significance, p = 0.07). In Hong Kong, more respondents invoked the duty to 
report crime (62.5 per cent compared with 20–33.3 per cent in other cities).
















To recover property 31 .7 40 .5 12 .2 15 .0 11 .4
Crimes should be reported/
serious events 36 .7 18 .2 31 .7 25 .0 34 .3
Wanted offender to be 
caught/punished 10 .0 18 .2 7 .3 25 .0 8 .6
To stop it happening again 21 .7 11 .6 29 .3 10 .0 31 .4
To get compensation from 
the offender 6 .7 9 .1 4 .9 0 .0 2 .9
For insurance purposes 0 .0 3 .3 0 .0 0 .0 2 .9
Other reasons 10 .0 13 .2 29 .3 25 .0 28 .6
Note: a Multiple answers were possible; total might add up to more than 100 per cent. 
Fraud by Outsiders 
Overall, recovering property was the dominant reason for businesses to report 
fraud by outsiders (40.5 per cent compared with 3.3–18.2 per cent for the 
other reasons). The duty to report crime and the desire to punish the offender 
came second, with 18.2 per cent of victims mentioning them. Prevention, 
compensation and insurance purposes were cited by relatively few businesses, 
but 13.2 per cent invoked other reasons. A different pattern of motivations 
emerged in Hong Kong. There, the major reason for reporting was the duty to 
report crime (35.9 per cent), followed by the desire to recover stolen property 
(20.5 per cent), and these differences between Hong Kong and mainland cities 
were statistically significant. In Xi’an and Shanghai, recovering property was 
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the first reason provided by half the businesses, but punishment was a stronger 
motivation to report than in Hong Kong and Shenzhen; getting the offender 
punished was cited by 35.3 per cent of victims in Xi’an and 27.8 per cent in 
Shanghai compared with about 7 per cent in the two other cities (p < 0.01). 
Internet-Related Fraud 
Incidents of fraud on the Internet were reported to the police but also to other 
agencies such as Internet service providers and system managers. The leading 
reasons for reporting online fraud were the duty to report crime (31.7 per cent) 
and crime prevention (29.3 per cent). Duty to report crime was most frequently 
cited in Hong Kong (66.7 per cent), but less often in the other cities (17–33 per 
cent). Stopping the crime from happening again was a major reason in Shenzhen 
(46.7 per cent) and Xi’an (29.4 per cent), but was not mentioned in Hong Kong 
and Shanghai.
Bribery 
A small proportion of businesses that were victims of bribery reported the 
incident to the authorities. One-quarter of respondents each invoked the duty 
to report crime, a desire to see the offender punished and other unspecified 
reasons. Fifteen per cent of respondents hoped to recover property and 10 
per cent wanted to stop it from happening again. Duty to report was the most 
frequently cited reason in Hong Kong (50 per cent), and getting the offender 
caught and punished was most frequently cited in Shenzhen (60 per cent).
Extortion and Intimidation 
The duty to report crime (34.3 per cent) and the desire to stop it from happening 
again (31.4 per cent) were the two most frequently invoked reasons for reporting 
extortion and intimidation. But while crime prevention was a major motivation 
across the four cities (ranging between 20 and 40 per cent of respondents), 
the duty to report crime was prominent only in Hong Kong (46.2 per cent) 
and Shenzhen (41.7 per cent), less so in Shanghai (20 per cent), and not at all 
mentioned in Xi’an. The desire to recover property was mentioned only in 
Shenzhen and Xi’an (25 per cent and 20 per cent respectively). Nearly 30 per 
cent of respondents cited other unspecified reasons for reporting.
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Reasons for Not Reporting Crime to the Police
Reasons for Not Reporting Common Crime
The reason most often invoked for not reporting crime across the four cities (Table 
7.6) was that the incident was not serious enough (38.3 per cent), followed by 
other unspecified reasons (30.9 per cent). About 15–16 per cent of respondents 
mentioned lack of time/too much trouble or the slight chance of success as reasons 
for not reporting to the police, and nearly one in 10 cited a lack of evidence. 
Between 1 and 6 per cent cited each one of the other reasons (not company 
policy, no insurance claim involved, police not interested, and internal matter), 
but no-one said it was because of fear of reprisals or fear of negative publicity. 
The reason that the incident was not serious enough to warrant reporting was 
mentioned least often in Hong Kong (35.1 per cent) and Shenzhen (35.7 per 
cent) and most often in Shanghai (55.6 per cent). Shanghai businesses provided 
only two reasons for not reporting: lack of seriousness, which was invoked 
by more than half the respondents, and the fact that involving police was not 
appropriate because the incident was an internal matter, which was invoked by 
one-third—and significantly more often than in the other cities. In Xi’an, 28.6 
per cent of respondents thought police would not be able to do anything and 
14.3 per cent that the police would not be interested in the matter. The police’s 
potential lack of interest in the complaint was mentioned only in Xi’an. Lack of 
time was cited more often in Hong Kong (19.3 per cent) and Shenzhen (14.3 per 
cent) than in Xi’an (7.1 per cent) and Shanghai (0 per cent).
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Table 7.6 Reasons for Not Reporting Common Crime to Police by City and 
Overall











Not worth reporting/not 
serious enough 35 .1 55 .6 35 .7 42 .9 38 .3
Police wouldn’t have been 
able to do anything/slight 
chance of success 17 .5 0 .0 7 .1 28 .6 16 .0
Lack of time/too much 
trouble 19 .3 0 .0 14 .3 7 .1 14 .9
Lack of proof/evidence/
witnesses 14 .0 0 .0 0 .0 7 .1 9 .6
Involving police not 
appropriate/internal matter 1 .8 33 .3** 7 .1 0 .0 5 .3
Police wouldn’t have done 
anything/not interested 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 14 .3* 2 .1
No insurance claim was 
involved 1 .8 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 1 .1
Not company policy 1 .8 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 1 .1
Fear of reprisals/negative 
publicity 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0
Other reasons 33 .3 22 .2 28 .6 28 .6 30 .9
* p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01
Note: a Multiple answers were possible; total might add up to more than 100 per cent.
Overall, similar reasons for not reporting were given across the various types of 
crime, but there was one exception: that the incident was an internal matter not 
appropriate for police was mentioned significantly more often in cases of theft 
by employees (25 per cent).
Reasons for Not Reporting Non-Conventional Crime
The reasons that businesses gave for not reporting non-conventional crime 
against them are presented in Table 7.7. Across the four cities and the five types 
of crime, the reason most frequently invoked for not reporting the crime was 
that it was not serious enough. Other reasons varied by type of crime.
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Table 7.7 Reasons for Not Reporting Non-Conventional Crimes to Police by 
Type of Crime














Not worth reporting/not 
serious enough 33 .1 32 .2 36 .0 28 .1 37 .0
Lack of time/too much 
trouble 14 .2 10 .1 13 .2 4 .1 9 .9
Police wouldn’t have been 
able to do anything/slight 
chance of success 5 .5 15 .4 2 .9 2 .1 6 .2
Lack of proof/evidence/
witnesses 8 .7 8 .0 2 .2 5 .1 13 .6
Involving police not 
appropriate/internal matter 12 .6 4 .2 2 .9 9 .2 11 .1
Police wouldn’t have done 
anything/not interested 1 .6 5 .6 1 .5 1 .7 1 .2
No insurance claim was 
involved 1 .6 1 .7 2 .2 0 .3 1 .2
Not company policy 2 .4 0 .0 3 .7 8 .2 2 .5
Fear of reprisals 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 3 .8 4 .9
Fear of negative publicity 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 0 .7 0 .0
Other reasons 32 .3 35 .3 45 .6 37 .3 22 .2
Note: a Multiple answers were possible; total might add up to more than 100 per cent. 
Fraud by Employees 
About one-third of victims did not report because they did not regard the 
incident as serious enough, and an equal proportion gave other unspecified 
reasons for not reporting. About 14 per cent did not have time or thought 
reporting was too much trouble. More than 12 per cent of respondents regarded 
the incidents of fraud by employees as internal matters, inappropriate for police 
action. This is a lower proportion than for theft by employees (25 per cent), but 
slightly higher than for the other crimes. Less than 10 per cent of respondents 
mentioned the other reasons, but none cited fear of reprisals or fear of negative 
publicity as a deterrent from reporting. 
Fraud by Outsiders 
Following from lack of seriousness (32.2 per cent) and unspecified reasons (35.3 
per cent), the second most frequently cited reasons for not reporting fraud by 
Business and the Risk of Crime in China 
156
outsiders were the small chance of success (15.4 per cent) and lack of time (10.1 
per cent). In Hong Kong, the slight chance of success (22.1 per cent) was cited 
significantly more often than in the mainland cities (2.8–13.1 per cent, p < 0.01). 
Internet-Related Fraud 
Nearly half the respondents cited other unspecified reasons for not reporting 
the fraud (45.6 per cent), followed by lack of seriousness (36 per cent) and lack 
of time (13.2 per cent). Two to three per cent of victims mentioned the other 
reasons. Across the four cities, similar proportions of businesses mentioned each 
reason for not reporting.
Bribery
The relatively high proportion of bribery victims who cited other unspecified 
reasons for not reporting (37.3 per cent) might indicate some reluctance in 
explaining their decision not to report. Second in the list of reasons for not 
reporting was that the incident was not serious enough (28.1 per cent), then 
that it was an internal matter inappropriate for police action (9.2 per cent) or 
that reporting was not company policy (8.2 per cent). In Hong Kong, victims 
were more likely to nominate procedural issues and pessimism (lack of proof/
evidence/slight chance of success: 24.5 per cent) than in mainland cities (4–6 
per cent), but less likely to nominate internal matter/company policy than in 
mainland cities (17–22 per cent). Nearly 4 per cent of respondents mentioned 
fear of reprisals as a deterrent for reporting. Although this is a small proportion, 
fear of reprisals was mentioned solely in relation to bribery and extortion. It was 
also mentioned significantly more often in Xi’an (9.5 per cent), where officials 
were more often the perpetrators, than in Hong Kong (2.2 per cent), Shanghai 
(1.6 per cent) or Shenzhen, where it was not cited at all.
Extortion and Intimidation 
Lack of seriousness was the most frequently cited reason for not reporting 
extortion (37 per cent), followed by unspecified reasons (22.2 per cent). 
More than 13 per cent invoked lack of evidence as justification, and a similar 
proportion (11.1 per cent) said that the incident was an internal matter. Nearly 
5 per cent cited fear of reprisals as a deterrent for reporting. To a lesser extent 
than in the case of bribery, Hong Kong victims were more prone than their 
mainland counterparts to cite procedural reasons, but less likely to mention 
company policy or the fact the incident was an internal matter to explain why 
they did not report the offence.
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Satisfaction with Police Response
Common Crimes
Across the four cities, about half the businesses that reported victimisation by 
conventional crime were satisfied with the police response (Table 7.8). There 
were no striking differences between the four cities, although a slightly lower 
proportion of Xi’an victims expressed satisfaction (44.7 per cent) than others 
(50–55 per cent). 
The reasons most often given for dissatisfaction with the police response were 
that police did not do enough (40.7 per cent) or that they were not interested 
(28.6 per cent). Similar proportions were dissatisfied because police did not find 
or apprehend the offender (19.8 per cent) or did not recover the stolen property 
(15.4 per cent). Less than 10 per cent of dissatisfied respondents mentioned the 
other reasons (police did not keep them informed, were slow to arrive or were 
impolite), but nearly 30 per cent cited other reasons but no further details about 
the substance of these ‘reasons’ were recorded.
Reasons for dissatisfaction varied by city, but because numbers are small, the 
differences did not reach statistical significance. Respondents in Hong Kong 
were less likely to say that police did not do enough (33.3 per cent) than in 
mainland cities (42.1–47.1 per cent) or were not interested (14.8 per cent versus 
23.5–39.3 per cent among mainland cities). Greater proportions of Hong Kong 
respondents, however, were dissatisfied because the police did not keep them 
informed (22.2 per cent) or did not treat them politely (14.8 per cent); by 
comparison, lack of information was not mentioned at all in Shanghai and by 
only 3.6 per cent of respondents in Shenzhen and 10.5 per cent, in Xi’an.  No 
respondent from Shenzhen thought that police were impolite and less than 6 
per cent in Shanghai and Xi’an. But we note that more than half of Shanghai 
respondents invoked other unspecified reasons, with lesser proportions in 
Shenzhen and Xi’an. Two reasons for dissatisfaction cited more frequently in 
Xi’an than in the other mainland cities were that police did not recover the 
stolen property (26.3 per cent compared to 11.8–14.3 per cent) and that they 
did not apprehend the offender (26.3 per cent compared to 11.8–21.4 per cent).
This might be related to Xi’an businesses’ greater interest in incapacitation and 
punishment and recovery of property as motivations to report victimisation 
to police. There might be both economic (Xi’an is the poorest city of the four 
surveyed) and cultural reasons for the emphasis on recovery of property and 
punishment in Xi’an.
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Table 7.8 Satisfaction with Police Response to Common Crime and 











Satisfied with police 
response 55 .7 54 .3 50 .0 44 .7 52 .1












Did not do enough 33 .3 47 .1 42 .9 42 .1 40 .7
Were not interested 14 .8 23 .5 39 .3 36 .8 28 .6
Didn’t find or apprehend the 
offender 18 .5 11 .8 21 .4 26 .3 19 .8
Didn’t recover property or 
goods 11 .1 11 .8 14 .3 26 .3 15 .4
Didn’t keep us properly 
informed 22 .2 0 .0 3 .6 10 .5 9 .9
Were slow to arrive 3 .7 11 .8 14 .3 0 .0 7 .7
Didn’t treat us correctly/
were impolite 14 .8 5 .9 0 .0 5 .3 6 .6
Other reasons 22 .2 52 .9 28 .6 21 .1 29 .7
Notes: a Multiple answers were possible, so total might add up to more than 100 per cent; b the number 
of businesses that were dissatisfied with the police response (N = 91) and that of businesses that were 
satisfied (N = 122) do not add up to the total number of businesses who reported to police (N = 234) 
because 21 respondents did not know or refused to answer questions on satisfaction with police. 
Fraud and Other Crimes against Business
Overall, the level of satisfaction with the police response to non-conventional 
crimes is comparable with that of conventional crime. About half the victimised 
businesses that reported the crime were satisfied with the response of the police 
or other agencies (for bribery and cyber fraud), ranging from 46.7 per cent 
for fraud by employees to 55 per cent for bribery (Table 7.9). We examine 
whether differences were found between the four cities, and the reasons for 
dissatisfaction that businesses provided. Again, because of the small number of 
businesses that reported non-conventional crimes, relatively large differences 
between cities might not reach statistical significance.
Fraud by Employees 
Across the four cities, 46.7 per cent of respondents were satisfied with the 
police treatment of their complaint of fraud by employees, but there were 
large disparities between the cities. In Hong Kong, the highest proportion 
of respondents (68.8 per cent) indicated they were satisfied with the police 
response, followed by Shanghai (53.3 per cent). Levels of satisfaction, however, 
were lower in Shenzhen (35.3 per cent) and particularly Xi’an, where just one-
quarter of businesses expressed satisfaction. 
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The main reasons for dissatisfaction overall were that police were not interested 
in the complaint (45.5 per cent) or did not do enough (41 per cent) to solve 
it. That police were not interested was the dominant reason in Xi’an (71.4 per 
cent), followed by the concern that police did not do enough (42.8 per cent). 
Half of Shenzhen respondents believed that police were not interested, but only 
one-quarter believed that police did not do enough. Lack of police action was 
the leading cause of dissatisfaction for Shanghai businesses (60 per cent). 
Fraud by Outsiders 
Overall, 48.8 per cent of businesses were satisfied with how the police handled 
their complaint of fraud by outsiders. The highest level of satisfaction was 
found in Shanghai (61 per cent) but those in Shenzhen (43.3 per cent) and Xi’an 
(41.2 per cent) were less satisfied. Many dissatisfied victims (44.4 per cent) 
invoked unspecified reasons, and comparable proportions of respondents (about 
one in five) mentioned that police did not do enough, did not apprehend the 
offender, did not recover the property and were not interested as sources of 
dissatisfaction. None of the Hong Kong respondents complained that police did 
not find the offender.
Table 7.9 Satisfaction with Police Response to Non-Conventional Crime 














Satisfied with police (and others’) 
response 46 .7 48 .8 51 .2 55 .0 51 .4















Did not do enough 41 .0 20 .4 35 .7 0 .0 43 .8
Were not interested 45 .5 16 .7 35 .7 16 .7 31 .3
Didn’t find or apprehend the 
offender 0 .0 22 .2 7 .1 0 .0 12 .5
Didn’t recover property or goods 9 .1 18 .5 14 .3 0 .0 6 .3
Didn’t keep us properly informed 4 .5 1 .9 7 .1 16 .7 0 .0
Were slow to arrive 18 .2 5 .6 14 .3 0 .0 0 .0
Didn’t treat us correctly/
were impolite 4 .5 1 .9 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0
Other reasons 31 .8 44 .4 35 .7 33 .4 31 .3
Notes: a Reporting authorities include: for bribery, police and anti-corruption agencies; for Internet fraud, 
police, Internet service providers and web/system managers; b multiple answers were possible, so total 
might add up to more than 100 per cent; for each type of crime, the number of businesses that were 
dissatisfied with police response and that of businesses that were satisfied do not add up to the total 
number of businesses who reported to police because various numbers of respondents did not know or 
refused to answer questions on satisfaction with police. 
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Internet-Related Fraud 
The businesses most satisfied with the responses to Internet-related fraud were 
those in Shanghai (83.3 per cent), with the other cities ranging between 33.3 
and 52.9 per cent satisfaction. The two leading reasons for dissatisfaction—each 
cited by 35.7 per cent of respondents—were that police (or other agencies) did 
not do enough or were not interested. A lack of police action was mentioned by 
one-third of Hong Kong respondents, and a lack of interest by police by 20 per 
cent of Xi’an businesses.
Bribery 
More than half the reporting victims (55 per cent) were satisfied with police or 
anti-corruption agencies’ response to their complaint. Hong Kong businesses 
expressed the highest level of satisfaction (75 per cent) and Shenzhen businesses 
the lowest (40 per cent). Only three respondents provided specific reasons for 
dissatisfaction.
Extortion and Intimidation 
Just more than half (51.4 per cent) the businesses that reported incidents of 
extortion or intimidation were satisfied with the action of the police. Again, 
satisfaction was highest in Hong Kong (69.2 per cent). It was lower in Xi’an 
(40 per cent) and particularly Shanghai (20 per cent). The main reasons for 
dissatisfaction were that police did not do enough (43.8 per cent) and were not 
interested (31.3 per cent). No businesses in Hong Kong mentioned the police’s 
lack of interest, but this was the leading cause of dissatisfaction in Shenzhen.
Incidentally—but perhaps somewhat revealing about the demands on business 
and apparent limits to civic action—was that in Hong Kong and Shenzhen about 
one-fifth of those who did not report common crime indicated that this was 
because of a ‘lack of time’ and/or that it was ‘too much trouble to report’. This 
reason also featured (albeit less frequently) for fraud-related offences but not 
bribery. The notion that ‘time pressure’ might override other considerations in 
the decision to report or not is unusual but has been noted in the Hong Kong 
ICVS as a factor cited by individuals who were victims of either trivial or non-
trivial crimes (Broadhurst et al. 2010).
In general, the survey respondents in Hong Kong had a more positive assessment 
of the police response. This was notable in respect to serious offences such as 
bribery and fraud by employees. Apart from Xi’an, however, where respondents 
tended to be more pessimistic about fraud, differences between the cities were 
small and statistical tests of significance were unreliable given the small number 
of subjects. This more positive attitude of Hong Kong business to policing is 
reinforced in respect to general attitudes to police performance in dealing with 
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crime problems where the findings show less dissatisfaction than in other cities. 
In the next section, we compare the reporting behaviour of our sample with 
similar studies and conclude this chapter by exploring further the attitudes of 
business to police as well as their knowledge of and response to collective efforts 
to prevent crime.
Comparison with Other Victimisation Surveys 
We are not able to compare patterns of reporting in China with those of Western 
Europe because few details were available in van Dijk and Terlouw (1996), 
except that burglary and theft of vehicle were reported by more than 90 per 
cent of the victims, but crimes committed by employees were reported by 
only one-third of the victims. To still be able to compare rates of reporting to 
police between China and Western countries, we use the results of the British 
Commercial Victimisation Survey, conducted in 2002 in England and Wales, but 
which focused on only two sectors: retail and manufacturing (Shury et al. 2005). 
First, we turn to the results of the Central Eastern Europe ICBS (Alvazzi del 
Frate 2004).
Central Eastern Europe ICBS
Figure 7.1 compares the rates of reporting common crime and non-conventional 
crime to police in mainland China, Hong Kong and Central Eastern Europe. 
Although rates by crime are different for each country, a similar pattern of 
reporting is present in all locations: theft of vehicle, burglary, robbery and 
assault are most likely to be reported to the police, with decreasing rates for the 
other types of crime and particularly the non-conventional crimes. For all types 
of crime, apart from bribery, we find the highest levels of reporting to police in 
mainland China. For many common crimes, Hong Kong’s level of reporting was 
not as low as that of Eastern Europe, but closer to it than the mainland’s—for 
example, 83 per cent of burglary victims said they reported the crime to the 
police in the mainland, but only 70 per cent and 67 per cent did in Hong Kong 
and Eastern Europe, respectively. One exception is theft of a vehicle, which was 
reported by all Hong Kong victims and 96 per cent of mainland victims, but by 
61 per cent of victims in the Eastern Europe ICBS. This is likely to be related, as 
noted above, to the requirement by insurance companies to report vehicle theft, 
and vehicle insurance was compulsory in both Hong Kong and the mainland at 
the time of the survey.
While the level of reporting to police was consistently higher in China than 
in Central Eastern Europe for common crimes, differences were not as sharp 
for non-conventional crimes such as extortion and fraud. For example, fraud 
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by outsiders was reported by 34 per cent of businesses in Eastern Europe 
and 36 per cent in the mainland (but only 22 per cent in Hong Kong). In all 
locations, bribery had the lowest level of reporting of all crimes (ranging from 
2 to 8 per cent). Given the context of widespread corruption of public officers 
in Central Eastern Europe and the mainland, this result is not unexpected, but 
it is somewhat surprising that only 8 per cent of businesses that were victims 
of bribery in Hong Kong reported the incident, given the highly regarded and 
proactive ICAC.
Figure 7.1 Reporting to Police: China ICBS, Hong Kong (2004) and 
mainland (2005), and Central Eastern Europe ICBS (1999) 
Less than half the respondents who had reported a common crime to the police 
in the Eastern Europe ICBS were satisfied with the police response (42 per cent). 
The main reasons for dissatisfaction were that police did not do enough, did not 
recover the stolen property and were not interested in the complaint. The level 
of satisfaction with the police response is only slightly lower than in the China 
ICBS and the reasons for dissatisfaction are similar.
British Commercial Victimisation Survey
For most of the common and non-conventional crimes, reporting levels in the 
British Commercial Victimisation Survey (ComVS)5 and the China ICBS were 
comparable (Figure 7.2). The reporting of assaults in both the manufacturing 
5 The British Commercial Victimisation Survey was conducted by telephone and based on a sample of 4000 
retailers and 2500 manufacturers. Across the two sectors, the overall rate of common crime was 66 per cent. 
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and the retail sectors was much lower in the United Kingdom than in China, but 
this is probably due to the broader scope of the assault category in the ComVS, 
which included threats and intimidation as well as actual physical violence. 
Businesses would be less likely to report threats of assault but more likely to 
report actual violence. In the manufacturing sector, theft by employees was 
reported more often in China (55 per cent) than in Britain (32 per cent), with an 
opposite pattern for fraud by employees in the retail sector (46 per cent reported 
in Britain versus 28 per cent in China). It is difficult to explain this result, but 
some confusion in the definition of fraud and theft might play a role.
Figure 7.2 Reporting to Police: China ICBS (2004–05) and British ComVS 
(2002) by type of crime 
Notes: a The ComVS includes actual assaults as well as threats of assault, which are less likely to be reported 
to the police; b the ComVS includes robberies and attempted robberies.
Among retailers, 4 per cent were the victims of fraud by employees and 18 per cent of fraud by outsiders. 
Among manufacturers, 2 per cent were the victims of fraud by employees and 8 per cent of fraud by outsiders 
(Shury et al. 2005).
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The British ComVS indicates that business respondents’ satisfaction with the 
police response was only slightly higher than in the China ICBS (59 per cent). 
In Britain, however, the main reason for dissatisfaction was that police were too 
slow to react to a call, followed by lack of interest in the complaint.
International and Hong Kong UNICVS
Table 7.10 presents the rates of reporting to the police for five common crimes 
in the Hong Kong UNICVS—a survey of the general population—and the China 
ICBS. Looking first at Hong Kong, we see that rates of reporting are similar for 
vehicle theft and burglary, but much lower for the other three crimes in the 
UNICVS than in the ICBS—that is, businesses were more likely than individuals 
to report theft from a vehicle, robbery and assault. Although the surveys provide 
only limited information, we can hypothesise that insurance requirements to 
report criminal incidents in order to process claims are part of the explanation. 
For both individuals and businesses, compulsory vehicle insurance would make 
it mandatory to report vehicle thefts, and it is probable that a large proportion 
of individuals and businesses would have insured their home and their premises 
against burglary.6
For the other three crimes, the UNICVS found that individuals tended to report 
only the most serious incidents (for example, those resulting in injuries or with 
a large monetary loss). Businesses might tend to report thefts from a vehicle 
because: a) they have insurance against such theft; and/or b) the loss of stock 
due to such theft is likely to be important. Businesses are likely to report violent 
crimes—assault and robbery—if they targeted their staff, and particularly if a 
staff member was injured.
On average, a larger proportion of UNICVS victims who had reported their 
victimisation to the police were satisfied with that response (66.6 per cent) 
compared with the businesses in Hong Kong (52.7 per cent satisfied), but reasons 
for dissatisfaction were similar. It could be that police provided a better service 
to individual victims of personal crime, or that business respondents had higher 
expectations.
6 We note, however, that only a small proportion of participants explicitly indicated that they reported the 
incident for insurance purposes; the duty to report such serious events was the leading reason for contacting 
police.
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Table 7.10 Reporting to Police, Hong Kong UNICVS and ICBS China 
UNICVS ICBS












Burglary 68 77 70 83
Theft of vehicle 89 91 100 96
Theft from vehicle 53 29 60 91
Robbery 49 42 60 80
Assault 31 35 75 80
Sources: International UNICVS (van Dijk et al. 2007:Table 12, pp. 267–8); Hong Kong UNICVS (Broadhurst 
et al. 2010).
Note: a Surveys were conducted in 33 capital cities of developed and developing countries in 2004–05. 
Satisfaction with Police and Crime Prevention 
In the preceding section, businesses that had been victimised by conventional 
or non-conventional crime and who reported the crime were asked how satisfied 
they were with the way in which police dealt with that particular incident. Here 
we examine business respondents’ opinion about the overall police performance. 
The first question measured how satisfied all respondents were with the way in 
which police handled crime problems: ‘in general, how satisfied or dissatisfied 
are you with the way the police deal with the crime problems facing business 
in this area?’ Possible answers were: ‘very satisfied’, ‘fairly satisfied’, ‘neither 
satisfied nor dissatisfied’, ‘fairly dissatisfied’, and ‘very dissatisfied’. The second 
question probed reasons for dissatisfaction, and was asked only to respondents 
who had indicated they were fairly or very dissatisfied, and those who were 
neutral. Nine standard answers were possible but respondents were invited to 
give their own reasons. 
Satisfaction with the Way Police Deal with Crime 
Problems
Overall, about half the respondents (49.5 per cent) were satisfied with law-
enforcement agencies; only 7.5 per cent clearly expressed that they were 
dissatisfied (Table 7.11). A large proportion of respondents, however, did 
not express an opinion: 21.7 per cent said they were neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied (neutral), and 21.3 per cent said they did not know or refused to 
answer. The level of satisfaction with the way police dealt with crime problems 
was significantly lower in Shenzhen compared with the other cities (p < 0.01). 
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Shanghai had the largest proportion of respondents who expressed satisfaction 
(53.4 per cent), followed by Xi’an (50.8 per cent) then Hong Kong (48.9 per 
cent). The proportion of respondents who were dissatisfied with the police was 
significantly lower in Hong Kong (2.7 per cent) than in the other cities, and 
largest in Shenzhen and Xi’an (12.7 and 12.1 per cent respectively).
An experience of victimisation tainted respondents’ perception of police 
performance in the mainland, but not in Hong Kong. Comparing the response 
of the victims of any crime (common and non-conventional) with those of non-
victims, we find that in Hong Kong, 47 per cent of victims and 49.4 per cent of 
non-victims were fairly or very satisfied with the performance of their police. 
In contrast, in the mainland, only 37.3 per cent of victims were fairly or very 
satisfied, compared with 52.4 per cent of non-victims (p < 0.001), with similar 
patterns in each mainland city. 












Very/fairly satisfied 48 .9 53 .4 45 .2** 50 .8 49 .5
Neutral 20 .7 22 .3 25 .9 18 .4 21 .7
Very/fairly dissatisfied 2 .7** 5 .5 12 .7 12 .1 7 .5
Don’t know/refusal 27 .7 18 .8 16 .2 18 .7 21 .3
** p < 0.01 
Reason for Dissatisfaction with the Way Police Deal 
with Crime Problems
Respondents who were neutral, fairly and very dissatisfied with the performance 
of the police (N = 1492) were asked the reasons for their dissatisfaction; 
multiple answers were allowed (Table 7.12). Unfortunately, a large proportion of 
respondents (37.7 per cent)7 answered ‘other reasons’ but did not specify what 
those reasons were. The reason cited by the largest proportion of dissatisfied 
respondents (17.3 per cent) was that law-enforcement agencies took too long 
to react to incidents. The second reason, mentioned by comparable groups, 
was that police were not interested in reported crime (13.5 per cent) and that 
respondents had no day-to-day contact with police (12.3 per cent). Smaller 
numbers of respondents cited each of the other reasons. 
7 Of those who cited ‘other reasons’ for dissatisfaction (N = 562), only a minority (12.2 per cent) mentioned 
one or more of the standard reasons, as well as ‘other reasons’. One-third of respondents cited only ‘other 
reasons’, but did not elaborate.
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Table 7.12 Reasons for Dissatisfaction with Police Performance by City 













Police take too long to 
react to incidents 4 .7*** 15 .9 25 .2 24 .7 17 .3
Police not interested in 
reported crimes 3 .5*** 14 .6 21 .4 15 .2 13 .5
No day-to-day contact 
with police 37 .2*** 2 .3 2 .1 2 .7 12 .3
Police do not react to 
alarms going off 3 .0*** 7 .1 9 .1 10 .4 7 .2
Police do not catch or 
prosecute offenders 0 .9** 4 .9 3 .3 5 .5 3 .4
Police involved in 
corruption 0 .2*** 1 .9 3 .7 6 .4*** 2 .9
Police not seen in this 
area 4 .0 2 .6 1 .9 2 .4 2 .7
Police give little 
information on crime 
reported 1 .6 1 .6 2 .1 1 .5 1 .7
Too much hassle to report 0 .9 2 .6 0 .9 2 .1 1 .5
Other reasons 26 .2 41 .7 48 .1 37 .5 37 .7
** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001 
Note: a Multiple answers were possible, so total might add up to more than 100 per cent. 
Looking at Table 7.12, we see some important differences in perceptions of the 
police between the cities. In Hong Kong, the main reason for dissatisfaction 
was the absence of day-to-day contact between businesses and police (37.2 per 
cent), but in mainland cities this reason was mentioned by only 2–3 per cent of 
respondents and did not seem very important. In the mainland, dissatisfaction 
was significantly more likely than in Hong Kong to be associated with perceptions 
of ineffective and neglectful law-enforcement practices such as taking too long 
to react to incidents (Shenzhen and Xi’an, about 25 per cent; Shanghai, 15.9 
per cent versus Hong Kong, 4.7 per cent), and not being interested in reported 
crime (Shanghai and Xi’an, about 15 per cent; Shenzhen, 21.4 per cent versus 
Hong Kong, 3.5 per cent). Although differences are smaller, similar patterns are 
present between Hong Kong and the mainland for the failure of police to react to 
alarms and to catch or prosecute offenders. As could be expected from the rates 
of victimisation, dissatisfaction because of the perception that law enforcers 
were involved in corruption was mentioned more often in the mainland, 
particularly in Xi’an, than in Hong Kong (Xi’an, 6.4 per cent; Shenzhen, 3.7 per 
cent; Shanghai, 1.9 per cent; versus Hong Kong, 0.2 per cent). 
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Crime Prevention
Two questions were asked about contact between businesses and the local 
government (for example, council) and the police regarding crime problems 
and crime prevention (apart from reporting crime): ‘did your business have any 
contact with the local council/local police about crime or corruption problems, 
or crime prevention in 2004?’ Another question concerned crime-prevention 
initiatives by businesses themselves: ‘to your knowledge, have businesses in 
this area taken any kind of cooperative action against crime and corruption 
or extortion, such as sharing security patrols, setting up a business watch or 
ring, phone alarm system’, and so on, and whether they would be interested in 
participating in such initiatives. 
Overall, 15 per cent of the businesses surveyed had contact with the local 
council or the police about crime problems or crime prevention (Table 7.13). 
These contacts were significantly more likely to happen in the mainland cities 
than in Hong Kong (16–23 per cent compared with 5.1 per cent respectively). 
For the majority of businesses, such contact involved the police rather than the 
council. This is likely to be a function of the Hong Kong Fight Crime Committee 
structure, which includes local or district Fight Crime Committees who play a 
role in prevention and awareness of crime. Given the relatively greater concern 
about crime in Shenzhen compared with the other cities, businesses there 
were also more interested in taking cooperative action and more aware of such 
activity, while Hong Kong businesses were least likely to seek involvement.











Aware of cooperative 
action on crime prevention 
by local businesses 8 .3*** 15 .6 20 .2 18 .5 14 .6
Interested in participating 
in cooperative action on 
crime prevention by local 
businesses 20 .7*** 25 .7 34 .9 30 .1 26 .9
Had contact with local 
council and/or police 
about crime and crime 
prevention 5 .1*** 16 .3 22 .9 22 .3 15 .0
Of those who had contact with local council or police 
N = 92 N = 255 N = 181 N = 240 N = 768
Council only 19 .6 6 .6 5 .5 8 .8 8 .5
Police only 66 .3 76 .3 72 .2 75 .0 73 .3
Both council and police 14 .1 17 .1 22 .3 16 .2 18 .2
*** p < 0.001 
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Respondents whose business had been the victim of a common or non-
conventional crime were not more likely to be aware of local crime-prevention 
initiatives, but they were more interested in participating in cooperative action 
to promote crime prevention (Table 7.14). They were also more likely to have 
taken the initiative to discuss crime-prevention strategies by contacting the 
local council or the police. The experience of victimisation prompted these 
respondents to try to prevent further victimisation. Yet, only about one-third of 
victimised respondents indicated that they had an interest in crime prevention 
(compared with about one-quarter of those who had not been victimised).
Table 7.14 Contact with Council or Police about Crime Prevention by 
Victimisation












Aware of cooperative action on crime 
prevention by local businesses 14 .6 14 .6 16 .0 14 .4
Interested in participating in cooperative 
action on crime prevention by local 
businesses 35 .7*** 26 .2 33 .2*** 25 .4
Contact with local council and/or police 
about crime and crime prevention 34 .1*** 13 .7 22 .5*** 13 .4
*** p < 0.001 
In this chapter, we found that businesses were more willing to report common 
crimes than non-conventional crimes to the police, and that businesses in the 
mainland were significantly more likely to report common and non-conventional 
crimes than those in Hong Kong. Bribery was least likely to be reported (only 
6.4 per cent of all incidents were) and vehicle theft was the most likely (96.4 per 
cent). Only about one in five businesses in Hong Kong and just more than one 
in three in mainland cities reported fraud to the police. Reporting behaviour 
did not vary significantly by business sector, whether the business was insured 
or not, or in respect to the size of the loss; however, once again, the larger 
the business, the more likely it was to report crimes to police, which could be 
because large companies have a wider exposure to risk and often have specialised 
security staff and policies mandating the reporting of crime to police. When 
we compared the reporting behaviour of Chinese business with comparable 
surveys such as the Central Eastern Europe survey and the British Commercial 
Victimisation Survey, we found similar patterns of reporting behaviour, but 
Chinese—especially mainland—businesses were much more likely to report to 
police than Central Eastern European businesses. 
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The main reason for not reporting crime to the police was that the incident was 
not serious enough and this was mentioned by nearly 40 per cent of victims in 
relation to common crime and by 30 per cent in relation to non-conventional 
crime. Lesser proportions of respondents believed that the police would not be 
able to do anything, that they did not have enough evidence, or that it took too 
much time or was too much trouble. About half of businesses were satisfied with 
the response of police when they did report a crime and there was little difference 
between the cities, albeit those in Xi’an expressed the least satisfaction. Most 
dissatisfaction was due to the view that police had not done enough or lacked 
interest, followed by failure to catch the offender or recover property. 
About half of businesses were satisfied with the way in which the police dealt 
with the general crime problems facing business, although Shenzhen businesses 
expressed higher levels of dissatisfaction than other cities, perhaps because the 
experience of victimisation negatively tainted views of police. There is room 
to develop partnerships with police and local authorities in crime prevention 
since only about one in six businesses had contact with police and were 
aware of cooperative action against crime. About one in four was interested 
in participating in cooperative activities and those that had been victimised 
were more interested in but not necessarily more aware of crime-prevention 
activities. Hong Kong businesses were the least interested in cooperative action 
while Shenzhen businesses were the most interested (that is, 34.9 per cent 
compared with 20.7 per cent in Hong Kong)—perhaps not surprising, given the 
relative risks of crime in both cities. 
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8. Perceptions of Business 
Environment and Crime Trends
All respondents were asked their opinion about several potential obstacles, 
including regulatory controls, to doing good business in the mainland. Hong 
Kong respondents were also asked about obstacles to doing good business 
within Hong Kong. While mainland businesses based their answer on their 
own experience, only the 20 per cent of Hong Kong businesses with additional 
premises in the mainland could talk from experience; others expressed their 
perception of what doing business in the mainland was like. Although a 
number of mainland businesses also had premises in Hong Kong (12.6 per 
cent), they were not directly asked about potential obstacles in Hong Kong. 
Eight potential obstacles were surveyed: export/import regulations, labour 
regulations, tax regulations, safety and environmental regulations, changes in 
law and regulations, lack of consultation with the business sector, crime and 
insecurity, and corruption. Respondents ranked each potential obstacle on a 
three-point scale: ‘no obstacle’, ‘moderate obstacle’ and ‘very strong obstacle’. 
Items about potential obstacles were asked early in the questionnaire and before 
respondents were prompted to recall whether their business had been victimised 
by crime. Thus, the effect of victimisation on perception should not be due to 
a ‘response set’ or item order effect—that is, because they had thought about 
their victimisation they were prompted to be more negative when answering 
questions about obstacles.
Respondents were also queried about their overall perception of the crime 
problem: first, whether they believed that the general level of crime had gone 
up, had remained the same, or had decreased in the past two or three years; 
then two questions focused on bribery and corruption, and extortion and 
intimidation and how common these practices were in the respondent’s sector 
of activity. 
Obstacles to Doing Good Business in Hong Kong
The series of questions on obstacles to business in Hong Kong was posed only 
to business respondents in Hong Kong. Their responses are presented in Table 
8.1. Lack of consultation with the business sector was seen as a moderate to 
very strong obstacle by the largest proportion of businesses (42.7 per cent). 
This was followed by crime and insecurity (36.4 per cent), changes in law (34.8 
per cent) and corruption (34.3 per cent). With the relatively low level of crime 
in Hong Kong, it was somewhat surprising to see that crime and insecurity 
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as well as corruption were considered obstacles by more than one-third of 
respondents. Given the much lower prevalence of bribery and corruption 
in Hong Kong compared with the mainland and the presence of strong anti-
corruption agencies, we hypothesised that corruption would not be seen as 
such a major obstacle to doing business in Hong Kong. We were surprised that 
more than one-third of Hong Kong businesses were concerned by corruption. A 
larger proportion of businesses with additional premises in the mainland rated 
corruption as an obstacle to doing business in Hong Kong (41.3 per cent) than 
those without premises in the mainland (32.6 per cent). 
Table 8.1 Obstacles to Doing Business in Hong Kong: Hong Kong 








All Hong Kong 
respondents
N = 1817
Lack of consultation with business sector 46 .3 41 .8 42 .7
Crime and insecurity 37 .7 36 .1 36 .4
Changes in laws 40 .2* 33 .4 34 .8
Corruption 41 .3** 32 .6 34 .3
Labour regulations 30 .2 33 .0 32 .4
Tax regulations 36 .8* 29 .7 31 .1
Safety/environmental regulations 31 .0 30 .6 30 .7
Export/import regulations 41 .0*** 23 .6 27 .0
* p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001 
About twice as many Hong Kong respondents with premises in the mainland 
cited export/import regulations as obstacles as those with premises only in 
Hong Kong (41 per cent and 23.6 per cent respectively). It could be that those 
businesses which export and import goods between Hong Kong and the mainland 
experience difficulties doing so. The fact that changes in laws and regulations 
were cited as an obstacle by 40.2 per cent of Hong Kong businesses with premises 
in the mainland compared with 33.4 per cent of businesses without premises in 
the mainland might also relate to similar problems. Businesses with operations 
in the mainland were also significantly more likely to see tax regimes as an 
obstacle. This might arise because of the many different forms of tax levied (26 
types of tax, including value-added tax [VAT], business turnover and employee 
levies), the prevalence of local/provincial taxes and the complications of the 
tax receipt/credit system adopted on the mainland. Yet, nearly 30 per cent of 
Hong Kong businesses without mainland premises also saw tax regulations as 
a problem, and, in the context of the relatively simple, fixed low-tax regime 
prevailing in Hong Kong, this was unexpected. According to the 2009 ‘Forbes 
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Magazine Tax Misery & Reform Index’ survey, China has the highest-cost tax 
regime in the Asia-Pacific while Hong Kong offers the least expensive and most 
administratively simple system (Anderson 2009).1
Impact of Victimisation on Respondents’ Perception
The experience of crime victimisation altered Hong Kong respondents’ 
perception of potential obstacles to business. Respondents whose company 
had been victimised tended to perceive greater obstacles to business than those 
who had not been victimised (Table 8.2). This varied, however, according to the 
type of victimisation, with victimisation by non-conventional crime affecting 
respondents’ views more strongly than by common crime. 
All potential obstacles to business were mentioned by larger proportions of 
victims than non-victims of common crime, but the largest difference and the 
only statistically significant one was found between those who cited crime and 
insecurity as an obstacle (50 per cent of victims compared with 35.2 per cent of 
non-victims). Other factors and possible interactions between them might not 
yield statistically significant results because the statistical analyses lack power 
due to the small numbers of victims. The impact of victimisation on respondents’ 
perception was comparable regardless of whether or not they operated business 
premises in the mainland.
Differences in perception of obstacles to doing business in Hong Kong were 
larger for respondents who had been victimised by non-conventional crime. 
They consistently cited more obstacles to doing business than non-victimised 
respondents, and the differences were statistically significant for all proposed 
obstacles, apart from export/import regulations. While the proportions of 
respondents who mentioned specific obstacles were different for those with or 
without premises on the mainland, the pattern of responses (that is, those who 
had been victimised tended to mention more obstacles) was similar between the 
two groups of businesses. 
1 According to the Forbes Magazine Survey, China’s tax on corporate income is 25 per cent, 45 per cent on 
personal income, 49 per cent for employers’ social security, 23 per cent for employees’ social security and a 17 
per cent tax on goods and services. Hong Kong’s tax regime is ranked the least expensive in the Asia-Pacific, 
with corporate tax standing at 16.5 per cent, personal income tax at 15 per cent and employer and employee 
social security levies both 5 per cent.
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Table 8.2 Obstacles to Doing Business in Hong Kong and Victimisation: 
Hong Kong respondents who answered moderate to very strong obstacle 
(per cent)
Respondents Victim of any common 
crime











Lack of consultation with business 
sector 49 .3 42 .1 53 .0*** 40 .6
Crime and insecurity 50 .0*** 35 .2 46 .3*** 34 .3
Changes in laws 43 .3* 34 .0 43 .1*** 33 .0
Corruption 39 .3 33 .9 45 .7*** 32 .0
Labour regulations 36 .7 32 .0 38 .7** 31 .1
Tax regulations 36 .7 30 .6 36 .4* 30 .0
Safety/environmental regulations 38 .3* 30 .0 40 .3*** 28 .7
Export/import regulations 26 .7 27 .1 28 .1 26 .8
* p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001
It is not surprising that business respondents who have directly experienced 
criminal incidents would rate crime and insecurity as obstacles to doing 
business. What is more surprising is that their experience seemed to colour 
their perception of all aspects of doing business. Perhaps the victimisation had 
made it harder to run a profitable business and thus all aspects of business 
appeared more difficult. 
Obstacles to Doing Good Business in the 
Mainland
Perception of Hong Kong and Mainland Businesses
Table 8.3 presents respondents’ perception of obstacles to doing good business in 
the mainland, for all businesses and according to the location of their premises. 
Overall, corruption, and crime and insecurity were regarded as moderate to 
very strong obstacles by about half the businesses surveyed, followed by lack 
of consultation with the business sector (42.2 per cent). The other potential 
obstacles were seen as problematic by lesser proportions of respondents (from 
36.3 per cent for changes in law down to 26 per cent for labour regulations). 
Although the proportions of respondents who ranked each potential obstacle as 
moderate or very strong varied between mainland and Hong Kong businesses, 
the ranking order was broadly similar. Hong Kong businesses with or without 
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premises in the mainland were consistently more negative than mainland 
businesses. For all groups of businesses, corruption, and crime and insecurity 
were ranked the highest, but Hong Kong respondents with premises on the 
mainland were the most negative, with about 78 per cent regarding corruption, 
and crime and insecurity as obstacles to business. Hong Kong businesses 
without premises in the mainland—that is, expressing their perception rather 
than their actual experience—were less negative (59.8 per cent and 58.1 per 
cent rated crime and insecurity, and corruption respectively as obstacles), but 
significantly more so than mainland businesses (who rated crime and insecurity, 
and corruption at 41.2 per cent and 46.5 per cent respectively). Hong Kong 
businesses with premises in the mainland tended to rank export/import 
regulations as more problematic than those with no premises in the mainland 
and mainland businesses. This probably reflects their experience of exporting 
and importing goods between Hong Kong and the mainland, and on to world 
markets. Overall, labour regulations were ranked as the least problematic 
(although still high at 61.2 per cent for Hong Kong businesses with premises in 
the mainland, 40.6 per cent for Hong Kong businesses without premises in the 
mainland, and 15.7 per cent for mainland businesses). Generally, Hong Kong 
businesses operating in the mainland reported regulatory and crime/corruption 
issues as substantially more of a problem than mainland companies or Hong 
Kong businesses that did not operate in the mainland.
Table 8.3 Obstacles to Doing Business in the Mainland by Location of 














Corruption 46 .5 77 .9*** 58 .1*** 52 .0
Crime and insecurity 41 .2 78 .1*** 59 .8*** 49 .1
Lack of consultation with 
business sector 36 .8 67 .6*** 48 .1*** 42 .2
Changes in laws 26 .8 71 .5*** 49 .1*** 36 .3
Tax regulations 28 .5 67 .6*** 44 .5*** 35 .8
Safety/environmental regulations 17 .4 67 .9*** 49 .0*** 30 .0
Export/import regulations 17 .8 72 .0*** 45 .8*** 29 .6
Labour regulations 15 .7 61 .2*** 40 .6*** 26 .0
*** p < 0.001
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Perception of Mainland Businesses by City
Looking at how businesses in each mainland city ranked the obstacles to 
doing business in the mainland (Table 8.4), we see a different pattern in 
each city. Corruption was rated as a moderate to very strong obstacle by the 
largest proportion of businesses in Shanghai and Xi’an (41.5 and 47.1 per cent 
respectively), but not in Shenzhen, where crime and insecurity came first (57 
per cent), followed by corruption (51 per cent). The differences of opinion about 
crime and insecurity and corruption between the mainland cities reflect the 
pattern of victimisation between these cities: Shenzhen businesses tended to 
have a higher risk of victimisation than the two other cities, but the prevalence 
of bribery and corruption was similar. 
Comparable proportions of respondents in the three cities rated lack of 
consultation with the business sector, tax regulations and changes in laws as 
obstacles. The lower level of concern about export/import regulations in Xi’an 
(13.9 per cent versus 19–20.3 per cent in Shanghai and Shenzhen) is probably 
related to the lower proportion of manufacturers who were likely to engage 
in this activity. Labour regulations were a low concern in Shanghai (rated as 
an obstacle by only 4 per cent of respondents) compared with Shenzhen (23 
per cent) and Xi’an (20.3 per cent), and this finding is difficult to interpret, 
especially given that controversial changes to labour regulation (China Contract 
Law)2 designed to protect blue-collar workers were widely discussed by local 
and foreign business groups throughout 2006–07 before being introduced at 
the beginning of 2008. It is, however, likely that the 2001 reforms to labour 
laws, especially labour contracts promulgated by the Shanghai Municipality, 
helped reduce the burden on employers and introduced a degree of flexibility 
not found in other cities (Chen 2009; Zhu et al. 2002). 
2 See The Labor Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China, adopted at the Twenty-Eighth Session of 
the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on 29 June 
2007, effective on 1 January 2008: <www.fdi.gov.cn/.../FDI.../Laws/GeneralLawsandRegulations/BasicLaws/
P020070831601380007924.pdf>
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Table 8.4 Obstacles to Doing Business in the Mainland: Mainland respondents 











Corruption 41 .5 51 .0*** 47 .1 46 .5
Crime and insecurity 27 .2 57 .0*** 39 .4 41 .2
Lack of consultation with 
business sector 33 .2 39 .2* 38 .0 36 .8
Tax regulations 27 .7 28 .8 29 .1 28 .5
Changes in laws 27 .7 28 .2 24 .5 26 .8
Export/import regulations 19 .0 20 .3** 13 .9 17 .8
Safety/environmental 
regulations 15 .1 20 .1** 17 .0 17 .4
Labour regulations 4 .0 23 .0*** 20 .3*** 15 .7
* p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001 
Impact of Victimisation on Respondents’ Perception
As Table 8.5 shows, there was a general tendency by respondents who had been 
victimised to perceive greater obstacles to doing good business in the mainland. 
This perception was not restricted to crime and insecurity, and corruption, but 
extended to all types of obstacles, particularly for mainland respondents. It 
seems that their victimisation experience, whether it occurred on the mainland 
or in Hong Kong, gave these businesses a more negative view of the business 
environment in the mainland. 
Significantly larger proportions of mainland respondents victimised by 
common or non-conventional crime reported obstacles to doing business in the 
mainland than non-victims. As in Hong Kong, here, variations between victims 
and non-victims were larger for victimisation by non-conventional crime. The 
most marked differences were found for crime and insecurity, cited by 62.1 per 
cent of victims of common crime compared with 40 per cent of non-victims, 
and corruption, cited by 67.3 per cent of victims of non-conventional crime 
compared with 41.5 per cent of non-victims.3
3 For both obstacles to doing business in Hong Kong and the mainland, we examined the impact of specific 
types of crime (for example, fraud versus bribery) on respondents’ perception. We found no differences 
between the crimes and, therefore, used the combined variable (any common or non-conventional crime 
victimisation), which increased the number of cases, hence the statistical power of analyses.
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Hong Kong respondents’ perception of the business situation in the mainland 
was affected in a slightly different way. While there were no major differences 
of opinion between those with premises in the mainland and those without 
such premises, respondents who experienced non-conventional crime were 
consistently and significantly more negative about the business environment 
in the mainland than non-victims. Table 8.5 shows a similar pattern, however, 
between victims and non-victims of common crime, with victims expressing 
more negative perceptions, with differences in proportions of the same 
magnitude as for non-conventional crime. We suspect that the analyses lack 
statistical power because of the small number of Hong Kong victims.
Comparing Perceptions in Hong Kong and the 
Mainland
Looking at how businesses in each mainland city ranked the obstacles to doing 
business in their own jurisdiction, both Shenzhen and X’ian ranked corruption, 
and crime and insecurity as the main obstacles (Table 8.4). Although the 
proportion of respondents who rated each of the eight potential obstacles as 
moderate to very strong varied between Hong Kong businesses rating obstacles 
in Hong Kong and mainland businesses rating obstacles in the mainland, all 
ranked corruption, crime and insecurity, and lack of consultation with the 
business sector higher than other obstacles. Mainland businesses referring to 
the mainland, however, placed corruption first, next crime and insecurity, and 
then lack of consultation, while Hong Kong businesses referring to Hong Kong 
put lack of consultation first, next crime and insecurity (on par with changes in 
laws and regulations), and then corruption. 
Apart from corruption, and crime and insecurity, which higher proportions of 
mainland respondents regarded as obstacles in the mainland (46.5 per cent and 
41.2 per cent respectively) compared with Hong Kong respondents within Hong 
Kong (34.3 per cent and 36.4 per cent respectively), all other types of obstacles 
were mentioned by higher proportions of Hong Kong businesses referring to 
Hong Kong than by mainland businesses referring to the mainland (Figure 8.1).
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Figure 8.1 Obstacles to Doing Business in the Mainland by Mainland 
Respondents and in Hong Kong by Hong Kong Respondents
Interestingly, all Hong Kong respondents generally rated the situation in the 
mainland worse than the situation in Hong Kong, whether they had premises 
in the mainland or not, but those who did have premises on the mainland were 
the most negative. A surprising result, however, is that Hong Kong respondents 
with premises in the mainland tended to also rate the situation in Hong Kong 
worse than their counterparts without premises in the mainland. A possible 
explanation is that Hong Kong businesses with premises in the mainland also 
had higher rates of victimisation. The main reason for this effect, however, is 
that these businesses were generally larger, and, as reported previously, larger 
business size was associated with higher risk of victimisation and also a greater 
likelihood of reporting the matter to police.
Obstacles to Doing Good Business by Sector
In this section, we examine whether respondents operating in different business 
sectors had similar perceptions about potential obstacles to business. Table 8.6 
presents the obstacles to business in Hong Kong that were ranked highest by 
Hong Kong’s respondents, and the obstacles to business in the mainland that 
were ranked highest by mainland respondents, by sector of activity (based on 
the percentage of respondents in each sector who perceived the various obstacles 
as moderate to very strong). 
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Regardless of their main sector of activity, mainland businesses ranked 
obstacles to business in similar ways. Although percentages varied, across 
all sectors corruption was cited as an obstacle by the largest proportion of 
respondents (45.4–52.6 per cent). Crime and insecurity were ranked equal first 
with corruption or second (38.7–49.4 per cent). Lack of consultation with the 
business sector came equal second or third (35.8–43.6 per cent). These were 
followed by changes in law and tax regulations, mentioned by 31–36 per cent of 
respondents across all sectors.
In Hong Kong, the relevance of potential obstacles differed according to the 
economic sector. Lack of consultation with the business sector was perceived as 
an obstacle by the largest proportion of respondents across all business sectors 
(37.2–52.1 per cent), but in the financial/professional services sector, changes 
in law were also perceived as an obstacle by a similar proportion of respondents 
(44.7 per cent). 
Respondents in the manufacturing and wholesale/trading sectors ranked 
corruption, export/import regulations and changes in law as equal second most 
important obstacles. These are the two sectors most likely to engage in export/
import activities and, therefore, to feel the impact and potential limitations of the 
regulations as well as of frequent changes to these regulations. Manufacturers 
were most likely to be the victims of bribery and corruption and therefore to 
perceive these practices as obstacles. For retailers, the second most important 
obstacles to business were crime and insecurity (36.9 per cent). This correlates 
with the high rate of theft as well as extortion and intimidation reported in 
the retail sector. In contrast, only 9.1 per cent of retailers perceived corruption 
as an obstacle, which accords with the relatively lower rate of this practice in 
their sectors. Other sectors were also concerned with crime and insecurity, but 
ranked them third. Changes in law, tax and labour regulations were ranked 
second or third by most respondents.
We conclude this section by noting that Hong Kong respondents were generally 
more negative than mainland respondents, particularly those with premises in 
the mainland. Although the perception of what constituted obstacles to business 
in Hong Kong varied depending on sectors of activity, lack of consultation with 
business was ranked as the main obstacle. For mainland businesses, corruption 
was the main obstacle, with crime and insecurity, and lack of consultation 
featuring as either second or third depending on sector. Much higher proportions 
of Shenzhen respondents ranked crime and insecurity, and corruption as major 
obstacles, which again is consistent with their experiences of victimisation. 
The experience of victimisation appeared to engender a more negative view of 
all obstacles, not just crime and insecurity, although the effect was stronger for 
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Perception of Crime Trends
So far we have focused on our respondents’ specific victimisation experiences 
and broad perceptions about selected issues that might impact on their business. 
In this section, we turn our attention to their broader views on the extent of and 
trends in crime in their respective city with the question: ‘In general, have crime 
problems for your company increased, decreased or remained the same over the 
last two to three years?’ Two further questions probed more specifically how 
common they believed practices of bribery and extortion were: ‘Do you believe 
such practices (bribery/extortion) are common in your line of business? Are 
they extremely common, fairly common, not very common or not common at 
all?’ We assume that it is likely that respondents who believed that bribery 
occurred frequently in their line of business would see it as an obstacle more 
than those who did not. Likewise, those who thought that crime problems had 
increased would be more prone to perceive crime as an obstacle than those who 
did not think crime was on the rise.
Trends in Crime
Across the four cities, nearly three-quarters of respondents felt that for their 
company, crime problems had been stable in the past two or three years and only 
8 per cent felt that crime problems had increased (Table 8.7). In Hong Kong, the 
majority (more than 90 per cent) of respondents said that crime had remained 
stable, with about 5 per cent thinking that crime had increased or decreased 
respectively. The last two categories were more likely to be food retailers. In 
the mainland, a greater proportion of respondents than in Hong Kong felt crime 
problems had decreased (overall 29.5 per cent and 33.6 per cent in Shenzhen) 
and 9.6 per cent felt they had increased. So, while Shenzhen stands out as the 
city where businesses were most at risk of victimisation, it was also the place 
where a greater proportion of respondents felt that the situation had improved.












Crime has remained the 
same or not sure 90 .3*** 68 .5 55 .2 58 .9 71 .4
Crime has decreased 4 .6††† 23 .8 33 .6 31 .1 20 .6
Crime has increased 5 .1 7 .7 11 .2 10 .0 8 .0
Bribery is very/fairly 
common 6 .5††† 13 .2 14 .5 13 .7 11 .2
Extortion is very/fairly 
common 4 .6*** 1 .7 2 .4 1 .4 2 .8
*** p < 0.001, significantly higher than other cities
††† p < 0.001, significantly lower than other cities
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Not surprisingly, in both Hong Kong and the mainland, business respondents 
who had been victimised were more likely to say that crime had increased. Table 
8.8 presents the overall pattern, but a similar pattern was replicated in each city. 
Respondents’ perception seemed to be particularly affected by the experience 
of common crime: those who had been the victims of common crime were about 
four times more likely to say that crime had increased than those who had not 
been victimised. Victims of non-conventional crime were just more than twice 
as likely as non-victims to say that crime had increased. 
Looking at sectors of activity, we see in Table 8.9 that manufacturers were most 
likely to state that crime problems had increased. This view is not consistent 
with actual risks of victimisation by common crime because it was the retail 
rather than the manufacturing sector that was most prone to common crime 
victimisation, but this did not seem to affect retailers’ views on the prevalence 
of crime. Larger businesses were more likely than smaller ones to perceive that 
crime problems had increased: the mean score on the business size scale of those 
who perceived an increase in crime was 6 compared with 5.71 for others (p < 
0.01), which matches their higher rate of victimisation. This size effect is likely 
to be related to the manufacturers’ perception of increased crime problems since 
businesses in that sector tended to be the largest.
Table 8.8 Perception that Crime had Increased and Victimisation (per cent)
Type of victimisation Victimised Not victimised
Common crime 27 .7*** 6 .7
Non-conventional crime 14 .4*** 6 .2
Any type of crime 15 .4*** 5 .4
*** p < 0.001










































































Perception that crime has increased 9 .3* 7 .6 6 .6 7 .2 8 .7
Percentage of businesses victimised by:
Common crime 6 .0 8 .9** 4 .1 6 .6 5 .8
Non-conventional crime 23 .0 20 .9 23 .6 22 .3 23 .7
Any type of crime 26 .1 26 .7 25 .9 26 .1 26 .4
* p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01
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We also found a consistent relationship between respondents’ perception that 
crime had increased or remained stable and their judgment of the business 
environment. Across the four cities, respondents who thought that crime had 
increased were significantly more likely to rate not only crime and insecurity 
as an obstacle to doing business, but also most of the other obstacles. Again, 
this suggests respondents do not differentiate between the types of difficulties 
they experience in running their business, but give a global judgment of their 
business situation.
Commonness of Bribery and Extortion
Across all the cities, more than 10 per cent of respondents (11.2 per cent) felt 
that bribery and corruption were fairly or very common in their line of business 
(Table 8.7). Rates in mainland cities were about twice as high as the rate in 
Hong Kong, which parallels the prevalence of bribery victimisation found in 
the survey. There were no differences between the mainland cities. For both 
bribery and extortion, business respondents who had been the victims of these 
crimes were more likely to say that these practices were common. Of the 312 
respondents whose company had been the victim of bribery, 42.9 per cent 
believed that the practice was widespread, but only 9.1 per cent of those who 
were not victims (p < 0.001). Similarly, of the 116 victims of extortion, 19.8 per 
cent perceived the practice was common compared with 11 per cent of non-
victims (p < 0.01).
From Table 8.10, we see that businesses engaged in manufacturing were more 
likely than others to say that bribery was fairly and very common (13.8 per 
cent, p < 0.01). Large businesses were also more prone to believe that bribery 
was common (the mean score on the business size scale of those who perceived 
bribery to be common was 6.27 compared with 5.66 for others, p < 0.001), which 
again mirrors their higher rate of victimisation. Respondents who perceived that 
bribery and corruption were common in their line of business were more likely 
than other respondents to rate corruption as an obstacle to doing good business, 
as well as most of the other obstacles, in both Hong Kong and the mainland.
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Table 8.10 Perception that Bribery and Extortion Were Common and Actual 










































































Perception that bribery was very/fairly 
common 13 .8** 9 .1 11 .6 9 .0 10 .7
Percentage victim of bribery 7 .8*** 3 .5 5 .0 6 .3 6 .2
Perception that extortion was very/fairly 
common 2 .3 4 .7** 1 .9 2 .8 2 .0
Percentage victim of extortion 2 .0 3 .2** 0 .7 2 .8 2 .6
** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001
The pattern of perceptions regarding the commonness of extortion was the 
reverse of that for bribery. Hong Kong respondents were significantly more 
likely to say that extortion and intimidation were fairly or very common than 
mainland respondents (4.6 per cent and 1.8 per cent respectively), and this 
reflected their greater risk of victimisation, although Shenzhen respondents 
tended to find extortion more common than in Shanghai and Xi’an. Retailers 
were most likely to find extortion common in their sector, which is consistent 
with the higher prevalence of extortion in that sector (Table 8.10). Surprisingly, 
smaller businesses were more likely to perceive that extortion was a common 
practice than larger ones, although larger businesses had higher risks of 
victimisation (the mean score on the business size scale of those who perceived 
extortion to be common was 5.38 compared with 5.74 for those who did not, 
p < 0.05). Although not all relations were statistically significant, respondents 
who thought that extortion was common were overall more negative about the 
general business environment, and mentioned more obstacles to doing business 
than the other respondents.
The broad perceptions of the extent of crime, bribery and extortion reported 
above confirm that crime has a significant overall impact on business confidence 
as well as confidence in the police (and perhaps by implication the state). The 
experience of crime victimisation undermines not only confidence but generates 
a sense that unfavourable conditions are encountered in respect to security and 
also in respect to the general regulatory demands of the state. In mainland cities, 
a (perceived) decline in crime was observed for between 23.8 and 33.6 per cent 
of businesses, while Hong Kong businesses noted little change; this mirrors the 
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significant fluctuations in crime that occurred in the mainland (and Shenzhen in 
particular) against the relative stability of the low crime rates observed in Hong 
Kong over the past decade.
Bribery rather than extortion was seen as very or fairly common in the 
mainland—again reflecting the relative risks for business and the notoriety of 
this crime in China. Extortion, on the other hand, was noted in Hong Kong 
and Shenzhen, which points to a concern with the role of triad-related crime 
groups. It is notable that for the most part, perceptions about crime and the 
actual experience of victimisation are closely related; those who had avoided 
crime victimisation perceived that the risks of crime were lower than victims 
and they also believed that general conditions were less negative.
In summary, when considering the potential obstacles they faced in running 
their business, respondents ranked crime and corruption as important issues 
and often ahead of problems such as labour and taxes. Corruption was perceived 
as either a moderate or a serious obstacle by more than half of businesses (52 per 
cent), followed by crime and insecurity (49 per cent) and lack of consultation 
(42 per cent). Respondents in Shenzhen were the most likely to see crime and 
insecurity as the most serious obstacle (57 per cent) and those in Shanghai (27 
per cent) were the least likely—a result consistent with Shenzhen’s higher risk 
of crime. Hong Kong respondents ranked lack of government consultation with 
business as the most serious obstacle. Those operating in the mainland as well 
as Hong Kong, however, ranked corruption, and changes in laws and export/
import regulations more highly than businesses operating only in Hong Kong. 
Among mainland businesses, corruption was ranked first, followed by crime 
and insecurity, and lack of consultation with business. Generally, Hong Kong 
businesses were more negative than mainland businesses about most issues, and 
for all respondents, the impact of crime victimisation tended to taint perceptions 
negatively not only in relation to crime and insecurity but also across all the 
potential obstacles. 
In relation to crime trends over time, businesses that had been victimised were 
significantly more likely to perceive that crime had increased, although, overall, 
the majority of businesses (71.4 per cent) thought crime had remained about the 
same. Hong Kong respondents were the most likely (90.3 per cent) and those 
in Shenzhen the least likely to see crime as remaining stable (55.2 per cent); 
however, despite their higher victimisation rate, in Shenzhen, respondents 
(33.6 per cent) were more likely to perceive that crime had decreased over the 
past two to three years. Hong Kong respondents did not perceive that bribery 
was common (6.5 per cent did compared with 14.5 per cent of Shenzhen 
businesses), but they were significantly more likely than mainland businesses 
to see extortion as commonplace, albeit by a small percentage (that is, 4.6 per 
cent compared with 1.7 per cent of Shanghai businesses).
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9. Summary, Implications and Future 
Directions
In this final chapter, we briefly summarise the main results of the China ICBS, 
with the prevalence of common and non-conventional crimes illustrated in 
Figures 9.1 and 9.2. The overall direct costs of crime incurred by our sample of 
businesses are estimated and extrapolated to the wider business community. We 
review the findings in respect to willingness to report to police and satisfaction 
with the police response, as well as general attitudes to crime trends and crime 
prevention. Where possible, we compare the results of this survey with those 
of a similar nature conducted in other parts of the world. Next, we return to 
the theories of crime and modernisation that we outlined in the introduction 
and discuss how well the findings of the ICBS and comparisons with other 
surveys fit these theories. From the comparisons, we are able to offer some 
general conclusions about the relative success or otherwise of managing the 
presumed crime risks associated with the transition from command-and-control 
economies to market-oriented economies as in the case of China, Eastern Europe 
and Russia.
In China, where detailed criminal statistics still seem to be regarded as state 
secrets and, for the most part, are available only at the aggregated national level, 
reliance on such official measures as guidance on trends in crime is even more 
problematic than usual. Even when such official data are available, they might 
be defined or collected in ways that make them only marginally useful to the 
interests of business. Consequently, the data provided by the ICBS can serve as 
an alternative or proxy measure of the level and nature of crime experienced 
by businesses in China. Such surveys provide valuable independent primary 
sources about crime and capture experiences and relationships otherwise 
neglected by police records. They are not, however, without limitations, which 
we discuss in detail below along with the possible remedies for some of the 
problems encountered in this prevalence study. 
Summary of Results
Prevalence of Victimisation
Among the 5117 Chinese businesses surveyed by the ICBS, more than one-quarter 
(26.2 per cent) reported at least one incident of common or non-conventional 
crime over the past year. In Shenzhen, nearly 31 per cent of businesses had been 
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victimised, which was significantly higher than in the other cities (22.2 per cent 
in Shanghai, 24.5 per cent in Hong Kong and 28.3 per cent in Xi’an). Businesses 
were at much higher risks of victimisation by non-conventional crimes (that is, 
fraud, bribery, extortion and IP infringement) than victimisation by common 
crime: across the four cities, the rate of non-conventional crime (22.6 per cent) 
was 3.4 times that of common crime (6.7 per cent). There were differences 
between the cities: in Hong Kong, respondents reported 2.3 times more non-
conventional crime than common crime, but in Xi’an, it was five times more. 
Figure 9.1 summarises prevalence rates for common crime and Figure 9.2, for 
non-conventional crime in each of the cities.
Across the sample, 343 respondents (6.7 per cent) mentioned one or several 
incidents of common crime (of nine canvassed such as burglary, theft, robbery 
or assault) and most were the victims of more than one of these offences. Hong 
Kong’s overall victimisation rate by common crime was higher than that of the 
mainland cities combined (8.3 per cent compared with 5.8 per cent). This higher 
rate, however, was largely due to a single crime—theft by customers—which 
was significantly more frequent in Hong Kong (3.1 per cent) than in the other 
cities (1 per cent) and was linked to Hong Kong’s higher proportion of retailers. If 
we exclude theft by customers, Shenzhen stands out as the city with the highest 
rates of common crime (about 8 per cent)—particularly robbery, vandalism and 
theft by employees and outsiders—while both Shanghai and Xi’an recorded 
lower levels (about 5 per cent). 
Figure 9.1 Prevalence of Common Crime in Four Chinese Cities 
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Businesses in Shenzhen were also at much higher risk of non-conventional crime 
(27.9 per cent) than those in Xi’an (25.3 per cent) and Hong Kong and Shanghai 
(19.5 per cent). Fraud was the most frequent type of economic crime reported by 
13.4 per cent of businesses, with a significantly higher proportion in Shenzhen 
(15.4 per cent) (Figure 9.2). Just over 6 per cent of respondents mentioned one 
or several incidents of bribery, but there was a large difference between Hong 
Kong (2.7 per cent) and the mainland (8 per cent). In Xi’an, bribery was just as 
likely to involve officials as members of other companies, but officials were least 
likely to be involved in Hong Kong where bribes were sought by managers and 
employees of other companies in four out of five incidents. Although Shenzhen 
businesses also reported a high level of bribery, this was less likely to involve 
officials than in Xi’an. We speculate that the higher level of bribery reported by 
Xi’an businesses arises from the dominance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
and the more recent commercialisation of its industry compared with Shanghai 
and Shenzhen. Extortion and intimidation were most common in Hong Kong 
and Shenzhen, and we attribute the relatively higher levels of such activities 
in both cities to the long-established activities of triad-related groups who 
capitalised upon the market for (illicit) protection on the opening up of the 
special economic zone in Shenzhen.
Intellectual property and copyright theft were reported by about 6 per cent of 
businesses, but this was significantly more of a problem in Shenzhen (9.1 per 
cent) and Xi’an (7.6 per cent) than in Shanghai (5.9 per cent) and particularly 
Hong Kong (3.5 per cent). The lack of follow-up questions on IP theft limited 
our ability to explore this offence, which is likely to have become more 
prevalent since 2004–05. In the absence of questions about foreign ownership 
or partnerships, it is not possible to assess whether foreign companies are at 
greater risk than local companies in respect to IP theft. The lower rate of IP theft 
in Hong Kong is, however, likely to reflect the stricter laws,1 as well as concerted 
efforts by customs and police to crack down on these offences. Combined with 
a well-funded private and public education program that employed popular 
film and music entertainers who stressed the impact of such theft on creative 
industries, the criminalisation of IP in Hong Kong has advanced more than in 
mainland China. 
1 See Hong Kong Copyright Ordinance (Cap 528) 1997 and subsequent amendments in 2007 that promoted 
corporate responsibility by holding directors liable.
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Figure 9.2 Prevalence of Non-Conventional Crime in Four Chinese Cities 
For the majority of the crimes we surveyed, the size of the company was the 
strongest predictor of victimisation. The prevalence of common crime was 
positively correlated with the size of companies, with the exception of theft by 
customers, which was significantly more likely to target small (retail) businesses. 
Larger businesses were also at higher risk of victimisation by non-conventional 
crime; however, the size of the business did not affect the likelihood of extortion, 
and smaller businesses had a higher prevalence of fraud by outsiders. 
Costs of Crime
For our businesses, the amount of direct monetary loss due to crime was 
significant.2 All offences of common crime cost US$3.74 million (in Hong Kong, 
US$1.53 million).3 In both Hong Kong and the mainland, the greatest amount of 
‘shrinkage’ due to common crime came from theft by employees, which totalled 
US$1.37 million or nearly 38 per cent of the total monetary loss. On top of these 
losses to common crime, the various types of fraud and IP infringement incurred 
2 Indirect costs from lost productivity and the administrative consequences of the crime (for example, 
reporting to police, filing insurance claims, and so on) are not included in any of our estimates. 
3 This is a conservative estimate because the calculation is based on different offences of common crime, 
but not multiple incidents of the same offence (the survey did not ask respondents about the frequency of 
victimisation by common crimes). In contrast, losses due to all incidents of fraud that occurred during the 
reference years are counted in the estimates.
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losses about four times larger than common crime and reached US$16.61 million. 
Again, this estimate is conservative because no data were collected with respect 
to monetary losses caused by bribery and extortion. Combining losses due 
to common crime and those due to non-conventional crime, we estimate that 
for our sample of 5117 Chinese businesses, monetary losses reached US$20.35 
million in one year. Bearing in mind the difference in per capita income and pay 
levels for workers between Hong Kong and mainland cities, the impact of such 
losses is significantly greater for mainland businesses.4
We know from the census that 296 249 companies were registered in Hong 
Kong in 2004 and can, therefore, extrapolate our estimates to the population 
of businesses (Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong 2006). Our sample 
of 1817 businesses represents approximately 0.61 per cent of all businesses in 
Hong Kong, but it includes more manufacturing and fewer retail businesses than 
indicated in the census. After weighting for these differences, we estimate that 
in 2004 Hong Kong businesses lost US$169.27 million to all offences of common 
crime. Using a similar procedure, we estimate that for the entire population 
of Hong Kong businesses, annual losses to non-conventional crime reached 
US$1.35 billion. Therefore, a conservative estimate of the cost of common and 
non-conventional crime to the Hong Kong business community was US$1.52 
billion in 2004. To place these losses in context, we can roughly compare them 
with a UK study of the impact of fraud conducted under the auspices of the 
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO). This study estimated that in 2005 
the direct cost of fraud (which included IP crime) for the whole of the United 
Kingdom was approximately £12.98 billion (US$23.2 billion). When broken 
down by sector, about £3.76 billion (US$6.73 billion) in losses came from the 
business sector, £2.75 billion (US$4.92 billion) from individuals, and £6.47 
billion (US$11.6 billion) from the public sector (Levi et al. 2007).5
The direct cost of crime for our sample of 3300 mainland businesses was about 
US$2.21 million for common crime and US$7.22 million for non-conventional 
crime. We cannot extrapolate these figures to the population of companies in 
Shanghai, Shenzhen and Xi’an because we do not have census data or estimates 
of the number of distinct businesses in these cities, as we have for Hong Kong. 
The 2006 China Statistical Yearbook states that across all sectors there were 
4 Although on a converging trend at about 2 per cent a year since the post-reform period (Lei and Yao 
2008), the income gap (either per capita or purchasing power parity) between Hong Kong and China remains 
substantial. Based on Table 1.1, the ratio of average annual income for employees varied from 12.5:1 for Hong 
Kong compared with Xi’an, through to 3.85:1 compared with Shanghai and 3.4:1 compared with Shenzhen. 
The purchasing power parity (PPP) ratio for Hong Kong to China as a whole is, however, nearly 6.5 to 1 (World 
Bank n.d.).
5 The conversion of British pounds to US dollars as of 30 June 2005 was US$1.79 per £1. Levi and Burrows 
(2008) also note a number of caveats and difficulties in making such estimates and have erred on the 
conservative side.
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582 977 businesses6 throughout China with income of CNY5 million or above. The 
Shanghai Municipal Statistical Bureau (2006) reported that 31 370 businesses with 
income of CNY5 million or more operated in the municipality (manufacturing, 
construction, wholesale and retail),7 but the number of businesses in the finance 
sector was not reported for 2005. In our survey, respondents were generally 
reluctant to report company income or annual turnover so we cannot estimate 
what proportion of our sample represents businesses with incomes above the 
threshold for inclusion in official statistics. According to recent sources, 90 per 
cent of approximately 43 million companies that operate in China are private 
and the number of private registered businesses grew at 30 per cent per annum 
between 2000 and 2009 (The Economist, 10 March 2011:13).8
It is unlikely that our mainland sample reflects the distribution of business by 
sector, income or workforce size in mainland China. In the absence of a known 
denominator for distinct businesses in our three mainland cities, we cannot 
extrapolate losses with great confidence. Based on the State Council’s National 
Economic Census (NBS 2005a) undertaken by the National Bureau of Statistics, 
we can, however, approximate the probable universe of secondary and tertiary 
enterprises in the three mainland cities. The scale of the census is indicative of 
the vast number of different kinds of non-agricultural enterprises that make up 
commercial business in China. The census contacted some five million legal units, 
seven million establishments and about 40 million self-employed individuals 
or privately owned enterprises and deployed three questionnaires depending 
on the kind of unit contacted: corporate, establishment/industry and self-
employed (Li 2006). We combine the number of corporate, industrial entities 
and private or self-employed businesses to estimate the population of business 
in our surveyed cities; however, our results must be treated with caution because 
we find contradictions in the available summaries and insufficient explanation 
in the available tables to determine precisely the counting and categorisation 
6 The 2006 China Statistical Yearbook describes the 2005 population of mainland companies as follows: 
manufacturing, 219 463; construction, 58 750; wholesale and retail, 177 629; food and hotel, 35 689; finance, 
82 453; and travel, 8993 (NBS 2006a).
7 The Shanghai data reported 14 769 manufacturing businesses, 2422 in construction, 4371 in wholesale and 
9788 in retail. The share of businesses that reached the income threshold had also grown by about 40 per cent 
across all sectors in the period 2005–09. 
8 The Economist cites Zheng Yumin, Secretary of the Commerce Department of Zhejiang, in relation to data 
possibly reflecting the 2009 census. The same report also estimates that private companies now contribute 
about 70 per cent of GDP and that the role of state-owned-enterprises, which once accounted for almost all 
business, has steadily declined since the 1980s. 
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rules.9 With these caveats in mind, we proceed to ‘guesstimate’ the proportion 
of the population of reported businesses (legal entities, establishments and 
privately owned) that our sample for each city represents.10
We calculate two estimates of the population of businesses in Shanghai, Shenzhen 
and Xi’an. The first likely overestimates the number of businesses; the second is 
more conservative. In the first estimate, we combine the number of businesses 
in the three categories—legal entities, establishments and privately owned—
which results in what we call the ‘maximum’ population (see Table 9.1 for the 
summary of the calculations). We suspect, however, that there is an overlap 
between legal entities and establishments and a number of businesses might 
be counted twice. Therefore, in the second estimate, we exclude legal entities 
and combine only establishments and privately owned businesses to obtain a 
population of businesses, which we call the ‘minimum’ population. Based on 
these maximum and minimum figures, our samples represent the following 
proportions of the total business population in each city: Shanghai, 0.102 to 
0.151 per cent; Shenzhen, 0.267 to 0.313 per cent; Xi’an, 0.337 to 0.380 per cent. 
From these approximations, we estimate the range of the monetary loss to the 
business community in each of the mainland cities. Across the three cities, we 
suggest that losses due to all crime totalled between US$4.17 and $5.61 billion 
and that about one-quarter of these losses were the result of common crime 
(that is, US$0.96–1.28 billion). Losses for Shanghai were the largest, ranging 
between US$2.45 and $3.61 billion, followed by Shenzhen, between US$1.20 
and $1.41 billion, and Xi’an, between US$0.52 and $0.59 billion. In short, 
our ‘guesstimate’ puts the overall annual business losses to crime in the three 
mainland cities altogether at a midpoint of about US$4.9 billion.
9 For example, the government press releases report different numbers for the entities in scope, so that 
contrary to Li (2006), 30 million rather than 40 million self-employed enterprises are noted. See Government 
of People’s Republic of China (2005).
10 For sources all retrieved on 18 May 2011, see for Shanghai: NBS (2005a); for Xi’an: NBS (2005d); for 
Shenzhen: NBS (2005b).
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Table 9.1 Estimates of Monetary Loss Due to Crime in Three Mainland 
Cities, 2005
Shanghai Shenzhen Xi’an
N business in 
ICBS sample 1112 1110 1078
Total monetary 
loss in ICBS 
sample, US$ 
million 3 .682 3 .755 1 .993
Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum
Population of 
businessesa 742 000 1 086 000 355 000 415 500 283 363 319 766
ICBS sample as 
a proportion of 
the population of 
businesses 0 .151% 0 .102% 0 .313% 0 .267% 0 .380% 0 .337%
Monetary loss 
for population of 
businesses,  
US$ billion 2 .45 3 .61 1 .20 1 .41 0 .52 0 .59
Average total 
monetary loss, 
US$ billion 3 .03 1 .30 0 .56
Notes: a Based on First National Economic Census (NBS 2005a) of secondary and tertiary enterprises; 
minimum number includes establishments and self-employed or privately owned enterprises; maximum 
number includes legal entities, establishments and self-employed or privately owned enterprises. 
These estimates show that losses due to crime were not negligible. How much 
of these losses was reported to the police, perhaps in the hope of recovering at 
least part of the money or having the perpetrator punished?
Reporting Crime and Satisfaction with Police 
There was more willingness by business to report common crimes than non-
conventional crimes, and mainland businesses were significantly more likely 
than those in Hong Kong to report both common and non-conventional crimes. 
In Hong Kong, of all incidents of common crime, 53.5 per cent were reported 
to the police compared with 79 per cent in the mainland. Across the cities, less 
than one-quarter of all incidents of non-conventional crime were reported: 19.1 
per cent in Hong Kong and 23.2 per cent in the mainland. Once again, large 
businesses were more likely to report crimes to police than small businesses. A 
possible explanation is that large companies have a wider exposure to risk and 
often have specialised security staff and policies mandating the reporting of 
crime to police. For the majority of respondents who did not report the crime 
to the police, it was because the incident was not serious enough or, for crime 
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by staff, because it was dealt with internally. Of those who did report, about 
half were satisfied with the police response and no significant differences were 
observed between the cities, but Xi’an businesses expressed the least satisfaction. 
Dissatisfaction was mostly due to the view that police did not do enough or 
lacked interest, followed by failure to catch the offender or recover property. In 
general, Hong Kong respondents were more positive about the police response 
than their mainland counterparts, especially in respect to bribery and theft by 
employees, but since they reported less often than in the mainland, they might 
have reported more serious incidents.
When asked about their general judgment about police efficacy in relation to 
the crime problems facing business in their area, about half the businesses 
were satisfied; however, experiences of victimisation negatively affected the 
perception of police effectiveness. As a result, Shenzhen respondents, who had 
higher risks of victimisation, had a significantly more negative view of police 
action in general.
Crime Prevention
Our survey shows that there is room for Chinese business to develop partnerships 
with police and local authorities in crime prevention since only about one in 
six companies had contact with police, local councils or government and were 
aware of cooperative action against crime (for example, joint security patrols, 
business watch groups, alarms/CCTV, and so on), and one in four was interested 
in participating in such cooperative activities. Victimised businesses were more 
interested in being involved in collective action, but were not necessarily more 
aware of crime-prevention activities. Hong Kong businesses were the least 
interested in cooperative action (20.7 per cent were) and Shenzhen businesses 
were the most interested (34.9 per cent). This is probably associated with the 
relative risks of crime in both cities. Larger companies were more aware of crime-
prevention initiatives and more interested in participating than smaller ones. 
They were also more likely to have had contact with police or local government 
about crime prevention, which is again probably due to their generally higher 
rate of victimisation. Given their economic weight, larger companies might be 
able to exert greater influence over crime-prevention policy and the deployment 
of police.
Perception of Crime Trends and Obstacles to Doing 
Good Business
Across the four cities, the majority of respondents (71.4 per cent) thought 
that crime levels had remained stable over the past two or three years, but, as 
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would be expected, those who had been victimised were more likely to say that 
crime had increased. Yet, despite their higher rate of victimisation, one-third 
of respondents in Shenzhen felt that crime levels had decreased. This finding 
supports Zhong (2009a) who reported that Shenzhen police had been more 
proactive and that crime rates had started to decline following a peak in 2003. 
Hong Kong respondents did not believe that bribery was common (only 6.5 per 
cent of Hong Kong businesses believed it was compared with an average of 14 
per cent in the mainland), but they estimated that extortion was more common 
than did mainland respondents.
Perceptions of obstacles to doing business—including crime and corruption but 
also other issues such as lack of consultation, taxes, and regulations in respect 
to labour, export/import and safety—provide a measure of the salience of crime 
and corruption as obstacles relative to other problems. Crime and corruption 
were ranked as important issues and often ahead of other problems such as 
labour and tax regulations. Overall, corruption was perceived as a moderate 
to serious obstacle by more than half of businesses (52 per cent), followed by 
crime and insecurity (49 per cent) and lack of consultation (42 per cent). Lack of 
government consultation with business was at the forefront of obstacles faced 
by Hong Kong respondents, followed by crime and insecurity. In contrast, 
among mainland businesses, corruption was ranked first, followed by crime and 
insecurity, and lack of consultation with business. Respondents in Shenzhen 
were the most concerned by crime and insecurity (57 per cent) and those in 
Shanghai (27 per cent) were the least concerned, which is consistent with 
Shenzhen’s higher risk of crime. Generally, Hong Kong businesses were more 
negative than mainland businesses about most issues. A striking finding was 
that the impact of crime victimisation tended to taint perceptions negatively not 
only about crime and insecurity but across all the potential obstacles. 
Comparisons with Other Surveys
Rates of common crime victimisation were considerably lower in China than 
in both Western and Eastern Europe. The Central Eastern Europe ICBS (1999) 
found that overall 27 per cent (compared with 6.7 per cent in China) of 
businesses had been the victims of common crimes, but as in China, the risk 
there was greater for larger businesses. The 1994 sweep of the ICBS revealed 
that businesses in Western Europe and Australia were up to 10 times more 
likely than Chinese businesses to be victimised by common crime. Lower rates 
of common crime were also recorded in the China ICBS than in the Nigerian 
CCBS. Comparisons with the UNICVS are consistent with previous research and 
show that businesses were at much greater risk of break and enter or burglary 
offences than households. The relative risks of vehicle-related theft and robbery 
were similar for businesses and households, but the risks of assault were almost 
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double for individuals than for those in business. As with common crime, risks 
of fraud were lower in China than in Western Europe, Eastern Europe and 
Nigeria. Incidents of bribery and extortion, however, were more frequent in 
China than in Western Europe and Australia, but less frequent than in Eastern 
Europe. The prevalence of crime against business in mainland China was also 
lower than in the emerging economies of Brazil, Russia and India.
In short, China’s transition has not been overly burdened with runaway crime 
and corruption, although both of these ‘distortions’ (or side effects of major 
economic restructuring) are capable of disrupting economies. In this snapshot 
of crimes against business, the rate of crime reported by Chinese business was 
relatively modest compared with other transitional economies. The fact that this 
transition was planned (Messner et al. 2007a) and the ideological importance 
of order and stability supported by authoritarian forms of campaign policing 
might have contributed to the containment of common crime. In Shenzhen, 
however, runaway crime and corruption have been grave enough to threaten 
the capture of key institutions in the municipality. The presumed crime-control 
benefits of the long-established ‘rule of law’ in Hong Kong when compared with 
the mainland cities was neither as dramatic nor as consistent in respect to crime 
against business as we might have originally assumed.
All the business surveys we considered showed similar reporting patterns to 
the China ICBS. Chinese respondents, however, especially in the mainland, were 
much more likely to report to police than Central Eastern European businesses. 
Reporting rates were broadly similar in Western nations and in China. Yet, we 
found that businesses (in Hong Kong and mainland cities) were much more 
likely to report burglary, vehicle-related theft, robbery and assault than Hong 
Kong households or for that matter the average households in all the 33 capital 
cities surveyed by the UNICVS.
Theoretical Perspectives
In the Introduction, we outlined some of the theories that have been used to 
explain trends in crime in transitional economies. We suggest that these theories, 
applied at three distinct but related levels of analysis—macro, meso and micro—
adequately explain our data. At the macro level, we draw from Durkheim’s 
notion of anomie, Shelley’s perspective on modernisation and urbanisation, and 
Messner et al.’s concepts of institutional anomie and planned transition. At the 
meso level, we draw from Cohen et al.’s (1980) and Clarke’s (1997) opportunity 
theory, and at the micro level, from Felson’s routine-activity approach. 
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Macro Level
The data from the ICBS provide a snapshot of the extent and nature of crime 
against business, but on their own do not permit us to analyse changes over 
time and test either Durkheim’s perspective on anomie or Shelley’s perspective 
on modernisation. The literature on crime in China, however, which has shown 
that crime levels have risen over the past 40 years since the economic reforms, is 
congruent with Durkheim’s association of crime rise with rapid and significant 
societal change. The fact that economic crime in the form of non-conventional 
crime rose at a much faster rate than common or street crime (Dutton 2006; 
Keith and Li 2006; Liu 2005) supports Shelley’s hypothesis about the growth of 
property crime associated with modernisation and urbanisation. Our data show 
that across the four Chinese cities business victimisation by non-conventional 
crime was more frequent than victimisation by common crime, which included 
both property and violent offences. This was also the case in Eastern Europe but 
not in Western Europe and Australia where an opposite pattern was observed. 
Although van Dijk and Terlouw (1996) in their European survey did not report 
the combined rate for each type of crime, we can use the highest rate of common 
crime (theft by customers, reported by 59.7 per cent of respondents) as a proxy 
for common crime and sum up the rates of fraud by outsiders and employees 
(25.2 per cent) as a proxy for non-conventional crime. If we divide the rate 
of non-conventional crime by that of common crime, we find a ratio of 0.42 
(that is, the rate of non-conventional crime was more than half that of common 
crime). The Eastern Europe ICBS found a total rate of common crime of 27 per 
cent. Again, summing up the rates of fraud by employees and by outsiders (38 
per cent), we find that the rate of non-conventional crime was 1.4 times that of 
common crime. The same process produces a ratio of 1.8 for the whole Chinese 
sample. 
These differential ratios between non-conventional and common crime in long-
established Western market economies compared with societies that only recently 
moved from command-and-control to market economies support Durkheim’s 
concept of anomie related to changes in values. In both mainland China and 
Eastern Europe—although the change has been more abrupt in the latter—the 
communist values associated with a command-and-control economy and the 
virtue of collective property have been replaced with new values supporting a 
market economy, private property and the pursuit of individual wealth. Both 
common and non-conventional crimes have increased, but the anomic effect 
has predominantly affected economic values so that economic crimes have risen 
more sharply, and represent a large proportion of crimes against business. In 
contrast, in ‘old’ Western capitalist economies, which experienced changes in 
(economic) values in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the initial rise 
in economic crime has now stabilised to a level where non-conventional crime 
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represents only a fraction of the total amount of crime. Of course, related factors, 
discussed below, such as the presence of stronger commercial regulatory and 
enforcement frameworks in Western countries, affect the ratio between common 
and non-conventional crimes.
Some differences in the ratio of non-conventional to common crimes are 
observed between the four Chinese cities: in Hong Kong and Shanghai, fraud 
was 1.6 times more frequent than common crime; in Shenzhen, 1.7 times; and 
in Xi’an, 2.3 times. Although Hong Kong has run a capitalist economy based 
on the free market for a long time, its common/non-conventional crime ratio 
is relatively similar to that of the other cities. Much of Hong Kong’s economic 
activity, however, occurs with the mainland, with many entrepreneurs on both 
sides of the border running cross-border operations; therefore, mainland anomic 
effects are likely to have an impact. In Xi’an, the rate of fraud is 2.3 times that 
of common crime, which is consistent with a more recent breakdown in the old 
collective values of economic order and a rise in anomie; Xi’an is probably the 
city currently experiencing the transition from old to new values and resulting 
anomie more strongly than Shenzhen and Shanghai. It is a traditional stronghold 
of the Communist Party, with a high proportion of SOEs and has only recently 
opened to foreign investment and global trade. Both the new economic values 
and business structures would increase licit and illicit commercial opportunities 
that Mertonian ‘innovators’, from the public and private sectors, seize by 
embracing the new slogan that ‘being rich is glorious’.
Shelley (1981) argues that modernisation and urbanisation involve large-scale 
migrations from rural to urban areas, which in turn leads to a rise in violent 
and property crime because opportunities for property crime increase and 
traditional rural violence is transported to urban areas. In time, when rural 
migrants settle in their urban lifestyle, violent crime decreases but not property 
crime and what remains of violent crime is essentially acquisitive (for example, 
robbery). In the mainland cities, particularly Shenzhen, the ‘floating population’ 
of rural migrants has been linked to increases in street crime. In Shenzhen—
Deng Xiaoping’s laboratory for ‘market socialism’—the rate of urbanisation 
and industrialisation has been phenomenal: from a fishing village of 30 000 
inhabitants in 1979, it had grown to a commercial and industrial centre of 
8.28 million by 2005. The population growth has been fuelled by the influx 
of unregistered rural workers from China’s interior attracted by the prospect 
of low-skilled jobs in the city. Official crime data for Shenzhen presented by 
Zhong (2009a) show not only a general increase in crime since 1980, but also 
that the nature of crimes has changed. In the recent period, economic crimes in 
Shenzhen represent a higher share of the total burden of crime and the share of 
non-acquisitive violent crimes has diminished. For example, in 1981, homicide 
represented 1.1 per cent of all reported crimes and rape 3.5 per cent. By 2006, 
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homicide was only 0.4 per cent of all crimes and rape 0.7 per cent. The share of 
robbery (acquisitive violent crime) went up from 2.5 per cent in 1981 to 6.7 per 
cent in 2006, and the share of grand larceny (that is, theft valued at more than 
US$370) grew from a low 1.9 per cent in 1981 to 23.1 in 2006. These trends are 
consistent with Shelley’s hypothesis about the impact of early and later stages of 
urbanisation on crime patterns. The overall volume of all crimes has increased in 
Shenzhen, but non-acquisitive violent crime has slowed and plateaued after 30 
years of urbanisation and modernisation, while property crime has continued 
to rise. 
Results from the ICBS in Shenzhen add further support for Shelley’s argument. 
Shenzhen recorded higher levels of violent crimes against business (robbery, 
assault and extortion/intimidation) as well as theft by employees and outsiders, 
vehicle theft, vandalism, fraud and IP infringement than the other cities. Rapid 
urbanisation, which in Shenzhen was characterised by a dramatic growth 
in business and commercial activity and attracted a large number of peasant 
workers bringing their ‘rural manners’ and traditional violence to the city, 
has resulted in a higher rate of violent crimes against business. Shanghai and 
Xi’an have long been urbanised, and they have also experienced a growth in 
commercial activity and an influx of rural workers, but not to the same extent 
as Shenzhen. In addition, Shenzhen was the first mainland city to engage in 
‘market socialism’ and served as an experimental ground from which other 
modernising Chinese cities have been able to learn what not to do, especially in 
respect to the key issue of political stability. Yet, even though Shenzhen had to 
contend with both the Durkheimian anomic consequences of modernisation and 
the effects of urbanisation hypothesised by Shelley, the rates of crime against 
business are lower than those recorded in Western Europe in 1994 (van Dijk and 
Terlouw 1996) and in Central Eastern Europe in 1999 (Alvazzi del Frate 2004). 
This important finding suggests that other mechanisms have acted as buffers 
against the criminogenic impact of rapid modernisation and urbanisation.
Messner (1982) argued that in times of rapid change, a lag between socioeconomic 
transformations and institutional adaptations to these transformations 
(institutional anomie) was likely, and as the experience of the former Soviet 
Union has demonstrated, this could even lead to total institutional collapse. On 
the other hand, he and his colleagues (Messner et al. 2007a) also proposed that 
institutional collapse could be avoided when the economic and social transitions 
were planned and managed by a strong authoritarian state such as the PRC. 
The ICBS data illustrate both aspects of Messner et al.’s argument. Shenzhen 
stands out as the city that has generally experienced higher levels of crime 
than other cities in our survey, and thus also stands out as the ‘litmus test’ 
of the institutional anomie theory. In Shenzhen, institutional anomie occurred 
during the city’s phenomenal expansion: while hundreds of thousands of rural 
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migrants constructed and laboured in Shenzhen’s newly established factories, 
the hukou system failed to provide adequate social services or basic social 
security to the huge ‘floating’ population. Police resources and regulatory 
reforms increased at a much slower pace than the population and the changes 
brought about by market socialism, and were unable to cope with the soaring 
rate of violent and property crime and the associated triad-related groups who 
had extended their activities from Hong Kong and Taiwan to Shenzhen. Despite 
several strike-hard anti-crime campaigns, the effectiveness of the police was 
limited by ‘technical’ deficiencies and compromised by high-level corruption in 
its own ranks and among other officials. The prevalence of most of the common 
and non-conventional crimes was higher in Shenzhen than in the other cities we 
surveyed. Extortion and intimidation were on par with Hong Kong and likely 
due to the same perpetrators. 
Yet, if we compare the rates of crime against business in Shenzhen with those 
of both the ‘old’ stable Western countries and transitional Eastern European 
countries, we find that Shenzhen has a lower prevalence of both common and 
economic crimes. In addition, the majority of Shenzhen’s respondents seemed 
confident that crime problems had stabilised and one-third thought things had 
started to improve and crime was diminishing. These findings do not suggest 
that an institutional collapse has occurred, but rather that if social and policing 
institutions had been slow to come to grips with Shenzhen’s experimentation 
in unregulated marketisation, they are now catching up. Across the three 
mainland cities, the prevalence of crime, particularly common crime, is lower 
than elsewhere in the world for which comparable data are available. The 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers Global Economic Crime Survey also indicated that 
fraud against business was less frequent in mainland China than in the new 
economies of Brazil, India and Russia. While the marketisation of the Russian 
economy has been mostly unregulated and apparently infiltrated by criminal 
organisations, the democracies of Brazil and India (following Nehru’s legacy) 
have been able to plan, steer and regulate their growing economies, but not to 
the extent of the Chinese Government. 
Consistent with Messner et al.’s (2007a) notion that an interplay of ‘master 
forces’ (forces of change) and ‘pathway forces’ (forces of control) helps to 
maintain a relatively effective framework of formal and informal social-control 
mechanisms, our survey suggests that the strong authoritarian Chinese state has 
been successful (most of the time) in curbing institutional anomie. Nevertheless, 
the much higher prevalence of non-conventional crime compared with common 
crime in the ICBS points to some deficiencies in fighting large-scale economic 
crime and coordinating public and private security services. This finding and 
interpretation are consistent with Trevaskes’s (2010a) argument that the Chinese 
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Government, through its periodic hard-hitting yanda,11 has kept common crime 
to low levels, but, we suggest, at the expense of non-conventional crime. 
Here, institutional anomie—in the sense of lagging institutional reforms in the 
presence of new challenges—might have manifested in the absence of policing 
apparatus specialised in economic crime. If a strong authoritarian state is, on the 
one hand, more capable of controlling institutional anomie than a weak state, on 
the other hand, the absence of independent oversight and checks and balances 
can facilitate corrupt practices by party members and officials, particularly in 
SOEs. For example, corruption was more frequently reported in the mainland 
than in Hong Kong, and especially in Xi’an where state-owned businesses and 
traditional party control are still prevalent.
Our reading of the survey results suggests that current countermeasures and 
policies aimed at mitigating crime against business have failed. Although 
public police have been able to contain common or street crime, they have 
not yet transformed into policing agencies with a capacity to differentiate 
between kinds of criminals and common and economic crimes, and to focus 
on crimes against business, which are both highly attractive to a new breed 
of criminals and harmful to society. The lag in implementing crime-proofing 
strategies, especially by large businesses that are at greater risk of victimisation, 
is apparent in their slow adoption (in terms of competence and effectiveness) of 
private security. In short, identifying the ‘new enemies of the state’ has become 
much harder than in the past when simple categories—class enemies, ‘rightists’, 
feudal remnants and the like—could be readily distinguished and demonised. 
Economic criminals, it seems, are hard to distinguish from valued entrepreneurs, 
business leaders and officials of SOEs who gamble with venture capitalists and 
fall for fanciful and fraudulent innovators. 
Meso and Micro Levels
Independent of the criminogenic impact of modernisation and urbanisation 
observed by Durkheim and Shelley, the growth in economic activities and 
consumerism also increases opportunities for property crime. As Cohen et al.’s 
(1980) opportunity theory argued, based on the trends in property crime in 
post–World War II North America, economic development and the availability 
of consumer goods led to an increase in property crime. The opening up of 
the Chinese economy and the implantation of new commerce and industries 
have produced both an increase in consumer goods (more opportunities for 
common crime) and an increase in business and commercial activities (more 
11 A Chinese word meaning ‘strike-hard’, referring to campaign-style policing.
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opportunities for non-conventional crime). In this medium-range theoretical 
perspective, larger businesses are more at risk of victimisation because they 
offer more attractive targets than smaller ones.
Related to opportunity theory but at a more micro level of interpretation, our 
analysis of the risk factors supports our introductory proposition that routine 
activity theory is relevant because the criminogenic elements highlighted by the 
theory—criminal opportunity, absence of competent guardianship and target 
attractiveness—are the key drivers of risk of victimisation for business. Chinese 
businesses thus suffer similar risks to those found elsewhere and could benefit 
from many of the measures recommended by situational crime-prevention 
approaches. Hardening attractive targets (making them more difficult to steal or 
trade in illegal markets) and improving the effectiveness of capable guardians 
both actual and virtual (for example, by increasing the capacity of police to ‘catch 
and convict’ and improving regulatory frameworks) can reduce the risk of theft 
and fraud. For example, we found that businesses located in serviced buildings, 
which offer a higher level of security, suffered relatively less victimisation than 
those located in shopping areas. The role of prevention is recognised by business 
and is reflected in the rapid growth of private security and guarding services 
in China, but their coordination and utilisation could be improved. The recent 
demise of campaign-style policing and the shift to a prevention focus rather 
than reliance on crude general deterrence and brutalising punishments will also 
help in redefining what constitutes serious harm (for example, Bakken 2004; 
Trevaskes 2010a, 2010b). If these changes release police resources for greater 
specialisation in complex crime such as fraud and enable better crime proofing 
of SOEs and other businesses then the costs of serious fraud, IP crime and 
corruption might be contained. Large-scale businesses usually make investments 
in crime prevention to protect assets and prevent theft. Smaller businesses 
have fewer resources and can be more vulnerable, even if they constitute less 
attractive targets than larger businesses. Collective action by businesses in 
concert with public police to develop effective countermeasures is vital and can 
help minimise the problem of crime displacement. Displacement of crime occurs 
when an industry or business in a particular location takes steps to minimise 
the risk of crime, often by increasing the role of guardians and reducing the 
opportunities for theft, but in doing so makes other businesses who invest less 
in crime prevention (by choice or circumstance) more vulnerable.
Limitations and Development of the Protocol
Our study was the first attempt at measuring the prevalence of crimes against 
business in China, and a good deal has been learned about how to make the 
ICBS a more effective instrument. In hindsight, our experience suggests that 
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reducing the number of questions about the business itself—especially whether 
it was foreign owned, a joint enterprise or an enterprise involved in export/
import—had implications for our interpretation of some forms of fraud, and 
might represent a crucial distinction for risks of IP crimes. Our failure to ask 
whether or not the business was an SOE was also an omission we later found 
frustrating; manufacturing, science-based and extraction businesses are often 
SOEs in mainland China and their extent varies across cities and provinces.12 
It is probable that SOEs are more likely to report crime and to be victimised in 
different ways than private commercial operations and that this status impacts 
on their attitudes to obstacles such as corruption. In addition, our standpoint 
was overly Hong Kong oriented and we should have asked questions about 
mainland businesses that were operating in Hong Kong because they might face 
equal if not greater risks than Hong Kong businesses operating in the mainland. 
We did ask Hong Kong businesses about the obstacles they faced operating in 
the mainland, but we did not ask the one in eight mainland businesses operating 
in Hong Kong what obstacles they faced in Hong Kong.
We consider that the current design fully stretches the capacity of telephone 
interviews and we think that face-to-face interviews might be the only way to 
achieve further depth and reliability. A related problem was the failure to enlist 
more business managers and to entice more businesses to participate, and this 
reflects the limitations of telephone-contact methods. Revision of the protocol 
should help to reduce overall respondent burden, and the possibility of using a 
split-sample procedure (that is, two versions of the questionnaire each covering 
the same core questions but sharing fewer questions from the list of crimes) 
could be considered for cities such as Hong Kong and Shanghai where survey 
fatigue might be more of an issue. 
A large-scale victimisation survey provides a tool for theoretical analyses 
and comparative examination of potential risk factors and opportunities for 
prevention, but is meaningful only if it is reasonably representative of the 
population of interest. We were hampered by incomplete census data about the 
number and nature of the business/enterprise population in mainland China. 
With a clearer idea of the population of businesses, we would have been able to 
stratify our sample (for example, by sector, size and income) and produce a more 
representative survey. Sampling options were tested in the pilot surveys, and in 
Hong Kong randomly dialling telephone numbers from the Yellow Pages (that is, 
a commercial business telephone directory) yielded a satisfactory distribution of 
12 The National Economic Census released in 2005 reported that the proportion of SOEs among all businesses 
was 7.5 per cent, but it increased to 24.6 per cent if collective enterprises (those that are owned as cooperatives 
or joint state/collective entities) are included. The proportion of SOEs also varied across the cities, with 27 per 
cent of Shanghai businesses estimated to be SOEs compared with (provincial data in the absence of city data) 
55 per cent of businesses in Shanxi (Xi’an) and 30 per cent of business in Guangdong (Shenzhen).
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broadly defined business activity compared with the official data about business 
size and sector. In the case of mainland cities, we also used the available business 
telephone directories but were not able to assess representativeness. 
The main challenge for surveys of crimes against business is to increase 
participation while retaining a comprehensive picture of the crimes encountered. 
The literature notes that business crime surveys report generally lower response 
rates than omnibus victim surveys (for example, KPMG Forensic 2003; Smith 
and Urbas 2002; Taylor 2002; van Dijk and Terlouw 1996).13 Overall, the 
completed response rate in our survey was 28 per cent, and well below our 
initial expectations, with a further 12 per cent who only partially completed 
the questionnaires. Thus, 2110 businesses that we contacted withdrew at 
some point during the interview, often stressing time constraints. Although 
partially completed surveys usually included all the obstacle questions but 
not the victimisation questions, we chose not to include such data because we 
thought victimisation was likely to be a key factor in both attitudes to crime 
and obstacles to business. The 18 per cent response rate for Hong Kong was well 
below the 2003 pilot survey response rate of 28 per cent,14 and this might be 
due to the problem of survey fatigue. In Hong Kong, official, marketing-based 
or industry-linked surveys are increasingly conducted and there are generally 
no restrictions on them. Early in the process, we realised that prearranged 
interviews were a useful option and we made additional call-back and ‘booked’ 
interviews, which helped increase response rates to about 41 per cent across 
the mainland cities. In addition, 17 per cent of mainland contacts partially 
completed the questionnaires, which suggests that the demanding nature of 
the survey was a significant factor in depressing the response rate. Shenzhen 
produced the highest response rate, of 54 per cent (with a further 18 per cent 
partial completion), followed by Xian with 39 per cent (and 19 per cent partially 
completed) and Shanghai, 34 per cent (plus 14 per cent partially completed). We 
have argued that differential response rates might reflect the salience of the crime 
issue; Shenzhen’s high response rate and Hong Kong’s low response rate are 
entirely consistent with these cities’ relative experience of crime victimisation.
Hopkins (2002) analysed the results of major surveys conducted in the United 
Kingdom and remarked that categorising the companies surveyed into broad 
business sectors (for example, retail, manufacturing) can be misleading because 
specific types of businesses within the same broad sectorial categorisation might 
be more prone to certain types of crime than others. For example, in the United 
Kingdom, off-licence premises and hardware stores were more likely to be 
13 A large-scale survey of selected crimes against business conducted by KPMG Forensic (2003) yielded an 
effective response rate of 18 per cent but drew upon its client base to boost the response rate.
14 Note that in the small pilot for Shenzhen, 35 per cent of contacts responded fully and a further 8 per cent 
indicated that they would be willing to undertake a booked interview.
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burgled than other retail shops. If sample size permits, it would be better to use 
a great number of discrete categories, which can then be combined if required. 
Alternatively, qualitative questions about the nature of the business might help 
to better describe it. A self-description of the business would provide functional 
criteria to better categorise businesses (better identification of types of retail 
or trading operations such as different types of shops, hotels, tourist/travel 
services; catering; entertainment; social welfare/community-oriented business) 
and thus yield the specificity suggested by Taylor, and with it the detailed 
information necessary to improve police responses and crime prevention. In the 
ICBS, the question about the business sector of activity should be replaced with 
the original two-part question that seeks first to identify a single main sector 
then follows up with a question about involvement in other sectors. There was 
also confusion between sector of activity and type of business operation (as in 
headquarters, branch, and so on). Because a further question asked whether the 
business was a branch in a chain, it would have been better to first query the 
sector (for example, manufacturing, retail, and so on) and then ask whether it 
was a shop, headquarters, factory, logistics operation, and so on. It also might 
be more effective to canvass different questions for different business sectors—
for example, customer theft will be prevalent in retail but not so much in other 
sectors. 
Further development of the new questions introduced in the survey and relating 
to IP infringement, cyber crime and credit-card fraud is needed. Surveying the 
prevalence of IP theft was an important addition since it is a growing source of 
concern, according to the more recent industry surveys (Economist Intelligence 
Unit 2010; PWC 2007a, 2009), and its costs were significant for our respondents; 
however, the lack of follow-up questions was an omission that arose from an 
underestimation of the scale of IP crime in China. Intellectual property theft 
should be included as a non-conventional crime (rather than a common crime) 
so in-depth questions can be asked about monetary losses, reporting to police 
and police response.
Cyber crime questions did not work well in part because they were borrowed 
from the Hong Kong UNICVS and were originally designed for individuals. 
Whatever advantages a comparison between business and household might bring 
were outweighed in our view by the poor fit to computer-security incidents in 
large companies and the growing role of e-commerce. First, there was confusion 
with the filtering questions in respect to cyber crime: 1) do you have access to 
a computer; 2) is it connected to the Internet? Many respondents said yes to 
the first question and no to the second, but then reported cyber victimisation 
that could happen only if they were connected to the Internet (for example, 
spam via email or fraud while purchasing online). The first question regarding 
access to a computer was redundant. There should be only one question—‘in 
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your business activities, do you use the Internet?’—with follow-up cyber crime 
questions then asked to those who answer yes. More importantly, apart from 
Internet fraud, the questions addressed relatively minor crimes, which occur 
frequently and do not specifically target businesses (for example, spamming). 
For example, the Hong Kong UNICVS found that 48.8 per cent of Hong Kong 
respondents had been victims of malicious attacks on their computer, and 40.6 
per cent had received unwanted communication. It is unlikely that respondents 
will be aware of all such incidents that occurred in their company. They are 
likely to report incidents that happened to them personally, rather than give a 
complete picture of cyber victimisation for the whole company. 
Questions concerning the types of cyber attacks were too technical for this 
survey. It is doubtful that many respondents, except perhaps systems or 
computer specialists, knew the difference between virus, malware and adware. It 
was enough to ask about viruses or malware in general—that is, something alien 
that disrupts or prevents the computer from working. As Richards (2009) notes, 
distinguishing technical failures from criminal acts and recognising how identity 
fraud in turn might be used to commit online fraud are complex matters even 
for experts. Cyber crime also raises the complex issues of multiple victimisations 
and the overlapping nature of crimes against business and crime by business 
especially in the e-commerce setting since in some cases both can take place in 
the same event. For example, Alibaba, China’s eBay-like e-commerce platform, 
fell victim to an internal scam based on the integrity of its endorsement of the 
‘China Gold Supplier’ platform, which assured buyers of honest transactions by 
trustworthy sellers (traders paid fees for independent verification, which was 
in some cases dubiously acquired). The ‘golden status’ was a mark of supposed 
integrity, but 2236 ‘gold’ dealers subsequently defrauded buyers, some of whom 
were other business, costing the company US$1.7 million in compensation to 
2249 buyers. The average compensation claim from victims of the scam was 
about US$1200 in 2009—similar to the average losses reported by the businesses 
who had been the victims of cyber crime in our survey (The Economist 2011a). 
Questions about cyber crime needed to be more specific to a business context—
that is, hacking the business network system, spamming using the business’s 
domain email address, shutting a web site down, the use of ‘botnets’, phishing 
and so on, but again these are quite technical concepts. Choo (2011) notes that 
some sectors might be at more risk of insider misuse and fraud, but knowledge 
about such events is dependent on a capacity to detect computer security 
breaches. Our experience with introducing questions on cyber crime in the 
ICBS suggests that the amount of information gathered from these questions 
was not worth the additional respondent burden. We conclude that measuring 
both the prevalence of cyber crime and assessing related risk factors would be 
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best served by a specialist survey, targeted at systems and security managers, 
rather than an omnibus survey (for example, see Richards 2009; Richards and 
Davis 2010).15
In addition, the inclusion of cyber crime items forced us to omit other questions, 
which, in hindsight, were important. For example, some of the original follow-
up questions on bribery—deleted from the China ICBS—inquired about the 
amounts actually paid and the role of secret commissions. In the context of 
China, these questions were highly relevant. Questions on bribery also should 
distinguish between cases where managers or employees receive bribes to do 
something for someone outside the company and cases where the company is 
asked for bribes to get something done or obtain a contract with the Government 
or another business. So the lead question (that is, did anyone try to bribe you, 
other managers, your employees, or obtain bribes from the company in relation 
to its activities) requires broader probing than is provided currently by the 
follow-up questions, which addressed only the case where the company was 
asked to pay a bribe to get something. 
Although the CATI system allowed for the text entry of additional comments 
made by respondents, there was a lack of attention to the recording of any 
additional information that respondents gave when opting to choose ‘other 
reasons’. Often the follow-up probes appeared to have been neglected, perhaps 
due to the pressure by interviewees to curtail the survey. A good example 
of this was in respect to the question about who actually extorted business; 
here further details of what constituted the ‘others’ category would have been 
helpful. Another instance of the need for further details was in relation to 
reasons for reporting or not reporting to police. The original research design 
included the intention to undertake face-to-face follow-up interviews of the 
respondents who reported extortion and bribery; however, funding limitations 
did not permit such follow-ups. These follow-up interviews would have been 
a valuable addition providing a clearer idea of the situational risks faced by 
businesses and helping to better understand the impact of organised crime. The 
questions about cooperation and crime prevention were too general, although 
the survey showed that there is ample scope to develop collective responses. In 
this respect, we suggest adding a question on whether businesses engaged their 
own security guards or employed a corporate or private security service.
15 The Australian business telephone survey of computer crime reported by Richards (2009) achieved a 29 
per cent response rate (N = 4000 business) and reported that 20 per cent of businesses detected at least one 
computer security incident in a one-year period (financial year 2006–07). The mean loss from these incidents 
was A$4467, with larger businesses more at risk, but significant differences between sectors were not observed 
and only 8 per cent reported incidents to the police. Expenditure on computer security and sector (except the 
financial sector) were not related to the detection of computer security incidents but the number of employees 
and whether security was outsourced were relevant to detection (Richards and Davis 2010).
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Surveys such as the ICBS provide tools to further the study of comparative 
criminology, which is increasingly relevant in a globalised world. We hope that 
this work will stand as a benchmark for further surveys and that the challenges 
we have identified offer some guidance to those that might follow.
Conclusion 
This survey enhanced our understanding of the nature of crimes against 
business, and their impact on business costs and confidence in China. We 
observed the extent and tolerance by businesses of crime and corruption, but 
also the high level of concern expressed by respondents about the impact of 
crime on business. This study enabled comparison of the crime risk of business 
relative to market development and the effectiveness of law enforcement, and 
could lead to improved crime-prevention practices and policies. In our view, the 
development of crime-prevention partnerships between business and police can 
have a significant impact on crime reduction and diminish the perceived and 
observed risks of crime and bribery. 
An important element in crime prevention is to promote collective action by 
victims and potential victims in concert with police often in partnership with 
industry or business-sector associations. A key criterion for collective action 
is informing others about the crime and usually that requires reporting the 
event to police. A significant proportion of crimes against business, however, 
including relatively serious crime, are not reported to police. An exception is 
the case of vehicle theft where mandatory insurance is required and insurers 
will deal only with claims reported to police. Without the lifeblood of such 
information to police, follow-up action to identify the frequency of different 
types of crime (and/or criminals) and, in particular, the methods that the offender 
used to complete the crime is hampered. Without knowledge of the nature, 
frequency and location of crime, prevention strategies and countermeasures 
are compromised. As our survey shows, the willingness of businesses to report 
crime to police varies substantially by type of crime, business sector, location 
and size. We noted that mainland businesses had high rates of reporting of 
common crime (those clearly targeted by yanda) compared with Hong Kong and 
the ‘old’ democracies of the West, but this did not extend to fraud and other 
non-conventional crimes. In this sense, Chinese businesses tended to share the 
same scepticism about the utility of public policing as elsewhere—namely, that 
often police could do little or would not be interested. 
The survey results raise more general questions—in particular, about the oft-
quoted assumption that the ‘rule of law’ provides an advantageous context for 
business, and enables some evaluation of policing and efforts to curb corruption. 
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Given the very large differences between Hong Kong and the other cities in China 
on the World Bank’s governance indicators,16 we expected that there would 
also be large differences in crime victimisation and that Hong Kong, because of 
its rule-of-law advantage, would have a lower risk of crimes against business. 
Apart from the lower level of bribery reported in Hong Kong, however, overall 
differences between Hong Kong and the mainland were relatively modest. 
Indeed the size of the business—irrespective of where it was located—was the 
most important predictor of crime risk. Furthermore, the greater propensity 
of mainland businesses to report both common and non-conventional offences 
(albeit to a lesser extent) to police compared with Hong Kong would suggest, 
on the surface at least, that they too have a high degree of confidence in police. 
It is possible that the higher reporting rates in the mainland partly reflect the 
extent that many businesses are state owned and their discretion to report 
or not might be limited. This being said, it also suggests that the association 
between effective legal and law-enforcement institutions and a successful 
climate for business is sufficiently functional in contemporary China to provide 
the social order and predictability necessary for the expression of capitalist 
markets. Thus, the assumption that the British legacy of a ‘rule of law’ culture 
provides a substantial commercial (competitive) advantage for Hong Kong might 
be exaggerated, at least in the context of risks of crimes against business. This 
exaggerated assumption might stem from an underestimation of the rapid 
development of commercial and contract law in China, especially in practice 
in Shanghai—the commercial hub of China, where business activity has been 
the engine of its economic revival. Yet, it is also clear that Hong Kong has been 
able to curb bribery among both officials and businesses to a much greater 
extent than mainland Chinese cities. Given the concern about corruption among 
businesses in China, Hong Kong’s reputation for clean and effective government 
is a credible example of what can be achieved. As noted in the Introduction, 
however, in practice, clean governance might not provide the arch advantage 
supposed, and collusion with powerful officials might actually make business 
sense if indeed competitors also seek ‘under the table’ assistance.
This study has hopefully enlarged, however modestly, the still too limited 
picture of attitudes to or perceptions of crime and corruption among businesses 
in China and contributed to the small body of studies that addresses public 
perceptions about crime and its salience compared with other issues. It was 
intriguing to see that in the National Sense of Security survey, the fear of crime 
in mainland households—which had grown from one in five in the late 1980s to 
16 On all six World Bank measures of good governance, Hong Kong substantially exceeds mainland China. 
For example, in 2005 in Hong Kong for the variable ‘control of corruption’, the value was 1.8 compared 
with –0.74 for China; ‘rule of law’, 1.56 versus –0.42; ‘regulatory quality’, 1.88 versus –0.20; ‘government 
effectiveness’, 1.57 versus –0.21; political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, 1.11 versus –0.36; 
and ‘voice and accountability’, 0.6 versus –1.52 (the scale varies from –2.5 to 2.5) (for further details, see 
Appendix A; World Bank n.d.).
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one in two in the early 1990s (at the height of the economic transformation)—
had declined to less than one in 10 in the period 2003–07, which was a level 
very similar to that reported for Hong Kong. This pattern might be explained 
by the control of institutional anomie provided by the policies of the planned 
transition. The question format used in the survey, however, appeared to 
be designed to manipulate a more positive response and the improvements 
might be more artefact than real. Even if it was the case, it remains that many 
businesses—notably in Shenzhen—felt that crime was in decline, although on 
the whole mainland businesses rated crime and corruption as serious obstacles. 
We conclude by arguing that if the extent of crimes against business in China 
is substantially exceeding that of ordinary households, it has not reached the 
levels experienced in other developing and developed economies, and that a 
planned rather than a laissez-faire transition was instrumental in this outcome. 
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Appendix A.  
World Governance Indicators
The following tables, compiled by the World Bank, list aggregate indicators 
of six dimensions of governance for a selected number of countries. These 
indicators have been constructed using a statistical compilation of responses 
on the quality of governance given by a large number of enterprise, citizen and 
expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries, as reported 
by a variety of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organisations 
and international organisations.
The six governance indicators are measured in units ranging from about –2.5 
to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better governance outcomes. The 
standard errors have the following interpretation: there is roughly a 70 per cent 
chance that the level of governance lies within plus or minus one standard error 
of the point estimate of governance. 
Details on the concepts measured by each indicator, its components and the 
interpretation of the point estimates and standard errors can be found in 
Kaufman, Daniel, Kray, Aart and Mastruzzi, Massimo 2010, The Worldwide 
Governance Indicators: A Summary of Methodology, Data and Analytical Issues. 
World Bank Policy Research, available at <www.govindicators.org> 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix B.  
Review of Business  
Victimisation Surveys
This table has been constructed from data provided in AIC (2004) and the 
authors’ own research. It includes surveys and studies available in English and 
is presented in chronological order.
Survey/citationa Year of data 
collection
Location Crimes surveyedb
Crime against Small 
Business (McDevitt et al . 
1990)
1989 US, Boston Assault, burglary, theft, 
robbery, vandalism
Dutch Commercial Crime 




Netherlands Assault and threats, burglary, 
theft, vandalism and malicious 
damage
Crimes on Industrial 
Estates Study (Johnston 
et al . 1994)
1990 UK, Northern 
England
Assault, burglary, theft, theft 
of and from vehicle, vandalism 
and malicious damage
Safer Cities Small Business 
Crime Surveys (Tilley 
1993)





(Eijken and Meijer 1995)
1990–93 Netherlands Robbery
Ernst & Young Global 







Fraud among large 
corporations




US Assault, burglary, extortion, 
fraud, robbery, theft, 
vandalism (retail sector only)
Crime against Small 
Holiday Accommodation 
Units (Gill et al . 1993)
1992 UK Assault, fraud, theft, 
vandalism and malicious 
damage
Study of Employee Injuries 
and Convenience Store 






1992–96 US Robbery, theft, workplace 
violence
AIC Crimes against 
Business Survey (Walker 
1995)
1993 Australia Bribery, burglary, extortion, 
fraud, robbery, theft of and 
from vehicle, theft, vandalism, 
workplace violence
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Survey/citationa Year of data 
collection
Location Crimes surveyedb




UK Burglary, fraud, robbery, 
theft, vandalism and malicious 
damage (retail sector only)
KPMG Fraud and 







corruption, credit-card fraud, 
theft
Violent Victimisation in 
Retailing Survey (Beck et 
al . 1993)
1993 UK Assault, threats, verbal abuse 
at work (retail sector only)
Commercial Victimisation 
Survey (Shury et al . 2005)
1994, 2002 UK Assault, bribery/extortion, 
burglary, fraud, theft of 
and from vehicle, theft, 
robbery, vandalism (retail and 
manufacturing sectors)
Crimes against Business 
Survey (Aromaa and Lehti 
1994)
1994 Finland Bribery, burglary, extortion, 
fraud, theft of and from 
vehicle, theft, robbery, theft, 
vandalism and malicious 
damage, workplace violence
International Commercial 
Crime Survey (ICCS) (van 









Assault, bribery and 
corruption, burglary, extortion 
and intimidation, fraud, 
robbery, theft of and from 
vehicle, theft, vandalism
CSI/FBI Computer Crime 





US Computer-related crime 
affecting enterprises
Small Business and Crime 
Initiative Study (Wood et 
al . 1997)
1995–96 UK, Leicester Burglary, fraud, robbery, theft, 
vandalism, workplace violence
British Forum of Private 
Business Survey (Gill 
1998)
1996 UK Burglary, fraud, physical 
abuse, robbery, theft, 
vandalism and malicious 
damage, vehicle theft
Crime against Small 
Business in the Midwest 
Survey (Fisher and Looye 
2000)
1996 US, 6 
Midwest 
States
Assault, burglary, fraud, theft, 
vandalism
European Union Survey 
on Living and Working 
Conditions (European 
Foundation for the 
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Survey/citationa Year of data 
collection
Location Crimes surveyedb
Global Fraud Survey 









corruption, financial statement 
fraud committed by employees
International Crime Victims 
Survey (Chappell and Di 
Martino 1999)





Crime against Small 







Burglary, fraud, robbery, theft
Crimes against Business 
Survey (Aromaa 1999)
1997 Estonia Bribery, burglary, extortion, 
fraud, robbery, theft of and 
from vehicle, theft, vandalism, 
workplace violence
Home Office Construction 
Plant Theft Study (Smith 
and Walmsley 1999)
1997 UK Theft 
Retail Crime and Safety 





Burglary, fraud, robbery, theft, 
vandalism, workplace violence
Australian Chamber of 
Manufacturers Survey 
(Alexander 1998)
1998 Australia Fraud, vandalism
British Oil Security 
Syndicate Survey on Petrol 




UK Assault, burglary, credit-card 
fraud, fraud, robbery, theft, 
vandalism
National Business Crime 




Ireland Assault and harassment, 
burglary, credit-card/cheque 
fraud, extortion, fraud, 
robbery, theft, vandalism and 
criminal damage
National Pharmaceutical 
Association Crime Survey 
(NPA 2000)
1998 UK Assault, burglary, vandalism
South Africa National 
Commercial Crime Survey 
(Naudé et al . 1999)
1998 South Africa Bribery, burglary, extortion, 
fraud, robbery, theft of and 
from vehicle, theft, vandalism, 
workplace violence
Crimes against Small 
Business Survey (Perrone 
2000)
1999 Australia Assault and threats, bribery, 
burglary, credit-card fraud, 
extortion, fraud, robbery, theft 
of and from vehicle, theft, 
vandalism
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Survey/citationa Year of data 
collection
Location Crimes surveyedb
International Crime against 
Business Survey (ICBS), 
Central Eastern Europe 










Assault, bribery and 
corruption, burglary, extortion 
and intimidation, fraud, request 
for protection money, robbery, 
theft of and from vehicle, 
theft, vandalism
Retail Theft and Security 
Survey (Grocers’ Review 
2000)
1999 New Zealand Burglary, fraud, theft, 
vandalism (retail)
Scottish Business Crime 
Centre Survey (Burrows et 
al . 1999)
1999 Scotland Assault and threat, burglary, 
fraud, theft, robbery, 
vandalism
Airline Fraud Survey 
(Deloitte 2006)
2000, 2006 Global Fraud, theft (airline industry)







‘Shrinkage’ in large retail 
corporations due to customer 
and employee theft and 
supplier fraud















Accounting fraud, asset 
misappropriation, corruption/
bribery, insider trading, 
IP infringement, money 
laundering
Federation of Small 




UK Assault and threats, burglary, 
credit-card fraud, e-crime, 
fraud, robbery, theft, 
vandalism
KPMG Fraud and 




US Asset misappropriation, 
corruption, credit-card fraud, 
fraud, theft
KPMG Fraud and 
Misconduct Survey (KPMG 
2007)
2003, 2006 Hong Kong Corruption, fraud, Internet-
related fraud, IP theft
British Chambers of 
Commerce (Elliott 2008)
2004, 2008 UK Arson, burglary, e-crime, 
personal injury or violence, 
robbery, theft, vandalism 
Organized Retail Crime 




US Fraud and theft as part of 
criminal enterprise activities 
(retail sector)
Port Moresby Business 
Crime Victimisation Survey 
(PNG Justice Advisory 
Group 2005)
2005 PNG, Port 
Moresby
Assault, bribery and 
corruption, burglary, extortion 
and intimidation, fraud, 
robbery, theft of and from 
vehicle, theft, vandalism
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Survey/citationa Year of data 
collection
Location Crimes surveyedb
Telecom Fraud Survey 
(Communications Fraud 
Control Association 2009)
2005, 2008 Global Fraud in telecommunication 
industry
International Crime and 
Corruption Survey (Alvazzi 
del Frate 2007)
2006 Cape Verde Assault and threats, bribery 
and corruption, burglary, 
extortion and intimidation, 
fraud, robbery, theft of and 
from vehicle, theft, vandalism
The Australian Business 
Assessment of Computer 
Users Security (ABACUS) 
Survey (Richards 2009)
2006–07 Australia Computer security incidents
International Crime and 
Corruption Business 
Survey (Nigerian National 
Bureau of Statistics 2009, 
2010)
2007 Nigeria Assault and threats, bribery 
and corruption, burglary, 
extortion and intimidation, 
fraud, robbery, theft of and 
from vehicle, theft, vandalism





Global Bribery and corruption, fraud, 
IP theft and counterfeiting, 
money laundering, theft
Study of Encounters of 
Enterprises with Crime 
(Ahven et al . 2007)
2007 Estonia Bribery and corruption, 
burglary, fraud, robbery, theft, 
vandalism, workplace violence
Notes: a The citation for surveys that have been repeated is that of the most recent sweep; b unless otherwise 
specified, the categories theft and fraud include those acts perpetrated by employees, customers and any 
other person within or outside the company.
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Appendix D.  
Hong Kong ICBS Pilot Survey, 2003
The Hong Kong ICBS Pilot Survey was conducted in July 2003 and referred to 
victimisation that occurred from 1 January to 31 December 2002. The response 
rate was 28 per cent, producing a sample of 612 businesses. More than three-
quarters of the respondents (78.4 per cent) were the owners or managers/
executives of the company. Retail was the major business sector represented 
in the sample (22.7 per cent, including non-food, 15.2 per cent, and food, 
7.5 per cent), followed by manufacturing (19.1 per cent), services, trading, 
restaurants and hotels (16.5 per cent), and wholesaling/distribution (13.1 per 
cent). Community, social and personal services (4.7 per cent), construction (3.1 
per cent) and transport, storage and communication (2.3 per cent) contributed 
smaller proportions to the sample. More than 80 per cent was involved in a 
single sector of activity, but 29 per cent had premises other than those surveyed. 
Foreign investments were present in 10 per cent of the businesses surveyed, and 
35 per cent were conducting import/export. 
Not surprisingly, it was difficult to obtain data on the businesses’ turnover, 
with only 45 per cent answering the question. The majority of respondents 
(66.3 per cent), however, came from their company’s management stratum, 
including business owners, managing directors, chief executives, and finance 
and production directors, and another 7.5 per cent was responsible for the 
company’s security. We can therefore assume that our respondents had good 
knowledge of crime and security issues in their company. Most of the businesses 
surveyed were very small, with three-quarters employing 10 or less employees. 
Only 2.2 per cent had more than 250 employees.
Results of the Hong Kong Pilot
Table D. 1 presents the findings of the Hong Kong pilot in relation to victimisation 
and reporting to police. For conventional crime, 11.8 per cent of surveyed 
businesses reported at least one victimisation incident in the past year. Theft 
by customers and theft by outsiders were the most commonly mentioned crimes 
(5.7 per cent and 5.1 per cent respectively), followed by burglary, cited by 4.7 
per cent of respondents. Although the sample was small, the pilot survey found 
a significantly higher level of crime than previous household victimisation 
surveys in Hong Kong (for example, Census and Statistics Department, Hong 
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Kong 1999). The proportion of respondents who were victimised by conventional 
crimes, however, appeared lower than that reported in the ICBS conducted in 
Central Eastern European capital cities in 2000 (Alvazzi del Frate 2004). 
Significant levels of non-conventional crimes, such as fraud, cyber crime, 
bribery and extortion, were identified. Rates of bribery (4.6 per cent) and 
extortion (4.6 per cent) in the Hong Kong pilot were about half those recorded in 
the Central Eastern Europe ICBS (9 per cent offered bribes, 19 per cent asked for 
bribes, and 9 per cent experienced extortion). The level of fraud by outsiders 
was particularly high (16.7 per cent), although not as high as that reported in 
Eastern European countries (26 per cent). Fraud by outsiders was most prevalent 
in the restaurant/hotel/transport sector (28.8 per cent), followed by wholesale 
(23.8 per cent) and retail (23 per cent), and manufacturing (17.1 per cent).
The rates of reporting to police varied by types of offences, but were consistently 
higher for conventional crimes than non-conventional crimes. Of all businesses 
that reported the conventional or non-conventional victimisation to the police, 
18.4 per cent did so out of a sense of duty (‘crimes should be reported’) and/
or to recover property or get compensation from the offender. Sixteen per cent 
reported to stop the crime from happening again. One-third of respondents who 
did not report the incident to the police said it was because it was not serious 
enough. About 15 per cent did not report because of lack of evidence, and 
a similar proportion thought the police would not do anything about it. On 
average, about two-thirds of those who reported (64 per cent) were satisfied 
with the way in which the police dealt with their complaint, although the 
rate of satisfaction with the police response was only 48 per cent for fraud by 
outsiders.
For the respondents’ perception of potential obstacles to doing good business 
in Hong Kong, the survey identified crime, corruption and lack of consultation 
with the business sector as moderate to strong obstacles (Table 4.2). Concern 
about corruption and crime was higher than concern about conventional 
‘impediments’ to business such as tax regimes, import/export controls, and 
labour, safety and environmental regulations, which was an unexpected finding 
given Hong Kong’s well-regarded and efficient anti-corruption and enforcement 
capabilities. 
The majority of Hong Kong business respondents believed that bribery/
corruption and extortion were not common practices in their line of business. 
Most (88.9 per cent) perceived that crime problems had remained stable over 
the past two to three years, and only 6.4 per cent believed they had increased. 
About one in five businesses surveyed was involved in some type of collective 
crime-prevention initiative.
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Table D.1 Business Victimisation in Hong Kong, 2002: Victimisation by 










Conventional crimes 11.8 72 -
Theft by customers 5 .7 35 40
Theft by outsiders 5 .1 31 45
Burglary 4 .7 29 93
Vandalism 2 .0 12 75
Theft by employees 1 .1 7 14
Vehicle theft 0 .5 3 100
Theft from vehicle 0 .3 2 50
Assault 0 .3 2 50
Robbery 0 .2 1 100
Non-conventional crimes    
Fraud by outsiders 16 .7 102 24
Cyber crimea 7 .7 47 4
Bribery 4 .6 28 7
Extortion/intimidation 4 .6 28 46
Fraud by employees 3 .8 23 17
IP infringementa 3 .4 21 n .a .
Credit card-related fraud by outsidersa 2 .5 15 n .a .
Credit card-related fraud by employeesa 0 .2 1 0
Other crimes 2 .1 13 61
 
Notes: a New types of crime surveyed in Hong Kong for the first time; cyber crime includes attacks on 
computers through virus or malware, online fraud, software copyright violation, and unwanted (spam) or 
lewd communication.
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Table D.2 Obstacles to Doing Business in Hong Kong, 2002: Proportion of 










Corruption 27 .3 27 .8 55 .1
Crime and insecurity 36 .9 17 .7 54 .6
Lack of consultation with business 
sector 38 .2 15 .7 53 .9
Changes in law 35 .0 13 .9 48 .9
Labour regulations 34 .3 10 .5 44 .8
Tax regulations 29 .4 13 .4 42 .8
Safety & environmental regulations 31 .0 7 .2 38 .7
Import/export regulations 27 .5 8 .2 35 .7
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Appendix E.  
Schematic Overview of the ICBS 
China Questionnaire, 2004–05 



























































































































Burglary ✓  – ✓  –  –  –  – – 
Vandalism ✓ – ✓ – – – – –
Theft of vehicle ✓ – ✓ – – – – –
Theft from vehicle ✓ – ✓ – – – – –
Theft by customers ✓ – ✓ – – – – –
Theft by employees ✓ – ✓ – – – – –
Theft by outsiders ✓ – – – – – – –
Robbery ✓ – – – – – – –
Assault ✓ – – – – – – –
Intellectual property 
infringement ✓ – – – – – – –
Other (to be 
specified) ✓ – – – – – – –
Most serious of 
above incidents – – ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Fraud by 
employees ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Credit-card fraud 
by employees ✓ ✓ – – – – – –
Fraud by outsiders ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Bribery ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ –





✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  –
What happened?
Methods used in committing offences
Any weapons?
Who was involved in committing offences?
Cyber crime ✓ – ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Computer usage
What kind of cyber crime?
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Table E.2 Respondent Attitudes on Crime Prevention and Police, Obstacles 
to Doing Business, and Description of Surveyed Business
Action against crime and 
corruption
Any cooperative action in the area with other businesses
Would you be interested in such action
Contact with local council about crime prevention
Contact with local police about crime prevention
Satisfaction with police How satisfied with how police deal with crime facing 
businesses
If dissatisfied, why
Retail business Types of goods sold
Obstacles to doing business
Within Hong Kong Export/import regulations
Labour regulations
Tax regulations
Safety and environmental regulations
Changes in laws and regulations
Lack of consultation with business sector
Crime and insecurity
Corruption
Within China Export/import regulations
Labour regulations
Tax regulations
Safety and environmental regulations
Changes in laws and regulations
Lack of consultation with business sector
Crime and insecurity
Corruption
Description of the surveyed business
Type and size of business Business sector
Main activity of company
How many employees
Annual turnover
Location China only/Hong Kong only/both China and Hong Kong 
Geographical location (town, etc .)
Business location (shopping centre, industrial estate, etc .)
Part of a chain of shops
Note: Design of the table adapted from van Dijk et al. (2007:195–6).
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Appendix F.  
ICBS China Questionnaire,  
2004–05: Hong Kong version1
Good morning/afternoon/evening. I am an Interviewer of the University of Hong 
Kong. We are conducting a survey about the problem of crime. Your company 
has been selected at random from the telephone directory to participate in the 
survey.
The survey is part of an international project, which is being done in four 
Chinese cities. The aim of the research is to get information about the patterns 
of crime against businesses, in order to assess how businesses can best avoid 
being victims of crime. Your answers will, of course, be treated confidentially 
and anonymously.
I need to address a few questions to the manager responsible for these premises. 
Can you please ask him/her whether he/she is willing to come to the phone? 
INT.: IF MANAGER AVAILABLE: Go to question 15 and continue with 15A
INT.: IF MANAGER NOT AVAILABLE: Can you tell me at what time I have the 
best chance of getting him/her on the phone? < NOTE TIME FOR CALLBACK >
INT.: IF MANAGER NOT AVAILABLE ANY TIME: Could you please put me in 
contact with the best person/a colleague to answer these sorts of questions? < 
Go to question 15 and continue with 15A >
NOTE: 1) MANAGER
 2) COLLEAGUE
15. CONTACT WITH RESPONDENT < INT.: If person other than first 
contact, repeat introduction >
16. SEX OF RESPONDENT < INT.: Note sex of respondent without asking >
1) Male 
2) Female 
1 We present the Hong Kong version because it contains extra questions to Hong Kong businesses about 
their experiences (for those with premises in the mainland) and their perceptions of doing business in the 
mainland.
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SECTION 1A: BACKGROUND
I’d like to start by asking you some questions about your company. I must 
emphasise that all the questions in the survey refer to your company’s activities 
at and from these business premises.
101. In which business sector is your company now operating at your present 
premise?








7) Financial service (eg., banking)
8) Professional service (eg., medical profession)
9) Other, namely (SPECIFY)_________
10) Refusal
103. How many paid employees—both full-time and part-time—work at or 
from these premises at present, including yourself? 
<INT.: IF RESPONDENT DOES NOT KNOW EXACT NUMBER, ASK FOR AN 
ESTIMATE>
1) 1 employee 11) 11–19 employees
2) 2 employees 12) 20–49 employees
3) 3 employees 13) 50–99 employees
4) 4 employees 14) 100–250 employees
5) 5 employees 15) 251–500 employees
6) 6 employees 16) 500–750 employees
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7) 7 employees 17) 751–1000 employees
8) 8 employees 18) more than 1000 employees
9) 9 employees 19) don’t know
10) 10 employees 20) refused
104. What is your position in the company?
1) Managing director, chief executive, owner





7) Other, namely…(SPECIFY) __________________________
105. What is the approximate annual turnover of your establishment? 
_______________________________
106. Are these premises located…<INT.: READ OUT>
1) In a town or city centre
2) In a built-up area outside a city centre
3) Countryside
4) Or somewhere else?
5) Don’t know
6) Refusal
107. Are these premises located in: <INT.: MORE THAN ONE RESPONSE 
POSSIBLE>
1)  An industrial estate or business park
2)  An indoor shopping precinct
3)  An outdoor shopping precinct
4)  A main shopping street
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5)  An out-of-town commercial area
6)  A serviced building for small businesses
7)  Or at another location (SPECIFY) ________________
8) Don’t know
9) Refusal
108. Does your company only do business at these premises, or does it have 
other premises? (Multiple options allowed)
1)  Only at these premises
2)  Other premises in Hong Kong
3) Other premises in mainland
4) Refusal
109. Are these premises part of a chain of shops?
1)  Yes
2)  No
3) Don’t know 
4) Refusal
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SECTION 1B: OBSTACLES TO DOING BUSINESS
110. In your opinion to what extent are the below listed representing 













Export/import regulations      
Labour regulations      
Tax regulations      
Safety and environmental 
regulations      
Changes in laws and 
regulations      
Lack of consultation with 
business sector      
Crime and insecurity      
Corruption      
111. In your opinion to what extent are the below listed representing 













Export/import regulations      
Labour regulations      
Tax regulations      
Safety and environmental 
regulations      
Changes in laws and 
regulations      
Lack of consultation with 
business sector      
Crime and insecurity      
Corruption      
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SECTION 2: VICTIMISATION
201. The following questions concern crimes which have occurred at your 
premises, including crimes against employees or crimes against visitors. 
 In general, have crime problems for your company increased, decreased 
or remained the same over the last two to three years?
1) Increased
2) Decreased
3) Remained the same
4) Don’t know
5) Refusal
202. I’d now like to ask you about specific types of offences. I am interested 
only in offences which happened in the last calendar year; that is between 1st 
January and 31st December 2004. 
In 2004, did any crime occur at your premises?
1) Yes
2) No
3) Don’t know 
4) Refusal
<IF ANSWER IS EQUAL TO CODES 2 OR 3, THEN CONTINUE WITH 
QUESTION 301. OR ELSE CONTINUE WITH QUESTION 203>
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203. Which from the following list? <MULTIPLE ANSWER POSSIBLE—
EXCLUDE REFERENCES TO REQUESTS FOR BRIBE/CORRUPTION, FRAUD 
AND INTIMIDATION/EXTORTION>
 1) Yes 2) No 3) DNK 4) Refusal
1) Burglary     
2) Vandalism     
3) Theft of vehicles     
4) Theft from vehicles     
5) Theft by customers     
6) Theft by employees     
7) Theft by outsiders     
8) Robbery     
9) Assault     
10) Intellectual property infringement*     
11) Other (specify_________)     
* illegal copying and counterfeiting, patents/trademarks/copyrights/designs owned by your company have 
been used by others without your permission
204. (The last time) did you or anyone else from the company report the 
incident(s) to the police?
 1) Yes 2) No 3) DNK 4) Refusal
1) Burglary     
2) Vandalism     
3) Theft of vehicles     
4) Theft from vehicles     
5) Theft by customers     
6) Theft by employees     
7) Theft by outsiders     
8) Robbery     
9) Assault     
10) Intellectual property infringement*     
11) Other (specify_________)     
* illegal copying and counterfeiting, patents/trademarks/copyrights/designs owned by your company have 
been used by others without your permission
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205. Taking everything into account, which was the most serious for you 
and your business? <INT.: NOTE ONLY ONE INCIDENT>
1) Burglary
2) Vandalism
3) Theft of vehicles
4) Theft from vehicles
5) Theft by customers
6) Theft by employees
7) Theft by outsiders
8) Robbery
9) Assault
10) Intellectual property infringement
11) Other (specify ____________)
12) Don’t know
13) Refusal
<CHECK AT QUESTION 204 WHETHER <<MOST SERIOUS CRIME>> WAS 
REPORTED TO THE POLICE. IF REPORTED, CONTINUE WITH QUESTION 
206—IF NOT REPORTED GO TO QUESTION 209>
206. (If reported) Why did your company report it? < MULTIPLE RESPONSE >
1) To recover property
2) For insurance reasons
3) Crimes should be reported/serious event
4) Wanted offender to be caught/punished
5) To stop it happening again
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Continue with question 207




3) Don’t know 
4) Refusal
If answer is equal to code 1 or to code 4, then continue with question 210
If answer equal to code 2 then continue with question 208
208. For what reasons were you dissatisfied? You can give more than one 
reason.
 < INT.: MULTIPLE ANSWERS ALLOWED >
1) Didn’t do enough
2) Were not interested
3) Didn’t find or apprehend the offender
4) Didn’t recover property (goods)
5) Didn’t keep us properly informed
6) Didn’t treat us correctly/were impolite
7) Were slow to arrive
8) Other reasons 
9) Don’t know
10) Refusal
Continue with question 210
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209. (If not reported) What were the main reasons for not reporting such 
incident to the police? < INT.: MULTICODING ALLOWED >
1) Not worth reporting, not serious enough
2) Police wouldn’t have done anything/wouldn’t have been 
  interested
3) Police wouldn’t have been able to do anything/slight chance of 
  success
4) Involving the police was not appropriate/it was an internal 
  matter
5) Fear of reprisals
6) Fear of negative publicity
7) Didn’t bother because no insurance claim was involved
8) Lack of time/too much trouble
9) Not company policy
10) Lack of proof/evidence/witnesses
11) Other reason, namely…(SPECIFY__________)
12) Don’t know
13) Refused to answer
Continue with question 210
210. What was the total value of any damage caused by these incidents, at 
these premises in 2004? For instance, were there any costs due to thefts, broken 
windows or other damages?
Please exclude money recovered from the insurance company.
If you don’t know exactly, please estimate as exactly as possible.
< INT.: WRITE DOWN AMOUNT IN LOCAL CURRENCY, WITHOUT 
ANY POINTS OR COMMAS > 
MAXIMUM = …
DON’T WANT TO SAY = 8888888 (7x8) 
DON’T KNOW = 9999999 (7x9)
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Continue with question 211
211. Are you insured against loss or damage to the contents (including goods, 
equipment, etc.) of the premises caused by crime?
1) Yes
2) No
3) Don’t know 
4) Refusal
SECTION 3: FRAUD BY EMPLOYEES
301. In 2004 was your company a victim of fraud committed by any 
EMPLOYEE based at these premises? That is, did anyone, while working for 
your company cheat the company in terms of diverting funds, goods or services 





302. How many incidents of fraud by EMPLOYEES based at these premises 
occurred in 1992?
< INT.: A SERIES OF SIMILAR INCIDENTS OF FRAUD COMMITTED 
BY THE SAME PERSON OR GROUP OF PEOPLE COUNTS AS ONE 
INCIDENT. > If you don’t know exactly, please estimate as exactly as 
possible. 
1) Less than 5 times
2) Between 5 and 10 times
3) Between 10 and 20
4) More than 20
5) Don’t want to say 
6) Don’t know = 9999
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303. What was the total value of the incidents of fraud by employees which 
occurred in 1998? If you don’t know exactly, please estimate as exactly as 
possible.
< INT.: WRITE DOWN AMOUNT IN LOCAL CURRENCY, WITHOUT 
ANY POINTS OR COMMAS >
DON’T WANT TO SAY = 8888888 (7x8) 
DON’T KNOW = 9999999 (7x9)
304. Do you know whether all incidents were reported (this incident was 
reported to the police), most incidents, just some incidents or none were 
reported to the police?
1) All (yes, the incident was reported)
2) Most
3) Some
4) None (no, the incident was not reported)
5) Don’t know
6) Refusal
305. (If reported) Why did your company report it? < MULTIPLE RESPONSE >
1) To recover property
2) For insurance reasons
3) Crimes should be reported/serious event
4) Wanted offender to be caught/punished
5) To stop it happening again
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307. For what reasons were you dissatisfied? You can give more than one 
reason.
 < INT.: MULTIPLE ANSWERS ALLOWED >
1) Didn’t do enough
2) Were not interested
3) Didn’t find or apprehend the offender
4) Didn’t recover property (goods)
5) Didn’t keep us properly informed
6) Didn’t treat us correctly/were impolite
7) Were slow to arrive
8) Other reasons 
9) Don’t know
10) Refusal
308. What were the main reasons for not reporting such incident to the 
police? 
< INT.: MULTICODING ALLOWED >
1) Not worth reporting, not serious enough
2) Police wouldn’t have done anything/wouldn’t have been 
  interested
3) Police wouldn’t have been able to do anything/slight chance of 
  success
4) Involving the police was not appropriate/it was an internal 
  matter
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5) Fear of reprisals
6) Fear of negative publicity
7) Didn’t bother because no insurance claim was involved
8) Lack of time/too much trouble
9) Not company policy
10) Lack of proof/evidence/witnesses
11) Other reason, namely…(SPECIFY)
12) Don’t know
13) Refused to answer
309. Apart from the incidents already covered, we want to ask about any 
fraud by employees using corporate payment/credit card.
In 2004, was your company a victim of corporate payment/credit-card fraud 





310. How many incidents of your employees using corporate payment card/
credit card for things for their personal purpose without proper approval 
occurred in 2004? A series of similar incidents of fraud committed by the same 
person or group of people counts as one incident. If you don’t know exactly, 
please estimate.
1) Less than 5 times
2) Between 5 and 10 times
3) Between 10 and 20
4) More than 20
5) Don’t want to say 
6) Don’t know = 9999
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FRAUD BY OUTSIDERS
401. In 2004 was your company at these premises the victim of fraud 





402. How many incidents of fraud by OUTSIDERS, including customers, 
suppliers and distributors, occurred at these premises in 2004? If you don’t 
know exactly, please estimate as exactly as possible. 
1) Less than 5 times
2) Between 5 and 10 times
3) Between 10 and 20
4) More than 20
5) Don’t want to say 
6) Don’t know = 9999
403. What was the total value of the incidents of fraud by OUTSIDERS in 
2004? If you don’t know exactly, please estimate as exactly as possible.
< INT.: WRITE DOWN AMOUNT IN LOCAL CURRENCY, WITHOUT 
ANY POINTS OR COMMAS > 
MAXIMUM = … 
DON’T WANT TO SAY = 8888888 (7x8) 
DON’T KNOW = 9999999 (7x9)
404. Do you know whether all incidents were reported (this incident was 
reported to the police), most incidents, just some incidents or none were 
reported to the police?
1) All (yes, the incident was reported)
2) Most
3) Some
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4) None (no, the incident was not reported)
5) Don’t know
6) Refusal
405. (If reported) Why did your company report it? < MULTIPLE RESPONSE >
1) To recover property
2) For insurance reasons
3) Crimes should be reported/serious event
4) Wanted offender to be caught/punished
5) To stop it happening again










407. For what reasons were you dissatisfied? You can give more than one 
reason.
< INT.: MULTIPLE ANSWERS ALLOWED >
1) Didn’t do enough
2) Were not interested
3) Didn’t find or apprehend the offender
4) Didn’t recover property (goods)
5) Didn’t keep us properly informed
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6) Didn’t treat us correctly/were impolite
7) Were slow to arrive
8) Other reasons 
9) Don’t know
10) Refusal
408. What were the main reasons for not reporting such incident to the 
police? 
< INT.: MULTICODING ALLOWED >
1) Not worth reporting, not serious enough
2) Police wouldn’t have done anything/wouldn’t have been 
interested
3) Police wouldn’t have been able to do anything/slight chance of 
success
4) Involving the police was not appropriate/it was an internal 
matter
5) Fear of reprisals
6) Fear of negative publicity
7) Didn’t bother because no insurance claim was involved
8) Lack of time/too much trouble
9) Not company policy
10) Lack of proof/evidence/witnesses
11) Other reason, namely…(SPECIFY)
12) Don’t know
13) Refused to answer
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BRIBERY
501. I would now like to ask you about bribery. By bribery I mean
•	 bribing managers or employees from your company
•	 being asked or expected to pay a bribe to government officials or politicians
•	 being asked or expected to pay a bribe to managers or employees of other 
companies.
Do you believe such practices are common in your line of business? Are they…
1) Extremely common
2) Fairly common
3) Not very common
4) Not common at all
5) Don’t know
6) Refusal
502. Did anyone try to bribe you, other managers, your employees, or obtain 




4) Refused to answer
503. (IF YES): Was it < INT.: READ OUT, MORE ANSWERS ALLOWED >
1) Legislative Council Members
2) Government Officials




7) Officials in courts
8) Managers or employees from other companies




504. How many incidents occurred in 2004? If you don’t know exactly, 
please estimate as exactly as possible. 
1) Less than 5 times
2) Between 5 and 10 times
3) Between 10 and 20
4) More than 20
5) Don’t want to say 
6) Don’t know = 9999
(INT.: ONCE A MONTH = code 3)
(INT.: ONCE A WEEK = code 4)
505. Do you know whether all incidents were reported (this incident was 
reported), most incidents, just some incidents or none were reported to the 
Public Security Bureau or Anti-Corruption Agency?
1) All (yes, the incident was reported)
2) Most
3) Some
4) None (no, the incident was not reported)
5) Don’t know
6) Refusal
506. (If reported) Why did your company report it? < MULTIPLE RESPONSE >
1) To recover property
2) For insurance reasons
3) Crimes should be reported/serious event
4) Wanted offender to be caught/punished
5) To stop it happening again
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507. On the whole, were you satisfied with the way the Public Security 
Bureau or Anti-Corruption Agency dealt with your report?
1) Yes (satisfied)
2) No (dissatisfied)
3) Don’t know 
4) Refusal
508. For what reasons were you dissatisfied? You can give more than one 
reason.
< INT.: MULTIPLE ANSWERS ALLOWED >
1) Didn’t do enough
2) Were not interested
3) Didn’t find or apprehend the offender
4) Didn’t recover property (goods)
5) Didn’t keep us properly informed
6) Didn’t treat us correctly/were impolite
7) Were slow to arrive
8) Other reasons 
9) Don’t know
10) Refusal
509. What were the main reasons for not reporting such incident to the 
Public Security Bureau or Anti-Corruption Agency? < INT.: MULTICODING 
ALLOWED >
1) Not worth reporting, not serious enough
2) Police wouldn’t have done anything/wouldn’t have been 
  interested
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3) Police wouldn’t have been able to do anything/slight chance of 
  success
4) Involving the police was not appropriate/it was an internal 
  matter
5) Fear of reprisals
6) Fear of negative publicity
7) Didn’t bother because no insurance claim was involved
8) Lack of time/too much trouble
9) Not company policy
10) Lack of proof/evidence/witnesses
11) Other reason, namely…(SPECIFY)
12) Don’t know
13) Refused to answer
INTIMIDATION/EXTORTION/PROTECTION MONEY
601. I would now like to ask you about intimidation/extortion. By this I 
mean
•	 extorting money from your company
•	 threatening and intimidating managers and/or employees
•	 threatening product contamination.
Do you believe such practices are common in your line of business? Are they…
1) Very common
2) Fairly common
3) Not very common
4) Not common at all
5) < DO NOT READ: Don’t know >
6) Refusal
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602. Did anyone try to intimidate you, other managers, your employees, or 




4) Refused to answer
603. IF YES: Did that include…
< INT.: READ OUT, MORE ANSWERS ALLOWED >
1) Extorting money from your company
2) Threatening and intimidating managers and/or employees
3) Threatening product contamination
4) Other (SPECIFY)
5) Refused to answer
What methods were used in committing the offences? < MULTIPLE ANSWERS 
ALLOWED >
1) Walk-in into the premises





7) Refused to answer




4) Yes, other weapons
Appendix F . ICBS China Questionnaire, 2004-05: Hong Kong version
263
5) No weapons used
6) Don’t know
7) Refused to answer
606. How many incidents occurred in 2004? If you don’t know exactly, 
please estimate as exactly as possible.
1) Less than 5 times
2) Between 5 and 10 times
3) Between 10 and 20
4) More than 20
5) Don’t want to say 
6) Don’t know = 9999
< INT.: ONCE A MONTH = code 3)
ONCE A WEEK = code 4) >
607. (In your opinion) Who was involved in committing such offences? 
< MULTIPLE RESPONSE POSSIBLE >
1) Local organised crime groups





608. Do you know whether all incidents were reported (this incident was 
reported to the police), most incidents, just some incidents or none were 
reported to the police?
1) All (yes, the incident was reported)
2) Most
3) Some
4) None (no, the incident was not reported)




609. (If reported) Why did your company report it? < MULTIPLE RESPONSE >
1) To recover property
2) For insurance reasons
3) Crimes should be reported/serious event
4) Wanted offender to be caught/punished
5) To stop it happening again










611. For what reasons were you dissatisfied? You can give more than one 
reason. < INT.: MULTIPLE ANSWERS ALLOWED >
1) Didn’t do enough
2) Were not interested
3) Didn’t find or apprehend the offender
4) Didn’t recover property (goods)
5) Didn’t keep us properly informed
6) Didn’t treat us correctly/were impolite
7) Were slow to arrive
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8) Other reasons 
9) Don’t know
10) Refusal
612. What were the main reasons for not reporting such incident to the 
police? < INT.: MULTICODING ALLOWED >
1) Not worth reporting, not serious enough
2) Police wouldn’t have done anything/wouldn’t have been 
interested
3) Police wouldn’t have been able to do anything/slight chance of 
success
4) Involving the police was not appropriate/it was an internal 
matter
5) Fear of reprisals
6) Fear of negative publicity
7) Didn’t bother because no insurance claim was involved
8) Lack of time/too much trouble
9) Not company policy
10) Lack of proof/evidence/witnesses
11) Other reason, namely…(SPECIFY)
12) Don’t know
13) Refused to answer
CYBER CRIME
Now, about YOUR use of a computer. Please include all computers, laptop, or 
access to WebTV at home, work, or school for BUSINESS USE or for operating 
a home business.
701. During the last 12 months, have YOU used a computer, laptop or WebTV 
for the following purposes? < INT.: MULTICODING ALLOWED >
1) Business use at home
2) Business use at work
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3) Business use at school, libraries, cyber café, etc.
4) None
5) Refusal
How many computers? ___________________________
702. Do(es) the computer(s) you use have software such as a firewall and anti-
virus program?
1) Yes, firewall










704. Have you experienced any of the following COMPUTER-RELATED 
incidents in the last 12 months?
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705. Any attack on your computer from a source such as a virus, spyware, 
hacker, malware, etc. 













707. Unrequested lewd or obscene messages, communications, or image 
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709. Something else that you consider a computer-related crime?
Please specify _________________________________






711. How much money did you lose as a result of the incident?
Enter amount _________________________________
712. Did you report the incident you just mentioned? < INT.: MULTICODING 
ALLOWED >
1) A law enforcement agency
2) An Internet service provider
3) A web site administrator
4) Someone else ______________
5) Not reported 
6) Refusal
713. Do you know whether all incidents were reported (this incident was 
reported), most incidents, just some incidents or none were reported to the 
police or other agency?
1) All (yes, the incident was reported)
2) Most
3) Some
4) None (no, the incident was not reported)
5) Don’t know
6) Refusal
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714. (If reported) Why did your company report it? < MULTIPLE RESPONSE >
1) To recover property
2) For insurance reasons
3) Crimes should be reported/serious event
4) Wanted offender to be caught/punished
5) To stop it happening again




715. On the whole, were you satisfied with the way the police or other agency 
dealt with your report?
1) Yes (satisfied)
2) No (dissatisfied)
3) Don’t know 
4) Refusal
716. For what reasons were you dissatisfied? You can give more than one 
reason. < INT.: MULTIPLE ANSWERS ALLOWED >
1) Didn’t do enough
2) Were not interested
3) Didn’t find or apprehend the offender
4) Didn’t recover property (goods)
5) Didn’t keep us properly informed
6) Didn’t treat us correctly/were impolite
7) Were slow to arrive
8) Other reasons 
9) Don’t know
10) Refusal
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717. What were the main reasons for not reporting such incident to the 
police? < INT.: MULTICODING ALLOWED >
1) Not worth reporting, not serious enough
2) Police wouldn’t have done anything/wouldn’t have been interested
3) Police wouldn’t have been able to do anything/slight chance of success
4) Involving the police was not appropriate/it was an internal matter
5) Fear of reprisals
6) Fear of negative publicity
7) Didn’t bother because no insurance claim was involved
8) Lack of time/too much trouble
9) Not company policy
10) Lack of proof/evidence/witnesses
11) Other reason, namely…(SPECIFY)
12) Don’t know 
13) Refusal
MISCELLANEOUS
801. To your knowledge, have businesses in this area taken any kind of 
cooperative action against crime and corruption or extortion, such as sharing 
security patrols, setting up a business watch or ring, phone alarm system, etc.?
1) Yes
2) No
3) Don’t know 
4) Refusal
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802. Would you be interested in participating in cooperative action against 
crime, corruption and extortion in your area such as sharing security patrols, or 
setting up a business watch or ring, phone alarm system, etc.?
1) Yes, interested
2) No, not interested
3) Don’t know 
4) Refusal
803. Did your business have any contact with the local council about crime 
or corruption problems or crime prevention in 2004?
1) Yes
2) No
3) Don’t know 
4) Refusal
804. Apart from any crimes you may have reported to the police in 2004, 
did your business have any contact with the police about crime or corruption 
problems or crime prevention in 2004?
1) Yes
2) No
3) Don’t know 
4) Refusal
805. In general, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way the police 
deal with the crime problems facing business in this area? Are you…
1) Very satisfied
2) Fairly satisfied
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806. Why are you dissatisfied with the way the police deal with the crime 
problems facing business in this area? < INT.: DO NOT READ, MORE ANSWERS 
ALLOWED >
1) Police not seen in this area
2) Police involved in corruption
3) Take too long to react to incidents
4) Do not react to alarms going off
5) Do not catch or prosecute offenders
6) Give little or no information back on reported crimes
7) No day-to-day contact with police
8) Not interested in reported crimes





Appendix G.  
Victimisation by Common Crime by 
City, Business Sector and Size
Table G.1 Conventional Crime: Rates of victimisation by city and by sector 










Manufacturing 5 .9 5 .7 8 .3 5 .5
Retail 13 .5** 6 .9 5 .1 4 .8
Wholesale/trading 5 .6 3 .7 2 .4 3 .6
Financial & professional 
services 7 .0 4 .8 10 .1 5 .9
Other sectors 7 .1 0 .0 7 .7 2 .8
Burglary
Manufacturing 2 .6 4 .1 5 .8 4 .3
Retail 4 .0 6 .2 3 .2 4 .0
Wholesale/trading 2 .7 2 .5 0 .8 1 .3
Financial & professional 
services 3 .4 2 .6 6 .9 5 .0
Other sectors 2 .1 0 .0 2 .6 2 .8
Vandalism 
Manufacturing 1 .2 1 .8 2 .3 2 .5
Retail 1 .6 2 .8 3 .2 2 .2
Wholesale/trading 1 .5 0 .6 0 .0 2 .2
Financial & professional 
services 1 .4 0 .9 5 .3* 1 .8
Other sectors 1 .4 0 .0 1 .9 0 .0
Vehicle-related crimea
Manufacturing 0 .9 0 .8 1 .4 2 .2
Retail 0 .4 1 .4 1 .3 1 .5
Wholesale/trading 0 .6 0 .6 0 .0 0 .9
Financial & professional 
services 0 .7 2 .2 2 .7 0 .9
Other sectors 1 .4 0 .0 1 .9 0 .0











Manufacturing 2 .1 1 .6 3 .5 1 .8
Retail 2 .2 2 .8 3 .2 0 .7
Wholesale/trading 0 .6 1 .2 0 .0 0 .4
Financial & professional 
services 1 .7 1 .3 3 .2 1 .4
Other sectors 1 .4 0 .0 3 .2 0 .0
Theft by customers 
Manufacturing 0 .5 0 .6 0 .6 1 .5
Retail 9 .2*** 3 .4** 0 .0 1 .8
Wholesale/trading 0 .6 0 .6 0 .0 0 .0
Financial & professional 
services 1 .2 0 .9 1 .6 1 .8
Other sectors 0 .7 1 .2 0 .6 0 .0
Theft by outsiders
Manufacturing 2 .6 2 .0 4 .8 3 .7
Retail 3 .6** 5 .5* 3 .8 4 .0
Wholesale/trading 1 .2 1 .9 0 .8 2 .7
Financial & professional 
services 1 .9 3 .5 7 .4* 4 .1
Other sectors 1 .4 0 .0 2 .6 2 .8
Violent crimeb
Manufacturing 0 .9 0 .6 2 .9 0 .6
Retail 1 .0 0 .0 1 .3 0 .7
Wholesale/trading 0 .6 0 .0 0 .8 1 .8
Financial & professional 
services 0 .5 0 .0 3 .7 1 .4
Other sectors 1 .4 0 .0 3 .8 0 .0
 
* p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001 
Notes: a Theft of vehicle and theft from vehicle; b robbery and assault.
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Small 1–10 7 .3 4 .8 5 .9 4 .1
Medium 11–49 9 .7 4 .9 5 .1 4 .9
Medium large 50–250 15 .3* 4 .2 11 .0** 5 .6
Large 250+ 36 .8*** 10 .2** 8 .2 9 .5*
Burglary 
Small 1–10 2 .7 3 .7 4 .1 3 .1
Medium 11–49 3 .9 3 .4 3 .0 3 .9
Medium large 50–250 8 .2** 3 .2 6 .7* 4 .1
Large 250+ 5 .3 6 .3 5 .3 6 .3
Vandalism
Small 1–10 1 .2 1 .6 2 .4 1 .6
Medium 11–49 1 .9 1 .0 1 .6 2 .1
Medium large 50–250 4 .7** 2 .6* 3 .4 2 .6
Large 250+ 0 .0 0 .8 3 .5 4 .2
Vehicle-related crimea     
Small 1–10 0 .6 1 .1 0 .6 1 .3
Medium 11–49 1 .2 1 .2 1 .6 1 .0
Medium large 50–250 1 .2 0 .6 1 .8 2 .0
Large 250+ 5 .3* 2 .3 1 .8 3 .2
Theft by employees
Small 1–10 1 .1 1 .6 0 .0 0 .3
Medium 11–49 3 .5* 1 .0 1 .1 1 .5
Medium large 50–250 2 .4 1 .9 6 .1*** 1 .5
Large 250+ 21 .1*** 3 .1 4 .7 2 .1
Theft by customers
Small 1–10 3 .1 3 .2** 0 .6 1 .3
Medium 11–49 2 .7 1 .0 0 .3 1 .0
Medium large 50–250 2 .4 0 .6 0 .6 1 .0
Large 250+ 10 .5 0 .0 1 .8* 4 .2**
Theft by outsiders
Small 1–10 2 .1 2 .7 4 .7 3 .4
Medium 11–49 3 .1 2 .9 3 .0 3 .3
Medium large 50–250 3 .5 1 .9 6 .4* 4 .1
Large 250+ 10 .5* 4 .7 4 .1 7 .4*











Small 1–10 0 .6 0 .0 1 .8 0 .6
Medium 11–49 1 .2 0 .0 2 .4 1 .0
Medium large 50–250 1 .2 0 .3 4 .6 1 .5
Large 250+ 15 .8*** 1 .6** 1 .8 2 .1
* p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001  
Notes: a Theft of vehicle and theft from vehicle; b robbery and assault.
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Appendix H.  
Victimisation by Non-Conventional 
Crime by City, Business Sector  
and Size 
Table H.1 Non-Conventional Crime: Rates of victimisation by city and by 










Manufacturing 14 .1 10 .8 15 .5 16 .0
Retail 15 .3 11 .0 12 .0 12 .1
Wholesale/trading 14 .5 9 .3 19 .7 20 .9**
Financial & professional services 11 .6 10 .8 16 .0 8 .2
Other sectors 8 .6 8 .6 14 .1 13 .9
Bribery
Manufacturing 5 .2** 6 .3 8 .5 12 .6**
Retail 1 .0 5 .5 7 .0 5 .1
Wholesale/trading 1 .5 4 .9 7 .9 8 .9
Financial & professional services 2 .7 6 .9 10 .6 8 .6
Other sectors 4 .3 11 .1 7 .7 8 .3
Extortion/intimidation
Manufacturing 2 .8 1 .0 3 .1 0 .6
Retail 4 .8* 0 .7 3 .8 1 .1
Wholesale/trading 0 .6 0 .6 1 .6 0 .4
Financial & professional services 3 .4 1 .3 2 .7 3 .6*
Other sectors 3 .6 0 .0 4 .5 0 .0
IP and copyright infringement
Manufacturing 5 .2* 5 .1 7 .9 8 .6
Retail 1 .8 2 .1 † 7 .0 4 .4
Wholesale/trading 2 .7 6 .2 10 .2 6 .7
Financial & professional services 4 .6* 7 .4 13 .8 10 .0
Other sectors 3 .6 12 .3* 8 .3 13 .9
* p < 0.05  **p<0.01
† p < 0.05, rate is significantly lower
Notes: Statistical significance refers to differences between sectors within each city; a includes fraud by 
outsiders, fraud by employees and Internet-related fraud. 
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Table H.2 Non-Conventional Crime: Rates of victimisation by city and by 










Small 1–10 13 .4 7 .0 13 .6 15 .7
Medium 11–49 14 .0 12 .4 16 .4 14 .7
Medium large 50–250 10 .6 9 .1 16 .8 14 .8
Large 250+ 31 .6* 14 .1 12 .3 14 .7
Bribery
Small 1–10 2 .7 4 .3 7 .7 5 .3
Medium 11–49 3 .1 7 .5 7 .8 10 .3
Medium large 50–250 1 .2 5 .8 9 .8 10 .7
Large 250+ 5 .3 10 .2 9 .9 14 .7*
Extortion/intimidation
Small 1–10 2 .6 0 .5 1 .8 1 .6
Medium 11–49 5 .4 1 .2 1 .9 0 .5
Medium large 50–250 3 .5 0 .3 4 .3 1 .5
Large 250+ 10 .5* 1 .6 5 .8* 3 .2
IP and copyright infringement
Small 1–10 3 .1 4 .8 9 .5 4 .1††
Medium 11–49 5 .1 7 .0 7 .3 10 .0*
Medium large 50–250 5 .9 5 .2 10 .4 9 .2
Large 250+ 10 .5 7 .0 11 .1 9 .5
* p < 0.05, rate is significantly higher
†† p < 0.01, rate is significantly lower
Notes: Statistical significance refers to differences between business size within each city; a includes fraud 
by outsiders, fraud by employees and Internet-related fraud.
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